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Each year, Howard University School of Law and the Howard Law Journal pay
tribute to the life and legacy of our former dean, Wiley A. Branton.  What began as
a scholarship award ceremony for the first-year student who completed the year
with the highest grade point average has grown into a day-long program that fo-
cuses on an area of legal significance inspired by Branton’s career as a prominent
civil rights activist and exceptional litigator.  The Symposium is then memorialized
in the Journal’s spring issue following the Symposium.  The expansive nature of
Branton’s work has allowed the Journal to span a wide range of topics throughout
the years, and the Journal is honored to present this issue in honor of the great
Wiley A. Branton.  Past Symposium issues include:
BROWN@50
The Value of the Vote: The 1965 Voting Rights Act and Beyond
“What Is Black?”: Perspectives on Coalition Building
in the Modern Civil Rights Movement
Katrina and the Rule of Law in the Time of Crisis
Thurgood Marshall: His Life, His Work, His Legacy
From Reconstruction to the White House:
The Past and Future of Black Lawyers in America
Health Care Reform and Vulnerable Communities:
Can We Afford It? Can We Afford to Live Without It?
Letter from the Editor-in-Chief
On November 1, 2012, the Howard Law Journal hosted its ninth an-
nual Wiley A. Branton Symposium. Each year, we honor our former Dean
and civil rights pioneer, Wiley A. Branton, by reflecting on what he did
during his lifetime and—in that spirit—by taking up the challenge to ana-
lyze key legal issues of the day.  Our goal is to initiate a dialogue that may
set us on the path to confront those issues, knock them down, and provide
for posterity, just as Branton did.
In this special year, our Symposium theme was Protest & Polariza-
tion: Law and Debate in America 2012. Amid colors of red, white, and
blue, the air in the Moot Court Room was charged with anticipation as we
assessed political unrest in America on the eve of its high stakes presiden-
tial election.  Our speakers and contributing authors led poignant discus-
sions that emphasized economic inequality, the efficacy of modern protest,
and increasingly polarized politics.
The editors of the Howard Law Journal would like to thank the speak-
ers and panelists who led an invigorating discussion that day: Professor
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Associate Dean Lisa Crooms-Robinson, Professor
Joel M. Gora, Professor Mark A. Graber, Professor Lenese C. Herbert,
Washington, D.C. Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, Professor Har-
old A. McDougall, Professor Thomas W. Mitchell, Maryland State Senator
Jamin Raskin, Professor Jeffrey Rosen, Professor Andre L. Smith, Professor
Guy Uriel-Charles, and Professor Timothy Zick.  We’d also like to thank
our gracious sponsors Sidley Austin LLP, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, and
the National Bar Association.
From the live Symposium, we are proud to present the written work of
six of our speakers.  Their works memorialize the exciting discourse that we
collectively began last November.  In our first article, The Coming Consti-
tutional Yo-Yo? Elite Opinion, Polarization, and the Direction of Judicial
Decision Making, Mark A. Graber explores judicial polarization and con-
ducts a critical analysis of judicial theories surrounding elite status, life ten-
ure, and election returns.
Next, our Keynote Speaker, Tomiko Brown-Nagin, gives us Does Pro-
test Work?  Her article distills the lessons that can be learned from critical
moments in protest history, examines whether modern protest movements
have learned and employed those lessons, and prescribes a plan for modern
social engineers to use in developing today’s effective protest strategies.
Joel M. Gora’s Free Speech, Fair Elections and Campaign Finance
Laws: Can They Co-Exist? provides an in-depth discussion about the Citi-
zens United case and campaign finance regulations; in the article, Gora di-
verges with popular opinion and makes a compelling argument as to why
the Supreme Court made the right decision.
Our own Professor Harold A. McDougall then leads us on an explora-
tion of social movements in Social Change Requires Civic Infrastructure.
In the article, he analyzes how movements like Occupy and Arab Spring
affect civil society and how social effects can be made more longstanding
through strategies that emphasize “civic infrastructure.”
Former Howard Law Journal Editor Thomas W. Mitchell then gives
us Growing Inequality and Racial Economic Gaps, which explains how
current forms of protest—including the Occupy Movement—have done
very little to affect change in the growing wealth inequalities and questions
whether any form of modern mass protest can address economic inequality
and poverty.
In Boycotts, Black Nationalism, and Asymmetrical Market Failures
Relating to Race, Professor Andre L. Smith concludes the discussion by
examining the comparative efficacy of boycotts as a black nationalist pro-
ject over traditional public legal responses to racist phenomena.  Smith ulti-
mately proposes the creation of an organization dedicated strictly to the
efficient execution of boycotts for racial justice.
We are pleased to publish three student-written comments.  In Death,
Sperm Heists, and Test Tube Babies: Support for Measures to Prevent So-
cial Security Abuse, Conserve Government Funds, and Protect Families,
our Executive Publications Editor Alyssia J. Bryant provides a unique look
into social security fraud and argues that, to prevent abuse of the Social
Security Act, posthumously conceived children should not be allowed to
receive survivorship benefits unless permitted by statute.
In Fundamental Right or Liberty?: Online Privacy’s Theory for Co-
Existence with Social Media Websites, our Senior Solicitations & Submis-
sions Editor Hakeem Rizk explores social media and privacy by comparing
the current state of American online privacy law to the European Union’s
online privacy directive, particularly in regards to social media outlets.
Senior Staff Editor Lauren Danice Shuman then closes the issue with
Pulling the Trigger: Shooting Down Mandatory Minimum Sentencing for
Victims Who Kill Their Abuser, which addresses the common plight of do-
mestic violence victims turned defendants who too often take unnecessary
plea agreements. She praises the proposed Domestic Violence Survivors
Justice Act as a measure that should be taken to better protect these victims.
This is my final letter as Editor-in-Chief of the Howard Law Journal.
I’ve been humbled and honored to spend the past year in its service.  As our
volume concludes, I’d like to thank our amazing Executive Editorial Board:
Alyssia Bryant, Sharaya Cabansag, Nadine Mompremier, and Roselle Ober-
stein; you ladies have been such an exceptional and dedicated team.  I am
excited to be joined by the world in beholding your passion, your drive, and
your inevitable achievements.  I’d also like to express my deep and sincere
appreciation to the Editorial Board and the rest of the Volume Fifty-Six
staff; thank you for your hard work, your enthusiasm, and many wonderful
memories.
To the new Executive Board, in sending you off to a successful Vol-
ume Fifty-Seven, I’ll refer to an African tradition—which is completely
appropriate seeing as though Howard University, Howard University
School of Law, and, thus, the Howard Law Journal are all founded in the
African tradition.  In that tradition, it is necessary for a person to obtain
permission from an elder before speaking.  As one of the members of Vol-
ume Fifty-Six, I will assume that I’m in the position of the elder as a mem-
ber of the outgoing Executive Editorial Board.  In that position, before you
all “speak” in Volume Fifty-Seven, I could not be more proud to “grant
permission” as a mark of approval and a message of confidence in the next
group; I have no doubt that you will elevate this Journal to a higher level of
excellence.
Finally, I will leave you all with the charge to keep the standard high
and prize the words published on these pages. Ensure that the words you
publish are “beautiful words,” and search until you find them: remember,
“good speech is a hidden as the emerald, but can be found among maids at
the grindstone.” – Instructions of Ptah-Hotep, 3580 bc
To close, on behalf of the Howard Law Journal, I would like to ad-
dress our readers and contributors: you are who we work for, and we will
never forget that you are the pulse of our publication.  From the bottom of
our hearts, thank you.
ANGELA M. PORTER
Editor-in-Chief
2012-2013
The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo?
Elite Opinion, Polarization, and the
Direction of Judicial Decision Making
MARK A. GRABER*
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Students of constitutional law provide two kinds of explanations
for judicial decisions.  Law professors traditionally emphasize the in-
ternal or constitutional law foundations for judicial rulings.  These in-
clude the constitutional text, past precedent, the original
understanding of the persons responsible for constitutional language
and fundamental constitutional values.1  Political scientists more com-
monly focus on the external and institutional foundations for judicial
decisions.  These include life tenure, the structure of partisan composi-
tion, the behavior of those persons responsible for staffing the federal
judiciary, and broader cultural forces.2
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  I am very,
very grateful to everyone at the Howard Law Journal for their editing and forbearance.
1. For one account of the different forms of constitutional arguments, see PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1992).
2. For the variety of institutional and external forces that political scientists claim influence
judicial decision making, see HOWARD GILLMAN ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: VOL-
UME I: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 14-18 (2013).
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Internal and external explanations for judicial decision-making as
much complement as conflict with each other.  Black letter law mat-
ters.3  Scholars have identified various “jurisprudential regimes,” ac-
cepted modes of analysis in particular areas of constitutional law,
which limit the influence of judicial policy preferences and political
pressures on judicial decision-making.4  Howard Gillman, in his ac-
claimed The Constitution Besieged, documents how late nineteenth
century judges who favored laissez-faire sometimes sustained what
they thought were misguided state regulations when such laws could
be justified within the dominant constitutional ethos of the Republi-
can Era, which regarded as constitutional any state law that was de-
signed to promote the public welfare and was based on real
differences between the social class being regulated and the social
class that remained unregulated.5  Judicial values matter as well.  Ju-
risprudential regimes structure but do not compel most judicial deci-
sions. All the Justices in Muller v. Oregon, regardless of their beliefs
about the merits of laws limiting the hours women worked, agreed
that real differences between men and women provided a sufficient
constitutional foundation for such regulations.6  The Justices on the
Fuller Court, however, disputed whether real differences between
bakers and other workers provided a sufficient foundation for laws
limiting the hours that bakers worked.7 Most Americans before the
Civil War acknowledged that Congress could not prohibit slavery
within a state,8 but attitudes about the morality of slavery influenced
constitutional decisions on whether Congress could prohibit slavery in
American territories.9
Scholars have proposed three different theories about what val-
ues influence judicial decision making.  Some theories claim that Jus-
tices with life tenure are better positioned than elected officials to
champion constitutional protections for powerless minorities. Frank
3. For a general discussion on this point, see Mark A. Graber, Looking off the Ball: Consti-
tutional Law and American Politics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS (2010).
4. Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J. Richards, Jurisprudential Regimes and Supreme Court
Decisionmaking: The Lemon Regime and Establishment Clause Cases, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 827
(2003); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Deci-
sion Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 305 (2002).
5. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCH-
NER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 61-62 (1993).
6. See generally Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
7. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
8. See ABRAHAM LINCOLN, FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS—FINAL TEXT, 4 COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 263 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
9. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 529-633 (1856) (McLean, J., dissenting).
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Michelman maintains, “[j]udges perhaps enjoy a situational advantage
over the people at large in listening for voices from the margins.”10  A
second family of theories suggests that Justices are more sensitive to
the concerns of the most fortunate American citizens.  Robert Dahl
thinks, “it would appear, on political grounds, somewhat unrealistic to
suppose that a Court whose members are recruiting in the fashion of
Supreme Court Justices would long hold to norms of Right or Justice
substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite.”11  The third
family of theories emphasizes how judicial values align with those of
most elected officials.  Finley Peter Dunne’s Mr. Dooley articulated
the most famous expression of this view when, commenting on the
Insular Cases,12 he wrote, “no matter whether th’ constitution follows
th’ flag or not, th’ supreme coort follows th’ iliction returns.”13
Elite polarization, conflict extension and electoral volatility con-
found these theories about the values underlying most judicial deci-
sions and the probable direction of judicial decision making.  Claims
that Supreme Court Justices are unlikely to be “substantially at odds
with the rest of the political elite” border on the trivial or absurd dur-
ing periods of elite polarization and conflict extension, when the polit-
ical elite is divided between those persons who hold the most liberal
and those persons who hold the most conservative positions on almost
all constitutional issues of the day. Judicial decisions in these circum-
stances either side with some elites against others or take positions
between the contending elite voices.  Justices when elites are polarized
bitterly dispute what constitutes “listening for voices from the mar-
gins.”  Liberal elites presently claim that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Romer v. Evans striking down a state constitutional amendment
prohibiting any official measure banning discrimination against gays
and lesbians14 protected a powerless minority by preventing the state
of Colorado from “singling out a certain class of citizens for disfa-
vored legal status or general hardships,”15 or so Justice Kennedy
claimed in his majority opinion.  Conservative elites complain that the
decision in Romer sided with “the knights rather than the villeins”16 of
10. Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1537 (1988).
11. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 291 (1957).
12. See generally Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW,
THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006).
13. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1901).
14. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
15. Id. at 633.
16. Id. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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American constitutional politics, or so Justice Scalia claimed in his dis-
sent.  Common claims that the Supreme Court follows the election
returns are unhelpful during periods of electoral volatility and divided
government.  Justices who follow the 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2010 elec-
tions make conservative decisions.  Justices who follow the 2006, 2008,
and 2012 elections make liberal decisions.  Whether Justices who fol-
low all election returns in the twenty-first century should make a mix
of liberal and conservative decisions or more often split the difference
between Republicans and Democrats is unclear.  Common claims that
the Supreme Court is a “majoritarian institution”17 rarely specify
whether the majority in question consists of the voters in the most
recent presidential election,18 voters in the most recent Senate elec-
tion, voters in the most recent House election, voters in the most re-
cent state elections, or American citizens as measured by some public
opinion poll.  Different answers to the “which election” and “when”
questions, for the last several decades, yield very different predictions
about what judicial values will determine the direction of future judi-
cial decision making.
This Article offers a more sophisticated account of elite theory
that incorporates the crucial insights underlying claims that Justices
with life tenure will protect minority rights and claims that the Su-
preme Court follows the election returns.  Justices tend to act on elite
values because Justices are almost always selected from the most af-
fluent and highly educated stratum of Americans.  During times when
American elites support the rights of a particular unpopular minority,
a Supreme Court staffed by elites is likely to be more supportive of
those rights than elected officials more dependent on popular majori-
ties for their office.  Elections have the most impact on judicial deci-
sion making during periods when politically polarized elites dispute
what minorities and minority rights merit constitutional protection.
Put simply, the direction of judicial decision making at a given time
reflects the views of the most affluent and highly educated members
of the dominant national coalition.
The values that animate the elite members of the dominant na-
tional coalition help explain the direction of judicial decision making
for the last eighty years.  During the mid-twentieth century, most Re-
17. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789-
2008, at ix (2009)
18. Assuming, of course, popular majorities and electoral majorities did not differ (similar
qualifications can be made of the other majorities noted in this sentence).
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publican and Democratic elites held more liberal positions on most
constitutional issues than less fortunate and less affluent Democrats or
Republicans.  This elite consensus minimized the impact of partisan
control of the White House and the partisan composition of the Court
on most matters of constitutional law.  Such Republican appointees as
William Brennan and Earl Warren frequently joined such Democratic
appointees as William O. Douglas and Thurgood Marshall in advanc-
ing such causes as racial equality and free speech.  At times, grumbles
about judicial activism emanated from the Democrat Felix Frank-
furter and the Republican John Harlan.  By the turn of the twenty-
first century, that consensus had dissipated.  Most Republican elites
presently take far more conservative positions on most constitutional
issues than the average Republican.  Most Democratic elites take far
more liberal positions on most constitutional issues than the average
Democrat.  One consequence of this elite polarization is that partisan
control of the White House and the partisan composition of the Court
have extraordinary influence on most matters of constitutional law.
At present, the four most liberal members of the Roberts Court are
the four Justices appointed by a Democrat.  The five most conserva-
tive Justices on that Court were appointed by a Republican.  The Su-
preme Court has often made fairly centrist decisions on the
constitutional issues of the day for the past twenty years only because
Justices O’Connor and Justice Kennedy more resemble a common
type of Republican party elite that roamed the political jungles during
the 1980s but is now largely extinct.  Should elites remain polarized
and either Justice Kennedy retire or a President of one party have the
opportunity to replace a Justice appointed by a President of the other
party, the result is likely to be either a court that is more liberal on
most constitutional issues than the average Democrat voter or a court
that is more conservative on most constitutional issues than the aver-
age Republican voter.
A closely divided bench composed of polarized elites is vulnera-
ble to what might be called constitutional yo-yos, dramatic swings in
judicial policy making on numerous policy issues.  Assume electoral
politics remains fairly volatile for the near future, with Presidents of
one party frequently replacing Presidents of the other party.  If we
also assume that Justices leave the bench at regular intervals, albeit
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longer intervals than had previous been the norm,19 the median justice
on the Supreme Court may well flip each decade between a Democrat
more liberal than the average Democrat and a Republican more lib-
eral than the average Republican.  The result will be a Supreme Court
that lurches back and forth between making relatively extreme liberal
and relatively extreme conservative decisions on the most important
constitutional issues of the day.  Judicial majorities in odd numbered
decades might strike down all restrictions on abortion, sustain all af-
firmative action policies, and insist on a strong separation between
church and state, while a change of one justice in even numbered de-
cades will lead to a tribunal that might sustain all restrictions (and
bans) on abortion, strike down any use of race in admissions or em-
ployment processes, and insist that government accommodate
religion.
These potential constitutional yo-yos threaten both the
majoritarian and the constitutional values that traditionally enjoy a
precarious balance in the American constitutional regime.20  Elite po-
larization undermines majoritarianism by grossly exaggerating the im-
pact of elections and public opinion on judicial decisions.  Small
fluctuations in public opinion and in voting behavior may induce judi-
cial decisions that lurch back and forth between relatively extreme
liberal and relatively extreme conservative opinions, even when most
citizens prefer centrist positions on issues ranging from the constitu-
tional status of abortion to the constitutional status of capital punish-
ment.  This volatility undermines constitutionalism by inhibiting such
constitutional purposes as providing credible commitments to crucial
stakeholders, maintaining the rule of law, and developing a national
commitment to a set of fundamental constitutional aspirations.21  For
these reasons, judicial minimalism during times of elite polarization
and electoral volatility has particular merit, even if such an approach
to the judicial function may disserve constitutional values during other
political periods.
19. See generally Justin Crowe & Christopher F. Karpowitz, Where Have You Gone, Sher-
man Minton? The Decline of the Short-Term Supreme Court Justice, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 425
(2007).
20. See ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 6-8 (5th ed. 2010) (noting
the tension between “the will of the people and the rule of law”); WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL.,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM INTERPRETATION 45-78 (4th ed. 1960).
21. For a general discussion of constitutional purposes, see GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 2,
at 7-10.
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The following pages document how elite opinion structures the
path of judicial decision making and how the present structure threat-
ens both majoritarianism and constitutionalism.  Part I examines
scholarly and popular claims that the Supreme Court has special ca-
pacities to protect minorities, is tethered to elite opinion, or relig-
iously follows the election returns.  Each theory explains some
important judicial decisions, but fails to explain other equally impor-
tant judicial decisions.  All are often elaborated so as to be almost
unfalsifiable.  Supreme Court Justices, no matter how they decide
most cases, protect some minorities, advance values held by some elite
faction, and support the constitutional vision of some recent electoral
winners.  Part II proposes that Supreme Court commentary pay spe-
cial attention to those elites most likely to gain federal judicial ap-
pointments.  This approach combines insights from elite theory
(Justices are elites who hold elite values), electoral theory (elections
determine what elites are appointed to the federal bench), and minor-
ity rights theory (whose voices from the margins do those particular
elites hear).  Unlike conventional elite theory, the theory outlined in
this paper explains which elite values the Supreme Court articulates
during times of elite polarization, namely those elite factions that most
influence the judicial selection process. Part III details how this ver-
sion of elite theory explains the pattern of judicial decision making
during the mid-twentieth century.  Warren Court activism took place
during a time of elite consensus.  Such judicial decisions as Brown v.
Board of Education22 and Engle v. Vitale23 reflected the tendency of
both Republican and Democrat legal elites to hold more liberal values
on racial and religious issues than less affluent and less well-educated
Republicans and Democrats.  Part IV details how the changes in the
structure of elite opinion that began to occur during the last decades
of the twentieth century changed voting patterns on the Supreme
Court. The present polarization on the Supreme Court reflects the
present polarization of elite opinion.  Most Justices hold either the rel-
atively extreme liberal opinions typical of highly educated, affluent
Democrats or the relatively extreme conservative opinions typical of
highly educated, affluent Republicans.  The extremist tendencies of
most American elites have nevertheless been held in check only be-
22. See generally 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson holding that separate
facilities for blacks and whites are inherently unequal).
23. See generally 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding voluntary non-denominational school prayer
to violate the Establishment Clause).
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cause a representative of a rapidly becoming extinct species of elite
moderate has held the median position on the Supreme Court for the
past twenty years.  As a result, that tribunal has often announced cen-
trist solutions to political and constitutional controversies that po-
larized elected politicians cannot achieve.  Whether that center can
hold is doubtful.  The median justice of the near future is likely to be a
more typical contemporary Republican elite or a more typical Demo-
crat elite.  So staffed, the Supreme Court will either hand down rela-
tively extreme opinions on almost all constitutional questions or,
should Americans continue to experience electoral volatility, oscillate
between relatively extreme liberal and relatively conservative posi-
tions on the constitutional issues of the day.  Part V discusses how a
court composed of an unstable group of polarized elites undermines
popular sovereignty and the rule of law.  Judicial decisions in these
circumstances neither reflect the more centrist commitments of the
voting public nor articulate durable constitutional values.  Judges can
mitigate the baneful combination of elite polarization and electoral
volatility, the Article concludes, only by practicing strong forms of ju-
dicial minimalism.  Even if judicial activism is often justified in light of
a judicial obligation to articulate fundamental constitutional truths,
Justices considering whether to hand down broad constitutional rul-
ings should have a greater degree of confidence than they can have at
present that their decisions will not be overruled within the decade.
“Extreme” or “relatively extreme” in this Article refers only to
sociological facts about where a particular belief belongs on the spec-
trum of public opinion at a given time, not to the normative merits of
either extreme or moderate views.  Persons who hold such views as
“abortion ought never be regulated” or “abortion ought never be le-
gal” are “relative extremists” at present only because most contempo-
rary Americans hold the more centrist opinion that abortion ought to
be legal but heavily regulated.  Such relatively extreme pro-life or pro-
choice opinions may be sound morality or constitutional law.  History
may vindicate one side to the debate over abortion just as history has
vindicated the relative extremists of past eras who thought slavery
ought to be abolished, women ought to have the same rights as men,
government should not mandate the one true religion, and criminal
defendants should have rights to an attorney.
Nevertheless, the sociological status of particular constitutional
beliefs has normatively relevant consequences.  Judicial decisions that
articulate what some Justices and their elite supporters regard as nor-
668 [VOL. 56:661
The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo?
matively desirable constitutional values may have less normatively de-
sirable consequences.  Backlash is one such unfortunate possibility.
Many commentators insist that some Supreme Court decisions pro-
moting what the commentator agrees are fundamental human and
constitutional rights have inspired a contrary political mobilization
that resulted in what the commentator claims is a less just status quo.24
This paper suggests that severe constitutional instability may be an-
other untoward consequence of commitments to judicial activism in
the wrong time and place.  Advocates of same-sex marriage and the
right to bear arms may well be championing compelling constitutional
values.  Whether those and other constitutional values are best served
by aggressive judicial decisions that may not survive the next series of
elections is a question that may haunt Americans if we continue to
live in a regime structured by elite polarization, conflict extension and
electoral volatility.
I. LIFE TENURE, ELITE STATUS, AND ELECTORAL
RETURNS IN ISOLATION
A general consensus exists that judicial values have at least some
influence on judicial decision making some of the time.  Leading polit-
ical scientists write as if voting on the Supreme Court is determined
almost entirely by values and policy preferences.  Jeffrey Segal and
Harold Spaeth, the most prominent proponents of the attitudinal
model of Supreme Court decision making, bluntly state, “Justices
make decisions by considering the facts of the case in light of their
ideological attitudes and values.”25  Those law professors and judges
who scorn social science efforts to discount the influence of law on
judges nevertheless recognize that an empirical theory of judicial deci-
sion making cannot altogether ignore judicial values.  Herbert Wechs-
ler in his famous “Neutral Principles” lecture recognized that
constitutional decisions “involve a choice among competing values”26
in those numerous cases in which “the language of the Constitution, of
24. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS,
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2013) (discussing the backlash sur-
rounding gay marriage).  For an argument against backlash, see generally Robert Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373
(2007).
25. JEFFRETY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDI-
NAL MODEL REVISITED 110 (2002).
26. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 15 (1959).
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history and precedent . . . do not combine to make an answer clear.”27
Even Justice Scalia thinks that one virtue of originalism is that “the
inevitable tendency of judges to think the law is what they would like
it to be will . . . cause most errors in judicial historiography to be made
in the direction of projecting upon the age of 1789 current, modern
values.”28
Questions about what judicial values influence judicial decisions
have received far less scholarly attention than questions about
whether values in general influence judicial decisions.  Political scien-
tists debate the extent to which Justices base constitutional decisions
on the same balance of policy preferences and values as do other offi-
cial decision makers, but do not consider whether Justices as a group
have the same policy preferences and values as other official decision
makers or a specific group of official decision makers.29  Law profes-
sors debate the extent to which law mandates that Justices make cer-
tain decisions on their best understanding of such values as equality
and liberty.30  They rarely explore whether judicial understandings of
such values as equality and liberty resemble those of other governing
officials or some group of citizens.  One consequence of these debates
is we know a good deal more about how beliefs about free speech
influence Supreme Court decisions in First Amendment cases than
why some Justices value speech more than others and why, at least in
the twentieth century, most Justices valued speech more than the av-
erage citizen and elected official.
Three theories about judicial values are nevertheless fairly ex-
plicit in the literature on Supreme Court decision making.  The first
maintains that Justices who have life tenure are more likely than aver-
age citizens and elected officials to protect minorities.  The second
maintains that Justices, who are almost always well-educated affluent
lawyers, are likely to hold those values widely held by other well-edu-
cated affluent lawyers.  The third suggests that Justices will follow the
electoral returns, either because they are appointed by electoral win-
ners or, if they are appointed by officials who have since become elec-
27. Id. at 17.
28. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989).
29. See generally Post & Segal, supra note 24; Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with
It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the ‘Legal Model’ of Judicial Decision Making, 26 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 465 (2001).
30. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKINGS RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1978) (calling for a “fusion
of constitutional law and moral theory”). See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
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toral losers, because they fear the consequences of challenging
electoral winners.
A Life-Tenured Supreme Court Protects Minorities.  One popular
theory of Supreme Court decision making claims that Justices recog-
nize a special judicial responsibility to protect minority rights.  Chief
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in United States v. Carolene Products Co.
called for “more search judicial inquiry” when official actions were
motivated by “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.”31
Subsequent commentary maintained that this famous footnote four
asserted both a normative theory about the values that should moti-
vate Justices and an empirical theory about the values that actually did
motivate Justices.  “The great and modern charter for ordering the
relation between judges and other agencies of government,” Owen
Fiss writes, “is footnote four of Carolene Products.”32  Judges and
scholars agree.  “Under our constitutional system,” Hugo Black stated
in Chambers v. State of Florida, “courts stand against any winds that
blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because
they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-con-
forming victims of prejudice and public excitement.”33  Professor
Geoffrey Hazzard expressed much conventional wisdom when he
stated, “The institution of judicial review protects minority ‘rights’
against ‘faction.’”34
Life tenure provides two good reasons for thinking that Supreme
Court Justices will act on different values than elected officials and
that these differences will often lead courts to be sensitive to the
needs of politically vulnerable populations.  Justices who do not have
to seek reelection are far freer to protect unpopular persons and
groups than persons who depend on popular support for their offices.
American Justices who have made unpopular decisions have never
lost their jobs or lives.  At worst, such decisions have not been imple-
mented.  Moreover, Justices who have served for decades are likely to
have different values than recently elected officials.  For this reason,
the Supreme Court is likely to protect former members of a majority
coalition should they become politically vulnerable minorities.35
31. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
32. Owen Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1979).
33. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
34. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1277 n.200
(1991).
35. See generally TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITU-
TIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003) (discussing the insurance function of judicial review).
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Many important Supreme Court decisions have protected politi-
cally vulnerable minorities.  Such cases as Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion36 and Loving v. Virginia37 ruled that racial majorities could not
establish a racial caste system in the United States.  “Measures de-
signed to maintain White Supremacy,” Chief Justice Warren stated in
Loving, constitute the “invidious racial discrimination” prohibited by
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.38  Consti-
tutional criminal procedure provides even clearer instances of courts
listening to the politically powerless.  Elected officials have almost no
incentive to adopt policies protecting the rights of ordinary criminals.
Even during the decade when successful candidates for the presidency
asserted that “some of our courts in their decisions have gone too far
in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in this
country,”39 the Supreme Court of the United States first declared and
then refused to overrule decisions forbidding prosecutors from intro-
ducing in criminal trials illegally obtained evidence40 and requiring
that police warn all persons they arrested that they have a right to
keep silent and a right to an attorney.41  While Richard Nixon was
president, the Justices declared unconstitutional every state statute au-
thorizing capital punishment.42  As Amy Lerman notes, during the
1960s and 1970s, “the Supreme Court bolstered the due process rights
of the accused, even as the public by and large preferred to strengthen
prosecutorial power.”43
The primary problem with claims that Justices protect minority
rights or have “special capacities to listen to voices from the margins”
is that such capacities seem to have lain dormant throughout much of
American constitutional history.  More often than not, federal and
state courts have sided with employers rather than employees.44  Vic-
toria Hattam and William Forbath detail how judicial resistance to
legislation aimed at improving working conditions led mainstream un-
36. See generally 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37. See generally 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
38. Id. at 11.
39. See President Richard Nixon, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the
Republican National Convention in Miami Beach, Florida (Aug. 8, 1968).
40. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
41. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
42. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
43. Amy E. Lerman, The Rights of the Accused, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY 41 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin, & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008).
44. See Benjamin Levin, Blue-Collar Crime: Conspiracy, Organized Labor, and the Anti-
Union Civil Rico Claim, 75 ALB. L. REV. 559, 582-84 (2012).
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ions at the turn of the twentieth century to eschew political action,
preferring to secure gains through collective bargaining consistent
with the common law of contract.45  With rare exceptions, nineteenth
century courts were far more attentive to the concerns of slaveholders
and white supremacists than the plight of slaves and free African
Americans.  The antebellum Supreme Court declared unconstitutional
federal laws banning human bondage in the territories.46  The postbel-
lum court imposed sharp constitutional limitations on federal power
to promote racial equality in the south47 and blessed the rise of Jim
Crow segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson.48 Bolling v. Sharpe49 is the
first instance when the Supreme Court declared a federal policy un-
constitutional that championed the rights of the sort of “discrete and
insular minority” that much progressive theory suggests courts are in-
stitutionally designed to protect.
Claims that the Supreme Court protects minorities also suffer
from a falsification problem.  All parties to constitutional debates
throughout American history have claimed to be members of the sort
of politically disadvantaged group that needs judicial protection.
Slaveholders and antebellum southerners claimed to be powerless mi-
norities.50  When Supreme Court Justices in the nineteenth century
complained about the tyranny of the majority, their concern was with
laws passed by the less affluent many that took property from the
more fortunate few.51  Justice O’Connor in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson insisted that white contractors disadvantaged by affirmative
45. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVE-
MENT 128-76 (1991); VICTORIA HATTAM, LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER: THE ORIGINS OF
BUSINESS UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 3-30 (1993).
46. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
47. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1893).
48. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that based on the Four-
teenth Amendment, a Louisiana-based law mandating that African Americans can only sit in
separate but equal railway cars was constitutional).
49. See generally Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that African American
children are deprived of equal protection found in the Fifth Amendment when segregated in
public schools).
50. See generally JESSE T. CARPENTER, THE SOUTH AS A CONSCIOUS MINORITY, 1789-1861:
A STUDY IN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1930) (examining the “minority philosophy” in the South
during the antebellum period).
51. The Supreme Court referenced that in strong examples like in the taxation of railroads
there are rights beyond the control of the state and that if the government “recognized no such
rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at all time to the
absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of power
. . . .” The Court then says that “[t]he theory of our governments, State and National, is opposed
to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere.” See Citizens’ Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Topeka,
87 U.S. 655, 662 (1874).
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action were powerless victims of a local African American majority.52
Other contemporary minorities arguably include Christian parents
who object to certain materials in the public school curriculum, Mus-
lims who are victims of ethnic profiling, atheists who object to refer-
ences to “God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, and billionaires who wish
to make large campaign contributions.  No Supreme Court Justice
supports all these persons, all of whom claim to be minority victims of
the majoritarian processes.
The Supreme Court and Elites.  Robert Dahl and others suggest
that the Supreme Court is more responsive to elites than to powerless
minorities, that “a Court whose members are recruited in the fashion
of Supreme Court justices would [not] long hold to norms of Right or
Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite.”53  Lu-
cas Powe observes, “justices are . . . subject to the same economic,
social, and intellectual currents as other upper-middle-class profes-
sional elites.”54  Lawrence Baum maintains that Supreme Court Jus-
tices make those decisions that they believe will be approved by elite
lawyers, journalists, and interest group leaders.  Baum and Neil
Devins speak of the “Greenhouse effect, whereby Justices shift their
views to reflect the left-leaning values of media and academic
elites.”55  Most Justices, understandably, do not claim that they re-
present the most fortunate Americans, but such criticisms are often
heard in judicial dissents. The Court, Justice Scalia complains, “has no
business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by the
elite class from which the Members of this institution are selected.”56
Common sense and scholarly analysis provide good reason for
thinking that judicial decisions often reflect elite sentiment.  Virtually
every judge who has ever sat on the Supreme Court in American his-
tory has had more education and more wealth than the average Amer-
ican at the time.57 The materials Supreme Court Justices read when
deciding cases are almost exclusively prepared by other educated, af-
52. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989).
53. Dahl, supra note 11, at 291.
54. POWE, supra note 17, at ix.
55. Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the
American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1543 (2010); see LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR
AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 142 (2006) (discussing the Greenhouse
effect).
56. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 601-02 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 48-49 (5th ed. 2008).
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fluent elites.58  Supreme Court Justices tend to socialize almost exclu-
sively with their highly educated, affluent peers.59  Baum and Devins,
who have looked at elite influence on Supreme Court decisions at
great length, conclude that
Because the individuals and groups most salient to the Justices are
overwhelmingly from elite segments of American society, it is the
values and opinions of elites that have the greatest impact on the
Justices. This is one important reason why Court decisions typically
accord with the views of the most educated people better than they
do with the views of the public as a whole. More to the point, the
Justices advance their personal preferences by attending both to
their preferred vision of legal policy and to the reference groups
that matter most to them. Consequently, although the Justices will
not diverge sharply from policy positions they strongly favor, the
departures they do make are more likely to reflect their personal
reference groups than the popular will.60
Many important Supreme Court decisions reflect the influence of
elite attitudes.  Such Marshall Court decisions as McCulloch v. Mary-
land61 and Gibbons v. Ogden62 expressed the Federalist/National Re-
publican vision of federal power to promote commercial prosperity
held by most early nineteenth century commercial elites.63  During the
late nineteenth century, when most American elites favored reconcili-
ation with the South, the Supreme Court was generally hostile to ra-
cial equality.64  As American elites began to reject theories of
58. See Baum & Devins, supra note 55, at 1566-68.
59. See BAUM, supra note 55, at 89-90.
60. See Baum & Devins, supra note 55, at 1580-81.
61. See generally M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (holding that Maryland cannot
tax a branch of the Bank of United States because the Bank is a means employed by the govern-
ment, which is executing its constitutional powers).
62. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (holding that when affecting com-
merce, conflicting state claims of sovereignty over bodies of navigable water are subordinate to
the legislation of Congress and that any concurrent power is limited power vested in the sover-
eignty of Congress).
63. See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 96-97.
64. See Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 973, 1003-05 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004)). See gener-
ally Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (holding that as the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution prohibits the discrimination of citizens by the government based on race, the
constitution and laws of Mississippi setting requirements for voter registration including poll
taxes and literacy and a grandfather clause to bypass strict requirements for whites were consti-
tutional as they did not discriminate against races); Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(upholding Louisiana laws requiring blacks and whites to sit in separate but equal cars during
intrastate travel because the legislation is reasonable); DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION:
THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY (2002).
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scientific racism, the Supreme Court became more supportive of racial
equality.65  Baum and Devins point to numerous contemporary judi-
cial decisions on constitutional issues ranging from flag burning to af-
firmative action, where persons with post-graduate degrees are far
more likely to prefer the policy made by the Justices than less edu-
cated Americans.66
The data Baum and Devins use to support claims that Justices
advance elite values nevertheless raises questions about their thesis.
While elites showed greater tendencies to support contemporary Su-
preme Court decisions than other Americans, on no issue for which
Baum and Devins presented data did a clear majority of persons with
post-graduate degrees support a decision that was opposed by a ma-
jority of persons who lacked a post-graduate degree.67  More than half
of all persons with and without post-graduate degrees opposed the
Supreme Court’s decisions on school prayer, affirmative action and
flag burning. Judicial decisions on homosexual relations and juvenile
death penalty are favored by majorities with and without post-gradu-
ate degrees.  In short, claims that Justices promote elite values do not
explain why the Justices frequently disagree with elite majorities and
why, when they do agree with elite majorities, they typically agree
with (smaller) popular majorities.
The claim that the Supreme Court champions elite values suffers
from the same lack of specificity that weakens claims that the Su-
preme Court protects minorities.  Most constitutional struggles fea-
ture American aristocrats on all sides.  Slaveholders were part of the
American elite, but so were the Boston Brahmins who provided sup-
port for John Brown.68  Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas were
elite members of the Illinois bar.  The Civil Rights movement pitted
65. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 210-11 (2004). See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation of children based on race, even when physical
location and facilities may be equal, is unconstitutional based on the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when an African American appli-
cant was denied admissions to the University of Texas Law School based solely on race because
a newly opened school only for blacks was not an adequate comparable level of education);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that because the United States is a constitu-
tional democracy, law grants the rights of citizens to participate in elections without state restric-
tion of race).
66. See Baum & Devins, supra note 55, at 1573.
67. Boumediene v. Bush was supported by exactly half of persons with a post-graduate de-
gree and opposed by two-thirds of persons who lacked such a degree. See Baum & Devins,
supra note 55, at 1573.
68. See BRIAN MCGINTY, JOHN BROWN’S TRIAL 44 (2009).
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northern elites against southern elites.  Robert Dahl, who penned the
seminal statement of elite theory,69 also published an exceptionally
influential study in political science maintaining that the United States
is governed by different elite factions, each of which holds sway over
some but not all policy arenas. Who Governs contended, “individuals
who are influential in one sector of public activity tend not to be influ-
ential in another sector; and, what is probably more significant, the
social strata from which individuals in one sector tend to come are
different from the social strata from which individuals in other sectors
are drawn.”70  To the extent American politics is structured by what
Dahl characterized as “dispersed inequalities,”71 the most important
question for thinking about judicial review is not whether the Court
advances elite values, but which elite values does the Court advance.
Little research has been done on that precise question.
The Supreme Court and Election Returns/Public Opinion.  Much
commentary asserts that Supreme Court Justices hold and act on the
same values that motivate elected officials and the general public.
The strong version of regime theory in political science maintains that
Justices carry out the policy agenda of the dominant national coali-
tion.  Bradley Joondeph states, “the Court tends to function more as a
policy-making partner of the ascendant political majority—or at least
an influential segment of that majority—than as an independent check
on the political process.”72  Terri Peretti endorses a regime politics ap-
proach that focuses on how “elected officials enlist the Court as a
partner in their electoral and policy aims.”73  Prominent law profes-
sors insist that Justices work within parameters marked out by public
opinion.  Michael Klarman declares, “the Court identifies and protects
minority rights only when a majority or near majority of the commu-
nity has come to deem those rights worthy of protection.”74  Barry
Friedman’s history of judicial power chronicles how “the Supreme
69. Dahl, supra note 11, at 291.
70. ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY
169 (1961).
71. Id. at 228.
72. Bradley W. Joondeph, Judging and Self-Presentation: Towards a More Realistic Concep-
tion of the Human (Judicial) Animal, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 523, 553 (2008).
73. Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
273, 275 (2010) (“[R]ather than a check on majority power, the federal courts often function as
arenas for extending, legitimizing, harmonizing, or protecting the policy agenda of political elites
or groups within the dominant governing coalition.”).
74. Michael Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1, 17-18 (1996).
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Court went from being an institution intended to check the popular
will to one that frequently confirms it.”75
Good reasons exist for thinking that judges are likely to hold or
at least articulate the values of political winners and popular majori-
ties.  Both social science evidence and common sense provide over-
whelming support for the notion that elected officials seek to appoint
persons to the bench they believe share their constitutional vision.
Henry Abraham declares,
Whatever the merits of the other criteria attending presidential
motivations in appointments may be, what must be of overriding
concern to any nominator is his perception of the candidate’s real
politics.  The chief executive’s crucial predictive judgment concerns
itself with the nominee’s likely future voting pattern on the bench,
based on his or her past stance and commitment on matters of pub-
lic policy insofar as they are reliably discernible.  All presidents
have tried, thus, to pack the bench to a greater or lesser extent.
They will indubitably continue to do so.76
Judicial majorities pull punches rather than risk reprisal on matters on
which the judges disagree with popular sentiment.  “I am not fond of
butting against a wall in sport,” John Marshall told Joseph Story when
explaining why he refused as a circuit court judge to strike down a
Virginia law forbidding African American seamen from entering the
state.77  The forces that influence popular opinion also influence Jus-
tices.  Benjamin Cardozo observed, the “great tides and currents
which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass
judges by.”78
Many important Supreme Court decisions are best explained, at
least in part, by election returns or popular opinion.  Shortly after
President Grant appointed two Republican Justices to the Supreme
Court, the 5-3 judicial majority that declared unconstitutional the Le-
gal Tender Acts passed during the Civil War79 became a 5-4 majority
that claimed Article I authorized the United States to make paper
money legal payment for all debts.80  John Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison81 would have almost certainly ordered the Jefferson Admin-
75. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 4 (2009).
76. ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 53.
77. 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 86 (1922).
78. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
79. See generally Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869).
80. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 501(1871).
81. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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istration to give Marbury his judicial commission had the Federalist
Party retained strong control over both houses of Congress in the 1800
national election.82  The unanimous Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Nixon83 was no doubt influenced by the strong popular tide
against Richard Nixon during his last months in office.
The main problem with drawing too tight connections between
Supreme Court decisions and election returns or popular opinion is
that both approaches to judicial decision making predict far less judi-
cial activism than has historically been the case.  If the Supreme Court
religiously followed election returns, we might expect the Justices to
declare federal laws unconstitutional only when the coalition that
passed those laws has been electorally deposed.  This is not the case.
Tom Keck’s study of judicial decision making at the turn of the
twenty-first century observed that, “Though this Court never included
more than two Democratic appointees, more than 70% of its judicial
review decisions were issued by bipartisan coalitions, and more than
80% invalidated statutes that had been enacted with substantial Re-
publican legislative support.”84  The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA) and the American Disabilities Act (ADA) are two good
examples of statutes whose fate was not forecast by strong regime
politics models of constitutional politics.  Both were passed by over-
whelming bipartisan legislative majorities. A unanimous Supreme
Court declared RFRA unconstitutional.85  The five most conservative
Justices on the Rehnquist Court struck down crucial provisions of the
ADA,86 a statute that President Bush declared to be an “historic act”
that “made the United States the international leader on this human
rights issue.”87  Public opinion polls are similarly weak predictors of
judicial decision making.  Although nearly two-thirds of all Rehnquist
Court decisions were consistent with the trend of public opinion
(where such a trend could be determined), only two-fifths of that tri-
bunal’s decisions declaring federal laws unconstitutional and less than
three-fifths of decisions declaring state laws unconstitutional reflected
82. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 20, at 25-28.
83. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
84. Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate Fed-
eral Statutes?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321, 336 (2007).
85. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534-35 (1997).
86. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
87. President George Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (July 26, 1990), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=18711&st=
disabilities&st1=.
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public opinion.88  Among the important decisions that bucked public
opinion were those prohibiting prayer exercises in public schools89
and striking down laws banning flag-burning.90
Claims that the Supreme Court follows election returns or public
opinion either suffer falsifiability problems or are simply not helpful
when the election returns or public opinion are not moving in clear
directions.  Americans for nearly fifty years have experienced this rel-
ative political instability.  Thirteen of the seventeen national elections
held between 1980 and 2012 resulted in divided government.  The pe-
riod between 1936 and 1948 is the last in which a party won more than
three consecutive presidential elections.  Even when one party con-
trolled all branches of the national government, the ruling majority in
Congress often had a quite different ideological bent than the Presi-
dent of the United States.  Conservative Southern Democrats during
the New Deal Era controlled crucial Congressional committees even
as liberals exercised greater power in the White House.91  Under these
conditions, commentators will almost always be able to find some
election returns consistent with particular Supreme Court decisions
and some election returns inconsistent with those decisions.  Ameri-
cans in 1984 elected a President who ran on a strong pro-life platform
but in 1986 returned control of the Senate to the party committed to
keeping abortion legal.  Depending on which election return one se-
lected, persons attempting to forecast the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services92 and Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey93 would have predicted that the
Supreme Court would overrule Roe v. Wade,94 overrule decisions per-
mitting states not to fund abortion,95 or find some middle ground on
abortion that was escaping both political parties.  Should the Roberts
Court declare unconstitutional recent state laws requiring women
seeking abortion to have ultrasounds before undergoing that proce-
dure,96 the Justices can be said to be following the 2012 presidential
88. See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT 44 ( 2008).
89. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Eichmann, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989); MARSHALL, supra note 88, at 24.
91. See NICOL RAE, SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS 12-13 (1994).
92. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
93. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
94. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
95. See, e.g., Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
96. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 578 (5th
Cir. 2012).
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election.  Should those laws be sustained, the Justices can be said to be
following the 2012 House of Representatives election.
II. LIFE TENURE, ELITE STATUS, AND ELECTORAL
RETURNS IN COMBINATION
Common claims that life-tenured judges protect powerless minor-
ities, promote elite values, or follow the election returns often sound
better in theory than they work in practice.  Good reason exists for
thinking that life tenured Justices will be more inclined than elected
officials to protect the unpopular, that Justices who hail from Ivy law
schools and earn six-digit salaries in bad years will be more inclined
than less educated or affluent Americans to act as an American aris-
tocracy, or that Justices appointed by elected officials will follow the
election returns.  The problem is that for every instance that supports
one of these theories, an equally prominent counterexample exists.
Worse, each common claim about judicial values suffers from falsifica-
tion problems.  Most cases before the Supreme Court pit one minority
against another, one elite against another, and the winner of some
recent elections against the winner of other recent elections. Com-
mentary on judicial review, for this reason, must be more specific.
Scholars must detail which minorities Justices protect, which elites
they represent, and what election returns they follow.
The most basic problem with the three above explanations for
judicial decision making is that each fails to take the insights of the
others into account.  Elite theorists explore how affluent well-edu-
cated judges make decisions, not how those decisions are made by
affluent well-educated judges who, after being appointed by electoral
winners, enjoy life tenure.  This myopic approach is mistaken and not
just because not all factors are considered as discrete influences on the
Supreme Court.  Students of intersectionally point out that the exper-
iences of a lesbian black woman cannot be broken down into discrete
race, gender, and sexuality components.97 For similar reasons, theories
of judicial making should focus on how life tenured Justices who are
appointed to office by political winners interpret the Constitution in
light of their elite values.  Rather than engage in a contest to deter-
mine which variable explains the most judicial decisions, scholars will
97. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139 (1989).
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be better off detailing how life tenure, elite status, and election returns
combine to structure the direction of constitutional law.
Life tenure, elite status, and election returns in combination help
explain some problems that plagued each factor in isolation as an ex-
planation for judicial decision making.  Consider the ways in which
judicial decision making during the nineteenth century seems inconsis-
tent with common claims that courts are structured to protect power-
less minorities.98  That difficulty vanishes when changing conceptions
of elite understandings of powerlessness are taken into account.  Most
elites during the nineteenth century thought affluent property holders
were the paradigmatic politically vulnerable minority.  James Madison
in 1829 declared,
[P]ersons now and property are the two great subjects on which
Governments are to act; and that the rights of persons, and the
rights of property, are the objects, for the protection of which Gov-
ernment was instituted.  These rights cannot well be separated.  The
personal right to acquire property, which is a natural right, gives to
property, when acquired, a right to protection, as a social right.  The
essence of Government is power; and power, lodged as it must be in
human hands, will ever be liable to abuse. . . .  In republics, the great
danger is, that the majority may not sufficiently respect the rights of
the minority.99
These elite attitudes explain why the affluent, well-educated Justices
who sat on the Supreme Court during the nineteenth century con-
cluded that corporations were citizens,100 adopted a railroad friendly
interpretation of the commerce clause,101 and tended to prefer the
rights of slaveholders to the rights of alleged slaves.102  The course of
Supreme Court decision making changed, unsurprisingly, when in the
minds of most elites the poor person of color replaced the successful
capitalist as the “discrete and insular minorit[y]”103 most vulnerable to
the prejudices of popular majorities.
Greater attention to the structure of elite competition helps alle-
viate other difficulties with common single-factor theories of judicial
policymaking.  The elites who contested the constitutionality and mo-
98. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
99. 9 JAMES MADISON, Speech in the Virginia Constitutional Convention, in THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 360-61 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1910).
100. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
101. Wabash, St. Louis Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 589-93 (1886).
102. See generally Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842) (holding a Pennsylvania statute
granting procedural protections to escaped slaves to violate the Constitution).
103. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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rality of human bondage were not equally situated politically.  Jackso-
nian presidents routinely appointed southerners and northern
doughfaces to the federal bench.104  Abolitionists did not win elections
and, as a result, were underrepresented on the federal bench.  John
McLean was the only antislavery advocate who served on the Su-
preme Court before the Civil War and his antislavery tendencies de-
veloped only after he was appointed in 1830.105  Such decisions as
Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Dred Scott v. Sandford106 reflected elite
Jacksonian beliefs that slaveholders were a politically vulnerable mi-
nority that required special judicial protection.107  When the elites
who staffed the Supreme Court changed, the course of judicial deci-
sion-making changed.  Five of the nine Justices on the court that de-
cided Dred Scott hailed from slave states.  Seven of the nine Justices
on the court that decided Brown v. Board of Education hailed from
states that had no slaves before the Civil War.  Just as Dred Scott re-
flected the southern tilt of the Jacksonian elite, so did Brown reflect
the liberal racial sentiments of northern elites during the mid-twenti-
eth century.108
The Supreme Court is most likely to protect the rights of those
minorities whose voices are heard by the most elite members of the
dominant national coalition, but the nature of that elite changes in
ways that are important for the course of judicial decision making.
During some political eras, elections make little difference because
elites from both parties are more likely to agree with each other on
major constitutional issues than they are to agree with the average
member of their political coalitions.  The Warren Court, as we shall
see, was a product of the elite consensus that developed during the
1950s and 1960s. During other periods, elections made a big difference
because the disagreements between the elite members of the two ma-
jor parties were far greater than the disagreements between the more
plebian members of the two major parties.  The contemporary Rob-
104. See ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 77-93; Frank Otto Gatell, Samuel Nelson, in THE JUS-
TICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS
817, 817-19 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., vol. 2 1969); Frank Otto Gatell, Robert C.
Grier, in THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND
MAJOR OPINIONS 873, 873 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., vol. 2 1969).
105. ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 78-79.
106. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
107. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
108. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431,
443-44 (2005).
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erts Court, as we shall see, is a product of the elite polarization that
structures contemporary American constitutional politics.
III. ELITE CONSENSUS AND THE WARREN COURT
The Warren Court is Exhibit A for every prominent theory of
judicial decision making discussed in this paper.  The Justices made
numerous decisions, from Brown v. Board of Education to Gideon v.
Wainwright109 that apparently demonstrated how life tenured Justices
had special capacities “to listen to voices from the margins.”110  Owen
Fiss declares,
In the 1950’s, America was not a pretty sight.  Jim Crow
reigned supreme.  Blacks were systematically disenfranchised and
excluded from juries.  State fostered religious practices, like school
prayers, were pervasive.  Legislatures were grossly gerrymandered
and malapportioned.  McCarthyism stifled radical dissent, and the
jurisdiction of the censor over matters considered obscene or
libelous had no constitutional limits. . . . Trials often proceeded
without counsel or jury. Convictions were allowed to stand even
though they turned on illegally seized evidence or on statements
extracted from the accused under coercive circumstances.  There
were no rules limiting the imposition of the death penalty. These
practices victimized the poor and disadvantaged, as did the welfare
system, which was administered in an arbitrary and oppressive man-
ner.  The capacity of the poor to participate in civic activities was
also limited by the imposition of poll taxes, court filing fees, and the
like.
These were the challenges that the Warren Court took up and
spoke to in a forceful manner.  The result was a program of consti-
tutional reform almost revolutionary in its aspiration and, now and
then, in its achievements.111
The Warren Court also consistently sided with elite opinion on such
matters as the place of religion in public life when most affluent, well-
educated citizens disagreed with their less fortunate fellow citizens.
John Jeffries and James Ryan point out,
[T]he controversy over school prayer revealed a huge gap between
the cultural elite and the rest of America. People generally may
have supported school prayer and Bible reading, but the leadership
class did not. Elite support for the Supreme Court’s secularization
109. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
110. Michelman, supra note 10, at 1537.
111. Owen Fiss, A Life lived Twice, 100 YALE L. J. 1117, 1118 (1991).
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project was clearly visible in the activities of law professors and
deans, in the prominent newspaper editorials endorsing Engel and
Schempp, and most importantly in the views of mainline Protestant
leaders, who overwhelmingly supported the prayer decisions and
opposed efforts to overturn them. The contrary opinions of many of
the Protestant faithful, especially conservative evangelicals, were
less visible and less influential than the announced positions of re-
ligious organizations and leaders.112
Finally, the Warren Court followed the national election returns.  Lu-
cas Powe writes,
[T]he Court was a functioning part of the Kennedy-Johnson liber-
alism of the mid and late 1960s. . . . The Warren Court demanded
national liberal values be adopted in outlying areas of the United
States . . . .  In the criminal procedure area, it took the lead as the
branch of government most familiar with the problems and most
capable of supervising the solutions.  The Court’s belated welfare
decisions were an assault on both national and local bureaucracies,
but in moving toward constitutionalization, the Court was several
years behind the Great Society in creating new rights.113
A broad elite consensus on civil rights and civil liberties helps
explain why life tenure, elite status, and election returns in isolation
each accounts for the path of Warren Court decision making.  During
the 1950s and 1960s, American elites in both the Republican and
Democratic parties tended to support racial equality, limiting the in-
fluence of religion in public life, broad free speech rights, and provid-
ing greater protections for poor persons and persons of color
suspected of crimes.114  Theories that the Court follows elite opinion
and theories that courts respond to elections reached similarly accu-
rate conclusions about mid-century constitutional politics because the
Republican and Democratic elites empowered by election returns had
reached similar conclusions on civil liberties and rights issues.  Moreo-
ver, because Democratic and Republican elites agreed on the power-
less minorities that need judicial protection, theories that courts
protect powerless minorities reached the same accurate conclusions
about judicial behavior during the 1950s and 1960s as theories that
emphasized elite status or election returns.
112. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause,
100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 325 (2001).
113. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 494 (2000).
114. See infra notes 120-34 and accompanying text.
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The Elite Consensus.  Political science during the New Deal/Great
Society Era made sharp distinctions between elite and mass political
behavior.  Such classics as The American Voter concluded that edu-
cated Americans knew more about politics than average citizens, par-
ticipated more, and were more effective participants.115  Mainstream
commentators maintained that American politics were pluralistic,
characterized by a wide variety of interest groups competing for
power.116  Nevertheless, as E.E. Schattschneider noted, “in the plural-
ist heaven . . . the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class ac-
cent.”117  Unlike less fortunate citizens, affluent, well-educated
Americans had the capacities necessary to be good democratic citi-
zens.  “The resources of time, money, and civic skills,” disproportion-
ately possessed by elites, the leading study of political participation in
the United States concluded, “make it easier for the individual who is
predisposed to take part to do so.”118
Many prominent commentators did not worry about class differ-
ences in political knowledge and political participation.  They believed
that mass political participation threatened the American democratic
order.  Leading social scientists worried that the average American
did not know enough about American politics to participate effec-
tively and, worse, that many less fortunate citizens harbored attitudes
antithetical to democracy.  Ordinary Americans, studies found, were
far less likely than elites to be committed to such democratic values as
free speech and equal protection.119 Other studies suggested that ordi-
nary citizens had authoritarian personalities and were obedient to au-
thorities in ways that made Americans particular susceptible to
dictatorial appeals.120  After finding that one-third of American voters
had “totalitarian” attitudes, Herbert McClosky fretted that “a large
proportion of the electorate has failed to grasp certain of the underly-
ing ideas and principles on which the American political system
115. ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER: AN ABRIDGMENT 251-54 (1964).
116. DAHL, supra note 70, at 5; see also DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS:
POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION, at vii (1951).
117. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 35 (1960).
118. SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 334 (1995).
119. HERBERT MCCLOSKY & ALIDA BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERI-
CANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 243-44 (1983).
120. See T.W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 759-62 (1950) (demon-
strating the connection between the success of social control and subordinates taking pleasure in
obedience); STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974)
(studying the tendencies of human nature to obey).
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rests.”121  What kept American democracy afloat was elite commit-
ment to democratic values. It Can[ ] Happen Here122 was the implicit
theme of much scholarship.
Herbert McCloskey and Alida Brill’s Dimensions of Tolerance
was a particularly influential statement of the gap between elite and
mass commitments to democratic rights and other civil liberties.  The
work proclaimed, “Social learning, insofar as it affects support for civil
liberties is likely to be greater among the influentials (that, is political
elites) of the society than among the mass public.”123  McCloskey and
Brill based this conclusion on a survey of ordinary citizens, community
leaders, and legal elites that asked numerous questions about constitu-
tional principles.  They discovered that leaders were far more likely to
be libertarian on rights issues than ordinary citizens and that legal
elites were far more likely to be libertarian than community leaders.
The latter conclusion was particularly important.  They stated:
It can be safely presumed, we believe, that the legal elite is
closer to other elites, and surely closer to than the mass public, to
the implicit norms of the political culture; that they are more in-
tensely involved with them; and that they respond to those norms
with greater consistency.  If civil liberties values, as we have argued,
are difficult to learn, the legal elite has more occasion to encounter
them than other samples, has greater knowledge of them, and is
more often compelled to reflect upon their merits and shortcom-
ings.  By the very nature of their vocation and activities, the mem-
bers of the legal elite would also be in the best position to
understand the reciprocal obligations that a belief in civil liberties
imposes upon the individuals who claim them for themselves.124
Studies of the new civil liberties issues that emerged in the 1970s
initially reached similar conclusions.  Attitudes on such issues as abor-
tion and the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) were more rooted in
class than gender.  Kristin Luker’s study of abortion politics depicted
battles over reproductive choice as being fought between women who
sought to be political and economic elites and women who preferred a
traditional homemaker role.125 “Abortion,” studies concluded, “is part
121. Herbert McClosky, Consensus and Ideology in American Politics, 58 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 361, 364-65 (1964).
122. See generally SINCLAIR LEWIS, IT CAN’T HAPPEN HERE (1935) (describing how Ameri-
cans voted for a fascist, who eventually establishes a dictatorship in the United States).
123. MCCLOSKY & BRILL, supra note 119, at 233.
124. Id. at 247.
125. See generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984)
(examining the issues, people, and beliefs on both sides of the abortion conflict).
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of a larger cultural conflict between certain strata of the upper-middle
class—the highly educated professionals, scientists, and intellectuals—
and the mass of Americans who comprise the working and lower-mid-
dle classes.”126  One study of abortion found abnormally high levels of
pro-choice support among almost all American elites.127  Jane Man-
sbridge’s study of the politics of the ERA similarly described a battle
between different women’s groups composed of women from differ-
ent classes.128  Women in the labor force and women who had home-
maker roles, she detailed, differed far more among themselves on
gender issues than women as a whole and men.129
Elite status trumped ideology and partisanship.  Affluent, highly
educated Republicans on many civil rights and liberties issues had
more opinions in common with affluent, highly educated Democrats,
than either shared with less fortunate fellow partisans.  In many in-
stances, education and social class were more important factors than
whether a respondent identified as a conservative or liberal.  A partic-
ularly influential article in the 1964 American Political Science Review
concluded,
If American ideology is defined as that cluster of axioms, values and
beliefs which have given form and substance to American democ-
racy and the Constitution, the political influentials manifest by com-
parison with ordinary voters a more developed sense of ideology
and a firmer grasp of its essentials.  This is evidenced in their
stronger approval of democratic ideas, their greater tolerance and
regard for proper procedures and citizen rights, their superior un-
derstanding and acceptance of the “rules of the game,” and their
more affirmative attitudes toward the political system in general.130
The author, Herbert McClosky, found that, regardless of partisan pre-
disposition, elites were more likely than ordinary voters to express ba-
sic commitments to democratic principles, less likely to express racist
attitudes, far more likely to support the rights of persons suspected of
crime and less likely to want to restrict speech rights.  Speech rights
were a particular matter on which elites differed from ordinary voters.
“Not only do [elites] exhibit stronger support for democratic values
126. Peter Skerry, The Class Conflict over Abortion, 52 PUB. INT. 69, 70 (1978); see MARK A.
GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE
POLITICS 144-45 (1996).
127. Robert Lerner et al., Abortion and Social Change in America, 27 SOC’Y 8 (1990).
128. See generally JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986) (arguing that the
ERA failed because it did not result in substantive changes in the position of women).
129. Id. at 216-17.
130. McClosky, supra note 121, at 373.
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than does the electorate,” McClosky noted, “but they are also more
consistent in applying the general principle to the specific instance.
The average citizen has greater difficulty appreciating the importance
of certain procedural or juridical rights, especially when he believes
the country’s internal security is at stake.”131
Judicial Decision Making and the Elite Consensus. The conclu-
sions social scientists reached during the 1950s and 1960s help explain
the direction of judicial decision making through much of the middle
to late twentieth century, even though owing to the balkanization of
the political science discipline, almost all of the scholars doing the re-
search exhibited little interest in public law.  The Justices Democratic
and Republican Presidents appointed to the Supreme Court from
1930 to 1980 were drawn from the affluent, educated elite that were
the most liberal segment of American society at that time.  In virtually
every area of law in which the Justices declared significant federal or
(more often) state measures unconstitutional, public opinion surveys
demonstrated that elites were more likely than average citizens to
favor the policy made by the Supreme Court and legal elites were
more likely than other elites to favor the direction of judicial policy
making.
Consider several questions that McCloskey and Brill asked re-
spondents during the survey research they conducted for Dimensions
of Tolerance.132  One concerned attitudes on free speech.  “Should
demonstrators be allowed to hold a mass protest march for some un-
popular cause?”  Three-fifths of ordinary citizens maintained that the
demonstration should be banned “if the majority is against it.”  More
than nine-tenths of all legal elites surveyed responded that the demon-
stration should take place, “even if most people in the community
don’t want it.”  The Supreme Court in such cases as Cox v. Louisi-
ana133 and Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham134 sided with the legal elite,
holding that civil rights protestors had constitutional rights to hold
demonstrations promoting unpopular causes in the south.  McClosky
and Brill asked about “forcing people to testify against themselves in
court.”  Three-fifths of ordinary citizens thought compelled testimony
“may be necessary when [people] are accused of very brutal crimes.”
131. Id. at 366.
132. MCCLOSKY & BRILL, supra note 119, at 246.
133. See generally 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (reversing appellant’s conviction of violating a local
regulation prohibiting public demonstrations).
134. See generally 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (permitting a demonstration that the local ordinance
prohibited).
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Almost nine-tenths of the legal elite asserted that compelled testi-
mony “is never justified, no matter how terrible the crime.”  The Su-
preme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois135 and Miranda v. Arizona136
sided with the legal elite, insisting on strong constitutional safeguards
against compelled testimony.  The same stark differences appeared
with McCloskey and Brill asked about religion.  Three quarters of all
average citizens declared that “the freedom of atheists to make fun of
God and religion should not be allowed in a public place where relig-
ious groups gather.”  Three quarters of the legal elite insisted that
such speech “should be legally protected no matter who might be of-
fended.”  Supreme Court decisions on school prayer championed the
secular values held by twentieth century American elites rather than
the more religious worldview of ordinary citizens.137
This elite consensus also marked the boundaries of liberal Su-
preme Court activism during the Warren and early Burger years.  In
sharp contrast to the structure of public opinion on almost every other
civil liberties issue, surveys found that affluent, educated Americans
were somewhat less likely than ordinary citizens to favor economic
equality.138  George Lovell’s study of the Civil Liberties Bureau of the
Justice Department documents a similarly sharp division between
what most elites and average citizens in the 1930s and 1940s thought
were civil liberties.139  Elite notions resembled those asserted in the
famous footnote four of the Carolene Products, which called for
heightened judicial scrutiny when a law “restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation” or reflects “prejudice against discrete and in-
sular minorities.”140  Civil liberties were free speech, freedom of relig-
ion, racial equality, and constitutional criminal procedure.  Lovell
found that ordinary people had far more capacious theories, many of
135. See generally 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (holding that the Sixth Amendment is violated when
the accused is not permitted to consult an attorney at the point a police investigation process
shifts from investigatory to accusatory).
136. See generally 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that no rule or legislation can abrogate a
right secured by the Constitution).
137. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963) (holding daily
mandatory Bible reading in school was unconstitutional); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433
(1962) (holding New York’s laws officially prescribing the Regents’ prayer are inconsistent with
the Establishment Clause).
138. See McClosky, supra note 121, at 367.
139. See generally GEORGE LOVELL, THIS IS NOT CIVIL RIGHTS: DISCOVERING RIGHTS
TALK IN 1939 AMERICA (2012) (discussing the practice of using civil rights language when ex-
pressing dissatisfaction with political and social conditions).
140. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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which centered on jobs and economic rights.141  The Supreme Court
during the New Deal/Great Society Era promoted the elite conception
of civil liberties, protecting free speech, freedom of religion. racial
equality, and the rights of persons suspected of crime, but rarely an-
nouncing rights to economic equality.142 When the Justices did turn to
rights to basic necessities during the late 1960s,143 partisan differences
among the Justices quickly emerged144 and the effort to promote eco-
nomic equality was soon abandoned.145
The pattern of liberal judicial decisions during the middle to late
twentieth century was partly a consequence of liberal elites in govern-
ment preferring federal Justices who shared their elite values.  One
consequence of the elite consensus that formed during the New Deal/
Great Society Era was that Republicans and Democrats in the execu-
tive branch of the national government often employed similar criteria
when making judicial nominations.  Kevin McMahon details how ra-
cial liberals in the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower administra-
tions sought to pack the federal judiciary with Justices they believed
were committed to declaring Jim Crow institutions unconstitu-
tional.146  Wiley Rutledge and Robert Jackson, two Democratic ap-
pointees, were appointed in part because they had criticized the
Supreme Court’s decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,147
which sustained a state law requiring public school children to salute
141. See generally LOVELL, supra note 139, at 70-106.
142. See generally ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT,
WELFARE RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997) (critiquing the Warren
Court’s rulings on welfare in the context of twentieth-century politics); Mark A. Graber, The
Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (1997) (questioning liberal constitutional theorists’ failure to promote equality
in welfare).
143. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (holding that termination of welfare
benefits prior to a fair hearing adversely affected a recipient’s ability to seek redress); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 621 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a state statutory provision that
denies welfare assistance to residents of the state who have not resided within their jurisdiction
for at least one year).
144. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (reversing judgment in favor of
welfare recipients on grounds that it is not the Court’s place to “second guess” the difficult
responsibility of state officials to allocate resources).
145. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-56 (1973) (holding that
where wealth was involved, the Equal Protection Clause did not require absolute equality or
precisely equal advantages).
146. See generally KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE
PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN (2004) (arguing that Roosevelt’s administration
played a crucial role in the Supreme Court’s increasing commitment to racial equality).
147. 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940) (deciding the courtroom is not the area for debating issues of
educational policy).
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the flag.148  William Brennan, a Republican appointee, had given sev-
eral speeches attacking McCarthyism before being appointed to the
bench.149  Justices who had known liberal attitudes on some civil liber-
ties issues, unsurprisingly, often had liberal attitudes on many other
civil liberties issues.
More important, the elite consensus of the New Deal/Great Soci-
ety Era meant that the Supreme Court was likely to be dominated by
constitutional liberals as long as presidents did not make self-con-
scious efforts to pack the court with constitutional conservatives.
With the exception of Truman’s tendency to nominate Justices he
thought would sustain anti-Communist legislation,150 no Justice from
1932 to 1968 was nominated to the Supreme Court because either the
President or crucial members of the Justice Department believed that
person had narrow conceptions of free speech, religious freedom, ra-
cial equality, or constitutional criminal procedure.151  Eisenhower, in
particular, had few if any substantive litmus tests for federal judges.152
More often than not, he and other Presidents of the time period
looked to appoint a distinguished jurist, whose opinion on one or two
issues might be ascertained with some reasonable degree of certainty.
The public opinion surveys of the times suggest, however, that as long
as Presidents fished in a pond in which only legal elites swam, they
were likely to have a far more liberal catch than if they picked people
randomly out of the phone book.  In particular, if a potential judge’s
opinion on free speech, race, religion, or constitutional criminal proce-
dure could not be determined on the basis of previous statements, the
odds were high that the jurist shared the same liberal sentiments as
did the vast majority of affluent, educated legal elites.
148. Mark A. Graber, False Modesty: Felix Frankfurter and the Tradition of Judicial Re-
straint, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 29-30 (2007).
149. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Closing Remarks for Symposium on “Justice Brennan and the
Living Constitution,” 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2217, 2217-18 (2007).
150. See generally DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999) (discussing what happens before the
Senate hearings to show how Presidents go about deciding who will sit on the Supreme Court).
151. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 163-231 (describing the relationship between
the President and the selection of Justices to the Supreme Court); YALOF, supra note 150, at 20-
96 (analyzing the selection criteria and political pressures affecting the decisions made by the
Presidents, from Truman to Reagan).
152. See YALOF, supra note 150, at 42-44.
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IV. ELITE POLARIZATION AND THE LATE
REHNQUIST/ROBERTS COURT
The late Rehnquist and early Roberts Court seem prominent
counterexamples to claims that life tenured Justices protect powerless
minorities, promote elite values or follow the election returns.  Recent
judicial decisions supporting the National Rifle Association’s interpre-
tation of the Second Amendment153 and striking down limits on cor-
porate expenditures154 hardly demonstrate a judicial capacity “to
listen to voices from the margins.”  A Supreme Court majority be-
came sensitive to gay and lesbian voices only after gays and lesbians
achieved substantial success in electoral politics.155  Several studies
demonstrate both Republican and Democratic judicial appointees are
willing to declare laws unconstitutional that were passed by bipartisan
majorities.156  No political party or elite faction champions the mix of
liberal and conservative polices presently championed by the Supreme
Court, a mix that includes constitutional protections for gun owners,
persons sentenced to death or detained during the war against terror-
ism,157 evangelical Christians,158 gays and lesbians, and white college
153. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding that the Second
Amendment right is fully applicable to the states); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
594 (2008) (holding the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear
arms).
154. Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 883 (2010).
155. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding the Texas statute that
criminalized intimate sexual conduct between same-sex persons was a violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that a law making it more
difficult for one group to seek aid from the government is a denial of equal protection), with
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986) (holding that the act of consensual sodomy is not
protected under the fundamental right to privacy or any right protected under the Constitution).
See generally KLARMAN, supra note 24 (discussing the strength of the backlash against gay mar-
riage in spite of its growing support).
156. See Matthew E. K. Hall, Rethinking Regime Politics, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 878, 885-
86 (2012); Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate
Federal Statutes?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321, 321 (2007) (examining when ideologically mixed
coalitions invalidate bipartisan statutes).
157. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (holding the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was
not intended to result, in death of the victim); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732-33 (2008)
(holding that aliens detained at Guantanamo have the habeas corpus privilege, and declaring
Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (holding the Eighth Amendment
prohibits imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that due process demands that a citizen
held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest
the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision maker).
158. See generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(holding the University’s denial of financial support to a student organization’s publication pro-
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applicants who claim to be victims of affirmative action.159  In sharp
contrast to the Court during the New Deal/Great Society Era, which
was divided between liberals who wished to exercise judicial power on
behalf of liberal causes and liberals who believed in judicial re-
straint,160 the late Rehnquist/early Roberts Court is divided between a
bloc of Justices who hold more liberal opinions on most constitutional
issues than most Democrats, a bloc of Justices who hold more con-
servative opinions on most constitutional issues than most Republi-
cans, and one or two Justices who hold more idiosyncratic opinions on
the constitutional issues of the day.161  The result is the first court in
American history that consistently engages in both liberal and con-
servative activism.162  Neither life tenure, nor elite status, nor the elec-
tion returns in isolation can explain this development.
Life tenure, elite status, and election returns in combination pro-
vide a clearer window into the path of contemporary constitutional
law.  American politics for the past decades has been structured by
increased elite polarization on almost all salient issues of the day.
One consequence of this polarization is that the legal elites that Dem-
ocrats appoint to the federal bench are highly likely to be more liberal
on most constitutional issues than the average Democratic and the
legal elites that Republicans appoint to the federal bench are highly
likely to be more conservative on most constitutional issues than the
average Republican.  Justices Anthony Kennedy is the only justice
presently on the Supreme Court who does not fit this mould.  Ken-
nedy’s voting pattern resembles that of a country-club Republican, an
elite type that flourished during the 1980s when Kennedy was ap-
pointed, but is rapidly vanishing from the political scene.
Elite Polarization.  The structure of elite opinion has changed
sharply over the past fifty years.  Surveys taken in the mid to late
twentieth century suggested that Republican and Democratic elites on
many issues had more in common with each other than with other
moting religious views was a denial of their right of free speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment).
159. See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (holding use of racial preferences
in undergraduate admissions violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
160. See HOWARD GILLMAN ET AL., RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 482 (2012).
161. See id. at 864. See generally MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST
COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11-12 (2005) (describing the political
makeup of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts).
162. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 548-49 (1997).
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members of their party.  Contemporary surveys find that Republican
and Democratic elites now have less in common with each other than
do ordinary Democrats and Republicans.  Much to the frustration of
many ordinary citizens, American politics seems stalemated on many
issues because fewer and fewer elites either hold moderate opinions
or are willing to compromise.
Contemporary public opinion is structured by two phenomena.
The first is elite polarization. Affluent, educated Americans are dis-
proportionately represented among both strong liberals and strong
conservatives, while less affluent and educated citizens are more in-
clined to be political moderates.  Morris Fiorina and Matthew
Levendusky write,
[W]hile systematic evidence indicates that American politics as con-
ducted by the political class is increasingly polarized, the evidence
also suggests that this development is not simply a reflection of an
increasingly polarized electorate.  The result is a disconnect be-
tween the American people and those who purport to represent
them . . . . Contrary to a half-century of theory and research on the
centrist tendencies of two-party politics, American politics today
finds a polarized political class competing for the support of a much
less polarized electorate.163
The second phenomenon is conflict extension.  Geoffrey Layman and
Thomas Carey describe “conflict extension” as “a growth in mass
party polarization on multiple distinct issue dimensions.”  Party elites,
they point out, are not simply more liberal or conservative in general
than ordinary citizens, they are “more polarized on social welfare, ra-
cial, and cultural issues.”164  An affluent, educated Democrat is likely
to be more liberal than the average Democrat on health care, affirma-
tive action, and same-sex marriage.  An affluent, educated Republican
is likely to be more conservative than the average Republican on each
of these issues.  On almost all issues, elite Democrats take the liberal
position and elite Republicans take the conservative position.
Two studies done by the Pew Research Group highlight the pres-
ence of elite polarization and conflict extension in American politics.
163. Morris P. Fiorina & Matthew S. Levendusky, Disconnected: The Political Class Versus
the People, in RED AND BLUE NATION? CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S PO-
LARIZED POLITICS 49, 51-52 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2002).
164. Geoffrey C. Layman & Thomas M. Carsey, Party Polarization and “Conflict Extension”
in the American Electorate, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 786, 789 (2002).
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The first survey was published in 2005.165  The second was published
in 2011.166  Each survey offered a typology of American voters.  Each
survey detailed how, over time, strong conservatives had become
more conservative on more issues and strong liberals had become
more liberal on more issues.  The most extreme typologies, both stud-
ies found, were disproportionately composed of affluent, educated
Americans.
The Pew Research Group in 2005 observed that previous differ-
ences among strong political conservatives had largely vanished.
Surveys in 1987 and 1994 documented the existence of two distinctive
conservative groups: “Enterprisers,” who held strong conservative
views on economic issues, and “Moralists,” who held strong conserva-
tive views on cultural issues.167  By 2005, “Enterprisers” had adopted
the cultural positions of “Moralists.”  The group Pew now labeled as
“Enterprisers” was characterized by strong conservative values across
the political spectrum.  The Pew study declared,
[T]his extremely partisan Republican group’s politics are driven by
a belief in the free enterprise system and social values that reflect a
conservative agenda.  Enterprisers are also the strongest backers of
an assertive foreign policy, which includes nearly unanimous sup-
port for the war in Iraq and strong support for such anti-terrorism
efforts as the Patriot Act.168
The defining values of Enterprisers were “anti-regulation and pro-
business; very little support for government help to the poor; strong
belief that individuals are responsible for their own well being[,]” and
“[c]onservative on social issues such as gay marriage . . . .”169
Liberals were the exact opposite of Enterprisers. Pew found,
“[liberals] are the most opposed to an assertive foreign policy, the
most secular, and take the most liberal views on social issues such as
homosexuality, abortion, and censorship.  They differ from other
Democratic groups in that they are strongly pro-environmental and
165. The 2005 Political Typology, PEW RES. CENTER, 1 (May 10, 2005), http://www.people-
press.org/files/legacy-pdf/242.pdf [hereinafter PEW 2005].
166. Beyond Red vs. Blue: Political Typology, PEW RES. CENTER, 1, 4 (May 4, 2011), http://
www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Beyond-Red-vs-Blue-The-Political-Typology.pdf [herein-
after PEW 2011].
167. See PEW 2005, supra note 165, at 8.
168. Id. at 53.
169. Id.
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pro-immigration.”170  Liberals were “pro-choice,” “supportive of gay
marriage,” and “most opposed to the anti-terrorism Patriot Act.”171
Enterprisers and Liberals were by a significant margin the most
educated and most affluent of the nine typologies Pew identified in
2005.172  Twenty-seven percent of the persons Pew surveyed had grad-
uated college, but 46% of all Enterprisers and 49% of all Liberals had
a college degree.173  Only one other typology (Upbeats—37%) was
composed of more than one-third college graduates and only one
other typology (Social Conservatives—28%) was composed of more
than one-quarter college graduates.174  The pattern was almost as
stark with respect to income.175  Twenty-four percent of the persons
Pew surveyed had family incomes above $75,000, but 41% of both
Enterprisers and Liberals earned that income.176  Upbeats (39%)
were almost as affluent as Enterprisers and Liberals.177  Outside of
Social Conservatives (30%), no other group identified had as many as
one-sixth of all persons surveyed earning $75,000.178
On almost every issue surveyed, the greatest percentage of re-
spondents taking the most conservative position were from the most
affluent and highly educated group of Republicans and the greatest
percentage of respondents taking the most liberal position were from
the most affluent and highly educated group of Democrats.179  This
was particularly the case with issues that were being litigated.  Enter-
prisers were far more likely to oppose (63%) and liberals most likely
to support (82%) “programs designed to help blacks, women and
other minorities get better jobs and education.”180  Liberals were the
group most likely to support legal abortion (88%) and same-sex mar-
riage (80%).181  Enterprisers were the group most likely to oppose
both (54% on abortion; 90% on same-sex marriage).182  Enterprisers
(and Pro-Government Conservatives) were most likely to support
teaching creationism in public schools.  Liberals were the group most
170. Id. at 58.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 64-65.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 70-71.
180. Id. at 70.
181. Id.
182. Id.
2013] 697
Howard Law Journal
opposed.183  Enterprisers and Disaffecteds were the group that most
favored torturing terrorists for information.184  Liberals were the
group most opposed.185
The 2011 Pew survey complicated this story a bit (in part by not
asking the same questions that were asked in 2005).  The divides be-
tween different groups that tended to support Democrats remained
the same.  Members of the most affluent well educated group of Dem-
ocrats tended to be far more liberal on all issues than members of
other Democratic groups.  Most Republicans, elite or otherwise, had
become conservative across the board, at least on the issues most
likely to come before the Supreme Court.  Two new groups of highly
educated, affluent Americans emerged: Post-Moderns and Libertari-
ans.  While Pew placed these groups in the center of their political
typology, because members weaker tendencies to vote for either
Democrats (Post-Moderns) or Republicans (Upbeats) than members
of more partisan groups.  Post-Moderns and Libertarians tended to
take more extreme positions on the sorts of issues likely to come
before federal courts than both members of less affluent and less well
educated groups and members of other, more centrist groups.
Solid Liberals were the most highly educated group that Pew sur-
veyed in 2011 and the most affluent of any group that had any ten-
dency to support Democrats.186 With very rare exception, Solid
Liberals were more liberal on every issue likely to come before fed-
eral courts than any other Democratic group or Democrat leaning
group.187  Eighty-five percent of Solid Liberals supported gay mar-
riage, as compared to 32% of Hard Pressed Democrats and 34% of
New Coalition Democrats.188  The difference between Solid Liberals
and these other Democratic groups was only slightly less with respect
to legal abortion.189  Solid Liberals were more likely than any other
group to favor liberal immigration laws, support health care reform,
maintain that racial discrimination is the main barrier to Afro-Ameri-
can progress, and insist that government must do more to “give blacks
equal rights with whites.”190  They and New Coalition Democrats
183. Id. at 71.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. PEW 2011, supra note 166, at 105.
187. See id. at 99-100, 111.
188. Id. at 111.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 99-100, 111.
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were far more likely than Hard-Pressed Democrats to support gun
control.191  Solid Liberals closely resemble other Democratic groups
only in their view of labor unions.  Members of all three Demo-
cratic groups had by a three-to-one margin of favorable views of that
institution.192
Matters were less clear on the Republican side. The most con-
servative group, Staunch Conservatives, were only slightly better edu-
cated and affluent than the other solidly Republican group, Main
Street Republicans.193  One reason for this change from 2005 was that,
unlike Democrats, who remain divided into distinctive ideological
groups, most Republicans have become conservative on all important
issues.  The Pew researchers noted, “the classic division between eco-
nomic and social conservatives is blurred,” as members of the previ-
ously more affluent and less affluent groups “have coalesced into a
single highly activated group of Staunch Conservatives.”194  Neverthe-
less, the slightly more educated and slightly more affluent Republican
group remains the most conservative of the two solidly Republican
groups in the country on all issues likely to come before courts.195
Staunch Conservatives are more likely than Main Street Republicans
to oppose the Obama health care plan (80%-47%), oppose gay mar-
riage (85% – 72%), oppose legal abortion (72% – 64%) and favor gun
rights (86% – 64%).196  With the exception of abortion, only a minis-
cule number of Staunch Conservatives actually favor liberal policies
on any of these issues (none of the Staunch Conservatives Pew sur-
veyed thought health care reform had “mostly good effects”).197  In-
terestingly, Staunch Conservatives are moderates on First
Amendment issues.198  This may reflect the increasing tendency of
government officials to restrict campaign finance, commercial speech,
and hate speech, measures that limit conservative advocacy, rather
than more traditional restrictions on communism and obscenity.199
The years between 2005 and 2011 witnessed the emergence of
two relatively affluent and educated groups of independents.  Post-
191. Id. at 111.
192. Id. at 108.
193. Id. at 1, 105.
194. Id. at 20.
195. See id. at 109, 111.
196. Id. at 111.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 88.
199. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 396 (1990).
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Moderns, who leaned Democratic, were the second most educated
group surveyed and almost as affluent as Solid Liberals.  Libertarians,
who leaned Republican, were the most affluent group surveyed and
slightly more educated than Staunch Conservatives.200  Post-Moderns
and Libertarians also resembled Solid Liberals and Staunch Conserva-
tives because members of these groups are more united than members
of other groups on virtually all civil liberties issues.201  On some issues,
most notably those associated with racial politics, Libertarians and
Post-Moderns, by comparison, were far more united in favor of con-
servative positions, than any group other than Staunch Conserva-
tives.202  On other matters, Libertarians and Post-Moderns were only
less liberal than Staunch Liberals.  Post-Moderns were the second
most liberal group on censorship, gay marriage, abortion, and envi-
ronmental issues.203  Libertarians were the third most liberal group on
these issues.204  Libertarians were the second most conservative group
on gun rights, labor unions, the merits of big versus small government,
and the environment.205  Post-Moderns were the only group composed
of a substantially number of affluent, well educated citizens who had
any tendency to be one of the three (of nine) centrist groups on any
number of issues that Pew surveyed.206
Members of the most affluent and highly educated of the groups
Pew surveyed were also the most united on the proper method of con-
stitutional interpretation.207 Solid Liberals (81%) and Post-Moderns
(70%) were the only two groups whose members by substantial mar-
gins endorsed a living Constitution.208  Staunch Conservatives (88%)
and Libertarians (70%) were the two groups that most strongly fa-
vored originalism.209  With the exception of Main Street Republicans
(64% favored originalism), members of other groups were far more
divided on questions of constitutional interpretation.210  This finding
200. PEW 2011, supra note 166, at 105.
201. Id. at 108-11.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 111.
204. Id. at 108-09, 111.
205. Id.  Similar differences appeared on foreign policy issues unlikely to come before courts.
Post-Moderns were the second most liberal group when asked if peace was better achieved
through diplomacy or military strength.  Libertarians were the second most conservative. See id.
at 100.
206. Id. at 108-11.
207. PEW 2011, supra note 166, at 109.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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suggests that, a President who nominated a Democrat with a law de-
gree for a federal judgeship was highly likely to place on the bench a
Justice who shared William Brennan’s approach to constitutional ad-
judication.211  Similarly, a President who nominated a Republican
with a law degree was highly likely to place on the bench a Justice who
shared Justice Antonin Scalia’s approach to constitutional
adjudication.212
The Late Rehnquist/Early Roberts Courts.  The changes in the
structure of elite opinion over the past fifty years help explain the
different divisions on the Warren Court and the late Rehnquist/early
Roberts Courts.  During the mid-twentieth century, Democratic and
Republican legal elites both tended to have liberal opinions on the
major constitutional issues being adjudicated before federal courts.
Hence, the major divide on the court in that time period was between
liberal proponents of judicial activism and liberal proponents of judi-
cial restraint.  During the early twenty-first century, most Democratic
legal elites are Solid Liberals who take very liberal positions on almost
every issue being adjudicated by federal courts and most Republican
legal elites are Staunch Conservatives who take very conservative po-
sitions on almost every issue being adjudicated by federal courts.
Hence, the major divide on the contemporary court is between Demo-
cratic appointees who are more liberal than the average Democrat
and Republican appointees who are more conservative than the aver-
age Republican.
The contentious politics of judicial confirmation213 may contrib-
ute to polarization on the Supreme Court.  Contemporary Presidents
often search for “stealth nominees,” whose opinions on many consti-
tutional issues are not well known, in order to avoid confirmation bat-
tles in the Senate.214 Republican Presidents who adopt that strategy
can be expected to select Enterprisers or Staunch Conservatives,
given most affluent, educated Republican legal elites fall into those
political typologies.  Such judges are likely to be originalists who take
211. See William J. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratifica-
tion, 43 GUILD PRAC. 1, 2-3 (1986) (describing Brennan’s approach to interpreting the
Constitution).
212. See Scalia, supra note 28, at 856-57.
213. See generally MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF SU-
PREME COURT CONFIRMATIONS (1994) (describing the evolving politics of judicial
confirmations).
214. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, SUP. CT. REV.,
2010, at 381, 438.
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conservative views on almost all issues coming before the court, with
the possible exception of some free speech matters.  Democratic Pres-
idents who adopt this strategy can be expected to select Liberals or
Solid Liberals, given that most affluent, educated Democratic legal
elites fall into those political typologies.  Such judges are likely to be
living constitutionalists who take liberal views on almost all issues
coming before the court, with the possible exception of matters con-
cerning labor unions.  Republican “mistakes” are likely to be Liber-
tarians, the other affluent, educated group whose members tend to
vote Republican.  Such judges will likely turn out to be originalists
who vote with the conservatives on the bench except on matters of
morality, immigration, and some issues of religion.  Democratic “mis-
takes” are likely to be Post-Moderns, the other affluent educated
group whose members tend to vote democratic.  Such a judge will
likely turn out to be a living constitutionalists who votes with the lib-
erals on the bench, except on some racial issues and questions of na-
tional power.
The voting patterns on the late Rehnquist and early Roberts
Courts are consistent with the patterns that would probably have re-
sulted had Presidents, instead of vetting judicial appointees at great
length, simply selected almost at random an elite lawyer who was a
member of their party.  Chief Justice Roberts, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito vote as Enter-
prisers/Staunch Conservatives.  They are originalists who consistently
take conservative positions on matters ranging from the role of relig-
ion in public life to the scope of national power.  When these Justices
cast liberal votes, the case before the court is likely to concern matters
such as immigration on which Libertarians tend to have more liberal
opinions than Enterprisers/Staunch Conservatives.215  Justice Gins-
burg, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Breyer vote as
Liberals/Solid Liberals.  They are living constitutionalists who consist-
ently take liberal positions on matters ranging from capital punish-
ment to the war against terror.  When these Justices cast conservative
votes, the case before the court is likely to concern matters such as
race and national power, on which Post-Moderns have more conserva-
tive opinions than Liberals/Solid Liberals.216
215. See generally Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497, 2510 (2012) (striking down
crucial state restrictions in Arizona on illegal immigrants).
216. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602, 2609 (2012) (declaring
that part of the Affordable Care Act violated the Spending Clause).
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Justice Kennedy might be characterized as a libertarian, given his
tendency to vote with liberals on some First Amendment issues217 and
privacy matters, but he and Justice O’Connor are better placed in a
previously existing category of Republican elites.218  Kennedy and
O’Connor were appointed at a time when many Republican elites
were best described as “country-club conservatives.”  Mark Tushnet
points out that such affluent, educated Republicans were “sympa-
thetic to claims about reproductive and gay rights and are opposed to
what they see as the intrusion of religion into the public schools.”219
Country-club Republicans were also not as hostile to national power
as those contemporary Staunch Republicans who often support the
Tea Party.220
The divisions on the contemporary Supreme Court mirror these
divisions among contemporary American elites.  Public opinion
surveys find that educated, affluent Democrats are far more likely
than other Democrats to take liberal positions on all the major consti-
tutional issues of the day and that educated, affluent Republicans are
far more likely than other Republicans to take conservative positions
on all the major constitutional issues of the day.  Whether the issue
concerns state sovereign immunity or school vouchers, on all matters
in which the late Rehnquist and early Roberts Courts were divided,
the most recent Democratic appointees took the more liberal position
(joined by two liberal Republicans) and the most recent Republican
appointees took the more conservative position.  Moreover, the lib-
eral and conservative blocs on the present Court seem more liberal
and conservative than the average Democrat and average Republican.
Consider abortion.  Most Americans believe that abortion should be
legal, but heavily regulated.221  The political elites who control the Re-
publican Party believe that abortion should be banned, while the elites
who control the Democratic Party oppose almost all common restric-
tions on abortion.222  Following in this vein, the Staunch Conservative
on the contemporary court have never voted to strike down a restric-
217. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 579-80, 599 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
398-99 (1989).
218. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
219. Mark Tushnet, Understanding the Rehnquist Court, 31 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 197, 198
(2005).
220. See PEW 2011, supra note 166, at 10.
221. See H.W. Perry, Jr., & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the Constitution, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 641, 675 (2009).
222. Id. at 670-78.
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tion on abortion and the Solid Liberals have never voted to sustain a
restriction.223  Justice Kennedy is the only member of the present Su-
preme Court who has voted to sustain and voting to strike down dif-
ferent abortion regulations.224
Electoral returns provide a less helpful guide to the direction of
Supreme Court decision making during times of elite polarization,
conflict extension and electoral volatility.  Most Supreme Court Jus-
tices in these circumstances are likely to be relatively extreme liberal
Democrats or relatively extreme conservative Republicans.  When
Republicans and Democrats alternate in power, the precise balance of
power on the federal judiciary depends on the accidents of death,
whether Justices retire strategically, and the voting pattern of the in-
creasingly rare justice who is neither a Solid Liberal nor a Staunch
Conservative.  Consider the very different pattern of decisions that
might have resulted had Justice Marshall retired during the Carter
presidency and that liberal Democrat judicial appointee left office
during President Obama’s first term of office.  The only prediction
that can be made with some certainty is, if Americans continue to live
in times of elite polarization, conflict extension, and electoral volatil-
ity, constitutional law is likely to be become less stable than at any
previous point in American history.
V. THE COMING CONSTITUTIONAL YO-YO
Elite polarization, conflict extension, and electoral volatility
threaten several enduring stabilities in American constitutional law.
American constitutional law for more than two-hundred years has
been structured by incremental change, relative issue autonomy, and
the relative endurance of landmark decisions.  These stabilities, in
turn, are consequences of either relative electoral stability or, during
periods of electoral volatility, elite consensus.  Americans have never
experienced an extended period when elites are polarized and parties
alternate in control of the national government.  Should these trends
continue, the likely result is an erratic constitutional law that swings
from one relative extreme on many issues to the other.
American constitutional law has historically tended to change in-
crementally.  While Supreme Court decisions inevitably make at least
some changes to the existing body of constitutional law, most deci-
223. See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
224. See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
704 [VOL. 56:661
The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo?
sions do little more than slightly extend or modify existing doctrine.
The constitutional law landscape is littered with far more decisions
resembling United States v. Jones,225 which relied heavily on the com-
mon law of trespass when declaring that police need a warrant when
attaching a GPS system to a private car, than Mapp v. Ohio,226 which
upset longstanding prosecutorial practices when holding that the
Fourth Amendment as incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment required states to exclude unconstitutionally
obtained evidence from criminal trials.  Judicial decisions overruling
past cases are rare.  Judicial decisions overruling landmark cases are
rarer still.227
Different areas of constitutional law are often relatively autono-
mous from each other, characterized by what Karen Orren and Ste-
phen Skowronek describe as “intercurrence.”228  Orren and
Skowronek maintain that “the normal condition of the policy [is] that
of multiple incongruous authorities operating simultaneously.”229
Constitutional doctrine on different subject matters, like “the institu-
tions of a polity . . . are created . . . at different times, in the light of
different experiences, and often for quite contrary purposes.”230  In-
stabilities in one area of constitutional law often have limited impact
on other areas of constitutional law.  The 1930s and 1940s witnessed
dramatic changes in the constitutional law of national powers231 and
property rights,232 but no changes in the constitutional law of capital
punishment233 or the right to bear arms.234  The “revolutionary” War-
ren Court did not challenge previous understandings of property
225. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
226. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
227. See generally LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECI-
SIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS (5th ed. 2011) (providing a comprehensive collection of data and
information on the U.S. Supreme Court).
228. KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL DE-
VELOPMENT 108 (2004).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 112.
231. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the federal govern-
ment can regulate economic activity); United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941)
(holding that the federal government can regulate employment conditions).
232. See generally West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of a state’s minimum wage legislation).
233. See generally Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (holding that
capital punishment does not violate the Constitution).
234. See generally Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435 (1935) (holding that a provision of
the National Firearms Act of 1934 violated the Second Amendment of the United States
Constitution).
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rights235 or gender equality236 and had almost nothing to say on the
constitutional law of separation of powers.237
Both secular trends in constitutional law doctrine and landmark
judicial decisions tend to have fairly long staying power.  Once the
Justices begin to expand or narrow particular constitutional rights, the
course of judicial decisions tends to go in the same direction for sev-
eral generations.  The Supreme Court from the end of Reconstruction
until the early twentieth century repeatedly chipped away at the con-
stitutional foundations of racial equality.238  After Guinn v. United
States,239 the Justices for the next fifty years consistently made deci-
sions that expanded constitutional protections for people of color.240
With the notable exception of Hepburn v. Griswold,241 which was
overruled almost immediately,242 the relatively rare judicial decision
that dramatically alters existing doctrine proves relatively enduring.
Landmark constitutional law cases are often modified or narrowed,
but rarely overruled. Liberals regularly accuse conservatives of under-
mining the spirit of such decisions as Mapp v. Ohio,243 Miranda v.
Arizona,244 and Roe v. Wade,245 but those decisions, as well as every
other landmark liberal decision of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, remain
standing today.246
The dynamics of partisan competition in the United States
throughout much of American history supported these stabilities.  Po-
litical scientists point out that American politics has historically been
235. See generally Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding a statute criminalizing
“debt adjusting”).
236. See generally Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding a jury selection statute that
mandated men, and not women, to serve as jurors).
237. Leading textbooks in law and political science include no case on separation of powers
decided when Earl Warren was Chief Justice. See, e.g., GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 490-
512; KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249-347 (17th ed.
2010).
238. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896);
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
239. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
240. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
241. 75 U.S. 603 (1870).
242. See Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457 (1871).
243. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). But see Leon v. United States, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (creating a
“good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule for violations of the Fourth Amendment).
244. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). But see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (holding that
Miranda warnings are not constitutionally protected).
245. 410 U.S. 113 (1972). But see Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)
(upholding a state statute that restricted various types of assistance to receiving an abortion).
246. For an admittedly outdated work on this point, see generally THE BURGER COURT: THE
COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
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characterized by long periods of relative partisan stability during
which one party, Jeffersonian Republicans, Jacksonian Democrats,
Reconstruction Republicans, or New Deal Democrats, controls most
national institutions most of the time.247  Either judicial doctrine is
stable during those time periods or the course of judicial decisions is
consistent because most Justices share whatever constitutional vision
animates the dominant party. Constitutional doctrine from Recon-
struction until the Civil War reflected the pro-business orientation of
the dominant Republican Party.248  The Supreme Court after the New
Deal provided increasing support for persons of color at the same
time that liberals in other national institutions provided increased sup-
port for persons of color.249
The structure of elite opinion throughout much of American his-
tory has also supported the incremental nature of most changes in
constitutional law, the relative autonomy of different issue areas, and
the relative durability of landmark cases.  Elite consensus has often
been the norm in American constitutional politics.  From the very be-
ginning of the Republic, elites often had more in common with each
other than they did with the mass base of their parties, and this elite
consensus provided foundations for a more stable constitutional law.
Thomas Jefferson when seeking to make his first judicial appointment
found that all qualified Jeffersonian lawyers in the deep south had
strong ties to commercial establishments.  Jefferson and Madison
tended to appoint moderate national Republicans to the Supreme
Court because educated affluent Jeffersonian lawyers were far more
likely to be moderates who were supportive of the general trends of
the Marshall Court than the average Jeffersonian voter.250  For this
reason, the transition from Federalist to Jeffersonian rule had less in-
fluence on the Supreme Court than other governing institutions.251
When elite polarization occurred, the lack of conflict extension pre-
served the relative autonomy of most matters of constitutional law.
During the years before the Civil War, Southern affluent educated
lawyers held very different opinions on slavery than Northern affluent
247. See generally JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT
AND REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1983).
248. See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 319-326.
249. See KLARMAN, supra note 65, at 173-96.
250. See generally RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN
THE YOUNG REPUBLIC (1971).
251. See generally Mark A. Graber, Federalist or Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and
Party Politics, 12 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 229, 242 (1998).
2013] 707
Howard Law Journal
educated lawyers. Dred Scott,252 which held that Congress could not
ban slavery in American territories, was one consequence of these sec-
tional differences.  Nevertheless, elite polarization on slavery was con-
tained.  The judicial majority in Dred Scott included Peter Daniel, the
Justice who held the narrowest conception of national power to regu-
late the economy,253 and James Wayne, the Justice who held the
broadest conception of national power to regulate the economy.254
Antebellum judicial alignments in slavery cases were different from
judicial alignments in Contract Clause and dormant Commerce
Clause cases, the two other constitutional issues frequently litigated
before the Supreme Court in Jacksonian America.  The Justices in the
Dred Scott majority, for example, divided 3-2 when considering the
state power to tax passengers on ships arriving from out of state.255
The absence of conflict extension helps explain why a court that took
southern positions on slavery issues adopted fairly centrist positions
on the other constitutional issues of the day and did not break dramat-
ically from previous precedent on these matters.256
Elite consensus explains the stability of American constitutional
law during the late nineteenth century, the most electorally volatile
period in American history.  From 1880 to 1900, the parties rotated
control over national executive and more than one-hundred seat sw-
ings in Congress were common.  Nevertheless, most areas of constitu-
tional law remained either unchanged or moved in a steady
conservative direction.257  Constitutional law exhibited almost none of
the instabilities of electoral politics because the elite wings of both the
Democratic and Republican Parties was located in the northeast and
was committed to a pro-business constitutional vision.258  The con-
servative Democrats that Grover Cleveland appointed to the Supreme
Court differed little from the conservative Republicans that James
Garfield, Chester Arthur, and Benjamin Harrison appointed to the
252. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
253. See, e.g., Seawright v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 151, 180-81 (1845) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (denying
national power to build roads).
254. See, e.g., Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 410-11 (1849) (“The commerce power is] exclu-
sively vested in Congress, [and] that no part of it can be exercised by a State.”).
255. Justices Wayne, Catron, and Grieg thought the state tax unconstitutional.  Chief Justice
Taney and Justice Daniel disagreed. See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
256. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1952); Piqua Branch of State Bank of Ohio
v. Knoop, 57 U.S. 369 (1853). See generally MCCLOSKEY, supra note 20, at 56-59.
257. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 20, at 80-90.
258. See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 322.
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Supreme Court.259  In Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co.,260 the
only major constitutional case in that era in which the Justices divided
5-4, the majority in favor of striking down the national income tax was
composed of three Republican appointees and two Democrat appoin-
tees.  Three Republican appointees and one Democratic appointee
dissented.
The Reagan Era provides another illustration of the structure of
elite opinion stabilizing constitutional law.  Reagan and his conserva-
tive allies sought to push American constitutional law sharply to the
right.261  Democrats after 1986, however, had the necessary votes to
prevent Reagan from placing on the Supreme Court any Justice on
record as favoring a substantial conservative judicial turn.  Stymied by
failed efforts to place such conservatives as Robert Bork on the
bench, Republicans in the executive branch turned to “stealth” nomi-
nees, affluent, educated Republican lawyers who had not expressed
firm opinions on most constitutional issues of the day.262  During the
late twentieth century, an affluent, educated Republican lawyer whose
constitutional opinions were not yet public was at least as likely to fit
the mold of a “country-club Republican,” as what the Pew Foundation
presently considers a Staunch Conservative.  Thus, the end result of
the stealth nominee strategy was a moderate with little interest in
moving constitutional law to the right (Souter), a libertarian/moderate
conservative interested in moving only some constitutional doctrines
to the right (Kennedy), and a more doctrinaire conservative
(Thomas).  The Reagan judicial strategy failed in large part because
the structure of elite opinion combined with the politics of judicial
confirmation privileged the selection of Republicans more interested
in stable constitutional law than a significantly more conservative con-
stitutional law.
These foundations for a stable constitutional law have crumbled.
Electoral volatility destabilizes constitutional law because Justices,
when control of the institutions responsible for staffing the federal ju-
diciary alternates, are frequently unlikely to share a common partisan
constitutional vision.  Elite polarization destabilizes constitutional law
259. See ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 109-21.
260. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
261. See generally YALOF, supra note 150, at 133 (“Reagan’s Pursuit of Conservative
Ideologies”).
262. See Richard S. Myers, Reviews, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 619, 619 (1992) (reviewing MARK
GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF AMERICA’S REJECTION OF
ROBERT BORK’S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT (1992)).
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because Justices, when the affluent educated lawyers most likely to
staff the federal bench are either more conservative then the average
member of the more conservative party or more liberal than the aver-
age member of the more liberal party, are unlikely to share a common
elite constitutional vision.  The combination of electoral volatility and
elite polarization, we have seen, is a recipe for a Supreme Court
whose two largest blocs are Staunch Conservatives whose opinions are
to the right of the average Republican and Solid Liberals whose opin-
ions are to the left of the average Democrat.
Conflict extension further destabilizes American constitutional
law.  For much of the twentieth century, the relative autonomy of con-
stitutional issues insulated most constitutional doctrines from substan-
tial changes in other constitutional doctrines.  Roosevelt’s judicial
appointees were as united as other New Deal liberals on the principle
that Justices should not interfere with economic legislation,263 but the
Supreme Court until 1954 did not move dramatically to the left on
civil rights and civil liberties issues because the liberals Roosevelt ap-
pointed to the Court were as divided on the merits of judicial protec-
tion for free speech rights and the rights of persons suspected of crime
as other New Deal liberals.264  While on the Court, for example, Jus-
tice Frankfurter destabilized Commerce Clause doctrine, but helped
temporarily stabilize doctrine on the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights.265  By comparison, should President Obama appoint a liberal
to the supreme bench solely for the purpose of providing greater sup-
port for health care legislation, he is highly likely to appoint a Solid
Liberal who also favors the liberal position on same-sex marriage, af-
firmative action, and government power to regulate guns.  Similarly,
should the next Republican President appoint a conservative to the
bench solely for the purpose of maintaining the right to bear arms, he
or she is likely to appoint a Staunch Conservative who favors the con-
servative position on federal health care legislation, same-sex mar-
riage and affirmative action.  In short, unlike New Deal Justices and
other jurists appointed to the Supreme Court during times of conflict
263. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby Lumber Co.,
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
264. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947).  For a general discussion of liberal divisions on free speech and other civil liberties
issues, see generally MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEG-
ACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991); JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FE-
LIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA (1989).
265. See cases cited supra note 231.
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diffusion, judicial appointments in times of conflict extension are
likely to want to move almost all of constitutional law in the same
ideological direction.
Should Americans continue to live in a political environment
structured by electoral volatility, elite polarization, and conflict exten-
sion, constitutional precedents are likely to be overturned at unprece-
dented rates.  Consider the numerous areas of constitutional law that
a liberal Justice appointed by President Obama to replace a conserva-
tive Justice would destabilize.  Among the decisions that the new 5-4
liberal majority on the Supreme Court would likely consider ripe for
reversal are past rulings finding regulatory takings, permitting ostensi-
ble neutral state aid to flow to parochial schools,266 finding an individ-
ual right to bear arms protected by the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments,267 striking down campaign finance regulations,268 im-
posing Commerce Clause and state sovereign immunity restrictions
against the federal government,269 and declaring unconstitutional
some self-conscious uses of race for purposes of diversity when as-
signing pupils to public schools.270  The replacement of a liberal Jus-
tice with a conservative would be as destabilizing.  Should a
Republican President have the opportunity to replace one of the four
members of the liberal bloc on the Roberts Court, the decisions ripe
for reversal include past rulings finding a public use when government
transfers property from one private owner to another private
owner,271 declaring unconstitutional school prayer exercises,272 strik-
ing down state restrictions on abortion and gay rights,273 protecting
detainees in Guantanamo Bay,274 limiting state capacity to inflict capi-
tal punishment,275 justifying the Affordable Care Act as a legitimate
exercise of the federal taxing power,276 and sustaining affirmative ac-
tion policies.277 Seventeen of the twenty-two Supreme Court cases de-
266. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
267. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570 (2008).
268. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
269. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. Ports
Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
270. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
271. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
272. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
273. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
274. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
275. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
276. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___ (2012).
277. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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cided on constitutional grounds that were included in the chapter on
the contemporary era in our casebook dedicated to civil liberties are
highly vulnerable to reversal in the immediate future.278
Given the precarious balance on the federal bench and in electo-
ral politics, the following constitutional yo-yo is not an unrealistic pre-
diction.  President Obama replaces Justice Kennedy with a Solid
Liberal, whose voting pattern on the Court is similar to that of Justices
Kagan and Sotomayor.  The result is huge swaths of constitutional
doctrine turn left.  Public opinion, however, shifts a bit.  The result is
that a Republican wins the 2016 presidential election and, a year later,
replaces Justice Breyer with a Staunch Conservative.  The new 5-4
conservative majority turns huge swaths of constitutional doctrine
rightward.  Public opinion, however, shifts a bit to the left, and you
can see how the rest of this story is going.  The course of constitutional
law becomes erratic, with minor changes in public opinion resulting in
substantial shifts in constitutional doctrine.
Changes in elite opinion make less likely the appointment of a
“stealth justice” who turns out either to have more centrist opinions
or less ideological consistency across issues than either Solid Liberals
or Staunch Conservatives.  As recently as thirty years ago, many elite
Republican lawyers were either traditionalists who held moderate/
center-right views on many constitutional issues or libertarians who
leaned to the left on some constitutional issues and to the right on
others.  Hence, when Democrats had the political power in the Senate
to defeat such known Staunch Conservatives as Robert Bork, the Re-
publican strategy of appointing an elite Republican lawyer was as
likely to result in the moderate David Souter or libertarian Anthony
Kennedy as the very conservative Clarence Thomas.  The vast major-
ity of elite lawyers in both parties now consistently hold more liberal
or more conservative views on almost all issues than the average
Democrat or Republican.  Hence, stealth candidates in the future are
more likely to be Solid Liberals or Staunch Conservatives who kept
their proclivities private than Justices who might moderate the im-
pending constitutional yo-yo.
278. See generally 2 HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: RIGHTS & LIBERTIES 881-1053 (2012).
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VI. TOO UNSETTLING?
If the above analysis is correct, American constitutional politics
in conditions of electoral volatility, elite polarization, and conflict ex-
tension will witness severe and destabilizing doctrinal swings.  This
likely erratic course of constitutional law undermines values champi-
oned by proponents of constitutional settlements and constitutional
unsettlements.  Neither majoritarian nor distinctively constitutional
values are promoted by constitutional doctrine that swings from ex-
treme conservatism to extreme liberalism in short periods of time.
Americans are likely to avert these constitutional yo-yos only if they
enter a new period of electoral stability, elite consensus, or conflict
diffusion.  Alternatively, Supreme Court Justices might discover the
temporary virtues of judicial minimalism.  These saving alternatives
require much strong sociological, jurisprudential, and normative foun-
dations for the constitutional center than presently exist in the United
States.
The Disease.  The constitutional yo-yos threatened by the lethal
combination of electoral volatility, elite polarization, and conflict ex-
tension will destabilize constitutional law more than even opponents
of constitutional settlements stomach.  These constitutional commen-
tators insist that constitutional authority and judicial power be exer-
cised in ways that keep certain fundamental regime questions
unsettled.279  Keeping constitutional question open, in their view, fa-
cilitates constitutional adjustments in light of changing public opinion,
political trends, or social conditions.  Constitutional yo-yos, however,
are far more sensitive to small, transient changes in public opinion,
political trends, or social conditions than any unsettlement theorist
thinks advisable.  Americans living in a regime where constitutional
law swings wildly in different ideological directions enjoy neither the
benefits promised by proponents nor opponents of constitutional
settlements.280
American constitutional commentators are engaging in a vigor-
ous debate over the merits of a stable constitutional law.  Larry Alex-
ander and Frederick Schauer urge their fellow citizens to adopt
institutional arrangements that minimize substantial changes in consti-
279. See generally LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DE-
FENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001).
280. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (1997); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2002).
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tutional doctrine.  They maintain that “the settlement of contested is-
sues is a crucial component of constitutionalism” and that “this goal
can be achieved only by having an authoritative interpreter whose in-
terpretations bind all others, and [that] the Supreme Court can best
serve this role.”281  Louis Seidman is the leading champion of prac-
tices that keep constitutional doctrine unsettled.  “An unsettled con-
stitution,” he writes, “helps build a community founded on consent by
enticing losers into a continuing conversation.”282
Electoral volatility, elite polarization, and conflict extension
destabilize the constitutional regime, but do so in ways that do not
promote the claimed virtues of an unsettled constitutional law.  Seid-
man champions a flexible Constitution that responds appropriately to
political and social developments.  He asserts that “stability and pre-
dictability are best served by gradual shifts in constitutional obligation
rather than by either rigid entrenchment or its inevitable partner, con-
vulsive regime change.”283  An unsettled constitutional law when pub-
lic opinion on capital punishment moves slightly to the left would also
shift slightly to the left, perhaps as a consequence of judicial rulings
requiring better legal representation for capitally sentenced prisoners
and slightly increasing the categories of crimes and criminals not eligi-
ble for execution.  Such relatively precise adjustments do not occur
when constitutional politics is more polarized than the political com-
munity.  In a constitutional universe divided between liberal Justices
who believe capital punishment is always unconstitutional and con-
servative Justices who believe capital punishment is no different than
any other sanction, small changes in public opinion either have no ef-
fect or an effect far beyond their scope.  If a slight swing in public
opinion causes no change in the ideological composition of the federal
judiciary, capital punishment law remains the same.  If a slight swing
in public opinion causes a slight change in the ideological composition
of the federal judiciary, then either the federal judiciary with a new 5-
4 Solid Liberal majority declares capital punishment unconstitutional
or the federal judiciary with a new 5-4 Staunch Conservative majority
overrules almost every case imposing constitutional limits on state and
federal efforts to impose the death penalty.
Small shifts in voting behavior in a society wracked by elite polar-
ization and conflict extension cause dramatic shifts in almost every
281. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 280, at 1359.
282. Seidman, supra note 279, at 8-9.
283. Id. at 47.
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constitutional doctrine, even when no change in public opinion has
taken place on the vast majority of constitutional issues.  Imagine the
Obama Administration is blamed by some segment of the country for
mishandling a foreign policy crisis and the Republican candidate rides
these international concerns to the presidency in the 2016 national
election.  In 2017, that newly elected President replaces Justice Ken-
nedy with a Justice who votes more similarly to Justice Alito.  The
resulting 5-4 Staunch Conservative majority in the next four years will
shift the constitutional law of abortion, same-sex marriage, property
rights, federal commerce power, school prayer, affirmative action, and
other matters substantially to the right, even though public opinion
has remained unchanged on these matters.  Should that Republican
President be caught with his or her hand in the till, Democrats gain
control of the White House in 2020, and that Democratic President
replaces Justice Antonin Scalia with a Justice who votes more simi-
larly to Justice Kagan, the resulting 5-4 Solid Liberal majority will ini-
tiate a sharp constitutional swing of similar magnitude to the left.
These swings are entirely unrelated to any change in public opinion or
social conditions with respect to any constitutional issue.  In condi-
tions of elite polarization and conflict extension, any change in voting
behavior for any reason is likely to result in dramatic changes in the
constitutional law of almost every constitutional issue.
Perhaps nothing is particularly wrong with such sharp swings in
American constitutional law.  Such swings are possible in a country
without a judicially enforceable constitution.  If most elections are
close contests between a committed liberal party and a committed
conservative party, the legality of same-sex marriage and affirmative
action, as well as the government’s willingness to adopt certain health
care programs and immigration policies, will swing as wildly as the
election returns.  If the point of constitutionalism is to mediate such
public mood swings, so much the worse for constitutionalism.  The
people can always decide to mediate electoral mood swings on their
own by voting for the status quo or building a party committed to
more centrist policies.
This erratic course of fundamental rights and regime principles
may nevertheless undermine constitutionalism.  Constitutionalism
normally requires some rule by the dead in order to empower officials
and organize politics, establish the rule of law and make credible com-
mitments, prevent self-dealing by governing officials, promote the
public interest, assert national aspirations, and entrench those consti-
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tutional compromises that preserve national unity.284  Constitutional
yo-yos threaten many of these constitutional purposes.  Constitutions
are poor means for asserting national aspirations when the constitu-
tional status of same-sex marriage, federal regulatory power, and
property rights changes substantially by the decade.  Rule of law and
credible commitment values are jeopardized when no one can be as-
sured that basic constitutional norms will last past the next election.
Strong majoritarians have fair responses to these dire predictions.
Democracies give the public the right to decide the weight of various
constitutional purposes.  Popular majorities, democrats think, are best
positioned to determine whether a change in regime outweighs needs
for credible commitments or an enduring policy on same-sex mar-
riage. Moreover, the threat to constitutional values is not quite as dire
as the above paragraphs may have suggested.  Constitutional law deals
exclusively with what Sandy Levinson has called the “constitution of
conversation” and not with what he declares to be the “constitution of
settlement.”285  The constitution of conversation consists of those
clauses, such as the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
whose meaning is disputable.  By comparison, the constitution of set-
tlement consists of those clauses, such as the inauguration day clause,
whose meaning is indisputable.  Thus, even if all of the constitutional
law found in the traditional constitutional casebook is up for grabs in
the next series of elections, most of the Constitution remains stable.
The Supreme Court is not being asked to reconsider bicameralism, the
four year presidential term, the basic processes by which a bill be-
comes law and the existence of a federal court system.  To this we
might add the enormous amount of constitutional law that does not
seem to be the subject of dispute between liberals and democrats.
This would include such cases as Marbury v. Madison,286 Brown v.
Board of Education,287 Gibbons v. Ogden,288 and Gideon v. Wain-
wright.289  These stabilities in themselves are probably sufficient to
preserve most vital constitutional purposes.
284. See 1 HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 7-10 ( 2013).
285. See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE
CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 17-27 (2012).
286. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
287. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
288. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
289. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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The problem with this democratic majoritarian justification for
constitutional yo-yos is that the impending destabilization of constitu-
tional law is a consequence of the less majoritarian features of the
American constitutional regime and not of a public that erratically
shifts from relatively extreme conservative to relatively extreme lib-
eral views on all issues of the day.  The American public is not as
polarized as the American elite.290 The more centrist majority of
Americans (or at least the more centrist median voter in the United
States) is having increased difficulty maintaining relative centrist poli-
cies on most constitutional issues for two reasons.  First, a constitu-
tional system in which most national officials are selected in local
elections has a tendency to generate Presidents and members of Con-
gress more polarized than the general electorate.291  Second, the prac-
tice of appointing highly educated, affluent, partisan lawyers to the
Supreme Court in the present circumstances of elite polarization prac-
tically guarantees a court divided between Solid Liberals and Staunch
Conservatives, even though less than a third of the public fit into ei-
ther of those relative extreme categories.  For both these reasons, the
course of American constitutional law is unlikely to reflect consist-
ently either the sentiments of the largely centrist median American
voter or the ideals championed by any particular elite constitutional
thinker.
The Cure.  The best cure for constitutional yo-yos is a return to
electoral stability, elite consensus, and conflict diffusion.  History sug-
gests that American constitutional law will avoid lurching from right
to left only if one of these three foundations for constitutional stability
is restored.  Electoral stability assures that constitutional law consist-
ently reflects the constitutional vision of a relatively enduring domi-
nant national coalition.  Elite consensus assures that constitutional law
consistently reflects the common constitutional vision of highly edu-
cated, affluent Republican and Democratic lawyers.  Conflict diffu-
sion prevents polarization on particular issues from having a
disproportionate impact on the entire corpus of constitutional law.
Judicial minimalism is the best preventative for constitutional yo-
yos.  Cass Sunstein, the leading proponent of that approach to the ju-
dicial function in constitutional cases, asserts, “[a] court that leaves
290. See sources cited supra notes 159, 217.
291. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 35-
36 (2012); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 707,
732-33 (2009).
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things open will not foreclose options in a way that may do a great
deal of harm.”292  Narrow judicial rulings also promote further demo-
cratic deliberation on complex constitutional issues.  Sunstein writes,
“minimalist rulings increase the space for further reflection and de-
bate at the local, state, and national levels, simply because they do not
foreclose subsequent decisions.”  Justices committed to judicial
minimalism do not declare capital punishment unconstitutional, insist
that Congress has no right to regulate independent expenditures, rule
that states may never use race in the admissions process, or defer any-
time the federal government whispers the phrase “commerce clause”
in oral argument.  Instead, they support rulings limited to either the
particular manifestation of a broader constitutional issue before the
court or a fairly small subset of the broader constitutional problems.
By deciding only, for example, that Congress may not pass this partic-
ular ban on independent expenditures, the Justices leave open the
possibility that other bans might be sustained in light of more mature
public deliberation, changes in social conditions or, frankly, changes in
the composition of the court.
Judicial minimalism is particularly appropriate during times of
electoral volatility, elite polarization, and conflict extension.  Justices
may justifiably issue broader rulings when either there is a general
consensus among the voting public, measured by consistent support
for a particular political coalition, or among persons who seriously re-
flect about legal matters, measured by a consensus among legal elite,
that a particular constitutional direction best achieves American con-
stitutional aspirations.  Courts may be leading public opinion in these
circumstances, but they are leading an opinion at least prone to follow
the Justices.  Justices who initiate or continue constitutional yo-yos re-
alize none of the benefits of judicial activism while bringing about
many of the defects.  Constitutional decisions that are likely to be re-
versed or severely modified within a decade do not give the United
States a distinctive constitutional character and they do not enable the
court to play the role of “republican schoolmaster.”293  All such deci-
sions are likely to do is move the Court further from the more centrist
public and provide further irritation for an already over-irritated con-
stitutional polity.
292. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 4 (1999).
293. See generally Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmasters, 1967 SUP.
CT. REV., 1967, at 127, 127.
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For better or worse, Justices are unlikely to act consistently with
minimalist principles in the near future.  Mark Tushnet has noted that
“natter(ing) at justices” in law reviews has almost no effect.294  Most
Justices, one expects, enter office with the confidence that the most
recent election is a harbinger of the future success of their preferred
political coalition.  If so, perhaps the best advice this Article can offer
is that all of us who teach constitutional law ought to be prepared to
rewrite our lectures on a regular basis.
294. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 155 (1999).
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Wiley Branton, the former dean of Howard University School of
Law, is best known for his legal skill and for his courage in the face of
white resistance to Brown v. Board of Education.  In 1956, two years
after the U.S. Supreme Court decreed Jim Crow schools a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause,1 and just three years after his law school
graduation, Branton filed suit on behalf of thirty-three black students
who sought admission to Little Rock, Arkansas schools, still all-white,
Brown notwithstanding.  The young lawyer’s suit, Cooper v. Aaron,2
escalated into a monumental constitutional conflict—a battle between
federal and state power, between the rule of law and mob rule.3
Cooper became the vehicle for a resounding declaration by the Su-
preme Court of the supremacy of Brown and all federal law over con-
trary state law and defiant authorities in all branches of state
government—executive, legislative, and judicial.4  For his decisive role
in a critically important constitutional case, we remember and cele-
brate Wiley Branton.
Branton’s legacy and the significance of Cooper surpass the
realms of courts and law, however.  The protest did not begin and
would not end with Branton; an entire community—a movement for
equality under law—instigated and sustained the lawsuit.5  Large
numbers of ordinary people, organized by non-lawyers in the local
NAACP chapter, supported Branton’s court-based challenge to segre-
gation in the Little Rock schools.  Both the feats of Branton and his
allies in the political community provide a fitting context in which to
consider questions relevant to this historical moment.  Does protest
really work?  Can citizen participation in  informal politics—demon-
strations, boycotts and other forms of mass participatory action—help
to address issues of our time?  If so, how might lawyers advance the
goals of such protest movements?
1. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
3. See David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1065
(2008) (analyzing Cooper as a keystone case testing and defining Brown’s civil rights legacy); see
also JUDITH KILPATRICK, THERE WHEN WE NEEDED HIM: WILEY AUSTIN BRANTON, CIVIL
RIGHTS WARRIOR 64 (2007).
4. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 1.
5. See ELIZABETH JACOWAY, TURN AWAY THY SON: LITTLE ROCK, THE CRISIS THAT
SHOOK THE NATION (2007).
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The most celebrated episodes of the civil rights era can crowd out
these questions and obscure answers to them.  In legal literature, the
constitutional dimensions of Cooper v. Aaron overshadow examina-
tion of the protest movement that gave rise to the legal action.6  Even
when scholars specifically recall the non-lawyers who animated legal
changes, they often discuss change agents in hagiographic terms.  The
Little Rock Nine are now iconic symbols of the hardship that blacks
endured in the struggle against Jim Crow.7  Few have analyzed the
story behind the lawsuit—the ideas, planning, groundwork, and pro-
test—that provided the context in which the great constitutional case
unfolded.
It is this context—rather than the landmark lawsuits—that should
command more of our attention.  For a truer picture of how social
change can occur, scholars must study social movements in detail
rather than skim the surface of history in search of icons and moments
to celebrate.  If civil rights-era protests are to provide useful lessons
today, when economic inequality is one of the most pressing issues of
our times, we must examine the movement’s evolution and its depth
and breadth.
Long before the Little Rock Nine’s struggle for school desegrega-
tion, and then again years after it, the movement made full and fair
employment and an end to poverty its chief quests.8  During the 1930s
and 1940s, A. Phillip Randolph and other labor leaders demanded
both racial equality and fair labor practices.9  In 1963, activists affili-
ated with multiple civil rights organizations demanded “jobs and free-
dom” during the March on Washington.10  And in 1967, Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. insisted: “The time has come for us to civilize our-
6. See generally Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional In-
terpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997) (defending Cooper and judicial supremacy in consti-
tutional interpretation without qualification); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch: Executive Power to Say what the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994) (asserting that Cooper
is wrong while defending a conception of the President’s broad interpretive powers).
7. See, e.g., Robbie Brown, Jefferson Thomas, Who Helped Integrate Little Rock School,
Dies at 67, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2010, at A18; Larry Luxner, Arkansas’ ‘Little Rock Nine’—55
Years Later, BALT. POST-EXAMINER, Dec. 20, 2012, available at http://baltimorepostexaminer.
com/arkansas-little-rock-nine-55-years-later/2012/12/20.
8. See, e.g., Jacqueline Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses
of the Past, 91 J. AM. HIST. 1233 (2005) (discussing dimensions of the labor and civil rights
struggle that focused on economic inequality).
9. See William P. Jones, The Unknown Origins of the March on Washington: Civil Rights
Politics and the Black Working Class, 7 LABOR: STUDIES IN WORKING-CLASS HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAS 33 (2010).
10. Id. at 34.
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selves by the total, direct and immediate abolition of poverty.”11  Af-
ter King’s assassination one year later, the demand for an “all-out
world war on poverty” became the unfinished business of the civil
rights movement.12
The “Occupy” Movement’s challenge to wealth inequality, the
domination by the “1 percent” of the “99 percent,” has brought new
urgency to what is, for students of the long civil rights movement’s
struggle for economic justice, an old issue.13  Like movement veterans
in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Oc-
cupy movement focused attention on unequal distributions of wealth
that relegate millions to society’s margins.14  Using the playbook of
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)—which
formed a multiracial Poor People’s Campaign that in 1968 camped in a
Washington park to highlight citizens’ hunger and deprivation in an
otherwise prosperous nation—Occupy camped in parks across the na-
tion to highlight one of the twenty-first century’s most vexing
problems.15  Critics of Occupy have dismissed it as ineffective, just as
skeptics lambasted civil rights-era antipoverty activists.16  Whatever its
flaws—and many are evident—Occupy has prompted a public conver-
sation about economic inequality not witnessed since the 1960s,17 and
it has created an opportunity for conversation about the past and fu-
ture of protest, policy, and legal change.
This Article considers why, and how, protests mattered yesterday,
and how protest might still matter today, using the civil rights move-
ment and Occupy as points of departure.  It historicizes the issue of
wealth inequality and then compares and contrasts Occupy’s activism
to past efforts.
The historical dimension of the analysis considers several key mo-
ments in the long history of the civil rights movement’s fight for a
11. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR
COMMUNITY? (1967).
12. THOMAS F. JACKSON, FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN LUTHER KING
JR. AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE 326 (2007).
13. See generally Hall, supra note 8; Jones supra note 9; JACKSON supra note 12.
14. See Michelle Singletary, Rage Against the Financial Sector Fuels Protest, WASH. POST,
Oct. 8, 2011, at G01 (discussing Occupy and its aims). See generally JOSEPH STIGLITZ, THE
PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012) (dis-
cussing wealth inequality).
15. See JACKSON, supra note 12, at 353-58 (discussing the SCLC and King).
16. See, e.g., Occupy Movement (Occupy Wall Street), N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2012), http://
topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/o/occupy_wall_street/index.html.
17. See STIGLITZ, supra note 14; see also David Carr, A Movement, A Question: What Now?,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at B1; Protestors Against Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, at 10.
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fairer distribution of economic resources.  It focuses on  Dr. King’s
contributions and on collaborations between antipoverty activists and
lawyers who, building on the legacies of Thurgood Marshall and Wiley
Branton, broadened and deepened the movement’s struggles beyond
formal equality.  The discussion of lawyers’ antipoverty activism cen-
ters on the work of Howard Moore, Jr., the general counsel of SNCC,
and of Margie Pitts Hames, a lawyer for the welfare rights movement.
These attorneys sought access to healthcare, affordable housing, qual-
ity jobs, and quality schools, all in close collaboration with local com-
munities.  These lesser-known historical figures illustrate the depth,
breadth, and creativity of the movement’s economic justice theories
and practices.18  Their work is relevant to a present that requires an
array of approaches to multidimensional problems—inequalities em-
bedded not in law but in culture, politics, and social structures—rather
than one-dimensional, courtroom-based advocacy.
The Article’s discussion of protest, the law, and wealth inequality
proceeds as follows.  Part I considers, in brief, the socio-legal founda-
tion of civil rights-era activists’ attack on Jim Crow.  Part II begins the
discussion of civil rights-era activists’ engagement of economic ine-
quality by examining the antipoverty activities of Martin Luther King,
Jr., a principled agent of change who also embraced compromise
when necessary to achieve legislative goals.  Part III turns to the anti-
poverty activism of students, deep skeptics of King’s brand of prag-
matic politics who favored confrontation to compromise.  The
students and their crusading lawyer, Howard Moore Jr., used tools of
community organizing and litigation to attack economic injustice.
Part IV considers a quixotic campaign by a group of impoverished
women activists, along with their lawyer Margie Pitts Hames, to gain
18. These figures challenge some legal scholars’ claim that the civil rights movement lacked
an economic agenda, in part because of its turn to litigation as a tool of reform.  In emphasizing
school desegregation, the argument goes, Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP—and affiliated
lawyers such as Wiley Branton—chose a strategy that, perversely, mobilized opponents of black
equality, narrowed the movement’s conception of civil rights to a single issue, crowded out eco-
nomic conceptions of equality, and deemphasized protest action outside the courtroom.  For
these arguments, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2006); GERALD ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).  For an economic
critique of civil rights lawyering, see RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS
(2010); Robert Korstad & Nelson Lichtenstein, Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals,
and the Early Civil Rights Movement, 75 J. AM. HIST. 786 (1988). Other works emphasize the
movement’s labor agenda or argue that other factors limited its ability to focus on economic
theories of equality. See, e.g., PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN-AMERICANS, THE
LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (2007); NANCY MACLEAN,
FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2006).
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social mobility for their children through a school desegregation cam-
paign.  The women’s campaign highlights the limits of antipoverty or-
ganizing in the civil rights movement.  Part V moves to the present.  It
discusses how the movement’s legacy has found expression in nascent
efforts to ameliorate economic inequality.  This part, which centers on
the Occupy protests, examines the extent to which this fledging move-
ment has taken advantage of the lessons that civil rights-era protests
can teach.
I. THE SOCIO-LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PROTEST
A. “Be True to What You Said on Paper”19
The long arc of this nation’s history reveals the importance of
protest movements to the country’s evolution.  When civil rights-era
activists sought equality in the streets and in the courts, they joined a
long list of citizens who forged monumental changes through expres-
sions of dissent and acts of protest.20
After all, this is a nation born in dissent.21  “We hold these truths
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are en-
dowed by their Creator with certain in-alienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,”22 states the
Declaration of Independence.  An eloquent petition of protest, the
Declaration enumerated abuses that animated the colonists’ struggle
for freedom from England.  It also articulated Enlightenment-inspired
philosophical and political principles that justified the colonists’ strug-
gle for liberty.23  These same principles found expression in the na-
tion’s charter, the U.S. Constitution.
Over time that Constitution proved to be an engine of democracy
and equality.24  The document’s transformation during Reconstruction
19. Martin Luther King Jr., I’ve Been to the Mountaintop, Speech in Support of the Striking
Sanitation Workers at Mason Temple in Memphis, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, THE ESSENTIAL
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 282, 282 (James Melvin Washington
ed., 1990).
20. See generally TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE
LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011) (providing a discussion of how dissent
yielded progress during the civil rights era).
21. See generally PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: COLONIAL RADI-
CALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO BRITAIN, 1765-1776 (2d ed. 1992).
22. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
23. See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE 83–89 (1998).
24. See generally GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1984); Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Consti-
tution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989).
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and reinterpretation by civil rights advocates  enabled full citizenship
rights.25  Justice Thurgood Marshall, who as director-counsel of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund successfully argued Brown v. Board of
Education, explained during a celebration of the Constitution’s bicen-
tennial: the Founding Fathers did not “forever fix” the Constitution’s
meaning in Philadelphia in 1787.26  It took “several amendments, a
civil war, and momentous social transformation to attain the system of
constitutional government, and . . . respect for individual freedoms . . .
we hold as fundamental today.”27  In the hands of talented lawyers
and clever activists, the promise of liberty—from which black Ameri-
cans had been excluded—became the foundation of a successful argu-
ment for equal citizenship rights.
Dr. King eloquently summarized how both the legal and direct
action wings of the movement reinterpreted these documents to jus-
tify demonstrations, picketing, boycotts, and ultimately, antidis-
crimination and voting rights legislation.28  When the movement
petitioned for redress, it did so with the goal of persuading authorities
to: “Be True to What You Said on Paper.”  King uttered these words
during his final public address, at Memphis in 1968:
All we say to America is, ‘Be true to what you said on paper.’  If I
lived in China or even Russia, or any totalitarian country, maybe I
could understand the denial of certain basic First Amendment privi-
leges, because they hadn’t committed themselves to that over there.
But somewhere I read of the freedom of assembly.  Somewhere I
read of the freedom of speech.  Somewhere I read of the freedom of
the press.  Somewhere I read that the greatness of America is the
right to protest for right.29
The movement appropriated the nation’s founding ideals to bril-
liant effect.  The master’s own tools had been used to dismantle the
foundation of the master’s house—if not the structure itself.30
25. See Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1987).
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id. at 5.
28. The lawyers of the NAACP, too, cited the right to assemble and petition for redress
when it sought to protect its members from retaliation in Southern states hostile to the associa-
tion’s very existence and bent on destroying its activism. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
29. KING JR., supra note 11, at 282.
30. The reference is a play on Audre Lorde’s assertion that the “master’s tool will never
dismantle the master’s house.”  Audre Lorde, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the
Master’s House, in SISTER OUTSIDER 110-113 (1984).
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II. DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND WEALTH
INEQUALITY, 1956-1968
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s clarion call for a colorblind society
in his 1963 speech at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom
is perhaps his best known and most often celebrated address.  How-
ever, the minister’s vision of equality, like that of many others in the
movement, extended beyond civil rights to human rights—including
economic justice.31
Dr. Martin Luther King’s final campaign in Memphis—where he
marched alongside sanitation workers who sought higher wages and
better working conditions—underscored King’s belief that economic
justice was an integral component of a racial just society.32   In his
final hour, King fought against the economic exploitation of laborers
who worked long, hard hours but still lived in poverty.
A. King’s Critiques of Economic Inequality
Long before 1968, Dr. King had deployed carefully-crafted rheto-
ric to explain how race and class intersected to maintain oppression.
As early as the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955 and 1956, King had
lamented the “‘triple evils’ of racism, economic exploitation, and mili-
tarism” during the mid-1960s; his economic critique focused on the
conditions of the ghetto poor in Harlem, Chicago, and Atlanta.33
Soon after the  enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, King ex-
plained to audiences still acclimating to the new law barring race-
based discrimination in all areas of public life that formal equality was
inadequate to achieve substantive justice.  The Civil Rights Act  had
not, and could not, fully resolve the nation’s racial dilemmas.  Even if
the Civil Rights Act ended all discrimination, King argued, “black
poverty, ‘the historic and institutionalized consequences of color,’
would continue . . . .”34
King reminded America of the devastating material impact of Jim
Crow with these words.  Not merely an oppressive social hierarchy
that relegated blacks to society’s bottom, Jim Crow involved an ex-
ploitative labor system.  Segregation had left African Americans over-
whelmingly impoverished.  It had confined blacks to the dirtiest,
31. See JACKSON, supra note 12, at 353.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 2-3, 21, 33, 209, 350.
34. See id. at 204.
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lowest-paying types of employment.35  It had prevented blacks from
attaining the education and skills that yielded better jobs and facili-
tated the accumulation of wealth.36  Even those blacks who managed
to attain higher levels of education found themselves relegated to em-
ployment incommensurate with their skills.37  Given Jim Crow’s ex-
pansive reach and devastating results, vastly greater effort would be
required to eradicate its vestiges.
B. Policy Proposals and Government Response, 1964
King did not only criticize economic inequality;  he proposed so-
lutions to it.  Most notably, in 1964, King called for a “massive assault
upon slums, inferior education, [and] inadequate medical care.”38  He
advocated a variation of the “Marshall Plan for the Negro” proposed
by Whitney Young, the President of the  National Urban League Pres-
ident; the plan would address the “historic and institutionalized conse-
quences of color” that had deprived blacks of wealth and provided a
guaranteed income for all Americans to place the poor (regardless of
race) on a path toward wealth accumulation.39
During the summer of 1964, President Lyndon Baines Johnson
responded to King’s plea for policies, in addition to the Civil Rights
Act, to ameliorate the poverty that kept equality of opportunity out of
reach of many Americans.  Johnson declared an “unconditional war
on poverty.”40  Its centerpiece of the war on poverty, the Economic
Opportunity Act (EOA), established a federal job corps, work train-
ing, community action, pre-school, community health, legal services
programs, and many other signature social welfare programs still with
us today.41  Dr. King, who from his teen years had recognized that the
35. See generally GOLUBOFF, supra note 18; MICHAEL HONEY, BLACK WORKERS REMEM-
BER: AN ORAL HISTORY OF SEGREGATION, UNIONISM, AND THE FREEDOM STRUGGLE (1999);
MACLEAN, supra note 18.
36. See JAMES D. ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH, 1860-1935, at 1-
3, 79-237 (1988); ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, A CLASS OF THEIR OWN: BLACK TEACHERS IN THE SEG-
REGATED SOUTH 4, 9, 10, 108-09, 116, 131, 190, 367-68 (2007).
37. See KAREN FERGUSON, BLACK POLITICS IN NEW DEAL ATLANTA 21-23 (2002); E.
FRANKLIN FRAZIER, BLACK BOURGEOISIE: THE BOOK THAT BROUGHT THE SHOCK OF SELF-
REVELATION TO MIDDLE-CLASS BLACKS IN AMERICA 43-59 (1957).
38. See JACKSON, supra note 12, at 204.
39. See id. at 199.
40. Id. at 191.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2711; NICK KOTZ, JUDGMENT DAYS: LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, MARTIN
LUTHER KING JR. AND THE LAWS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 182-84 (2005).
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“inseparable twin of racial injustice was economic injustice,”42 hailed
the dual approach to civil rights and antipoverty legislation.43
However, King’s rhetoric about the EOA can be deceiving.  In
private he questioned the government’s commitment to fulfill its anti-
poverty promises and called the movement’s alliance with the federal
government a “malignant kinship.”44  The legislation fell short of
King’s highest policy aspirations.  King’s broad antipoverty agenda in-
cluded fair and full employment, a guaranteed income for all, trade
unionism, equal education and much more—a “democratic socialist”
agenda.45  The EOA did include jobs training, but did not constitute
the “massive” public works project that King had hoped for, and it did
not address other facets of King’s agenda at all.
Moreover, the EOA had materialized long after King made anti-
poverty legislation a priority, and then only after the sociopolitical cir-
cumstances conspired to create an opportunity for legislative action.
King had begun publicly advocating greater attention to the ills of the
poor in 1956, after he had achieved fame in the bus boycott.46  Con-
gress did not act until 1964, in the wake of a complex, and in many
ways unpredictable, series of events.  Congress had passed the law
amid social cataclysm, including riots in Harlem47 and violent reac-
tions to civil rights protests48 that they could not ignore.  The wide-
spread crisis demanded a legislative response.  President Johnson’s
embrace of an antipoverty agenda had been critical.  Yet, his own im-
poverished background in rural Texas and the values it inculcated had
propelled his interest in a war on poverty as much as had King’s lob-
bying.49  Johnson had been elected to office in 1964 and attained polit-
ical currency to support civil rights and antipoverty initiatives in the
shadow of the assassination of President Kennedy.50
All told, the EOA had been a partial victory at best.  The priority
that King placed on Memphis sanitation workers’ strike for increased
wages in 1968 highlighted the limited reach of the antipoverty legisla-
42. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 25.
43. See id. at 193-95.
44. Id. at 200.
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id. at 208, 168-69.
48. Id. at 184-85.
49. KOTZ, supra note 41, at 30-31.
50. Id. at 33-34.
730 [VOL. 56:721
Does Protest Work?
tion.  The EOA had not addressed at all the dire economic position of
the large numbers of unskilled, low-wage workers among the poor.
C. Lessons
The story behind the EOA teaches important lessons about how a
protest movement may achieve its objectives.  First, King’s activism
teaches that protests with purpose can be instrumental to making
change.  The King-led direct action wing of the civil rights movement
saw aspects of its agenda codified in law because it sought and suc-
cessfully wielded influence on formal and informal political processes.
It shaped political dynamics at the local and national level through
protest tactics and influenced officeholders by voting or through the
threat of bloc voting and by lobbying decision makers for concrete
initiatives.
To be sure, social movements for progressive causes sometimes
have spurned the state and shown little interest in rights discourses
and policy change.  Elements of the radical wing of the student-led
civil rights movement, members of the nuclear freeze movement, radi-
cals in the women’s movement, and anti-war activists all adopted op-
positional stances toward the state and to policy formation.51  It
strikes me as valuable for change movement to embrace dissenting
voices and differentiated roles:52 the entire movement need not entan-
gle itself in “malignant kinships” with the state.
As a general proposition, however, it is infeasible and unwise for
a movement that hopes to shape the world in which we live, as op-
posed to a Utopia that might be ideal, to reject the state and spurn the
hard work of developing alternatives to inequitable policies.  Move-
51. See ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM 4-5, 220-53
(1993) (noting that the “very notion of citizen is male supremacist” and rejecting “narrow legal-
istic ‘rights’ interpretation of feminism employed by government and the ‘state[’s] manipu-
lat[ion] [of] feminist demands for its purposes’”); David S. Meyer, The ‘Smothering’ Allies of the
Nuclear Freeze Movement, in THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS READER 261-267 (Jeff Goodwin &
James M. Jasper eds., 2003) (criticizing  Congressional supporters’ appropriation of movement’s
language and symbolism and moderation of demands and arguing that entanglement with gov-
ernment demobilized and co-opted movement); Anne N. Costain, Women Lobby Congress, in
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 172 (Anne N. Costain & Andrew
S. McFarland eds.,1998) (discussing reluctance of some social movements to engage in lobbying);
CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960S 1-2,
154, 175-76, 191-92, 215-16, 229-30, 265-86 (1981) (discussing radicalization of SNCC).
52. See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 20, at 439-441.
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ments can simultaneously critique the state and make policy demands
upon it, fusing outsider and insider tactics.53
Proponents of change for socioeconomically marginalized groups
not only should dedicate energy to the legislative process, but must do
so—just the same as interest groups who represent corporations, in-
dustry, and labor.54  Precisely because of the outsized influence of
monied interests in the legislative process, it is incumbent upon the
disadvantaged and their representatives to seek influence in the halls
where policy is made.  If the truly disadvantaged and their agents
choose not to seek policy changes consistent with their interests, stud-
ies show, no one else will.55
Second and related, pragmatic political conditions can be instru-
mental to achieving change.  The King-led civil rights movement’s
“malignant” alliance with influential people, with the federal govern-
ment, and with competing organizations proved key to its evolution,
proliferation, and victories.  Even if a movement’s interests do not
neatly align with the interests of those in positions of power, this mo-
ment teaches, it may be necessary to act strategically and form prag-
matic political coalitions.
53. See Douglas R. Imig, American Social Movements and Presidential Administrations, in
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 51 at 159, 159-70
(discussing influence of social movement actors and organizations on policy); Anne N. Costain,
Women Lobby Congress, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 51 at 171, 173-84 (discussing circumstances under which Congress responds to citizen
mobilization and success of women’s groups’ lobbying efforts); FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD
A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLES’ MOVEMENTS 324 (1979) (discussing welfare rights movement’s
involvement in lobbying).
54. For an argument that social movements, interest groups, and political parties are indis-
tinguishable, see Paul Burstein, Interest Organizations, Political Parties, and the Study of Demo-
cratic Politics, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 51
at 39, 39-56. See also Jeffrey M. Berry & Deborah Schildkraut, Citizen Groups, Political Parties
and Electoral Coalitions, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 51 at 136, 136-56 (discussing the ability of citizen groups to influence electoral dynam-
ics and policy).
55. Kay Lehman Schlozman et al., The People With No Lobby in Washington, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 26, 2012, at 1 (data shows that business-oriented groups dominate lobbying).  The
study concluded:
In analyzing our results, the most sweeping conclusion we could draw about the
thousands of organizations active in Washington is that, in the aggregate, their interests
tilt strongly in the direction of the haves. More than half represent the interests of
business in one way or another. Only 5 percent represent broad public interests
(whether conservative or liberal or neither) such as wilderness preservation, auto
safety, national security, human rights abroad, lower taxes, reproductive rights, and
citizen education. Only 4 percent represent people on the basis of such identities as
race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, age, sexual orientation, or gender. A mere 1 per-
cent are unions. And less than 1 percent advocate on behalf of, or provide social ser-
vices to, the economically needy.
Id.
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Third, movements may be unable to achieve any of their goals
without willingness to compromise on some of them.  King moderated
his agenda to accommodate the legislative process; he hoped for race-
conscious initiatives but advocated race-neutral policies both to ap-
pease whites and because he cared deeply about inequality across ra-
cial lines.
Fourth, compromise need not involve capitulation, however.
King’s antipoverty mobilization shows that victories occurred amid
crisis rather than consensus.  Movements today, like those yesterday,
must seize opportunities presented by social upheaval and be capable
of accommodating changing political dynamics.
Fifth, contrary to a conventional wisdom that developed against
the backdrop of successful legal challenges to race-conscious public
policies, class-oriented campaigns for equity are not necessarily easier
to wage than race-based campaigns for social justice.56  Each has en-
gendered and can expect to precipitate significant opposition.  King’s
class-based critiques of the social order encountered deep resistance
from many quarters—including within the movement itself.57  Discus-
sion that focused on disparities of wealth and criticized materialism
threatened erstwhile allies who always had viewed equality in terms of
black versus white.  Many lacked King’s core conviction that a class
analysis and tactics that attacked wealth-based inequities advanced a
civil rights agenda; they perceived an integrated, race- and class-analy-
sis of inequality as divisive or superfluous.58  Other, self- interested
members of the middle class, saw little reason to spend precious politi-
cal capital on the “lower” classes as opposed to those already en-
sconced in the middle class and therefore better positioned to take
advantage of reform efforts.59  Many Americans, regardless of race,
self-consciously held themselves above members of the working class
who find themselves unable to advance in society.60  Character deficits
56. For arguments that class-based remedies for inequality in education are more politically
and legally viable than race-based remedies, see generally RICHARD KAHLENBERG, THE FU-
TURE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION: SOCIOECONOMIC DIVERSITY AS AN EDUCATION REFORM
STRATEGY (2012); RICHARD KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION (1996).
57. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 237-38.
58. Id.; see also BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 20, at 271.
59. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 53, at 320 (noting that “powerful and prestigious
figures, whether black or white,” did not join demonstrations for poor relief or give money or
lend support to welfare rights movement and it remained a “movement of paupers, of a pariah
class”).
60. See id. at 321, 348-49 (discussing negative views of poor); MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERI-
CANS HATE WELFARE (1999); Heather Bullock, Attributions for Poverty: A Comparison of Mid-
2013] 733
Howard Law Journal
and intellectual deficits, much more than structural inequality, limit
upward mobility.61  Many of these same convictions still make it diffi-
cult for class-oriented critiques of American society to gain traction.
Sixth, success is relative.  It is unnecessary to prevail on every
agenda item to make significant advances for a cause.  The War on
Poverty never addressed the full constellation of social, economic, and
cultural problems that plagued those left behind as a result of the “his-
toric and institutionalized consequences of color.”  Movements should
not expect to achieve all, or even most, of their goals.  Relative suc-
cess should not be regarded as failure.
Those unresolved dilemmas of race and class about which King
and others had raised consciousness remained unsettled after 1965,
when the movement faced new circumstances, opportunities, and
constraints.
III. THE STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING
COMMITTEE’S ANTIPOVERTY WORK, 1966-1970
Enter the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC),
the “new abolitionists” and “shock troops” of the movement.62  SNCC
adds two elements to this consideration of whether and how protest
works.  The college-aged activists’ arsenal of tactics varied from those
favored by King.  SNCC disdained the strategic political alliances criti-
cal to King’s success; the youthful activists believed in confronting au-
thority, including over economic injustice, an issue SNCC had
prioritized since the 1963 March on Washington.63  The group also
preferred community organizing to community mobilizing.64  That is,
SNCC’s signature campaigns featured longer-term, community-based
initiatives designed to empower marginalized groups from within, as
opposed to shorter-term, highly-publicized, violent clashes between
dle-Class and Welfare Recipient Attitudes, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2059 (1999); Lauren D.
Appelbaum, The Influence of Perceived Deservingness on Policy Decisions Regarding Aid to the
Poor, 22 POL. PSYCHOL. 419 (2001); Heather E. Bullock, Wendy R. Williams & Wendy M.
Limbert, Predicting Support for Welfare Policies: The Impact of Attributions and Beliefs about
Inequality, 7 J. POVERTY 35 (2003).
61. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 53 at 338-39 (discussing pathology of the poor); id.
at 48-49 (discussing rising crime rates, drunkenness, and promiscuity among unemployed); FELI-
CIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS 88-90, 129-30, 145-46 (2007) (discussing
criticism of lack of work ethic among poor).
62. See generally HOWARD ZINN, SNCC: THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS (photo. reprint 2011)
(1964) (detailing the social movement led by young people known as the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee).
63. BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 20, at 137-38.
64. Id. at 266.
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practitioners of civil disobedience and segregationists aimed at sway-
ing white public opinion.65  SNCC also turned to litigation, often
coupling lawsuits with community organizing campaigns.  This ap-
proach distinguished the lawyers of SNCC from the better-known at-
torneys of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF), which focused
primarily on the courts.66  This examination of SNCC and its innova-
tions permits us to reflect on the rewards and risks of its unique com-
bination of frontal assaults on the socio-legal order and court-based
advocacy.
A. Community Organizing as a Political Tool
SNCC distinguished itself from the NAACP, the lawyers of LDF
and even SCLC with its assumption that ordinary people—the grass-
roots—rather than an educated, professional, or clerical class, should
lead their own communities in the struggle against injustice.67  The
students sought to build political and social capital among the grass-
roots through community organizing.68
Organizing involved several interlocking steps.  Workers listened
to everyday people discuss their lives and problems; they educated
people about their citizenship rights; and they persuaded them to cast
off mental chains imposed by Jim Crow that undermined activism.  As
I wrote in my book-length analysis of the legal and social history of
the civil rights movement, “the most effective organizers possessed
emotional and interpersonal intelligence in abundance and embraced
a range of roles and personas.”69
Through community organizing SNCC sought to plant “seeds
of change.” As they built relationships with the poor, volunteers
nurtured citizens’ . . . leadership abilities. . . . SNCC expected that
impoverished and poorly educated blacks, if given encouragement
and taught the necessary skills, would move from the margins of
society and become energetic stakeholders in the democratic pro-
cess . . . .  Ultimately, organized communities would pursue concrete
forms of equality, including a bundle of property and personal enti-
65. See generally CHARLES PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM 236-64 (1995) (dis-
cussing the difference between organizing and mobilizing).
66. BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 20, at 266.
67. Id. at 266.
68. Id. at 264-65.
69. Id. at 266.
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tlements: decent jobs, income supports, housing, and education, as
well as political representation and participation.70
SNCC tested its community organizing tactic in rural and urban
areas.  This analysis focuses on SNCC’s work in Atlanta, where the
group established a community organizing operation in 1966.  SNCC
first organized a project to demand “economic justice” in an urban
area in 1966.  It chose Atlanta’s Vine City neighborhood, an area be-
set by filth, squalor, and misery, for its initial foray into urban organiz-
ing.71  On a typical day, SNCC’s staff canvassed the unpaved streets of
Vine City, where it met local people and learned about their priorities.
The staff not only listened to peoples’ problems, but also found nu-
merous ways to be of assistance.  SNCC conducted workshops about
picketing, sit-ins, rent strikes, boycotts, and electoral politics as tools
to address the community’s problems.72  Workers also offered practi-
cal solutions to specific problems that plagued the neighborhood,
among them poor healthcare, education, housing, and lack of employ-
ment opportunity.  Workers informed the residents about federal
work and educational resources, including War on Poverty
programs.73
B. Single-Issue Advocacy: The Attack on “Slum Lords” Inside the
Courtroom and Outside
The search for safe and affordable housing dominated the lives of
residents in Atlanta’s Vine City, and therefore, it also consumed much
of the project’s energies.  The project pursued its housing initiative
through a range of political tactics, including demonstrations and boy-
cotts, and repeated invocations of the rule of law and the legal
process.74
1. Political Mobilization and Rent Strikes, 1966
In January of 1966, SNCC began a sustained campaign against
inadequate housing in Vine City—a “war on Atlanta’s slums.”75  Ju-
lian Bond, a founding member of SNCC and the newly-elected state
representative of the area’s residents, demanded attention to the
70. Id.
71. Id. at 267.
72. Id. at 266-68.
73. Id. at 268.
74. See GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING 38-44 (1992) (explaining the classic text
on the concept of lay lawyering or informal peer to peer problem solving).
75. BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 20, at 269.
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plight of his cold and hungry constituents.76  He wired Atlanta’s
mayor with a request that the city fulfill its responsibility to ensure
adequate housing for every citizen.77  Treating the Markham Street
crisis like a natural disaster, Bond also called on the American Red
Cross to supply emergency provisions such as blankets, food, and gen-
erators.78  SNCC workers crafted billboards that lambasted the condi-
tions in the neighborhood and continually issued press releases
criticizing the city’s slow and inadequate response.79
In the middle of SNCC’s campaign, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
visited the area, raising the profile of SNCC’s campaign.80  Only re-
cently, King had visited Chicago; there he had decried the “economic
exploitation” that trapped the poor in urban ghettos.  Now, touring
the ghettos in his own hometown, King commented that the appalling
conditions surpassed even those in Chicago’s worst areas.81
In the wake of King’s visit, the project launched a rent strike:
aggrieved tenants withheld rental payments until landlords made
needed repairs to address substandard housing conditions.82  With this
tactic, SNCC exposed the exorbitant profits that the landlords made
from dilapidated housing, groceries, and sundry items sold to tenants.
The system was no more than a modern version of a “plantation”
economy.
The tactic allowed SNCC to achieve three interlocking goals: it
sought to empower the poor to seek concrete changes in their eve-
ryday lives, to dramatize the injustices of life in the ghetto, and to
pressure both private parties and local government to address the
need for safe, affordable housing for low-income citizens.83
The daring rent strike tactic entailed serious risks.  The law pro-
vided limited relief, and remedies could be counterproductive.  As a
rule, renters did not enjoy a contractual right to major repairs.  “Te-
nants took the premises of rental properties as they were unless a stat-
ute imposed enforceable obligations on landlords to maintain
property.”84  In the mid-1960s, few jurisdictions imposed such obliga-
tions.  “Atlanta’s building code mostly covered building defects.  It did
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 260.
80. Id. at 269.
81. Id. at 269-70.
82. Id. at 270.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 271.
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set minimum standards for occupancy: a supply of running water,
watertight roofs, plumbing and general ‘cleanliness.’”85  Tenants also
enjoyed a legal right to property fit for habitation.  But the municipal-
ity seldom enforced these code requirements.  When it did, a different
problem arose: housing code enforcement could leave the poor home-
less.  Tenants could be compelled to vacate property declared unfit for
human habitation—an unsatisfactory “solution” for residents with few
resources and housing options.  SNCC could only hope for the best:
that the strike would embarrass public officials and thereby increase
access to existing public housing, or stimulate the construction of new
private developments that included housing affordable for the poor.
In the meantime, the decision to engage in a rent strike could be
counterproductive to the intended beneficiaries.86
And, in fact, SNCC’s rent strike produced mixed results.  Land-
lords retaliated by threatening to evict any tenants who participated in
the campaign.87  In many cases, the threats worked, undercutting
SNCC’s effort to mobilize the community.88  Moreover, SNCC’s cam-
paign attracted little support, if any, from other civil rights and civic
groups.  Many considered rent strikes “radical” and a violation of
landlords’ property rights.89  The campaign also alienated the mayor, a
white liberal whose advocacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had been
critical to the law’s passage.90  After SNCC began attacking economic
inequality, the mayor accused the organization of attempting to un-
dermine the “American way.”91  With the mayor’s help, police
launched investigations and prosecutions of alleged “disorderly con-
duct” and other minor infractions by SNCC protesters—a tactic that
threatened to decimate the movement by jailing its most active mem-
bers.92  Newspapers, radio, and television filled with negative stories
about SNCC.93  The organization, repeatedly tagged as “un-Ameri-
can,” lost influence because of its aggressive critiques of authority
figures, government, and the economic order.94
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 279-80, 285-87.
93. Id. at 276-77.
94. Id.
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2. The Constitutional Challenge to Summary Eviction, 1966-1970
In addition to staging demonstrations and rent strikes, SNCC
turned to affirmative constitutional litigation in its war against slums.
SNCC’s general counsel, Howard Moore, Jr., led the legal efforts.95
Moore challenged a summary eviction statute that enabled a speedy
summary eviction proceeding when landlords claimed non-payment of
rent.96  The tenant could only halt the proceeding by posting a bond
that covered the sum in dispute at trial, an insurmountable obstacle
for Moore’s poor clients.97  Without the requisite payment, the court
would not even accept a counter-affidavit from the tenant, stating his
version of the facts.  The landlord could simply seek the eviction of a
tenant who could not pay.98
Moore hoped to make the eviction process fairer for citizens who
lived on society’s margins by arguing that the summary eviction pro-
cess stacked the deck in favor of landlords.  The statute’s bond re-
quirement violated the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment,
Moore argued.99  Georgia’s law compelled a poor person to pay for
access to the courts: one could only challenge an unlawful eviction if
one were wealthy enough to do so—an outlandish proposition for in-
digent tenants in neighborhoods such as Vine City.  The Constitution
plainly barred such outright discrimination against the poor, SNCC’s
counsel claimed.100
Moore’s argument failed spectacularly in the Georgia courts.  The
resource barrier to judicial review of eviction proceedings did not vio-
late due process, and the statute did not otherwise discriminate be-
tween poorer and wealthier citizens on constitutionally forbidden
grounds.101  The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed on grounds that
Moore’s clients had already been evicted from the properties in ques-
tion—making the issue they had raised moot.102  “All that was sought
to be enjoined,” the court reasoned, “has been done . . . .”103  Williams
95. See id. at 272.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Williams v. Shaffer, 149 S.E.2d 668, 669 (Ga. 1966); see also Williams v. Shaffer, 385
U.S. 1037, 1039 (1967).  The statute was GA. CODE ANN. § 61-301 (1966).
99. See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 20, at 272.
100. Id.
101. See Williams, 149 S.E.2d at 670.
102. See id.
103. See id.
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and Martin were too poor to make poverty an issue before the
court.104
Moore appealed the case, Williams v. Shaffer, to the United
States Supreme Court.  Again, he struck out.  The High Court refused
to hear the case.105  Moore and his clients nevertheless made a strong
impression at the Court.  Justice William O. Douglas disagreed with
his colleagues’ decision.  He wrote a powerful dissenting opinion ex-
plaining why the Court should have heard the case.106  Douglas
framed the case as indicative of a “larger problem” that “vividly dem-
onstrates the disparity between the access of the affluent to the judi-
cial machinery and that of the poor in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.”107  Douglas asserted that the Justices should re-
view the Georgia Supreme Court’s mootness holding because it would
perpetually preclude review of the underlying statute.  For every im-
poverished tenant would be unable to post the requisite bond, would
be evicted, and the eviction, by Georgia’s logic, would moot every
challenge to the statute.108  “The ability to obtain a hearing is thus
made to turn upon the tenant’s wealth,” Douglas concluded.109  Sev-
eral of the Court’s precedents had held such discrimination constitu-
tionally proscribed.  These precedents all pertained to deprivations of
the judicial process in criminal cases, however, perhaps explaining the
Court’s denial of the appeal.110
Moore did not prevail in this particular 1966 case, but his legal
activism and SNCC’s political mobilization against Atlanta’s slum
housing effected change.  In 1970, just four years after the campaign
had begun, and after additional litigation and political work by the
Georgia Legal Aid Bureau and other public interest organizations,111
the state reformed the statutory scheme that Moore challenged in Wil-
liams v. Shaffer.112  The new law no longer required tenants to post a
bond to contest an eviction proceeding.113  A tenant who contested a
104. See id. at 668-70 (citing numerous precedents of the Georgia courts in support of its
conclusion).
105. See Williams, 385 U.S. at 1037.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1039.
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See generally KRIS SHEPARD, RATIONING JUSTICE: POVERTY LAWYERS AND POOR PEO-
PLE IN THE DEEP SOUTH 37-67 (2007) (describing litigation efforts by several civil rights
organizations).
112. See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 20, at 385.
113. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-50 (2010).
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landlord’s non-payment allegation in court retained his shelter while
the legal process ran its course.114
C. Lessons
Like Dr. King’s antipoverty work, SNCC’s political and legal in-
terventions against poverty offer invaluable insights about how move-
ments can make change and cautions about the consequence of
frontal attacks on the social order.
The first lesson that SNCC’s work teaches is that a massive social
problem can be made manageable by limiting advocacy to a single,
compelling aspect of the broad issue—or scaling down.  SNCC gained
advantage in its fight against poverty by developing a single-issue
campaign, focused on the most obvious need of community members,
adequate and affordable housing.  Whereas many reform organiza-
tions puzzle over how to scale up promising pilot programs to achieve
greater impact,115 a scaled down approach can be an invaluable tool
when reformers confront a social problem of tremendous scope.
Second, SNCC’s work shows that community organizing can be
an effective, if deliberate and laborious, tactic.116  SNCC garnered new
or improved legislation through community organizing.  It mentored
new leaders, and raised public awareness of inequities. It even helped
to bring about statutory change.  However, these gains occurred after
long hours of work in communities alongside citizens who faced
profound barriers to political participation.  The success of community
organizing efforts will turn in part on the extent to which organizers
with requisite interpersonal and cross-cultural intelligence commit
time and resources to building relationships, to engaging in commu-
nity education, and to developing and implementing concrete agendas
for change.
Third, SNCC used litigation to inspire political consciousness and
mobilize political action. Some scholars consider the inability of pro-
114. See Sanks v. Georgia, 401 U.S. 144, 147 (1971) (finding challenge to Georgia summary
eviction statute moot because of legislative reforms).
115. See, e.g., MICHAEL EDWARDS, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CIVIL SOCIETY 61-62
(2011) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of social change organizations “scaling up” in-
fluence by connecting to national organizations); THOMAS J. MARCHIONE, SCALING UP, SCAL-
ING DOWN: OVERCOMING MALNUTRITION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 72-74 (1999) (discussing
need to connect grassroots and local communities to national governments and organizations
with resources to ameliorate hunger).
116. For a theoretical overview, see ROSS GITTELL & AVIS VIDAL, COMMUNITY ORGANIZ-
ING: BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL AS A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (1998).
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gressive social movements to prevail in court a serious, if not fatal,
problem; however, SNCC effectively used the courts to promote its
political agenda even when it did not prevail.  Being on defense—the
underdog—created a political mindset that SNCC leveraged to gener-
ate change outside of court.117  SNCC sometimes mobilized its constit-
uencies by engaging in losing battles with authorities, including judges,
governmental officials, and police officers.118  On other occasions,
SNCC’s litigation did not succeed on the merits, but nevertheless
highlighted inequities and set the stage for legislative action years
later.  SNCC employed litigation to inspire political action as often as
it relied on courts to define affirmative rights.119  This distinction be-
tween the inspirational and definitional uses of lawsuits120 is crucial if
social reform movements are to effectively employ litigation as a tool
of protest.
SNCC also effectively employed lawyers as mediators with power
structures.  Students formed critical alliances with sympathetic lawyers
whose use of legal expertise kept students out of legal jeopardy, and
thus the student movement alive, at critical stages.  Such mediators
are crucial to reform movements.
Fourth, because of unyielding dogmatism SNCC eventually disen-
gaged from center-left of politics in the U.S. and its disengagement
made it less effective.  SNCC alienated allies when it began coupling
attacks on economic inequality with credible threats of rebellion and
militant rhetoric critiquing the social order.  Its turn to the language of
revolution, as opposed to a demand for reform, undermined its credi-
bility.121  Once-sympathetic governmental officials parted ways with
117. The abortion rights movement, among other movements, also has effectively leveraged
court loses to mobilize participants. See Suzanne Staggenburg, The Survival of the Pro-Choice
Movement, in THE POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
164, 164-171 (Donald T. Crithlow ed., 1996).
118. See generally BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 20, ch. 6, at 133; id. ch. 9, at 253.
119. For an excellent scholarly treatment of litigation as a social change tactic, see Michael
McCann, Social Movements and the Mobilization of Law, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 51 at 201, 201-215.
120. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements and the Law: The Case of Affirma-
tive Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005).  In this Article I argue that: “Social movements
may profitably use rights talk to inspire political mobilization, although with less success than
legal mobilization theorists assume. But social movements that make law definitional risk under-
mining their insurgent role in the political process and thus losing their agenda-setting ability.”
Id.
121. Here, revolution implies a break with a prevailing ideology and institutions, including
by violent overthrow of the government or oppressors.  For a general description of revolution-
ary tactics and outcomes, see Lawrence Stone, Theories of Revolution, 18 WORLD POL. 159
(1966).
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the organization.  Its opponents also grew to include other civil rights
groups, as well as civic organizations dominated by white liberals.
While it is important for reformers to articulate principles and
objectives, dogmatism is rarely an asset for progressives who hope to
make a lasting impact on the American body politic.122  Movements
profit from the kind of ideological heterogeneity and role differentia-
tion that enables some parts of the whole to maintain productive rela-
tionships with decision makers and opinion makers.
IV. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AS AN ENGINE OF
SOCIOECONOMIC MOBILITY, 1972-1979
The experiences of Margie Pitts Hames and her clients, mostly
black single mothers who sought a pathway out of poverty for their
children, make another important point: the stigma of low socioeco-
nomic status, not merely the condition of poverty, impedes efforts by
the poor themselves to ameliorate wealth inequality.
A. The Voice of the Forgotten Poor
Ethel Mae Mathews, founder and president of Atlanta chapter of
the National Welfare Rights Organization,123 served as the public face
of the school desegregation litigation that Margie Hames filed in
1972.124  By the time she met Hames, Mathews had long been active in
local politics and made a compelling advocate for her cause.  After
moving to Atlanta from sharecropping in rural Alabama, Hames, a
single mother who worked as a housekeeper and lived in public hous-
ing, had become a hard-charging veteran of direct-action protests.125
Mathews organized protests against the legislature, at welfare offices,
and at courthouses against budget cuts that punished low-income peo-
ple like herself.126  Together with her neighbors, Mathews lodged sear-
ing critiques of the still unequal world that existed despite passage of
landmark civil rights and voting rights legislation.  The new laws, they
122. See WILLIAM GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL PROTEST (1975).  On the role of
violence and rebellion in recent American history, see also VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: PROTEST,
REBELLION AND REFORM 12-13 (Ted Robert Gurr ed., 1989) (noting that in recent American
history “recurring waves of mass violence” have coexisted with “democratic values and stable
institutions”).
123. See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 20, at 438.
124. Id. at 386, 409.
125. See id. at 438.
126. See id. at 409-10.
2013] 743
Howard Law Journal
argued, had not actually changed the lives of the urban poor.127  Even
when they worked on bettering themselves, single mothers faced a
profound stigma.  “We didn’t trust nobody,” Mathews once explained.
“We were just a bunch of welfare mothers, desolated.”128  No one,
black or white, viewed them as fully human.129
Because of these experiences, Mathews and other single mothers
fought hard for better lives for their children.  The children of the
black poor languished in the city’s worst schools, apart from whites,
and even from much of the black middle class.  The poor women
could not know what a racially mixed educational experience might
hold for their children, but the women reasoned that it could not be
much worse than what they already had—nothing.  If their children
could attend school with whites, they might be able to work them-
selves out of poverty.
B. Education Litigation
By the time Margie Hames filed a suit on Mathews’s behalf seek-
ing metropolitan-wide school desegregation, Atlanta’s schools had
been officially desegregated for a decade.130  Desegregation had only
occurred on a token basis, however, for three reasons: 1) white politi-
cal and legal resistance, which resulted in 2) rapid demographic turno-
ver in the cities, and 3) black middle class indifference to racially
mixed schools.  Local blacks who had reached the middle class could
cite good reasons to prefer increased resources to black schools over
school desegregation.  Within the segregated system, the children of
the black middle class attended the highest quality schools and had
little incentive to alter the system.  Black teachers, the greatest pro-
portion of the black professional class, feared for their jobs and
proved especially resistant to racial change in the school system.
Black administrators, also concerned about employment discrimina-
tion, sought affirmative action policies to ensure job security.131  They
resented the idea that blacks could not successfully manage their own
schools, particularly when some of the nation’s most successful
blacks—including Thurgood Marshall—had graduated from precisely
such institutions.  Hence prominent blacks—including Atlanta’s first
127. See id. at 321-22.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 145, 385, 409.
131. See id. at 4-6.
744 [VOL. 56:721
Does Protest Work?
African-American mayor, Maynard Jackson; Lonnie King, the presi-
dent of the local NAACP chapter; and Rev. Andrew Young, Georgia’s
first black Congressman since Reconstruction—repudiated school de-
segregation.  Instead these luminaries preferred black control of the
school system.132
Hence, Hames and her clients fought against the political and le-
gal winds when they sued for metropolitan-wide school desegregation
in Atlanta.  Hames had mustered evidence of combined housing and
school segregation that she thought would permit her to prevail
against area school boards.133
Instead, the case precipitated backlash.  In court, the men who
represented the state made clear their contempt for the plaintiffs.  The
lawyers focused as much on the status of the women as on the law that
controlled the case.134  The state’s lawyers implied that the women’s
(single) marital status, large families, lack of education, menial jobs,
and meager employment prospects made their children unattractive
candidates for integrated schooling.135  Dr. Benjamin Mays, president
of Morehouse College, a mentor to Dr. King, and one of the most
respected black men in America, testified against the women and
sealed the lawsuit’s fate.136
In the end, the courts in a series of decisions issued during the
period spanning 1972 through 1979, rejected the women’s legal claims.
The courts turned to extralegal considerations, in part, to explain why
the women would not prevail.137  Black control of city government
implied adequate representation for all blacks, the court concluded—
notwithstanding the women’s claims that middle class blacks did not
well represent them.138  The women’s bid for intergenerational social
mobility failed miserably.
C. Lessons
This unhappy story reveals truths about the status of the poor in
our society that few wish to hear.  First, these events underscore that
identity mattered, and therefore, that reform movements must be adept
at managing negative stereotypes.  Lawyers for the state undermined
132. See id at 406.
133. See id. at 409-410.
134. Id. at 413-417.
135. Id. at 413-14.
136. Id. at 422-23.
137. Id. at 395, 424-26.
138. Id. at 407-08, 426.
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Hames’s legal advocacy by tagging Mathews and her allies “undeserv-
ing poor.”139  Continuing public skepticism and suspicion of the poor
continues to impede the ability of low-status groups to gain institu-
tional leverage, including in courts.140  The choice to use the court-
room as an arena of struggle must be well conceived and well
implemented.
Second, the pariah status of impoverished women also undermined
their ability to garner effective representation through the political pro-
cess.  In many ways, Ethel Mae Mathews, a politically active leader in
her community, modeled good citizenship.  In the wake of the Voting
Rights Act passage she expected to wield influence through electoral
politics.  Mathews and her neighbors found that the vote had not con-
ferred substantive representation, or an ability to achieve policy out-
comes consistent with their interest.141  Black members of the school
board and other same-race government officials did not support the
women’s cause.  To the contrary, most of these newly elected officials
and members of the black middle class shunned these women and pur-
sued their own interests.  This lack of social and political capital
among the poor is of long standing and continues to limit their ability
to vindicate their interests.142
Third, the limitations that low-status groups face in the court-
room and through the formal political process show why protest is crit-
ical for socially and politically marginalized groups.  Precisely because
they cannot acquire effective representation through the formal politi-
cal process, they must seek advantage outside of the system.  Today, as
much as ever, those poorly served through politics must apply pres-
sure tactics that give them voice and the possibility of influence.
139. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO
THE WAR ON WELFARE 1-12 (1989).
140. See Kristina Cooke et al., The Undeserving Poor, ATLANTIC, Dec. 20, 2012, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/12/the-undeserving-poor/266507/ (docu-
menting “widespread ambivalence” about government assistance to able-bodied poor); see also
Marc Galanter, Why The “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (classic account describing barriers that prevent the overwhelm-
ing majority of the poor from making successful legal claims).  For a nuanced recent account that
documents anti-poor bias in courts but also argues that this bias is not inevitable, see Daniel
Brinks & Varun Gauri, The Law’s Majestic Equality: The Distributive Impact of Litigation Social
and Economic Rights (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working Paper No. 5999, 2012).
141. On the disconnect between descriptive and substantive representation of outsider
groups in formal politics, see Lani Guinier, “No Two Seats”: The Elusive Quest for Political
Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1414 (1991).
142. See Imig, supra note 53 at 162 (“The poor lack critical resources that would advance
their tendency to act collectively, participate in electoral campaigns, or contribute to political
organizations.”).
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Now that the many lessons that civil rights-era protest can teach,
the question then becomes whether modern protest movements have
learned them.
V. PROTEST TODAY: OCCUPY WALL STREET
Today, protest movements of varied political orientations and re-
lationships to struggles for racial equality tether themselves to the civil
rights movement.  In bids for acceptance and political leverage, move-
ments for gay marriage143 and for immigration reform,144 against mass
incarceration145 and affirmative action, invoke the civil rights move-
ment to justify their causes.  Most recently, the Arab Spring146 and the
Occupy movement turned to the legacy of the black freedom struggle
to gain credibility, visibility, and direction.
The effort of these social causes to tether themselves to the civil
rights movement for political advantage makes perfect sense.  The sto-
ried mid-century struggle for black freedom constitutes perhaps the
most impressive example in recent history of citizens successfully
achieving wide-scale social change through protest.  The history of the
movement is inspiring.  And, as I have explained above, it offers inval-
uable lessons about how to organize effectively.
Modern causes logically seek to portray themselves as successors
to the civil rights movement, but do they truly appreciate that move-
143. The movement for marriage equality compares the state’s requirement of opposite sex
marriage to bans on interracial marriage. See generally R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez
v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 839
(2008); James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation
Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93 (1993).
144. Proponents of the Dream Act, legislation that would provide a path to citizenship for
undocumented youths who grew up in the United States, gathered in Memphis in 2011 to learn
lessons from the civil rights movement. See Daniel Altschuler, Immigrant Youth Movement
Takes a Civil Rights Lesson, DISSENT MAG. (Jan. 31, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://www.dissentmaga-
zine.org/blog/immigrant-youth-movement-takes-a-civil-rights-lesson.
145. The movement against mass incarceration, led by the Stop Mass Incarceration Network,
counts the civil disobedience tactics of the movement as its primary tactical weapon. See STOP
MASS INCARCERATION NETWORK, http://www.stopmassincarceration.org/about-us.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2013) (“It took dramatic mass resistance to rivet the attention of society on the old
Jim Crow—racial segregation and the lynch mob terror that enforced it.  And it will take the
same kind of determined mass resistance to stop the New Jim Crow!”).
146. The Arab Spring movements for democracy and against dictatorship in Africa and the
Middle East, which began in Tunisia in 2011 and spread to a dozen nations including Egypt,
Libya, and Syria invoked the black freedom struggle in its literature.  Activists invoked Dr.
King’s “Montgomery Method” and disseminated via the internet an Arabic language version of
a 1958 brochure by the Fellowship of Reconciliation that explained the theory of civil disobedi-
ence and outlined practical steps that practitioners of it must take. See Michael Cavna, Amid
Revolution, Arab Cartoonists Draw Attention to Their Cause, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2011, at C01,
available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/comic-riffs/2011/03/arab_cartoons.html.
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ment’s complexities?  And have they really learned some of the many
lessons about effective organizing for change outlined in the Article’s
previous sections?
This part analyzes these questions.  It does so by examining the
philosophy, structure, and tactics of the Occupy movement.  More
than any other recent effort, Occupy has taken up the mantle of
wealth inequality—the question that emerged as the civil rights move-
ment’s most pressing priority during the late 1960s—and that today
remains the movement’s unfinished business.
A. Back Story
The first step in analyzing Occupy is to determine precisely what
Occupy is and whom and what it represents.  The Occupy movement
began in September 2011 when protesters inspired by the Arab Spring
created an encampment in New York.147  The encampment later set-
tled in New York’s Zuccotti Park to bring attention to issues of corpo-
rate corruption of government and wealth inequality.148  Before long,
the movement had proliferated across the country and throughout the
world.  Protesters set up encampments in one hundred cities, includ-
ing Oakland, Washington, D.C., Denver, and Honolulu.149  Occupy’s
encampments could hardly be ignored, and their advent garnered sig-
nificant reportage in print, electronic, and broadcast media.150
More recently, media attention to the movement has plummeted.
The evaporation of interest in Occupy occurred after police raided its
New York encampment on orders from Mayor Michael Bloomberg;151
just two months after its inception, the New York Police Department
evicted Occupy from Zuccotti Park.152  The eviction occurred after au-
thorities raised concerns about filth and congestion in and around the
camps, after scattered reports of violence and injuries, and following
investigations by federal, state, and local government, including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Se-
147. See About, OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 8,
2013).
148. Id.
149. See OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
150. See Colin Moynihan, Wall Street Protests Continue, With at Least 6 Arrested, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2011, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/wall-street-protests-con-
tinue-with-at-least-5-arrested/?ref=occupywallstreet.
151. Id.
152. Andrew Grossman et al., Wall Street Protesters Evicted from Camp, WALL. ST. J., Nov.
16, 2011, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020419050457704056
3377026378.html.
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curity.153  Officials determined that Occupy posed a threat to public
safety and might be linked to terrorism.154  Similar public health and
safety concerns precipitated the eviction of Occupy Oakland, Occupy
Boston, Occupy Philadelphia, Occupy San Francisco, Occupy D.C.,
and many other encampments.155  Evictions occurred, notwithstand-
ing lawyers’ filing of restraining orders arguing that the evictions vio-
lated Occupy’s right to assembly.156  Following the evictions, most
media outlets labeled Occupy moribund and a failure.157
In reality, Occupy lives on.  The movement remains active in sev-
eral cities and retains a vibrant presence on the internet.158
And some of its claims of unlawful government harassment and
repression may yet be confirmed.  In tribunals around the world, law-
yers are contesting police officers’ treatment of the movement.  Last
summer a consortium of legal clinics based at Harvard, New York
University, Fordham, Stanford, and several other institutions issued a
report documenting human rights violations in the government’s re-
sponse to Occupy.159  Police allegedly violated the protesters’ rights of
assembly, speech, and petition, engaged in violent raids under cover of
night, and conducted pervasive, unjustified surveillance of the over-
153. See Dominique Debucquoy-Dodley, FBI Considered Occupy Movement Potential
Threat, Documents Say, CNN (Dec. 27, 2012, 5:34 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/26/us/fbi-
occupy/index.html.
154. See id.; Grossman et al., supra note 152.
155. See Grossman et al., supra note 152; Jay Lindsay, Police Clear Occupy Boston Encamp-
ment, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2011, at A10, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massa-
chusetts/articles/2011/12/10/police_begin_evicting_occupy_boston_protesters_1323515291/;
Maggie Fazeli Fard, Occupy DC Eviction, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2012, 7:09 AM), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-buzz/post/occupy-dc-eviction-body-found-in-well-identified-am-
buzz/2012/01/30/gIQA5TB7bQ_blog.html; Frederick Kunkle, One Protester Tazed, Arrested at
Occupy D.C., WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
crime-scene/post/one-protester-tased-arrested-at-occupy-dc/2012/01/29/gIQAxqRKaQ_blog.
html.
156. See Grossman et al., supra note 152; Chad Bray et al., Judge Rules Against Occupy
Protesters, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2011, 6:36 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297
0204190504577039253668863814.html.
157. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Occupy Wall Street: A Frenzy That Fizzled, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2012, at B1, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/occupy-wall-street-a-frenzy-
that-fizzled/; Jennifer Rubin, Op-Ed., Occupy Movement Deteriorates, WASH. POST (Nov. 15,
2011, 8:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/the-left-occupy-what/
2011/11/14/gIQAngZHON_blog.html.
158. See OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallstreet.net/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013); See
PROTEST & ASSEMBLY RIGHTS PROJECT, SUPPRESSING PROTEST: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
IN THE U.S. RESPONSE TO OCCUPY WALL STREET 12 (2012), available at http://cdn.theatlantic.
com/static/mt/assets/politics/Suppressing%20Protest.pdf. See generally OCCUPY WALL STREET,
supra.
159. See PROTEST & ASSEMBLY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 158, at vi.
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whelmingly peaceful protesters.160  Hoping to redress these violations
of protesters’ rights, the consortium filed complaints about the alleged
governmental overreach with the U.S. Department of Justice, the
United Nations, and state and local authorities.161  In addition, the
New York Civil Liberties Union, the National Lawyers Guild, and
several private attorneys filed lawsuits challenging the legality of the
police response to Occupy.162  The presiding judge in one such suit,
filed in a U.S. District Court in New York, recently ruled that the
plaintiffs had mustered sufficient evidence to keep alive their lawsuit
against NYPD officers who arrested 700 protesters during a protest on
the Brooklyn Bridge.163
The Occupy saga continues, even if the movement at present is
relatively quiescent, and this pause in its pace permits some analysis of
its nature, functions, and limits.
B. Philosophy, Structure, and Tactics
Some commentators initially characterized the Occupy move-
ment as a modern equivalent of American revolutionaries.  One
scholar called Occupy’s populist attack on corporate greed an:
“American tradition since 1776.”164  “Every exchange in the debate
would have made good sense—with a little idiomatic translation—to
the propertied men who drafted the United States Constitution in
Philadelphia in 1787,” wrote another.165
Occupy itself claims decidedly different sources of inspiration and
affiliation.  The movement does not cite the rhetoric of America’s rev-
olutionary generation as foundational texts.  Occupy instead counts
the Arab Spring as its most immediate progenitor.  Like participants
in the Arab Spring, those involved in Occupy aspire to build democ-
racy.166  Occupy’s emphasis on democracy does not, in its view, tether
160. See id.
161. See Legal Experts File Complaints About Widespread Rights Violations in Policy of Oc-
cupy Movement, OCCUPY WALL STREET (July 26, 2012, 10:25 AM), http://occupywallst.org/arti-
cle/legal-experts-file-complaints-about-widespread-rig/.
162. Id.
163. See NY Judge Lets Occupy Lawsuit Proceed Against Cops, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 7,
2012, 8:05 PM, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57449334/ny-judge-lets-oc-
cupy-lawsuit-proceed-against-cops/.
164. See Jonathan Zimmerman, Op-Ed., Occupy Wall Street: An American Tradition Since
1776, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/
2011/1005/Occupy-Wall-Street-an-American-tradition-since-1776.
165. Jedediah Purdy, Observations from Occupy Wall Street, FIELDWORK (Oct. 23, 2011, 8:44
AM), http://jedfieldwork.blogspot.com/2011/10/observations-from-occupy-wall-street.html.
166. See generally OCCUPY WALL STREET, supra note 158.
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it to America’s foundational creed or lend legitimacy to the present
American socio-political order.  Contrary to the nation’s creation
myth, America’s Founding Founders did not conceive this country as a
democracy, insists David Graeber, Occupy’s intellectual father; this
country began as a republic, a political formation meant to tame the
perceived excesses of direct democracy.167  Later generations of
Americans embraced the rhetoric and practices of true (direct) de-
mocracy, asserts Graeber.168  Over time even the weak commitment
to direct democracy that developed in the United States has been
corrupted.169
Occupy’s roots lie not in American-style democracy but in an-
archism.  The movement embraces the absolute freedom of individual
and decentralized decision making, and it is opposed to statism and
government rule.170  Occupy does not appear to advocate all of the
teachings of anarchism, as classically understood, however, including
the one for which anarchists are best known: violent overthrow of
government.171  Anarchism’s heyday occurred in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century, during revolutions in Russia and Spain,
and in the United States, all places where anarchists overthrew or at-
tempted to overthrow governments.172  Occupy also cites more recent
historical antecedents.  The New Left movements of the 1960s, includ-
ing the counter-culture, the peace, and the Green movements, all em-
braced anarchist principles, Greaber approvingly notes.173  He also
associates Occupy’s form of anarchism with the “global justice move-
ment” of the 1990s, designed to impede the World Trade Organiza-
tion.174  While Occupy’s roots lie in these 1960s and 1990s movements,
Graeber counts a particular anarchist society as its closest and most
authentic model.  The Betafo community in Madagascar, admired for
167. David Graeber, Occupy Wall Street’s Anarchist Roots, OCCUPY WALL STREET (Apr. 30,
2012, 6:28 AM), http://occupywallst.org/article/occupy-wall-streets-anarchist-roots/ (“The result
[of the American founding] was a republic—modelled not on Athens, but on Rome.  It only
came to be redefined as a ‘democracy’ in the early 19th century because ordinary Americans had
very different views, and persistently tended to vote—those who were allowed to vote—for can-
didates who called themselves ‘democrats’”).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See PETER MARSHALL, DEMANDING THE IMPOSSIBLE: A HISTORY OF ANARCHISM 3
(2010).
171. Id. at ix.
172. Id. at 5-8.
173. Id. at 5-6.
174. See Graeber, supra note 167.
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its practice of “consensus-based” and non-hierarchical decision mak-
ing, created what is, for Graever, an ideal society.175
The Betafo example suggests that Graeber’s understanding of an-
archism is different from—and much more benign than—anarchism as
historically practiced and understood.  Graeber defines anarchism
loosely—those who “wish to see human relations that would not have
to be backed up by armies, prisons and police.”176  He also connects
the political philosophy with notions of equality.  “Anarchism envi-
sions a society based on equality and solidarity, which could exist
solely on the free consent of participants,” Graeber insists.177  And
anarchists do not necessarily view violence as an effective tactic.178  In
short, Occupy seeks to make anarchism more relevant to our current
time and place.
In practice, Occupy’s anarchism coalesced into a leaderless resis-
tance movement.179  Decisions are made through “peoples’ assem-
blies,” mediums for direct and participatory democracy.180  In these
assemblies participants engage in sustained dialogue to find solutions
to issues presented.181
Even within this informal structure, some local Occupy affiliates
took a commanding role in the movement, articulating guiding princi-
ples.  The Declaration of the Occupation of New York City declares
that the highly diverse group is united as the “99%” and in objection
to the greed and corruption of the 1%.182  The Declaration also enu-
merates the movement’s grievances183 and explains that the foremost
175. See Dan Berrett, Intellectual Roots of Wall St. Protest Lie in Academe, CHRON. HIGHER.
EDUC., Oct. 16, 2011, available at http://chronicle.com/article/Intellectual-Roots-of-Wall/129428/.
In November of 2011, a self-proclaimed “anarchist” and anti-authoritarian element in Occupy
called on others to join it in solidarity. See Alison Barnwell, About 100 People Meet for ‘Anarch-
ist General Assembly’ in Preparation for Occupy Portland Eviction, OREGONIAN (Nov. 12, 2011,
10:04 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2011/11/about_100_people_meet_for_
anar.html.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See NYC GEN. ASSEMBLY, Declaration of the Occupation of New York City, OCCUPY
WALL STREET, http://occupywallstreet.net/learn (last visited Jan. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Occupy
Wall Street Declaration] (“Occupy Wall Street is a peoples movement.  It is leaderless and party-
less by design.  It is not a business, a political party, an advertising campaign or a brand.  It is not
for sale.”).
180. See About, http://occupywallst.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2013).
181. See id.
182. See OCCUPY WALL STREET, supra note 158.
183. See NYC GEN. ASSEMBLY, DECLARATION OF THE OCCUPATION OF NEW YORK CITY
(2011), available at http://www.nycga.net/resources/documents/declaration/ [hereinafter Occupy
Wall Street Declaration].
752 [VOL. 56:721
Does Protest Work?
objection of the 99% is to corporations’ prioritizing of “profit over
people, self-interest over justice, and oppression over equality . . . .”184
The chief aim of Occupy is to establish a sustainable and equitable
economy that works for the 99% of Americans.185  It also believes
that everyone has the right to “occupy space safely.”186
However, with one exception, the movement has not developed
any plan or policy proposals to achieve these aims.  To do so would be
inimical to Occupy’s anarchist philosophy and its claim that America
is an illegitimate, corrupt state187 (the exception occurred when “Oc-
cupy the SEC” produced a 325-page letter to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission in support of the Volcker Rule, legislation that
would prevent consumer banks from engaging in risky trades of the
type that animated the subprime mortgage crisis).188
Nevertheless, Occupy has identified key concerns that might be
addressed through policy: mortgage fraud, illegal foreclosures, rule of
government by monied interests, taxpayer bailouts of banks, crushing
student loan debt, and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.189
Occupy’s main tactical innovation has been as its name suggests,
the occupation of public space—a kind of taking of property.  As ex-
plained above, Occupy established living quarters in encampments
throughout the country.  Until they faced eviction, members of Oc-
cupy ate, slept, conducted meetings, and engaged all other life activi-
ties in these open encampments.  The occupations all operated
autonomously.190
In addition, Occupy harnessed the power of social media to at-
tract attention, to disseminate information, and to encourage organiz-
ing and “direct action.”191  Protesters affiliated with Occupy staged
numerous marches and “flash” demonstrations to air their griev-
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. See OCCUPY WALL STREET, supra note 158 (“We do not have one or two simple de-
mands, though many demand them of us.  Why?  Because we believe that making demands of a
corrupt system makes our success contingent on the will of others.  It legitimizes the corrupted, it
disempowers us.”).
188. See PROTEST & ASSEMBLY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 158, at 13.
189. See Occupy Wall Street Declaration, supra note 183.
190. See What is the Difference Between Occupy Wall Street and the occupies in other cities?,
OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallstreet.net/learn (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
191. See What are you protesting?, OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallstreet.net/learn
(last visited Jan. 15, 2013) (“Get your city to transfer its money out of corrupting banks.  Sing at
the auctioneer until they cancel the illegal foreclosures.  Join groups writing letters to the SEC
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ances.192  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Citizens United193 decision has
served as a rallying point at some of these demonstrations; the case
permitted unlimited corporate funding of elections,194 and, for Oc-
cupy, facilitates the corruption of American institutions.195196  Rather
than protecting the interests of the average American citizen, our
vaunted institutions instead promote the perversion of the democracy.
C. Analysis
In addition to the inspirations described above, Occupy’s David
Graeber links the current protest against economic injustice to civil
rights-era protest movements.  In his view, Occupy’s anarchist teach-
ings and tactics are similar to, if not precisely the same as, the methods
employed by 1960s civil rights activists.197  Occupy’s emphasis on par-
ticipatory democracy, its decision making through consensus, and its
use of direct action and alternative media to advance its cause, are all
consistent with civil rights era protests.198  So is Occupy’s attack on
wealth inequality.
But there are numerous ways in which Occupy and the civil
rights-era protests diverge.  The following analysis discusses some of
those differences and associated costs.
1. Socio-Legal Framework and Rhetoric
Occupy’s anarchist leanings distinguish it from civil rights-era
protestors.  Contrary to Graeber’s assertion, the civil rights move-
ment’s embrace of participatory democracy and direct action never
amounted to an endorsement of anarchism.199  The movement as-
exposing the Corporations’ lies they use to beg for mercy for their crimes.  Teach shareholders
the power of shareholder activism.  Don’t just protest.  Take action.  Direct action.”).
192. See Michael Greenberg, What Future for Occupy Wall Street?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Feb.
9, 2012), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/feb/09/what-future-occupy-
wall-street/?pagination=false; see also PROTEST & ASSEMBLY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 158,
at 8-11 (stating that Occupy participants held frequent demonstrations and marches in the weeks
following the start of the protests).
193. Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
194. Id. at 913.  For a discussion of the decision and its implications, see Michael S. Kang,
After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243 (2010).
195. PROTEST & ASSEMBLY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 158, at 12.
196. See, e.g., id. (mentioning a targeted protest gathering that was held to mark the anniver-
sary of the Citizens United decision).
197. See Graeber, supra note 167.
198. See generally BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 20 (chronicling the history of the civil rights
movement in Atlanta from the end of World War II to 1980).
199. This claim is made in Michael Kazin, Anarchism Now: Occupy Wall Street Revives an
Ideology, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 7, 2011, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/
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serted itself using collective action, but most of its demands could be
met within the framework of liberal individualism.  Activists sought to
reform the American state by exploiting the gap between America’s
ideals and its reality: the movement demanded that the country prac-
tice its own ideals.  Major movement actors clothed themselves in the
flag and in patriotism; they articulated the movement’s guiding princi-
ples in ways that cohered with America’s core principles, as enunci-
ated in founding legal texts.200  Precisely because the movement’s
pleas for equality tracked familiar elements of the national creed, its
quest for rights prevailed.
To be sure, some elements of the civil rights movement, including
some concerned with wealth disparities, found inspiration in global
ideologies, including Marxism.201  Notably, however, the movement
lost credibility and encountered repression when adherents attacked
inequality by turning to Marxist theories and rhetoric.202  SNCC,
which had been the leading edge of the movement—its shock
troops—rapidly declined under the weight of the backlash.
Occupy’s embrace of anarchism also occurs at a cost to its credi-
bility, and, as we have seen, encouraged the perception that Occupy
posed a threat to law and order, and invited and resulted in repres-
sion.  Occupy may mean merely to embrace self-governance and free-
dom by aligning itself with anarchy.  But the word “anarchism”
includes much darker connotations.  Therein is the problem for Oc-
cupy: anarchism, legitimately or not, invokes deeply negative, even
terrifying, associations.  Anarchy implies violence, and anarchists sum-
mon images of bomb throwers who induce fear and seek to destroy
society, including innocents.  It is not surprising, given these associa-
tions, that Occupy’s quest for equality using this rhetoric has subjected
it to ridicule and de-legitimization.
In embracing such a threatening ideology, Occupy violates a car-
dinal rule: the socio-legal framework of a reform movement’s protest
must be accessible to the public, and people must be able to relate to
97114/anarchy-occupy-wall-street-throwback.  Authorities on the era locate the movement’s
socio-legal foundations elsewhere, including in Judeo-Christian teachings, liberal-legal individu-
alism, and traditions of self-help. See, e.g., CARSON, supra note 51, at 21. See generally BROWN-
NAGIN, supra note 20 (exploring the different ideologies that spurred activists during Atlanta’s
civil rights movement).
200. This strategy worked particularly well in a Cold War context; advocates argued that
America’s failure to live up to its creed of equality made it no better than its enemies, the
Communists. See MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS 1 (2000).
201. See CARSON, supra note 51, at 16, 94, 101, 265-86, 276-78.
202. Id. at 276-78.
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it.  Symbols and rhetoric should be calibrated to the historical moment
and to the prevailing political economy.  In this moment, concerns
about domestic and international terrorism and civic unrest, animated
by real geopolitical dangers, have fueled push back against all sorts of
non-conformist individuals and groups.  Occupy is no exception.203
This is not to suggest that Occupy has, or is, engaging in actions
that, in reality, are outside of the American experience.  The point
here is that the rhetoric with which Occupy (or any other movement)
associates itself is significant.  Framing is, if not everything, critically
important.204  It can give a movement momentum, or, as in Occupy’s
case, inhibit political traction.
Therefore, the negative associations that Occupy’s anarchist lean-
ings invoke logically must be balanced against the benefits associated
with anarchism.  The advantages of the anarchist association are not,
in this case, entirely clear.  For the definition of anarchism to which
Occupy subscribes is not especially rigorous.  Occupy could adopt vir-
tually the same structure, tactics and aims without declaring itself “an-
archist.”  Its brilliant slogan—”We are the 99%”—its grievance
against corporate greed and perverted government, its direct action
tactics and creative use of social media, could stand more effectively
on their own.  Or Occupy could simply assert its commitment to “civil
disobedience,” an association that would engender positive associa-
tions in the lion’s share of the population.
2. Relationship to the State and Influential Elites
To be sure, for Occupy, the allegiance to anarchism is significant;
it conveys something unique about the group.  The terminology be-
speaks Occupy’s renunciation of the state, its disavowal of a corrupt
government.  The value of such an absolute position is obvious.
Nevertheless, Occupy’s absolutism not only separates it from the
civil rights movement but also limits its ability to directly participate in
the process of change making through policy and law, as distinguished
from cultural or social change.  As indicated above, alliances across
differences—including with government officials and other elites—can
be profitable if thoughtfully engaged.
203. See, e.g., Debucquoy-Dodley, supra note 153 (stating that the FBI extensively moni-
tored the Occupy Wall Street movement fearing that a rogue citizen would exploit the move-
ment to air general dissatisfaction with the government).
204. See THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS READER, supra note 51, at 52.
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One solution to this conundrum might be for the movement to
consider compromise: it need not embrace an all-or-nothing position.
Occupy might profit if at least some components of the movement
adopted a less absolutist position or at least highlighted continuities
with, rather than cleavages in its relationship to the American creation
myth.
The advantage of this proposition is clear if we again consider
dynamics in the black freedom struggle and lessons that it can teach.
Within the civil rights movement some embraced the “malignant kin-
ship” that I have argued was critical to Dr. King’s ability to achieve
some of his goals.  At the same time that King embraced the politics
of pragmatism, other elements of the movement tacked far left; they
turned to the language of revolution and socialism to make a case for
a more just society.  Still, other elements in the movement tacked
right; they disavowed the need for federal intervention to redress
black inequality.  These individuals preferred self-help and commu-
nity building as means of achieving and sustaining change to the inter-
ference of outsiders.  Heterogeneity in the movement created the
opportunity structure in which the movement as a whole achieved
change through policy and law.205  Given discord in the movement,
decision makers at the national and state level sought a compromise
solution, one at the midpoint of the right and left flanks of the move-
ment.  Congress enacted the landmark civil rights legislation of the
1960s—which not only benefited blacks but also advanced the inter-
ests of women and ethnic and religious minorities—within precisely
such a socio-political environment.
Should elements of Occupy embrace a less absolutist position on
government, the movement might also usefully form alliances with in-
fluential elites who can advance its cause without undermining its
goals.206  During the civil rights era, even the most radical activists
found that lawyers are indispensable to protest movements.  Counsel
can provide representation to individuals who find themselves en-
205. See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 20 at 135-36 (arguing that disagreements within the civil
rights movement over tactics and strategy facilitated evolutions that brought about policy objec-
tives shared by all).
206. See, e.g., Verta Taylor, The Continuity of the American Women’s Movement: An Elite-
Sustained Stage, in WOMEN AND SOCIAL PROTEST 277, 277-78 (Guida West & Rhoda Lois
Blumberg eds., 1990) (contradicting claims that the women’s movement occurred in two waves
by focusing on ways that elite women sustained struggle during the 1940s and 1950s).
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snared by the apparatus of the state because of their activism.207  Simi-
larly, alliances with journalists, who can provide a balanced account of
developments and spread the movement’s narrative, are crucial.  Law-
yers also can serve as investigators who aid social movements by pro-
viding neutral accounts of contested developments and by filing
complaints that dispute official versions of events adverse to the
movement.208
To the extent that Occupy gains interest in policy proposals or in
making change through law, alliances with attorneys will also be criti-
cal, as the movement’s most radical elements learned.  Because a law-
yer who undertakes representation of a client pledges to represent the
client zealously, to maintain his secrets, and to advocate his client
even against state authority, collaboration with a lawyer does not nec-
essarily undermine a movement’s criticisms of the government.  In
fact, the beauty of legal advocacy is that an attorney can at once par-
ticipate in official proceedings of government and function as an an-
tagonist of the state and its laws.
3. Tactics
Another observation about convergences and divergences be-
tween Occupy and civil rights era protesters relates to tactics.  Occupy
has employed an impressive array of tactics to highlight its agenda.
Many replicate some of the most effective tactics of civil rights-era
protests.  However, Occupy’s most prominent tactic, its formation of
encampments, did not reflect an effective social movement choice, as
history might have foretold.
The encampment tactic violated another important rule: by their
nature, protest movements are spontaneous, unpredictable, and must
be dynamic rather than immobile.  Literally and figuratively, social
movements move.
Several examples underscore the point.  In 1968, after Dr. King’s
death, SCLC set up an encampment of “poor people” in Washington,
D.C.209  The encampment suffered for much the same reasons that
Occupy precipitated criticism and eventually faced eviction: concerns
207. See generally BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 20 (discussing the integral role lawyers played
in Atlanta’s civil rights movement).
208. Several legal clinics served in this capacity by investigating the police response to Oc-
cupy. See, e.g., PROTEST & ASSEMBLY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 158, at i (“[T]he Protest and
Assembly Rights Project . . . investigated the United States response to Occupy Wall Street in
light of the government’s international legal obligations.”).
209. See JACKSON, supra note 12, at 354.
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about public health and safety and a perception that the Poor People’s
Campaign lacked direction.  The encampment departed Washington
after it did not achieve concessions from President Johnson.210  Activ-
ists came to deeply regret the encampment.211  More than four de-
cades earlier, in 1932, a “Bonus Army,” an assemblage of destitute
veterans, thousands strong and from all over the country, established
an encampment in Washington, D.C. to demand payment for services
or jobs.212  Governmental authorities—led by Douglas McArthur,
George S. Patton, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, men remembered to-
day as great generals—used tanks to evict the veterans.213
Encampments proved so ineffective in part because the groupings
triggered negative stereotypes about the poor.  The immobility and
takeover of property by these encampments reinforced the social
marginalization and stigmatization of the groups that participated in
the efforts.  Members of encampments highly visible as they sat
around in tents or milled about in search of food and water appeared
socially irresponsible and unproductive.214  Unfair as this viewpoint
about the poor or their advocates is, it remains a perspective about the
disadvantaged that is widespread.  If protest movements are to be ef-
fective, negative stereotypes must be managed; as SNCC and the wo-
men of the welfare rights movement learned through defeat, images
matter almost as much as substance.
D. Achievements
These observations notwithstanding, I disagree with the hurried
journalist conclusion that Occupy “failed.”  However Occupy ulti-
mately is judged by history, it deserves credit for bringing citizens to-
gether and for inciting public debate about economic inequality and
economic exploitation, including by banks and lenders.  After Oc-
cupy’s advent, public opinion polls showed broad support for the
movement and deep concern about the problem of stifled economic
opportunity that it highlighted.215  In a Gallup poll conducted two
210. See id. at 355-56.
211. Id. at 354.
212. See PAUL DICKSON & THOMAS B. ALLEN, THE BONUS ARMY: AN AMERICAN EPIC 1
(2004).
213. See id. at 6.
214. See, e.g., id. at 5 (“Some people saw them simply as men of the Great Depression,
homeless, hopeless, and looking for cash.”); see also JACKSON, supra note 12, at 355 (noting that
government officials characterized the marchers as a “mob”); id., at 354 (stating that the media
viewed the communities as “slums”).
215. See PROTEST & ASSEMBLY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 158, at 14.
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weeks after the movement began, 44 percent of Americans reported
feeling that the economic system is personally unfair, and 54 percent
of Americans viewed the protests favorably.216  Journalists published
appreciably more stories about wealth inequality.217  Even the Presi-
dent of the United States seemed to endorse Occupy’s critique of the
system.  He called the “breathtaking greed of a few” unacceptable and
argued that “fairness” to the economic system was the “defining issue
of our time.”218
These developments and others indicated that Occupy raised so-
cial consciousness219 about inequality and stimulated cultural
change.220  Such socio-cultural changes lay the groundwork for
changes in policy and law.  In this, Occupy has managed a significant
feat: in just a few months impassioned individuals organized and, in so
doing, altered perspectives and created a foundation upon which
others can build.
CONCLUSION
Class-based critiques of the social order are not, as some claim,221
aberrant in United States history.  This Article has refuted that claim,
first, by examining challenges to wealth inequality in the civil rights
movement.  During that era, this Article has shown, figures ranging
from Dr. King, to student activists, to lawyers Howard Moore, Jr., and
Margie Pitts Hames, all addressed economic injustice.  The collabora-
tions between lawyers and communities are especially significant.
They belie the categorical assertion in some scholarship that civil
rights lawyering depoliticized the movement and crowded out eco-
nomic conceptions of equality.  These examples also teach that critics
of wealth inequality need not disavow the state and avoid the courts
to advance their agendas.  Movements that effectively organize can
216. See Greenberg, supra note 192.
217. See PROTEST & ASSEMBLY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 158, at 14.
218. See Greenberg, supra note 192.
219. On consciousness raising in social movements and as an element of social change, see
FRANCESCA POLLETTA, FREEDOM IS AN ENDLESS MEETING 114, 160, 164, 166, 168, 171, 188, 222-
23 (2002).
220. On the importance of cultural change in movements, see generally JAMES M. JASPER,
THE ART OF MORAL PROTEST 69-99 (1997).
221. See, e.g., Corbett B. Daly, Santorum Says There Are No Classes in the United States,
CBS NEWS (Jan. 8, 2012, 12:14 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57354598-5035
44/santorum-says-there-are-no-classes-in-the-united-states/ (“Former Pennsylvania Sen. says the
United States does not have any classes and Republicans should stop using the term ‘middle
class’ because it only helps President Obama drive a wedge among the Republicans looking to
unseat him.”).
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gain advantage in the courts, through the legislature, and through po-
litical protest.
This foregoing Article outlined many lessons  current and future
protest efforts that seek to leverage the civil rights movement for
change may wish to consider.  Protest movements can gain by embrac-
ing: a socio-legal narrative framework that is accessible and attractive
to the public; protests with purpose; pragmatic political coalitions
compromise; and scaling down.  In addition, I observed that reform
can be achieved through strategic management of crisis.  Community
organizing can be effective if reformers deploy the human capital and
resources necessary to make the time-consuming endeavor worth-
while.  Litigation can be effective, too, and not because courts can de-
fine and confer affirmative rights upon those who seek change.  Legal
constructs—equality, liberty, due process—can serve as sources of in-
spiration to movements; legal setbacks can aid political mobilization.
Identity always matters in court; stereotypes, which inevitably will be
deployed against the poor, must be managed, especially if reformers
hope to avenge rights in court.  Sympathetic lawyers are critical to
defending a movement under assault and helping devise creative argu-
ments about law and organizing tactics.
Breaking with current wisdom, this Article also cautioned that
class-oriented campaigns for equity are not necessarily easier to wage
than race-based campaigns for social justice.  Each approach is limited
in its own way, and each has advantages.  Whatever mode of advocacy
a reform movement adopts, it is unlikely to be well-served by dogma-
tism that alienates potential allies.  Collaboration is essential.  And
success is relative.
The most critical insight that both civil-rights era activism and the
short history of Occupy teaches is that protest is necessary, and, if
well-conceived and thoughtfully-executed, it can work.  For women
and men who cannot otherwise garner influence in the political pro-
cess and those whose interests are not effectively represented, advo-
cacy outside of formal channels is essential.
Today, as ever, John Lewis’s statement at the 1963 March on
Washington is relevant.  Americans who seek change, he said, must
“[g]et in and stay in the streets of every city, every village and every
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hamlet of this nation until true freedom comes, until the revolution of
1776 is complete.”222
222. John Lewis, Speech at the March on Washington (Aug. 28, 1963), available at http://
voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/lewis-speech-at-the-march-on-washington-speech-text/.
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I. TWO GREAT LAWYERS
As a constitutional law professor, it is a privilege to have an arti-
cle appear in the Wiley A. Branton Symposium at an institution that
has played such a central role in the development of constitutional law
and the advancement of civil rights in America.
Participating in this Symposium  is also special to me for personal
reasons.  My first legal boss was one of the most distinguished gradu-
ates of  Howard University School of Law and a key player in the
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  I want to thank Dean Nick Allard, Associate
Dean Michael Cahill, and the Brooklyn Law School Dean’s Summer Research Stipend Program
for supporting the work on this Article.  I should also note that as an ACLU lawyer I helped
challenge the campaign finance restrictions and requirements at issue in many of the cases dis-
cussed in this article, most notably, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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constitutional revolution that so many of its professors and graduates
helped to bring about.  His name was Robert L. Carter, and he was
the General Counsel of the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP).  My second legal boss is a key
participant in this Symposium, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Nor-
ton, for whom I had the pleasure and privilege of working at the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).  From both of those great
lawyers and leaders, I learned important lessons about principles that
bear on the issues of free speech, fair elections, and campaign finance
law.
I worked for Robert Carter when I was a first year summer law
student intern at the NAACP.  He was one of the legal masterminds
for the Brown v. Board of Education1  desegregation revolution and
was also a key lawyer who protected the NAACP’s rights to organize
and lead that revolution.  He went on to a long and distinguished ca-
reer on the federal bench in New York after serving the cause of civil
rights so ably at the NAACP.2
In researching this article, I came across a tribute to Judge Carter
at the time of his death  a  year ago.  It is from the First Amendment
Center.  Here’s what they said about his career:
Many will mourn this week’s passing of Robert L. Carter, a former
U.S. district judge in New York and a pioneering attorney who
fought for the cause of racial equality during his long career. Carter,
94, also made great contributions to First Amendment jurispru-
dence, arguing numerous cases before the U.S. Supreme Court
while an attorney for the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People.
Carter cared deeply about the First Amendment and saw it as an
essential tool for the advancement of equality. Carter noted in his
book, A Matter of Law: A Memoir of Struggle in the Cause of Equal
Rights, that he wrote his thesis at Columbia Law School (where he
earned a master’s in law in 1941) “on the essentiality of the First
Amendment for the preservation of a democratic society.”
Carter later used this thesis when developing arguments before the
Supreme Court, including N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (1958), in which
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Judge Carter served on the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York from 1972 until his death in 2012, serving in senior status from 1986. See Roy Reed,
Robert L. Carter, an Architect of School Desegregation, Dies at 94, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2012, http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/nyregion/robert-l-carter-judge-and-desegregation-strategist-dies-
at-94.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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he successfully argued that the First Amendment protected the free-
association rights of rank-and-file members of the NAACP from
having their names disclosed to Alabama state officials bent on us-
ing that information for negative purposes.
Carter’s thesis became his life’s work as an attorney.  [As one
scholar put it:] “In the eight First Amendment cases he argued
before the Court between 1958 and 1965, Robert Carter had con-
structed a bridge between the liberty principle of the First Amend-
ment and the equality principle of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
The First Amendment served as an essential tool during the civil
rights movement. The late, great Robert L. Carter should be praised
and remembered for his mastery in using that tool to carve out a
better society.3
And that, in a nutshell, is one of the key points of my article: free
speech and equal rights are allies, not adversaries.  Civil liberties and
civil rights are inextricably intertwined.  You cannot have one without
the other.  The values they serve are not in tension, but in harmony.
Sometimes with all of the scary headlines during the 2012 elections
about high-spending so-called “super pacs,” and secretive non-profits
who used so-called  “dark money” to “pollute” our politics and “steal”
our elections, it is easy to forget the lessons that Judge Carter devoted
his life to helping us learn.  Many today insist that the quantity of our
political speech is too high and the quality of it is too low, and that the
government should step in and fix both problems by limiting the
amount of money that people and groups can spend on politics.  The
less that can be spent the less that will be spent on bad “negative”
speech, or so the argument goes.  My main point is that the invitation
to have government control the quantity and quality of our political
3. David L. Hudson, Jr., Remembering Civil Rights Legal Pioneer, Friend of the First
Amendment, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
remembering-civil-rights-legal-pioneer-friend-of-the-first-amendment.  Among the landmark
First Amendment cases that Judge Carter handled while an NAACP lawyer were, most signifi-
cantly, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), which was the magna carta for the right of
associational privacy and of controversial cause organizations—in that case a non-profit corpora-
tion—to shield the identity of their members and protect them from harm and harassment for
their affiliation; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), which recognized a First Amendment
right of public employees not to have to reveal indiscriminately all groups to which they be-
longed; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), which  upheld the right of organizations to use
litigation as an advocacy tool and solicit lawsuits for that end and Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigating Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963), which protected the NAACP and other advocacy
groups from indiscriminate investigations into their activities in the claimed search for subver-
sive influence in civil rights groups.
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speech is a grave threat to liberty and equality and, therefore to de-
mocracy.  And I would hope that Judge Carter would have agreed.
I learned another vital principle about the relationship of free
speech and civil rights from Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton.
The principle is that First Amendment rights have to be indivisible
and universal.  If they are allowed to be taken away from one person
or group, then the government is invited to take them away from
other persons and groups until there are no rights left.4  During her
service as a top lawyer for the ACLU, her career famously embodied
that wisdom.  Although she handled a wide variety of civil rights and
free speech cases and was a champion in the cause of equal rights, she
received a good deal of notoriety when she represented individuals
and groups with whose ideas about civil rights she was in total disa-
greement, but whose rights to express those ideas she supported in
full.  So, she represented the segregationist Alabama Governor,
George C. Wallace, when, in 1968, while running for President, he was
denied the right to hold a campaign rally at Shea Stadium in New
York City.5  And she represented a Maryland white supremacist group
when they were denied a permit to hold a parade by defending their
rights all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States.6  In both
cases the government was concerned that the controversial ideas
would cause trouble, perhaps violence.  But Eleanor  Norton under-
stood that the gravest danger to law and order was allowing the gov-
ernment to suppress controversial groups and views that it found
threatening. She so well understood, as the late Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes famously put it,  “if there is any principle of the Constitution
that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the
principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with
us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”7 In protecting freedom
4. That philosophy was exemplified in ACLU literature of the time by the following quote
attributed to Pastor Martin Niemoller, a German anti-Nazi theologian:
First they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out because I was not a socialist.
Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out because I was not a
trade unionist.
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out because I was not a Jew.
Then they came for me, and there was no one left to speak for me.
Militia Movement Controversy Affords Baldwin Opportunity to Teach Important History Les-
son, BOBMCCARTY.COM (Mar. 20, 2009), http://bobmccarty.com/tag/martin-niemoller-founda
tion/.
5. See A Conversation with Eleanor Holmes Norton, D.C. BAR (1997), http://www.dcbar.
org/for_lawyers/resources/legends_in_the_law/norton.cfm.
6. See Carroll v. President of Princess Anne Cnty., 393 U.S. 175, 176-77 (1968).
7. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
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for thoughts that she personally may have hated, she established pro-
tection for the thoughts, speech, and actions in which she believed. By
defending the free speech rights of those who would take away civil
rights, she safeguarded the rights of civil rights activists to exercise
their own free speech rights.
II. OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES
Turning to how these principles impact today’s election issues, it
is helpful to recall that the prominent politician, former House Demo-
cratic  Majority Leader, Richard Gephardt, once observed that,
“[w]hat we have is two important values in conflict: freedom of speech
and our desire for healthy campaigns in a healthy democracy.  You
can’t have both.”8 In my opinion, based on the teachings of Robert
Carter and Eleanor Norton, Richard Gephardt had it precisely back-
wards.  In fact, you cannot have one without the other.
Over forty years ago, the ACLU realized that there was a clash
between campaign finance laws and First Amendment rights when the
government used those laws against a handful of dissenters who ran
an ad in the New York Times criticizing the President of the United
States, Richard Nixon.9  No view of the First Amendment or demo-
cratic values or equality could possibly justify sending someone to jail
for running that ad, regardless of who sponsored it, or when it ran, or
how much it cost, or how it was funded.  In more recent years, the
government passed the McCain-Feingold Law, which made it a crime
for the ACLU or the NAACP to broadcast an ad criticizing the Presi-
dent of the United States during an election season.10  In the Citizens
United case,11 a right-wing group that funded an anti-Hillary Clinton
movie—a movie—ran afoul of the campaign finance laws.12  Why
8. Nancy Gibbs, The Wake Up Call: Clinton Makes Serious Noises About Campaign Re-
form, but that May Not Be Enough to Change a Cozy System that Loves Special-Interest Money,
TIME, Feb. 3, 1997, at 25, available at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/analysis/time/
9702/03/gibbs.html.
9. See United States v. Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972); see
also ACLU v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973) (three-judge court), vacated as moot
sub nom., Staats v. ACLU, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975).
10. The statute is the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 166
Stat. 81, the key provisions of which were upheld in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540
U.S. 93, 188-89 (2003), over the objection of some of the major organizations in America, such as
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO, the NRA, and the ACLU.
11. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding
that the First Amendment prohibited the government from restricting independent political ex-
penditures by corporations and unions).
12. Id.
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would we want to put government in charge of political speech in that
manner?
When I first started working on these issues, we were only trying
to protect the free speech rights of groups like the ACLU and the
NAACP to run ads criticizing the President of the United States in an
election year despite the campaign finance laws.  That was classic, old-
fashioned civil liberties: protecting the First Amendment right of peo-
ple and groups to criticize the government.  But then, after Watergate,
the government passed much more sweeping restrictions on campaign
funding, which would clearly protect incumbents and the status quo
and make it harder to criticize or challenge the government.13 And so,
we at the ACLU came to see campaign finance restrictions as classic
examples of the establishment protecting itself against challenge.
Contribution limits did not hurt the powerful and the well-heeled who
would always find another way to get their messages out.  The limits
hurt dissenting voices, such as minority voices who needed to be able
to rely on supporters for seed money to get started and to get their
message across.  We pointed to Senator Eugene McCarthy whose 1968
challenge to the Vietnam War was funded by a few wealthy contribu-
tors, which would now be illegal.  We pointed to black politicians like
Georgia’s Julian Bond and Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley whose
early political careers depended on a handful of large contributors to
get started.  With contribution limits, they would have gotten no-
where.  We pointed to the early founding of groups like the ACLU
and the NAACP who were dependent on the generosity and political
support of a few well-heeled financial angels to get them started and
to get their ideas circulating.
We saw campaign finance limitations as undermining First
Amendment rights  and democracy  by limiting criticism of the  gov-
ernment, protecting incumbents, shortchanging new candidates and
new movements, and generally putting the government in charge of
political speech by controlling its funding.
We rejected the idea that you can enhance democracy by limiting
speech or that you can have more democracy through less speech.
The First Amendment is based on exactly the opposite premise,
namely, that the more discussion and free flow of information we
have,  the better democracy we will have.  The discussion of govern-
13. The law was the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
443, 88 Stat. 3 and was at issue in the landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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ment and politics must be robust and uninhibited, not restrained and
controlled.  Unlimited political speech is not the enemy of democracy,
it is the engine of democracy and the foe of the status quo and the
established order.  As a judge recently said in a case protecting pro-
choice campaign funding by Emily’s List: “The government has unlim-
ited resources, public and private, for touting its policy agenda.  Those
on the outside, whether voices of opposition, encouragement, or inno-
vation must rely on private wealth to make their voices heard.”14
In the famous 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo,15 the United States
Supreme Court recognized these principles, though in a partial and
incomplete manner.  The Court, soundly and properly, ruled that limi-
tations on political campaign expenditures were direct limitations on
political speech and could not be justified, especially not on theories
that the government could “level the playing field” by limiting and
rationing the amount of political speech that each person or group
could be allotted or decide how much political speech was “enough”
in our elections.16  But the Court also ruled that limitations on cam-
paign contributions were acceptable because the latter was a form of
second-hand speech and posed problems of corruption.17  And that
dual decision has set the stage for many of the campaign finance diffi-
culties we have experienced ever since.
So, my submission is that our civil liberties and our civil rights
traditions both (1) require that we try to keep the government from
regulating political speech and undermining democracy;  and (2) we
not invite government control of political speech in what would be a
futile and self-defeating  way to improve democracy.
III. ARE FREE SPEECH AND FAIR ELECTIONS AT ODDS?
Of course, the power of speech is often badly imbalanced today,
because power and wealth in our society are badly imbalanced.  We
only have to look at my own New York City Mayor Michael Bloom-
berg’s campaign spending to know that.  But, you cannot level the
playing field without leveling the First Amendment in the process, be-
cause every legislated restriction on political speech funding creates
loopholes that require additional restrictions and more government
14. Emily’s List v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 581 F.3d 1, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Brown, J.
concurring).
15. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
16. Id. at 38-59.
17. Id.
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controls.  If we limit Mayor Bloomberg from spending his own money
to speak out on his own candidacy, then what about people who want
to spend money to support Bloomberg independently?  That would be
more imbalance, would it not?  So should we limit those people also?
The law we challenged successfully in Buckley did precisely that, and
it sharply limited all independent citizens and groups from spending to
speak.18  In 2004, two of the ACLU’s biggest contributors—George
Soros and Peter Lewis—spent about $75 million dollars to try to de-
feat George Bush for re-election.19  Are we prepared to declare that
illegal?  What about letting contributors give the money to the ACLU
or the NAACP to attack George Bush’s policies on civil liberties or
civil rights during an election year on a daily basis?  In more recent
years, wealthy individuals on the right funded speech designed to pre-
vent Barack Obama from being elected and re-elected.20  Should we
restrain that also, in order to level the playing field?  And it does not
take too much imagination to see where this is going.  If George Soros
or Peter Lewis or Sheldon Adelson or David Koch want to buy a
newspaper or a television network and support or attack the President
of the United States every day, should we let the government limit
that in order to level all electoral speech to make sure it is, shall we
say, fair and balanced?  This is exactly the path that the arguments for
campaign finance controls take you down, and I think it would be a
disaster for the First Amendment as well as for democracy if they
were to gain more of a purchase.
In a similar vein, in last year’s elections, Mayor Bloomberg was
reported to have donated $250,000 to support the same-sex proposal
on the ballot in nearby Maryland.21  If I were a Maryland citizen who
18. Id. at 39-51.
19. Ryan Grim, Peter Lewis Leaves Democracy Alliance, The Liberal Donor Network, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Mar. 21, 2012), http://huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/21/peter-lewis-democracy-alli
ance_n_1368551.html.
20. Tim Dickinson, Right-Wing Billionaires Behind Mitt Romney, ROLLING STONES, May
24. 2012, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/right-wing-billionaires-behind-mitt-romney-
20120524.
21. John Wagner, New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg Gives $250,000 to Maryland Same-
Sex Marriage Efforts, WASH. POST BLOG (Oct. 10, 2012, 8:12 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/maryland-politics/post/ny-mayor-michael-bloomberg-gives-250000-to-maryland-same-
sex-marriage-effort/2012/10/12/e870cb16-145e-11e2-ba83-a7a396e6b2a7_blog.html; see also Erik
Eckholm, Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage See Room for Victories, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/us/politics/gay-marriage-supporters-hope-to-win-in-4-states.
html?ref=erikeckholm&_r=0  (reporting that Amazon chief Jeff Bezos had donated $2.5 million
to support a same-sex marriage referendum in Washington State, where supporters outspent
opponents by a 5 to 1 margin)  The referendum passed and Washington became one of the first
States to adopt same-sex marriage by popular vote. Id.
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opposed same-sex marriage, I might ask “Where’s my megaphone?”
Why should we let billionaires like Mayor Bloomberg have so much
free speech when I am unable to afford anything like that?  Should
we, instead, level the playing field, by denying him the right to have so
much more influence than the average citizen?  Should we limit to
$1,000 per year the amount of money that anyone can contribute to
influence the public on a referendum campaign?  After all, if one is
serious about leveling the playing field, that would seem to be the
right thing to do.  These are precisely the kinds of rhetoric you hear
from the campaign finance control groups.22  Bring out the bulldozers
and flatten the First Amendment.  These are the kinds of concerns
that motivated the Supreme Court in Buckley to rule that limits on
campaign expenditures made to inform the public during an election
season when they most need the information violated the First
Amendment.23  Not to mention the excruciating problem of deciding
exactly what content will be subject to these limits: express advocacy
of the election or defeat of an identified candidate; or a mere mention
of an identified political candidate raising an issue that might help one
side or the other.  This is precisely the path that the arguments for
campaign finance controls take you down, and I think, it would be a
severe setback for the First Amendment as well as for democracy to
give them full sway.
When the Supreme Court  heard the government’s argument in
Citizens United that the First Amendment did not prevent the govern-
ment from banning the publication of a book that criticized a Presi-
dential candidate,  the Court understood that individuals and groups
of individuals will inevitably try to find ways to avoid the laws and get
their messages out and it saw how our campaign finance laws had be-
come loaded with rules, regulations, exceptions, safe harbors, and
qualifications.24  Much like an internal revenue code operating in the
First Amendment area,  it is understandable that the Court saw the
need for reform and simplification of these laws and renewed enforce-
ment of the commands of the First Amendment.25
22. Derek Crissman, A Constitutional Amendment Should Establish a Level Playing Field,
COMMON BLOG (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.commonblog.com/2012/04/26/a-constitutional-
amendment-should-establish-a-level—playing-field.
23. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38-59.
24. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 884-85 (2010).
25. Indeed, the Court explicitly referenced the complexity of the laws as an ongoing threat
to First Amendment freedoms observing, “[t]he First Amendment does not permit laws that
force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney, conduct demographic marketing research,
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As a result, in the highly controversial Citizens United decision
three years ago, the Court reinforced and expanded the speech-pro-
tective theories of the Buckley decision by dismantling the system of
censorship “vast in its reach” that our campaign finance controls em-
body.26  The Court held that where campaign expenditures are con-
cerned, all speakers and groups have equal rights to use their
resources to get out their messages by speaking about candidates and
politics and government.27  And the beneficiaries of this expanded and
clarified freedom of political speech are all of us who can hear what
the voices of different groups and individuals have to say.  For those
who contend that the Citizens United ruling was a radical right-wing
departure from normal constitutional rules, I would ask you to re-
member what the law said and what the government argued.  The law
made it a crime for a non-profit advocacy corporation, Citizens
United, to spend one dollar on broadcast advertising of a movie
harshly critical of then Senator Hillary Clinton, who was running for
President, near to the time of the election.  The group had to take the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) to court to see if there was some
way around the restriction.  It still amazes me that after thirty-five
years we accept so blandly the concept that people and groups that
want to engage in the most fundamental political speech imaginable
have to get the permission of a government agency or a court in order
to do so free from the fear of punishment.  The lower courts, however,
said no, there was no loophole or way out.28  And then, for the Su-
preme Court to justify this remarkable restraint, the government ar-
gued that even a book saying the same critical things about Senator
Clinton might be banned, because the publisher was a corporation.
Now that seems to be a breathtakingly radical proposition that would
effectively put the government in charge of both broadcasting and
publishing.  Where was the outrage, especially from the media com-
munity that the government would actually make that argument?
Where was the gratitude from the media community that the Supreme
Court wanted to be sure the media were fully protected by the First
Amendment from government censorship?29 Yet, outside of the edito-
or seek declaratory rulings before discussing the most salient political issues of our day.” Id.  at
889.
26. Id. at 907.
27. Id. at 899.
28. They were right in this regard. See id. at 888–92.
29. More recently, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito commented at a conference that if
the Court in Citizens United had not interpreted the First Amendment to protect corporations,
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rial pages of the Wall Street Journal and a few other pockets of First
Amendment universalism, the media outcry against the decision was
thunderous.30  And it was critical in inciting broad popular contempt
and revulsion for the Court and its ruling.31  In some quarters that is
thought of as biting the hand that feeds you.  I guess it is indeed true
that no good deed goes unpunished.
Of course, many have bemoaned the Citizens United decision and
contended that it has led to a perversion of our politics, a buying of
our elections or a selling of our democracy to the highest bidder.32  In
fact, the hyperventilated and doleful predictions to this effect have not
been borne out in any significant way.33  But, even if there had been a
sharp increase in campaign spending and political speech by business
corporations, non-profit groups, and labor unions as a result of the
Citizens United decision, that is a good thing, not a bad thing.  As the
generally, it could not be used to protect media corporations from government control either.
See Editorial, Justice Alito, Citizens United and the Press, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2012, § A, at 26.
Predictably, he was editorially attacked by the New York Times, which insisted that its constitu-
tional rights flowed from its function and status as the press, not its rights as a corporation. Id.
The trouble with that theory is that the Court itself has not ruled that the Freedom of the Press
Clause gives the media greater First Amendment rights than the Freedom of Speech Clause
gives the rest of us.  Instead, the Court has protected all speakers, media and non-media, equally,
an important First Amendment safeguard in my view.
30. Sean Higgens, Citizens United: The Dog that Never Barked, WASH. EXAMINER, Nov. 13,
2012, http://washingtonexaminer.com/citizens-united-the-dog-that-never-barked/article/2513358#
(“The howls of outrage began almost immediately after the Supreme Court ruled on Citizens
United v. Federal Elections Commission in January 2010.  It continued for months afterward.”).
31. Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on Campaign Fi-
nancing, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2010, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-16/politics/3677
3318-1-corporations-unions-new-limits.
32. Paul Abrams, Supreme Court to Hand government to Republicans, Again: This Time,
Forever, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-abrams/su
preme-court-to-hand-gov_b_395239.html; Bob Edgar, Supreme Court’s Campaign Ruling: A Bad
Day for Democracy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.csmontor/commentary/
opinion/2010/0122/supreme-court-s-campaign-ruling-a-bad-day-for-democracy; Editorial, The
Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A30 (“With a single, disastrous 5-to-4
ruling, the Supreme Court has thrust politics back to the rubber-baron era of the 19th century.
Disingenuously waiving the flag of the first First Amendment, the court’s conservative majority
has paved the way for corporations to use their vast treasures to overwhelm elections and intimi-
date elected officials into doing their bidding.”); Patrik Jonsson, ‘Fighting’ Obama Hits Supreme
Court Over Campaign Finance, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 23, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.
com/USA/Politics/2010/0123/Fighting-Obama-Hits-Supreme-Court-Over-Campaign-Finance;
Jeffery Toobin, Bad Judgment, NEW YORKER, Jan. 22, 2010, http:www.newyorker.com/online/
blogs/newsdesk/2010/01/campaign-finance.html.
33. See Matt Bai, How Much Has Citizens United Changed the Political Game, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., July 17, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/magazine/how-much-has-
citizens-united-changed-the-political-game.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Tarini Parti & Dave
Levinthal, 5 Money Takeways From 2012, POLITICO (Nov. 17, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.politi
co.com/news/stories/1112/83655.html (explaining how only about ten percent of super PAC fund-
ing came from corporations, and that figure was estimated  by an aggressively anti-corporate
group).
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Supreme Court has observed,  “that the air may at times seem filled
with verbal cacophony is . . . not a sign of weakness but of strength.” 34
This is all a reflection of the fact that people and groups are going
to use their resources, financial and otherwise, to get their messages
out about who should run the government and how they should run
the government, which increasingly influences more and more of our
lives.  The actions of the government have legitimacy only where the
political processes for choosing, checking, and controlling the govern-
ment remain free and unrestrained.
That is why the wrong lesson is being drawn about the campaign
spending in the 2012 elections.  The cries are out to roll-back and re-
peal the First Amendment protections for campaign funding and roll-
in the restrictions from the past.  Indeed, there are serious proposals
to even amend the Constitution itself to give Congress and the state
legislatures plenary power to impose broad regulation of campaign
finances.35  That is precisely the wrong idea: putting government in
charge of the funding of political speech and association in America.
IV. A WORD ABOUT SUPER PACS
So much of the hysteria is focused on the super pacs.  In the end,
it turned out that super pacs  swayed almost no significant elections.36
But in the meantime, super pacs, like the Citizens United decision that
supposedly spawned them, were treated like some kind of electoral
Frankenstein’s monster with citizens almost being urged to get their
torches and pitchforks  and hunt these evil creatures down.  So, it is
important to understand what super pacs are and to support them and
the First Amendment principles which they embody and realize.
34. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971).
35. One prominent version of a proposed constitutional amendment, supported by key
Democratic Senators like my own Charles Schumer, would provide as follows:
Section 1. Congress shall have power to regulate the raising and spending of money and
in kind equivalents with respect to Federal elections, including through setting limits
on-
(1) the amount of contributions to candidates for nomination for election to, or for
election to, Federal office; and
(2) the amount of expenditures that may be made by, in support of, or in opposi-
tion to such candidates.
S.J. Res. 29, 112th Cong. (2011).
36. Editorial, A Landslide Loss for Big Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2012, at SR 12. See
generally Joe Trotter, Media Watch Surprise! “Secret Money” Didn’t Buy Elections, CENTER FOR
COMPETITIVE POL. (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2012/11/08/media-watch-
surprise-that-secret-money-didnt-buy-election/ (collecting similar stories on campaign finance).
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First, what are super pacs?  They are political committees organ-
ized by individuals and/or groups that are only engaged in raising and
spending funds for “independent expenditures” (i.e. speech endorsing
politicians but independent of and not coordinated with any politician
or campaign).  Because they are not contributing directly to any can-
didate or campaign or working with a campaign, the money that sup-
ports them can come from corporations, unions, non-profits, as well as
from individuals; it can also come in unlimited amounts.  So, in their
essence, super pacs trace their origins back to the landmark case of
Buckley v. Valeo, which held that there can be no limitations on cam-
paign expenditures, especially independent expenditures that re-
present citizen advocacy and criticism of government—one of the
most precious protections of the First Amendment.37
The right of independent groups and individuals to use their
funds to speak out about politicians during an election year was front
and center in the Buckley case.  The new law, enacted supposedly to
cure the campaign finance ills associated with “Watergate,” severely
limited what any person or group could spend independently on
speech about politicians.38  The limit was $1,000 in an entire year,
which silences anyone once they run a small political advertisement in
a newspaper.  Spend a dollar more and risk going to prison for the
felony of illegal campaign spending under the law.  That is a pretty
frightening prospect in a democracy.  The justification for this Draco-
nian law was that because the law also limited to $1,000 how much a
person or group could contribute to a candidate, it would create a
“loophole” to allow such individuals or groups to go out indepen-
dently and spend more to support that candidate or oppose his oppo-
nent.39  Of course, that “loophole” was the heart of the First
Amendment.
37. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21–23 (1976).  Actually, the first modern “super PAC” may
have been the small group of anti-war liberals who gathered a significant amount of money to
run a newspaper advertisement in 1972 accusing President Richard Nixon of being a war crimi-
nal because of his conduct regarding the war in Vietnam. See United States v. Nat’l Comm. for
Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135, 1136–37 (2d Cir. 1972).  The government sued the group claiming
that the advertisement was a campaign message against the re-election of the President, and
therefore subject to all of the limits and restrictions of the new Federal Election Campaign Act
passed earlier that year. Id. at 1136–37.  The lower courts quickly ruled that it would be wrong
and a violation of the First Amendment to limit the funding of independent, issue-oriented criti-
cism of public officials including candidates for election or re-election, in that fashion. See id. at
1140-42; see also ACLU v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041, 1054 (D.D.C. 1973) (three-judge court),
vacated as moot sub nom, Staats v. ACLU, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975).
38. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-51.
39. See id. at 44-45.
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That is, indeed, precisely how the Supreme Court saw it, with
only one Justice dissenting on this point.  First, the Court ruled that
the law had to be narrowed so that it only reached “express advocacy”
of the election or defeat of a candidate.40  To give it any broader read-
ing would impermissibly silence issue advocacy and criticism of the
stand of public officials on political issues, and it would unwisely limit
the activity of groups like the ACLU and the NAACP.41  Second, but
even narrowed in that fashion, the law and its limits on independent
spending cut to the core of the First Amendment by limiting criticism
of the government and the officials who run it.  In the process of
reaching that conclusion, the Court rejected the many arguments that
the government put forward to try to justify the law.  In the Court’s
view, the values of independent political speech substantially out-
weighed any dangers it might pose.42
First, the Court rejected the idea that independent spending
could corrupt the politicians benefitted by it.  Because the spending
was independent and could not in any way be coordinated with the
candidate, there was no danger of a quid pro quo corruption or ex-
change of favors for funds.43  Indeed, they might sometimes be harm-
ful to a candidate.  Second, since the Court had determined that only
“express advocacy” by independent groups and individuals could be
regulated at all, people could criticize candidates extensively without
even urging their election or defeat.44  So, what was the point in
preventing them from doing so.  Third, the Court rejected the idea
that you could limit the speech of some in order relatively to enhance
the speech of others.45  This is basically the idea of so-called “leveling
the playing field,” and the Court said that the First Amendment can-
not tolerate such a steamrolling of the right to criticize government.46
As the Court put it:
The concept that government may regulate the speech of some ele-
ments of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others
is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed to
secure the “widest possible dissemination of information from di-
verse and antagonistic sources” and to assure the “unfettered ex-
40. See id. at 40-44.
41. See id. at 42-44.
42. See id. at 44-51.
43. Id. at 45-48.
44. Id. at 45.
45. Id. at 48–51.
46. Id. at 48-49.
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change of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.”47
Finally, the Court also rejected the government’s claim that ex-
cessive spending will lead to excessive or worthless speech.48  That is
the equivalent of today’s concern that too much campaign spending,
particularly in the hands of super pacs, will lead to extremely “nega-
tive” campaigns which will turn off voters.  Here’s how the Court an-
swered that argument:
The First Amendment denies government the power to determine
that spending to promote one’s views is wasteful, excessive or un-
wise.  In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the
government, but the people—individually as citizens and candidates
and collectively as associations and political committees—who must
retain control over the quantity and range of debate on public issues
in a political campaign.49
So, in Buckley, the Court gave constitutional validation to what
the super pacs are doing to circulate views on government and polit-
ics, to advocate for those candidates who share those views, and to
amplify the voices of those of like mind.50
The one issue that Buckley did not explicitly resolve was whether
corporations in general, and labor unions as well, had the same right
as individuals and groups to engage in independent political advocacy
concerning government and politics and politicians, or could they be
silenced because they had too much wealth and potential power (i.e.,
the capacity for too much speech).
That, of course, was the issue in the famous Citizens United
case.51  There, the Court ruled that organizations, corporate and
union, as well as individuals, had the First Amendment right to use
47. Id.
48. Id. at 57-58.
49. Id. at 57.
50. Since Buckley, the Court has reaffirmed that independent campaign expenditures lie at
the core of the First Amendment and has applied this principle. See Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 614 (1996) (protecting independent
expenditures by political parties to support their candidates); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass.
Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 251 (1986) (protecting a non-profit ideological corporation
funded only by individuals); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985) (protecting a small donor PAC’s independent advertisements);
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788–89 (1978) (protecting corporate speech
about a referendum election).  The deviation from this principle, reflected in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668 (1990) and applied in McConnell v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 221–22 (2003) was at last, in my view, properly repudiated and corrected
in Citizens United.
51. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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their resources to engage in free speech about the government, polit-
ics, and politicians during elections.52  In reaching that conclusion, the
Court swept away all of the pointless distinctions and limitations on
expenditures for independent political speech.53  Individuals and
groups—corporations, unions, non-profits, any individual or group—
all have the same rights to use their resources to get out their
messages about the government and the officials and politicians who
run it.  In that case the Court upheld the right of a conservative non-
profit advocacy group to make, distribute, and advertise a movie criti-
cizing a leading candidate for President of the United States.54 But
that ruling protected all corporate and union groups of any kind.  It is
difficult to imagine a stronger blow for freedom of speech and associa-
tion and press than that decision.  It was based on the principles of the
Buckley case that where independent political speech was concerned,
there can be no limits on the amount or source because the free flow
of information to the public from as many sources as possible is man-
dated by the First Amendment and necessary for our democracy.55
Are these super pacs evil?  Should we support measures to dis-
mantle them?  Two arguments are made against super pacs, but, to my
mind, they do not support overturning the principles of the First
Amendment.  First is the equality argument, the same one rejected in
Buckley.  Namely, no one person or groups should have too much free
speech.56  One person should not have a bigger megaphone than any-
one else, especially since we believe in “one person, one vote.”57  But
to think that this requires some sort of principle of “one person, one
picket sign” is to reject the core purpose of the First Amendment: to
get as much information to the public from as many different sources
as possible so that the public will be able to exercise its democratic
52. See id. at 866.
53. See id. at 916-17.
54. See id. at 886-88
55. Based on the principles of both Buckley and Citizens United, a lower court unani-
mously held that since one individual or group could spend unlimited amounts on independent
political speech, such individuals or groups could join together and support a political committee
that did the same thing. See SpeechNow.Org. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also Emily’s List v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 581 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir.
2009).  So, the freedom of speech and the freedom of association helped to create what we call
Super PACS. See generally Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644 (2012) (ana-
lyzing the development of Super PACs since the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United).
56. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-51 (1976).
57. The phrase comes from the Supreme Court decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
558 (1964), where the Court ruled for the first time that malapportioned legislative districts vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause.
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choices most effectively.  It  ignores the fact that the views put out by
super pacs and its supporters are shared by millions of Americans and
are thereby amplified.  Finally, it is often new, insurgent, and dissident
voices and viewpoints that need to be able to get their message of
change out in a way that leveling the playing field will frustrate.
Likewise, the corruption argument falls short as well.  This is the
argument that the backers of super pacs will have the same access to
and influence on the politicians they support as if they made contribu-
tions directly.58  But that does not strike me as a valid concern but as
an appropriate element of democracy.  People and groups support
politicians because of their stands on issues that affect those people
and groups.  If their support results in electing their favored candi-
dates, such people and groups rightly expect those candidates to be
responsive through policy and action to their concerns.  That is called
democracy, not corruption.
Finally, despite all of the sturm und drang about the super pacs,
super pacs wound up influencing almost no significant election in a
decisive way.  Of all the money raised and spent by super pacs – the
vast majority of it fully disclosed—many of the candidates supported,
particularly on the Republican side, did not win, and many of the can-
didates opposed, often on the Democratic side, did not lose.59 Presi-
dent Obama was re-elected handily and the Republicans spectacularly
lost their seemingly strong bid to take over the Senate.  Though the
House remained in Republican hands, there is little evidence that
super pac spending was decisive in many of those races.  Because most
of the claims that super pacs, like corporations, were going to steal the
election and buy up our democracy were coming from the Democratic
side of the ledger, the election results did much to undermine those
claims and make them seem more like political assertions than real
dangers.
58. Richard Hasen, Opinion, Of Super Pacs and Corruption, POLITICO (Mar. 22, 2010),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/74336.html.
59. There was a good deal of election-related spending by non-profits that are not organ-
ized as super pacs and do not have to publicly disclose their donors.   But because there is no
disclosure, claims as to how much election-related spending occurred are mostly estimations,
usually by groups critical of such activity, and not based on hard government mandated data.
See, e.g., Paul Blumenthal, “Dark Money” in 2012 Elections Tops $400 Million, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/02/dark-money-2012-election-400-
million_n_2065689.html.  While it can be argued that some of these groups are really thinly-
disguised campaign groups that should have to disclose, traditional non-profits, like the ACLU,
NAACP, and many of the major non-profit cause organizations in America, have been using
their funds to put out arguably “political” messages for decades without publicly disclosing their
sources of funding.
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What the super pacs did do is generate a great deal of campaign
speech, heighten interest in the issues in the election, and increase
electoral competition.60  And in some races they did help even the
odds, a bit, and “level the playing field,” without the use of a govern-
ment steamroller over the First Amendment.  That strikes me as a
pretty good accomplishment, one that should be praised, not
bemoaned.
Finally, the one valid concern raised by the super pacs as well as
the high-spending non-profits is that two of the most important actors
in the political process—the candidates and the parties—are much
more limited in their campaign funding rights than all of these outside
groups and individuals.  Parties and candidates can only raise money
in limited amounts and from people, while all around them are groups
and individuals, including the mass media that can use unlimited funds
to support or oppose those candidates and parties.  Surely those kinds
of disparities warrant revisiting those restrictions.
V. ELECTORAL SPEECH MUST BE “UNINHIBITED,
ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN”61
My view of the principles that should guide us in thinking about
these issues is based on the touchstone that campaign and electoral
speech should be “uninhibited, robust and wide-open” both in amount
and content.  I have long been involved in opposing governmental
limitations on the amount of money that individuals or groups can
spend to voice and amplify their political views, as well as any official
restraints on the content of that speech on the theory that it is too
“negative” and not fruitful for political discourse.  On the contrary,
our First Amendment and our democracy require that, in the words of
the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in New York Times Co. v.
60. See Editorial, Super Democracy: Why Super PACs Are Good for Our Political System,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-02-09/news/ct-edit-superpacs-
20120209_1_romney-super-pac-gop-groups-priorities-usa-action; Bradley A. Smith, Why Super
PACs Are Good For Democracy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 17, 2012, http://www.usnews.
com/opinion/articles/2012/02/17/why-super-pacs-are-good-for-democracy; Ross Douthat, The
Virutes of the Super PAC, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2012, http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/04/03/the-virtues-of-the-super-pac/; Manu Raju & John Bresnahan, Outspent Democratic
Super PAC Made Dollars Count, POLITICO, Nov. 11, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
1112/83699.html; Paul Blumenthal, Democratic Super PACs Trim Conservative Advantage in
Congressional Races, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
11/10/democratic-super-pacs-red_n_2104668.html.
61. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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Sullivan,62  “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cials.”63  There should be few limits in the First Amendment market
place of ideas, and, to my mind, “negative” campaign speech really
may be properly sharp criticism of government and those who run or
seek to run it.
So, when I look back on the 2012 elections, I see a great deal of
campaign spending that produced a great deal of campaign speech
with dozens of hotly-contested campaigns all across the country,
which raised a host of critical public issues topped by a presidential
race that was very competitive and hard-fought.
Whether all of the campaign spending is a cause or an effect of the
increased interest in and competitiveness of the elections is anybody’s
guess.  But the closeness of the election is not surprising given the
magnitude of the stakes.  As one conservative pundit put it,  “Every
four years we are told that the coming election is the most important
of one’s life.  This time it might actually be true.  At stake is the rela-
tion between citizen and state, the very nature of the social con-
tract.”64  To his supporters, President Obama’s accomplishments
rivaled those of Lyndon B. Johnson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
To his detractors, the key elements of his program, such as “Obama-
care,” were shoved through and passed without a single vote from the
“loyal opposition,” hardly an homage to bi-partisanship, compromise
or finding common ground.65 And, most observers would agree, the
Obama campaign was overwhelmingly a summer long attack on Gov-
ernor Romney in an effort to demonize him and his candidacy, which
is a classic example of “negative” campaigning.66  So it should not be
surprising that President Obama’s opponents would try to raise and
62. Id.
63. Id. at 270.
64. Charles Krauthammer, The Choice, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2012, http://articles.washing
tonpost.com/2012-11-01/opinions/35504507_1_health-care-conservative-ascendancy-affirmative-
action.
65. E.g., Background on Obamacare: Why We Fight, FREEDOM WORKS (2013), http://www.
freedomworks.org/repeal-obamacare-background (charging that among the reasons the law is
“Bad Medicine” is that it was “rammed through Congress . . . without garnering a single Repub-
lican vote.”).
66. See Jeff Zeleny, Obama’s Team Taking Gamble Going Negative, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/us/politics/obama-campaign-takes-
gamble-in-going-negative.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; see also Tarini Parti & Dave Levinthal, 5
Money Takeaways From 2012, POLITICO, Nov. 17, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
1112/83655.html.
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spend as much as they could to counter these attacks and oppose his
re-election.
But, despite all of this high spending and frequently negative
campaigning, the demonizing of much of it by much of the media has
been exaggerated and unjustified.  First, the total spent on federal
elections last year, perhaps $6 billion, will only be about  15% or 20%
more than  in 2008, and still less than we, as a nation, spend annually
on potato chips.67  More importantly, this spending helped to fuel a
great deal of electoral competition, which is all to the good in a de-
mocracy.  The two main parties seemed to be about evenly matched in
their financial resources.68  President Obama’s campaign raised and
spent somewhat more than Governor Romney’s and the independent
spending on the Republican side matched and probably exceeded the
independent and labor campaign spending on the Democratic side.69
Unlike 2008, when President Obama raised and spent seven times
what Senator McCain did and, indeed, raised more money than any
candidate in American political history—and won by almost ten mil-
lion votes—this time we were closer to the proverbial level playing
field by letting the major parties and their candidates and supporters
raise and spend as much as they could to get their respective electoral
messages out to the American people.70  All told, each side spent
about $1 billion on the Presidential election.71  And encouraging a
healthy electoral competition can be an antidote to the rigidness of
one-party rule and an encouragement to political compromise and
conciliation.
Moreover, the vast majority of the money being spent was fully
disclosed, down to the $200+ contributors, including spending by
super pacs.72  And a very small proportion of it came from corpora-
67. See Nicholas Confessore & Jess Bidgood, Little to Show for Cash Flood by Big Donors,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/little-to-show-for-cash-
flood-by-big-donors.html;see also Janet Raloff, Potato Chips: A Symptom of the U.S. R & D
Problem, SCI.  NEWS (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/63647/descrip
tion/Potato_chips_A_symptom_of_the_US_R+D_problem.
68. See infra note 71.
69. Jeremy Ashkenas et al., The 2012 Money Race: Compare the Candidates, N.Y. TIMES
(2012), http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance.
70. See infra note 71.
71. The non-partisan Campaign Finance Institute reported that the two sides spent $1.0 and
$1.1 billion dollars respectively. See Press Release, Campaign Fin. Inst., Money vs. Money-Plus:
Post-Election Reports Reveal Two Different Campaign Strategies (Jan. 11, 2013), available at
http://cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/13-01-11/Money_vs_Money-Plus_Post-Election_Reports_Re
veal_Two_Different_Campaign_Strategies.aspx.
72. Under the Federal Election Campaign Act, campaigns, parties, and political committees
must disclose the name, address, business occupation, and business address of every person or
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tions.73  The baleful media predictions that the Citizens United deci-
sion would lead to a tsunami of corporate money swamping our
political shores and drowning our democracy never materialized.74
Ironically, unions seem to have taken far more advantage of Citizens
United than corporations have, by being able to use union treasury
funds for general political advocacy for the first time ever at the fed-
eral level, thereby freeing up member-contributed funds for more
targeted political action.75  To be sure, there was a good deal of spend-
ing on ads that criticized or supported candidates sponsored by non-
profits that are not organized as super pacs, but it is not the new
“dark money” that some journalists claim.  Non-profits have engaged
in such public advocacy for some time without having to publicly dis-
close their contributors.  This applies to the ACLU and the NAACP,
as well as the Karl Rove groups.  And all groups, including those, are
subject to regular Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)
disclosure when they engage in the kinds of independent, candidate-
related speech subject to  FECA.76  Run an ad on television that even
whispers the name of a federal candidate and you have to file a report
with the FEC within twenty-four hours identifying who you are and
how much was spent on the ad.  You may not have to disclose your
individual contributors because of a long-standing FEC interpretive
ruling, recently upheld by an appellate court.77  But the ACLU and
the NAACP have never had to publicly disclose their contributors in
similar circumstances.
entity that contributes in excess of $200 in any election cycle (as well as recipients of expendi-
tures of more than $200).  Likewise, anyone who makes more than $250 in “independent ex-
penditures”  (i.e., for communications “expressly advocating” the election or defeat of a federal
candidate) must file reports identifying $200+ contributors.  Every person or organization that
makes “electioneering communications” (i.e., broadcast and similar media mention of a federal
candidate during the periods near an election) must file reports once they spend in excess of
$10,000 in a calendar year and disclose everyone or group that contributes $1,000 or more to-
ward those communications.   These various disclosure provisions are contained in 2 U.S.C.
§ 434 (2012).
73. See supra note 33.
74. See supra note 33.
75. T.W. Farnam, Unions Outspending Corporations on Campaign Ads Despite Court Rul-
ing, WASH. POST (July 7, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/
06/AR2010070602133.html; Melanie Trottman & Brody Mullins, Union is Top Spender for Dem-
ocrats, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 1, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702047071
04578091030386721670.html, (SEIU spent almost $70 million supporting President Obama and
Democratic candidates; almost as much as some of the conservative groups on the opposite
side).
76. See supra note 72.
77. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Van Hollen, 694 F.3d 108, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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So, why demonize the campaign financing of this election with
the common refrain that billionaires spending “dark money” through
“outside groups” were buying the election and stealing our democ-
racy?  First, the whole concept of “outside groups” or “outside”
spending strikes me as contrary to the idea of citizen criticism of gov-
ernment.  “Outside” of what?  The candidates?  Is that our view of
democracy, that only the politicians can speak and that speech by any
other individual or group about the politicians is illicit or alien or
wrong or “outside” of democratic norms?  If parties run ads support-
ing their candidates or attacking the opponents, is that “outside”
spending?  How about ads by labor unions, environmental groups,
abortion rights groups criticizing or praising the candidate’s record on
issues of concern to those groups, is that also “outside” spending by
“outside” groups?  Finally, of course, what about the Press?  Is its
daily editorializing and often partisan news coverage also “outside”
speech?  In my day, the phrase “outside agitators” was the ugly
epithet that die-hard segregationists used to try to tar civil rights advo-
cates who traveled to the South to fight for equal rights.78  To my
mind, the persistent use of the term “outside groups” in the campaign
finance area to disparage and demean individuals and groups who use
their resources to raise their voices about politics and government is
just as offensive and just as much an effort at de-legitimization.
In fact, one of the main reasons we are witnessing the super pac
and related developments is precisely because we have imposed limits
on the ability of individuals and groups to contribute directly to candi-
dates and parties.  As a result, supporters have no option but to use
their resources to get their messages out independently.  It might be
far better for accountability and transparency in our political system
to think about raising or even eliminating those contribution limits so
that the funding would be back inside the tents of the parties and the
candidates, and they would be responsible for its use.  We might have
less “negative” campaigning under those circumstances.
The criticism of unlimited campaign spending has always been
with us, ever since the Buckley case decided that limits on spending
for political speech were effectively limits on the political speech itself.
But it intensified dramatically in 2010 with the Citizens United deci-
sion.  Why then?  Well, one possible explanation, as one journalist
78. See DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM A BIRMINGHAM JAIL (April 15,
1963), available at http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.
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suggested,  is that “outside spending tilted left in every year from 2000
to 2008, but that in 2010—in the aftermath of deregulation – the bal-
ance skewed decisively to the right.  In the current 2011-12 election, it
shifted overwhelmingly to the right.”79  The extent to which this is at-
tributable to the Citizens United decision in January 2010 is debatable,
though some supporters of the decision have suggested that the in-
crease in spending is proof that the law before that decision did in-
deed impose the “vast” censorship that the Court found to be a
violation of the First Amendment, which needed to be ended.80  Also,
the statistics do not take account of the hundreds of millions of dollars
of union expenditures the vast majority of which favor Democrats,
from President Obama on down, or to the perhaps billions of dollars
worth of “expenditures” resulting from favorable news media cover-
age of President Obama.81  But it is clear that in 2010 the Republicans
and their allies swept the congressional elections, and this past year
they came closer to leveling the  playing field than in previous
elections.
Perhaps, as a result, the media coverage of campaign financing is
usually heavily tilted toward opposing, condemning, and demonizing
“excessive” “outside” “dark money funded” campaign spending.
Charles Koch and Sheldon Adelson and other big donors on the right
have become scorned household names in ways that George Soros,
Peter Lewis, and Jeffrey Katzenberg on the left never have been, even
though the latter have spent tens of millions of dollars trying to elect
79. Thomas B. Edsall, Campaign Stops: Billionaires Going Rogue, N.Y. TIMES BLOG
(Oct. 28, 2012, 10:53 PM), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/billionaires-going-
rogue/.
80. During the 2010 election, in responding to claims that independent spending following
Citizens United was unduly influencing the election, Bradley Smith pointed out that, in fact, the
Democrats were largely outspending the Republicans, and the independent spending was only
helping to level the playing field and make the elections more competitive—as they turned out
to be: “This independent spending is serving as an equalizer.  The Citizens United decision has
done just what it was intended to do—increased competition, assisted challengers, and allowed
more voices to be heard.”  Brad Smith, AP News Flash: Citizens United Equalizes Playing Field;
Independent Groups Add to Competition, CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POL. (Sept. 28, 2010), http://
www.campaignfreedom.org/2010/09/28/ap-news-flash-citizens-united-equalizes-playing-field-in-
dependent-groups-add-to-competition/.  And in an email exchange about whether independent
spending had increased dramatically and was overwhelming the 2012 elections, William Maurer
replied: “What a fantastic result!  It is marvelous to see such an outpouring of political speech
and associational freedom.  Alternatively, what a clear demonstration of how McCain-Feingold
suppressed speech and deprived the American people of information about who should re-
present them.  This proves Justice Kennedy’s assertion that that law was censorship vast in
scope.” ELECTION LAW LISTSERVE (July 9, 2012).
81. See Matthew Continetti, See No Evil, THE WASH. FREE BEACON (Nov. 30, 2012, 5:00
AM), http://freebeacon.com/see-no-evil/.
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Democrats and defeat Republicans or otherwise use their wealth and
financial clout to advance electoral causes they support82  This dispar-
ity and one-sided coverage have always been the case because cam-
paign financing is very much a partisan issue.  The Democrats are for
regulation, because they think the Republicans benefit without it.  The
Republicans see campaign financing restrictions in precisely the same
way: efforts by Democrats and their media allies to silence Republi-
cans and their speech funding.83
Some of the media and the campaign finance “reform” groups
they favor envision an electoral  model where private campaign fund-
ing will be banned or severely limited; candidates will rely for most of
their campaign funding on public or government funding with severe
limits on how much they will be allowed; “outside” groups will be se-
verely curtailed in what they can spend to inform the public on polit-
ics, and, as a result, the media—who are exempted by the politicians
from the campaign finance control laws—will have a clear field to
dominate the debate and tell us who to vote for.84
I reject that view of political and electoral speech.  Fortunately, so
too does the Supreme Court in its interpretation of the First Amend-
ment.  Ever since the modern First Amendment doctrine was born in
the stirring dissents of  Justices Holmes and Brandeis almost a century
ago, one of its central themes has been that speech about the govern-
ment, politics, public officials, and politicians has to be as unfettered
82. See id.; Kenneth P. Vogel & Tarini Parti, Democratic Super PACs Get Jump on 2014,
2016, POLITICO (Nov. 27, 2012, 12:25 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/84205.html
(showing information for the original report of the meeting); see also John Hinderaker, Bad
Money Rising, POWERLINEBLOG (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2013/01/
bad-money-rising.php? (reporting on the virtual press blackout of the secret meeting of well-
heeled, left-wing groups and prominent Democratic politicians pledging, ironically, if not hypo-
critically, to spend excessive amounts of money on a campaign to get the “big money” out of
politics.).
83. See Joseph E. Cantor, Campaign Finance, ALMANAC OF POL’Y ISSUES (Oct. 23, 2002),
http://www.policyalmanac.org/government/archive/crs_campaign_finance.shtml; Thomas B. Es-
dall, Billionaires Going Rogue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2012, http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes
.com/2012/10/28/billionaires-going-rogue/; David E. Rosenbaum, Campaign Finance Reform
Fails Again, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/02/weekinreview/sept.25-
oct.1-campaign-finance-reform-fails-again.html; Cleta Mitchell, Campaign Finance Reform and
its Casualties, WALL STREET J., Aug. 30, 2012; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904
44327204577617133260342296.html. See generally Amy Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ine-
luctable Question of Corporate Citizenship, 44 CONN. L. REV. 575, 578-79 (2012).
84. The primary, pro-regulation campaign finance groups are the Brennan Center of New
York University, Common Cause, the Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21.  Except for
Common Cause, these groups are not membership organizations, and they receive extensive
funding from foundations, corporations, law firms or wealthy individuals.  More irony, if not
hypocrisy.
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and unrestrained as possible.85  And that constitutional message has so
often been delivered on behalf of speakers whose own message was
militant and “negative.”86  Those are the voices we most need to hear
to tell us that the emperor of the day has no clothes.  And those prin-
ciples of unfettered political speech are just as applicable to campaign
finance restrictions as they are to any other efforts by the government
to censor what we the people want to say and how we want to say it.
That is why restrictions on the quantity and quality of political speech,
through controls of its funding, are antithetical to the purposes and
principles of the First Amendment and subversive of open political
debate in a free society. Elections are therapy for our democracy,
where we air our grievances and our differences on political issues,
and they cannot function properly if we repress that conversation.
VI. “ANOTHER SUCH VICTORY AND I AM UNDONE.”87
Finally, the same is true of the frequent cries that our campaigns
are “too negative” and too filled with vicious “attack ads.”88  But as
much as we may bemoan the “negativity” that some say has been the
hallmark of this past election season—though many historians have
pointed out that political campaigns, cartoons and slogans of yester-
year make our current attack ads seem like Disney productions89—we
must realize that the First Amendment welcomes and encourages such
free-wheeling, as well as free-spending political speech.  Indeed, the
Court has made clear starting almost fifty years ago that limitations on
speech about government, politics, politicians, political candidates,
and public officials run directly contrary to our “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide-open and that it may well include vehe-
85. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919); see also NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 934 (1982) (upholding provocative speech by civil rights boycott
leaders); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 292 (1964) (upholding challenging speech by civil rights leaders criticizing official
wrongdoing); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
672-73 (1925).
86. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (speaker burned American flag to express
contempt for the country); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (speaker threatened
“revengence” against racial and religious minority groups).
87. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
88. Devin Dwyer, Too Negative: Voters Blast Obama, Romney Ads, ABC NEWS (Aug. 22,
2012, 6:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/08/too-negative-voters-blast-romney-
ads (recounting voter reactions to the 2012 presidential race).
89. See generally DAVID MARK, GOING DIRTY: THE ART OF NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING
(2009) (surveying campaigns from Thomas Jefferson’s through George W. Bush).
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ment, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on govern-
ment and public officials.”90
The landmark case that fashioned that principle, New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan91  was a civil rights case, as well as a corporate speech
case involving legal threats against a media corporation.92  The case
involved a “negative” newspaper advocacy ad attacking southern seg-
regationist officials for police brutality against civil rights demonstra-
tors.  The civil rights leaders who paid to run the ad and the
newspaper that carried it were socked with enormous libel damage
judgments in state court, which threatened to stop harsh criticism of
such officials in its tracks.93  That is why the Supreme Court pushed
back hard and established strong First Amendment protections for
such “negative” speech.  In doing so, the Court recognized what true
civil rights and civil liberties advocates have long understood: it is the
outsider groups, the insurgents, and those who would change the ex-
isting order the most who need free speech the most to get their dissi-
dent message of change out to the people.94  And it is the established
order that seeks to use the laws to stifle such advocacy.  Without the
strong protections for “negative” political speech that the Court fash-
ioned during the tumultuous struggles for civil rights in the 1960’s, the
Civil Rights Movement would have been stifled, and later anti-war,
feminist and gay rights movements would have had a harder time get-
ting frequently “negative” messages out, as well.  Indeed these crucial
First Amendment principles do their most important work when they
afford protection not just for the ideas we like or which are embraced
by the powers-that-be or reflect the conventional wisdom, but when
they provide immunity from restraint and “freedom for the thought
that we hate.”95
The true defenders of civil rights understand that so well.  In a
1950’s case, the Supreme Court majority upheld an Illinois law which
90. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
91. See id. at 292  (explaining the importance of free speech in a democratic form of
government).
92. See id. at 256.
93. See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1991).
94. See id. at 269.
95. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) (right to burn an American flag in protest, the Court’s
observing that under the First Amendment “concepts virtually sacred to our Nation as a
whole–such as the principle that discrimination on the basis of race is odious and destructive
[will not go unquestioned in the market place of ideas].”); Collin v. Smith, 578 F. 2d 1197, 1210
(7th Cir. 1978) (holding that Nazi march in Jewish community cannot be prevented).
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punished making derogatory remarks about any racial religious or
ethnic groups.96  We now call that a “hate speech” law.  The Court
back then, in an era when First Amendment rights were not very spe-
cial or protected in the Supreme Court, said that such a law was neces-
sary to insure social order and harmony.97But the dissenters, among
the strongest civil rights champions on the Court, saw it differently.
They understood that outside groups and minority groups needed the
most free speech protection to advance their causes and that cheering
on a ruling that lets the government control controversial or hateful
speech was a short-sided view.98  As the dissenting opinion put it, in-
voking the historic metaphor of a Pyrrhic victory  (i.e. a victory that is
really a loss) “another such victory and I am undone.”99  In the years
since then the Court has invigorated First Amendment protection, se-
cured it for even the most hateful and hurtful political speech and
effectively overruled the Illinois decision.100  The Court has now made
it clear that our tolerance of the most hateful ideas, is a strength of our
democracy and not a weakness.101  And some of the most civil rights
friendly Justices, like William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, have
understood that laws against ugly, hurtful,  hateful, or negative
speech, if upheld, most threaten minority groups and outsiders.102
Indeed, in October 2012, President Obama himself took the same
stand in a United Nations speech discussing the anti-Islam video that
caused riots in the middle east,
96. Beauharnais v. Ill., 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1951) (“[The Illinois statute made it a crime to
communicate publicly any message] which . . . portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack
of virtue of a class of citizens of any race, color, creed or religion, which said publication or
exhibition exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or
obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots.”).
97. See id. at 261-62.
98. See id. at 274-75.
99. Id. at 275.
100. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (invalidating a hate
speech ordinance).
101. See generally Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (ruling that the First Amendment
protected anti-gay hate speech); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (ruling that burning the
American flag is free speech protected by the First Amendment); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971) (prohibiting California from making the public display of an expletive a criminal of-
fense); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (ruling that an Ohio statute that punished
advocacy of violence was unconstitutional).
102. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 775 (1978) (Brennan, J. & Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]n our land of cultural pluralism, there are many who think, act, and talk differ-
ently from the Members of this Court, and who do not share [the majority Justices’] fragile
sensibilities.  It is only an acute ethnocentric myopia that enables the Court to approve the cen-
sorship of communications based solely because of the words they contain.”).
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Here in the United States, countless publications provoke of-
fense. Like me, the majority of Americans are Christian, and yet we
do not ban blasphemy against our most sacred beliefs. As president
of our country, and commander in chief of our military, I accept
that people are going to call me awful things every day, and I will
always defend their right to do so.  Americans have fought and died
around the globe to protect the right of all people to express their
views—even views that we profoundly disagree with. We do so not
because we support hateful speech, but because our founders un-
derstood that without such protections, the capacity of each individ-
ual to express their own views and practice their own faith may be
threatened.
We do so because in a diverse society, efforts to restrict speech
can quickly become a tool to silence critics and oppress minorities.
We do so because, given the power of faith in our lives, and the
passion that religious differences can inflame, the strongest weapon
against hateful speech is not repression, it is more speech—the
voices of tolerance that rally against bigotry and blasphemy, and lift
up the values of understanding and mutual respect.103
Unfortunately, around the world, free speech is on the decline
and governments are rushing in to outlaw “hate speech.”104  Even in
America, the “anti-bullying” movement raises many of the same cen-
sorship concerns.105  There seems to never to be a paucity of argu-
ments against free speech and in favor of its limitations.  Even more
reason to celebrate the sentiments expressed by the President and the
principles of the First Amendment they reflect.  Robert Carter under-
stood these principles so well, and so does Eleanor Holmes Norton.
VII. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
One who has labored in the field of campaign finance law for
quite some time, starting even before the Buckley case and including
103. Obama’s Speech to the United Nations—Text, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/09/26/world/obamas-speech-to-the-united-nations.  The current Supreme
Court shares the President’s expressed opposition to censorship and has invalidated almost all of
the speech restrictions to come before it in recent years. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132
S. Ct. 2537 (2012); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011); Snyder v. Phelps, 131
S. Ct 1207 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); United States
v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
104. See Jonathan Turley, Shut Up and Play Nice: How the Western World is Limiting Free
Speech, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-12/opinions/3549
9274_1_free-speech-defeat-jihad-muslim-man.
105. See William Creeley, New Anti-Bullying Initiatives Threaten Protected Speech, Infan-
tilize College Students, FIRE (Nov. 10, 2010), http://thefire.org/article/12454.html.
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the Citizens United case, as well, must be thoroughly aware of the ex-
cruciatingly difficult issues of trying to reconcile campaign finance
concerns with First Amendment  principles and protections.  My own
position should be clear by now.  Government limitations on contribu-
tions and expenditures made for the purpose of advocating candidates
and causes in the public arena violate core First Amendment princi-
ples and should be opposed.  That approach is most consistent with
those principles and with the unrestrained flow of political informa-
tion so vital to our democracy.  Now let me suggest five fundamental
reasons why this is so.
First, remember who is writing the campaign finance rules.  The
people in power.  Do not  be shocked if they write those rules in ways
most guaranteed to perpetuate their power.  When we, at the ACLU,
confronted and challenged the brand new FECA in the Buckley case,
we called it not “reform,” but an Incumbent Protection Act that in the
process cut to the heart of the First Amendment’s protections of the
freedoms of speech, press, association, assembly, and petition.  It im-
posed very low overall campaign limits designed to handicap challeng-
ers and protect incumbents whose franking privilege and other perks
of office did not even count against the limits.  It set very low contri-
bution limits to make it harder for challengers to rely on the help of
wealthy supporters, while incumbents could easily raise money in
$1,000 chunks by holding one $1,000 per plate dinner with lobbyists
and special interests.  It limited how much a candidate could spend of
his or her own money, even though one cannot corrupt oneself, so
incumbents would not have to worry about some guy named Bloom-
berg coming along with a healthy self-funded campaign.  And to insu-
late themselves even more, incumbents placed a limit of $1,000 per
year on independent expenditures, which would buy you one 1/8 page
ad in The New York Times.  Then, if you spent a dollar more to speak
out about politics  you committed a federal crime.  To be sure that
people would be afraid to donate funds to challengers, incumbents
imposed deep disclosure and burdensome disclosure requirements on
people who gave as little as $100 to a candidate, thus guaranteeing a
ready-made enemies list of people who buck the incumbent.106  The
106. The Supreme Court upheld the disclosure in the Buckley case, through carving out a
constitutional exemption for controversial causes and parties.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
60-84 (1976).  In a later case, the Court applied the exemption to spare the Socialist Workers
Party from having to disclose contributions or expenditures. See Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74
Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 102 (1982).  Many States have even lower disclosure thresholds
than $100, with some States having disclosure thresholds as low as zero.  At the federal level,
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law also tried to control those pesky “outside” issue-oriented groups
like the ACLU or the Sierra Club who published box scores criticizing
the voting records of the members of Congress.107  This was all done,
of course, in the name of reform and casting sunlight on the process.
Finally, to be sure these rules would not come back to bite them, the
incumbents gave themselves control over the members of the brand
new FEC which would enforce all these new and burdensome rules
and thereby monitor and regulate the raising and spending of every
dollar used for political and electoral speech in federal elections.
Again, all claimed to be reform.  Although the Supreme Court in
Buckley knocked out the worst of these excesses, under the parts of
the law that remain it is little wonder that the incumbency rate has
remained extremely high and incumbents outraise challengers by four
to one under this regime.108  Yet, even though it is claimed that these
incumbents can be corrupted so easily that we have to have all these
rules and regulations, we now trust them to write them fairly and
even-handedly.  In fact, incumbent-protective campaign finance rules
are just another form of corruption, like grossly gerrymandered
districts.
Second, independent speech, or “outside” speech as it is deri-
sively called, is the Achilles Heel of campaign finance regulation.
Limit that speech, and you cut to the quick of the First Amendment’s
core protections of the right of citizens and the groups to criticize the
people in power and to urge that the rascals be thrown out.  Remove
the limits, as we have and as we should, and you have an end run
around the contribution limits, as the recent super pacs’ phenomenon
proves.  It is good and vital that we protect independent speech and
allow it to flourish.  But if we do, what is the point of continuing to
limit the money that can be given to candidates?  Rather, we should
bring all of that money into the tent by allowing it to be contributed
directly to candidates and then holding them accountable for its use.
As we have seen with super pacs, limits simply will not work.  People
Congress raised the disclosure threshold to $200, which is still lower than the $100 figure in 1976
when adjusted for inflation.  And, the level is not indexed for inflation and will remain at $200
until Congress—or a court—says otherwise.
107. Section 308 of the Act, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437(a), was unanimously invalidated by
the lower court in Buckley, a tribunal which upheld every other feature of the Act. See Buckley
v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 869-78 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other
grounds, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
108. See Committee Hearing on “Free Speech and Campaign Finance Reform” Before Sub-
comm. On the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of
Bradley Smith, Adjunct Scholar, CATO Institute).
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and groups who want to get their message out will find ways around
them.  That has been the history ever since Buckley allowed expendi-
tures to be unlimited but kept the cap on contributions.
Third, keep it simple.  One of the reasons that the Court in the
Citizens United case threw out all the restrictions on expenditures by
unions, non-profits and corporations was that the campaign finance
law had become so complicated that you needed to hire a lawyer to
figure out how to navigate the byzantine rules and regulations in order
to engage in political campaign speech.109  After all, the Citizens
United non-profit group only wanted to make and distribute a movie
criticizing a leading Presidential candidate.  What could be more pro-
tected under the First Amendment than that?  Yet, they could not do
it because of the campaign finance rules and the ban on corporate
expenditures.  I tell my students that before Citizens United, you had
to be like a reporter or maybe a tax accountant to answer the follow-
ing simple question: can I run an ad criticizing the president of the
United States?  In a country with the First Amendment, the elegantly
simple answer should be: of course you can, and more power to you.
In a country with the FECA and the FEC and thousands of pages of
rules and regulations, the answer requires a set of interrogatories ask-
ing: who, what, when, where and why. Who are you?  A person?  A
group of persons? A committee?  A corporation? What kind of cor-
poration? If you are a non-profit corporation, do you receive any
money from a business corporation or a union? What are you going to
say?  Are you going to engage in Express Advocacy?  Are you going
to mention the name of a candidate? When are you going to say it?  In
the sixty to thirty days leading up to an election? During an election
year?  Where are you going to say it?  In what location?  Through
what media?  Broadcasting, newspapers, billboards?  The answer will
affect your right to criticize the President of the United States.  Fi-
nally, Why are you doing this?  Is it for the purpose of influencing the
outcome of an election?  Is it for the purpose of raising an issue, not
supporting a candidate?  All of this, because you want to run an ad
criticizing the President of the United States!
The beauty of Citizens United is that it swept away all of the
encrusted and convoluted distinctions underlying all of these ques-
tions and came up with one united theme: any person or any group of
persons can use their resources to speak out on any issue or candidate
109. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-51.
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so that the people can hear the views of all of these individuals and
groups so that our democratic debate can by fully informed.  In one
fell swoop, the Court eliminated regulatory complexity, undermined
incumbent protection, and dismantled the “vast system of censorship”
that our campaign finance laws had become.110  Of course, the case
has gotten a bad rap from the outset.  President Obama launched an
unprecedented and unwarranted attack on the Court and its ruling in
his State of the Union Address a few days later,111 the kind I have
never seen in my lifetime.  For almost three years we have been sub-
jected to a constant unrelenting barrage of media and special interest
groups commentary about how evil and demonic and anti-democratic
the decision was from a radical right-wing Court.  To my mind, how-
ever, the extremism in the case was the government’s contention that
it could censor a movie or even a book about a presidential candidate
because it was sponsored by a corporation, and the fact that four Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court accepted that argument that the govern-
ment could control publishing and broadcasting and political speech in
that fashion.
Fourth, money matters, but it does not buy elections.  We have all
if the proof of that during the 2012 elections.  Despite a drumbeat of
fear-mongering that billionaires and corporations using “dark money”
were going to buy the election and steal our democracy, none of that
happened.  Even The New York Times admitted that all of the super
pac spending did not achieve the results that some desired and others
feared.112  And the avalanche of corporate money that was predicted
the day Citizens United was decided has yet to materialize.  So, you
can put your pitchforks away.  But whatever increase in campaign
spending there was did give us much more competitive elections, and
a real level playing field between the two major parties and their can-
didates.  The lack of limits works for our First Amendment and our
democracy.
Fifth, consider the alternatives.  Do we really want to roll back
the protections of Citizens United and re-impose a vast system of cen-
sorship on all of the corporations, non-profits, and labor unions in
110. That’s why I wrote a law review article entitled, The First Amendment . . . . United, in
support of the Court’s decision. See generally Joel M. Gora, The First Amendment . . . United, 27
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 935 (2011) (providing a summary of the Citizens United ruling by the Su-
preme Court).
111. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, In Front of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/us/politics/29scotus.html.
112. See supra note 36.
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America to silence their collective voices during the campaigns?  Do
we really want to bring back a $1,000 annual limit on political speech
for any individual to kill off the super pacs?  And, do we give the
corporate media and its rich owners a pass from these new rules?
More broadly, do we really want to pass a constitutional amendment
to repeal the First Amendment and give Congress the unrestrained
power to regulate campaign funding in any way a Congress full of
incumbents sees fit, so that we are allowed only as much political
speech as they see fit to give us.  Why would we want to install such a
neo-Orwellian system?
Our campaign finance system does need serious attention.  All of
the unlimited independent spending does pose problems for our can-
didates and our political parties, which still have to rely on limited
contributions and funding sources.  Maybe we should ease some of
these limits to help level that playing field up and assist all candidates
and parties to keep pace with the other players.  We certainly should
not go back to the days of limits, limits, and more limits.
Here is a sixth idea for free: Trust the good judgment and com-
mon sense of the American people to get all the information, to sepa-
rate the wheat from the chaff, and to make-up their own minds.  That
approach is the only one in keeping with the letter and the spirit of the
First Amendment.
Finally, how do these principles and precepts translate into
proper reform and restructuring of our campaign finance laws?  A
three-fold First Amendment-friendly response should be
considered.113
A. Limits
First, there should be no limits on contributions and expenditures
used by individuals or groups in order to advocate candidates or
causes in the public arena.  This approach reflects the principles that
limits on political funding  are limits on political speech and will di-
rectly restrain and suppress speech at the heart of the First Amend-
ment.  Such limits benefit the political status quo, entrench the
powers-that-be, and privilege those political speakers whose speech
are not subject to the limits, most notably, the organized news media.
113. I also made these suggestions on the Corporate Political Activity Law Blog. See Joel
Gora, Guest Blogger Series: Five Ideas for Campaign Finance Reform, CORPORATE POLITICAL
ACTIVITY LAW BLOG (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.corporatepoliticalactivitylaw.com/index.php/
2012/10/guest-blogger-series-five-ideas-for-campaign-finance-reform-ii/.
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The Court has rejected expenditure limits, but upheld contribution
limits.114 Contribution limits should be reconsidered, either as a con-
stitutional matter or as a legislative policy determination.  Ever since
the Court in Buckley mistakenly upheld limits on the amount of con-
tributions that individuals could give to candidates, we have seen con-
stant and understandable efforts to get around those limits: greater
reliance on Political Action Committees (an incumbents-favoring de-
vice), use of soft money by parties and independent groups and indi-
viduals, and, highlighted in the most recent  electoral season,
independent spending “super pacs” and non-profits.  So, much of this
activity is attributable to the limits on direct contributions to candi-
dates.  People and groups are going to try to use their resources to get
their message out, especially in an election year, whether by direct or
independent support of the candidates and causes they espouse.
In this regard, strong political funding may have been a pivotal
factor in securing the passage of same-sex marriage equality in my
own home state of New York.  As it became well-known, key politi-
cians who supported same-sex marriage were given generous cam-
paign finance support for taking such a stand.115  Few claimed that this
phenomenon reflected “corruption,” and it resulted in a major legisla-
tive victory for an important  minority group of people.  By the same
token, though much more ironically, a major push for state-wide pub-
lic funding of political campaigns is currently being lavishly financed
by, among others, an internet multi-millionaire whose group will be
giving campaign finance support in an effort to persuade key Republi-
can state senators to vote for public funding of political campaigns.116
This is the very same kind of campaign finance stratagem which was
successful with marriage equality.  Again, there have been few com-
plaints of “corruption” from the usual suspects.  Perhaps “big money”
in politics does not seem so bad if it is supporting political outcomes
114. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
115. See The Associated Press, Gay-Rights Groups Give Cuomo $60,000 As He Pushed Mar-
riage Bill, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/nyregi
on/gay-rights-group-donated-60000-to-cuomo-campaign.html; Editorial, Campaign Speech and
Gay Marriage, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230
4447804576413914228779664.html; Frank Bruni, The GOP’S Gay Trajectory, N.Y. TIMES, June
9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/opinion/sunday/the-gops-gay-trajectory.html?page
wanted=all.
116. See Laura M. Holson, A Powerful Combination, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/05/06/fashion/chris-hughes-and-sean-eldridge-are-the-new-power-brokers.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Thomas Kaplan, Groups Push To Highlight Campaign Finance Re-
form, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/22/nyregion/groups-push-to-
highlight-campaign-finance-reform-in-new-york.html.
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you approve.  To my mind,  campaigns like this are good examples of
free speech and democracy in action and a strong argument for raising
or eliminating contribution limits.
Party contribution limits should be raised or eliminated as well.
We should resist efforts to weaken the funding of our political parties.
Strong parties are essential to a strong democracy and a balance of
power in governance.  In sum, let the people decide for themselves—
individually and in groups—how much speech is necessary and proper
in an election campaign and not cede to government the power to
control political speech.
B. Disclosure
The benefits and value of disclosure to the electorate are over-
rated and the harm to freedom of association and political privacy
from disclosure underappreciated.117  To be sure, some kinds of dis-
closure can be an antidote to governance concerns, which may flow
from campaign finance patterns, by allowing people to decide who has
too much access or influence to politicians or office holders.  But
make it what we might call today “smart” disclosure: focus only on
large contributions to major party candidates.  Disclosure any broader
or deeper than that (e.g., on minor parties, on issue organizations, on
small contributors even to major party candidates)  needlessly sacri-
fices cherished protections for the rights of political association, politi-
cal privacy and political anonymity.  It is outrageous that at the
federal level, the public disclosure threshold—$200.01—the amount
that will get your name, address, employer and employer address on
the FEC website and open to surveillance and scrutiny by everyone in
the world—is much lower, in 1976 dollars—than the $100.01 threshold
upheld by the Supreme Court in Buckley, despite the fact that it was
“indeed, low.”118  Other than satisfying the political prurient interests
of campaign finance control groups searching for “bundled” $200 con-
tributions from employees of the same company, for example, little
117. See Dick Carpenter et al., Campaign Finance Disclosure Has Costs, ROLL CALL (Nov.
26, 2012), http://www.rollcall.com/news/carpenter_primo_tendetnik_and_ho_campaign_finance_
disclosure_has_costs-219370-1.html; Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the
Information Tradeoff, 98 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2168343; Symposium, Disclosure, Anonymity and the First Amend-
ment, 27 J. L. AND P. NO. 4 (2012).
118. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 83 (1976).
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purpose in preventing serious corruption is served by these low limits
and a great deal of harm to political privacy is visited.119
Just as the depth of disclosure should be “smarter” than that, the
breadth of disclosure should be limited to groups that engage in ex-
press advocacy of electoral outcomes.  Any broader scope of disclo-
sure, encompassing issue advocacy, poses a serious threat to such
advocacy and should be resisted.  One of the reasons the ACLU got
into the campaign finance debate in the first place was to protect the
right of itself and all other non-profits like the NAACP and other sim-
ilar issue groups to criticize politicians and public officials without
having to disclose the identities of their supporters in order to do so.
That should be the proper approach now as well.120
C. Public Financing
Finally, address the imbalances and disparities that might result
from no limits on giving or spending  by significant public funding to
expand political opportunity, without restricting political speech.  The
public funding should be generous and equally available to all quali-
fied candidates, not just to those representing the two major parties.
And that public funding should not be limits-based, but rather should
provide “floors, without ceilings,” platforms to facilitate speech,
rather than roofs to restrain it.  To impose spending or similar limits as
119. The $99.00 disclosure threshold in my home state of New York is also an outrageously
low figure.  Give a penny more than that to a candidate or committee in a year and your name,
address and other identifying information have to be supplied.  The amount is not even adjusted
or varied or indexed with the level of office in the way that certain contribution limits are.
Whatever claimed value there is in knowing who gave that paltry sum to a politician is greatly
outweighed by the harm to freedom of association and political privacy.  Even the most ardent
campaign finance reformers believe that low-level disclosure thresholds like that do much more
harm than good.  In many other States, the disclosure threshold is even lower, sacrificing associa-
tional privacy and political anonymity for an almost prurient desire to disclose contributions,
thereby violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the protections safeguarded in NAACP v. Ala-
bama. See generally NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (prohibiting Alabama from scruti-
nizing the membership list of the NAACP because of the right of the members to associate
freely).
120. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court recently has been much too receptive to the govern-
ment’s claims, touting the benefits of disclosure and minimizing its burdens.  The one exception,
Justice Clarence Thomas, has been the sole dissenter, insisting on the need for strict scrutiny of
all political disclosure requirements in order to protect political anonymity and associational
privacy. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 979-82 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting in part); Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2837-47 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Mc-
Connell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 275-77 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n., 514 U.S. 334, 358-71 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring).  At the very least, there should be legislative efforts to raise disclosure thresholds to more
realistic and less invasive levels.
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the condition of receiving public benefits would be a back door way to
restrain political speech.
Unlike the late, great liberal Senator Eugene McCarthy, who
compared public financing of politics with the American Revolution-
ists’ asking King George to fund their revolution, and unlike many
contemporary politicians who characterize public financing as “food
stamps for politicians,” I think public funding and subsidies for politics
can serve positive First Amendment purposes.  But not if the scheme
is limits-based as are many, if not most, of the public funding schemes
extant in America today.  You can summarize the most effective argu-
ment against limits-based public financing in just two words: Barack
Obama.  In 2008, candidate Obama had no intention of letting his rep-
utation as a campaign finance reformer encumber him with the spend-
ing limits that went with accepting presidential public financing, even
though they were almost $100,000,000. So he rejected the “clean” pub-
lic money, raised and spent more than $750,000,000 in private funds—
becoming the biggest spender in American political history—and won
an historic presidential election, and in 2012 he exceeded that level
and may have become our first political Billion Dollar Man.121
That’s why we need to rethink the limits-based model of public
financing, rather than replicate it at the national level.  Models such as
New York City’s public financing program or others like it, despite
being much ballyhooed in the press, have not been sufficiently suc-
cessful in either enhancing electoral competition or deterring official
corruption as to justify automatic implementation without further re-
view.122 In addition, in its recent decision in the Arizona public fund-
ing case,123 the Supreme Court, for the first time, entertained serious
constitutional concerns about some of the more popular campaign
finance mechanisms—such as “trigger” matches for high spending op-
ponents or independent groups—and struck them down.  Arrange-
ments should be developed which provide floors to facilitate electoral
speech not ceilings to limit it.
121. In fact, the President raised about the same amount as in 2008, roughly $750 million, but
his party and allies took his cause over the $1 billion mark.  See supra note 37.
122. SEE Peter J. Wallison & Joel M. Gora, Better Parties, Better Government: A Realistic
Program for Campaign Finance Reform 62-64 (2009).
123. See also Joel M. Gora, Don’t Feed the Alligators: Government Funding of Political
Speech and the Unyielding Vigilance of the First Amendment, 2010-11 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 81
(2011). See generally Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806
(2011) (finding the Arizona law requiring a matching of public funds to be unconstitutional).
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CONCLUSION
Our elections would be more free and more fair if our campaign
finance system embodied the wisdom of those three principles: (1) no
limits; (2) smart disclosure; and (3) “floors without ceilings” public
funding.  Applying these principles would lead to the following five
proposals.  First, contribution limits should be as high as possible, if
not eliminated completely, and certainly not reduced.  Second, public
funding needs to be seriously rethought, be as simple and straightfor-
ward as possible, and not be limits-based. Third, disclosure require-
ments should be as focused and smart as possible.  Fourth, likewise,
they should be limited to express political advocacy expenditures.  Fi-
nally, all of this should be guided by the realization that the best elec-
tion reform provision ever enacted is the First Amendment’s
injunction that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to as-
semble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
The more we follow its letter and spirit, the better off we will be.
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ABSTRACT
Civil society is a potentially powerful “third force,” which can bal-
ance the excesses of business and government.  To date, civil society
has only been convened episodically, through demonstrations, pro-
tests, and other forms of mobilization to press general or specific
grievances.  Once grievances have been addressed, or the move-
ment co-opted, activity tends to subside.  How might civil society be
organized to maintain continuous oversight over government, be-
yond periodic elections, and over business, beyond individual con-
sumer choice?  This article explores these questions, in light of
historic and current social movement trends.
“We must be organized”— Stokely Carmichael (a.k.a. Kwame
Ture)
INTRODUCTION
Time Magazine identified “The Protester” as its 2011 Person of
the Year because massive street protests have become the “defining
trope of our times” and the protester a maker of history.1  Protest
leaders are overwhelmingly young, middle class, and educated, adept
at using social media,2 and operate outside the political establish-
ment.3  They are frustrated with a dysfunctional and corrupt political
and economic system rigged to favor the rich and powerful and pre-
vent significant change.4  They don’t want communism,5 but they
1. Kurt Anderson, The Protester, TIME (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/specials/
packages/article/0,28804,2101745_2102132_2102373-1,00.html.
2. See id. (“[S]ocial media and smart phones did not replace face-to-face social bonds and
confrontation but helped energize and turbo charge them, allowing protesters to mobilize nimbly
and communicate with one another and the wider world more effectively than ever before.”).
3. See id.
4. Id.; see Robin Rogers, The Hidden Costs of Million-Dollar Donations, WASH. POST
(Dec. 30, 2011), www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-hidden-costs-of-million-dollar-dona-
tions/2011/12/20/gIQAzpC1QP_story_2.html (finding that even when the rich engage in philan-
thropy, their inordinate wealth and power can unbalance community stability).
5. See Anderson, supra note 1.
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don’t want “hell-bent megascaled crony hypercapitalism” either.6
They search for a third way, a “new social contract.”7
Can they succeed?8  And if they do, what would the new social
contract look like?  According to Time Magazine, the “vanguard”
youth of Arab Spring have been “subordinated, if not sidelined, by
better-disciplined political organizations.”9  Can protest movements
such as “Occupy Wall Street”10 learn from this example?  And if so,
what’s the lesson?  Is it to focus their energies on the mainstream po-
litical process?11  Or is it to develop some entirely different machin-
ery?12  Maybe they have learned from Einstein, who defined insanity
as doing things the way they have always been done, and expecting to
get different results.13
The weakness of government and the indifference of corporations
prompt the need for some new machinery, which I call “civic infra-
structure.”14  In Part I, I discuss the decline of community in the
United States since the days of de Tocqueville and the corresponding
6. Id.
We live in a winner-take-all world. The top 1 percent controls 40 percent of the
planet’s wealth. In cities throughout the United States, people are still camped in public
parks, holding signs that say “We are the 99%.”  Unemployment hovers around 9 per-
cent, state budgets have been slashed and social programs cut. Food pantries report
growing demand. The very rich, in the meantime, have never been richer.
Rogers, supra note 4.
7. Anderson, supra note 1.
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. See Anderson, supra note 1; see also Dan Gillmor, Time Magazine’s Protester Cover
Reminds Us of the Value of Big Media, GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2011, 6:05 PM),
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/dec/14/time-magazine-protester-dan-
gillmor.
11. See Anderson, supra note 1.
12. See id.
13. Quotation #26032 from Michael Moncur’s (Cynical) Quotations, QUOTATIONS PAGE,
http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Albert_Einstein/31 (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (“Insanity:
doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results.”).
14. The Deliberative Democracy Consortium has begun using the term, picked up by its
Executive Director Matt Leighninger, after reviewing a chapter of my book AFRICAN CIVIL
RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF OBAMA: A HISTORY AND A HANDBOOK, in which I first used the term.
See infra note 17.  In June of 2012, the Consortium held a conference called “Building Civic
Infrastructure.”  Their promotional material states:
Communities would do well to take a closer look at their “civic infrastructure” the
opportunities, activities, and arenas that allow people to connect with each other, solve
problems, make decisions, and celebrate community.  These are the fundamental build-
ing blocks of strong local democracy, and they include physical and online spaces for
citizens, civic skills and capacities, and participatory processes for policymaking.
Matt Leighninger, What Is Civic Infrastructure and Why Does It Matter? Join Us for Next Week’s
Conference Call, CMTY. MATTERS (June 21, 2012), http://communitymatters.posterous.com/
building-civic-infrastructure-join-us-for-nex.  We differ here.  What they are calling “civic infra-
structure,” I would call “civic capital,” as it is not knit together.  Knitting civic capital into civic
infrastructure is the topic of this article.
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increase in government and corporate power.  Part II considers the
failure of American institutions to respond to the imbalance.  Part III
looks at both the promise and the limitations of social media as a rem-
edy.  In Part IV, I consider the lessons of Arab Spring and the Occupy
Wall Street movement.  Part V sketches the contours of the proposed
civic infrastructure, and Part VI looks at its possible operation.  A
conclusion follows.
I. THE RELATIVE DECLINE OF COMMUNITY POWER
Revolution is a powerful and attractive idea. It is an even more
attractive and exhilarating experience.  Many of us in the United
States see our politics and our economy as systems that are broken.
Weighted down by centuries of corruption, the spirit of the American
revolution as well as its great and resounding principles of a demo-
cratic and open society have been crushed under  generations of indif-
ference and decades of selfishness and greed.
From that perspective, it was a great privilege to participate in the
frontier days of the grass-roots civil rights movement as a college stu-
dent and as a law student. It was also a breath of fresh air to see the
Occupy Movement burst on the scene, after so many years have
passed since I have breathed a revolutionary atmosphere. I was so
taken with their example that I brought my Civil Rights Planning class
to Freedom Plaza in Washington, D.C.’s McPherson Square to ob-
serve the Occupiers, meet, and talk with them. That was October
2011.
While there, I got into a deep conversation with David Swanson,
Press Secretary for Dennis Kucinich’s 2004 presidential campaign, and
an Occupy leader.  I told him about a concept I had for a “civic infra-
structure” to be built from the ground up to hold government and
business accountable.15  I told him I would send him a short memo on
it and asked that he share it with whomever he thought would benefit.
I asked specifically not to be named, because I didn’t want to slow
down its absorption with a focus on who I was—an outsider.  I asked
that he use my nom de plume, “Prof,” a nickname my Howard stu-
dents call me.  We emailed and talked a bit after that, but then l lost
contact with him. It wasn’t until the editors of the Howard Law Jour-
15. I had begun working with these concepts in an article for the Howard Law Journal on
ways to organize communities struck by Hurricane Katrina. See generally Harold McDougall,
Hurricane Katrina: A Story of Race, Poverty, and Environmental Injustice, 51 HOW. L.J. 533
(2008).
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nal went Googling that they found David’s website, where my analysis
is lodged, where all Occupiers—and their colleagues in social move-
ments around the world—could see it.16
In a separate conversation, my friend Matt Lehninger, who I met
while working with the Study Circles Resource Center’s governing
Board, told me that my term “civic infrastructure,” which I first used
in a book chapter in 2009, was “in the water.”17 He said everyone he
knew who was in the movement for democratic, grass-roots participa-
tion and social change was using it.  We both tried to figure out how
that had happened, because the book was used only at Howard.  Now,
thanks to the Journal editors, I know.
To quickly summarize, I quote Senator Bill Bradley’s analogy
that compares U.S. society to a three-legged stool.18  It has a govern-
ment leg, a business leg, and a community leg.19  Because the business
and government legs are so long, and the community leg so short, the
whole stool—the society—is unstable.20  How to grow the community
leg of American society that so impressed de Tocqueville?21  How to
make it long enough to balance the other two, hold them
accountable?
The basic idea is to build a latticework of small, regularly meeting
groups, of about ten people each, connected to one another by dele-
gates.22  The delegates meet in groups of ten each, select their own
delegates, and create a cascading system that grows to a scale of more
than 100,000 people, meeting in groups of ten.23  The system is accessi-
ble, face-to-face accountable, and small-“d” democratic.24  I supplied
David with a graphic model,25 created for me by my research assistant
Gabrielle Sims in 2010.  (Gabrielle was also the Howard Law Journal
Executive Publications Editor 2011-2012).
16. “Prof.”, Study Circle, Citizen’s Assemblies, and Social Media: A Civic Infrastructure for
“Occupy Wall Street,” WAR IS A CRIME (Nov. 8, 2011), http://warisacrime.org/content/including-
non-occupiers-and-strengthening-movement.
17. Harold McDougall, African American Civil Rights in the Age of Obama: A History and
a Handbook 186 (2010).
18. Id.; see “Prof.”, supra note 16.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id. (“[America is a society] with a rich community life and a vibrant civil society.”).
22. Id.
23. Harold McDougall, The Citizen’s Assembly: A Civic Infrastructure for Progressive So-
cial Change, HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2012, 10:49AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/Har-
old-a-mcdougall/civic-engagement_b_1637398.html.
24. Id.
25. “Prof.”, supra note 16.
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L4
L3
L2
L1 26
The groups would meet periodically, processing community is-
sues, considering how the support of government and business could
be enlisted, or coerced.27  How could the interests of citizens and con-
sumers be protected day by day and over the long haul?
26. Level One groups are “study circles,” bringing ten people together. Each study circle
picks a delegate who represents them at a committee of ten Level One groups (this is Level
Two). Each committee picks a delegate who represents them at a council of ten Level Two
groups (this is Level Three). Each council picks a delegate who represents them at an Assembly
of ten Level Three groups (this is Level Four). Continue that process to Level Five and 100,000
people are involved.
27. See “Prof”, supra note 16.
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I built on the short memo that you can find on David’s website28
with a slightly longer essay that appeared on my blog for the Huf-
fington Post almost a year later, in summer 2012.29 Here, in the How-
ard Law Journal, I can expand on the concepts a bit and give scholars
the benefit of the research that underlies my ideas.
My Article for the Branton Symposium expands on the practical
workings of this theoretical construct, “civic infrastructure.”  I will
also provide a bibliography of the books, articles, and web resources
that have informed my work.
II. THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS
Today, “[g]lobetrotting businesses and banks increasingly see
their customers as commodities rather than as members of a shared
community.”30 “Government has become increasingly less responsive
to ‘ordinary’ people and their concerns.”31  On the community side,
television, and virtual reality increasingly substitute for human contact
and exchange.32
Robert Putnam saw television eroding the sense of community in
America.  Membership in clubs and associations has been declining
ever since television viewing became popular in the 1950s.  Values are
now transmitted to children by television, which has consequently re-
placed the family as the essential transmitter of moral education.33
The more television a child or adult watches, Putnam adds, the less
they trust other people, the less they vote, and the less likely they are
to take part in organized activities outside the home.34
America has become a “mediated culture” in which mass media’s
“talking heads, flashing images, and concocted drama” deliver “pre-
packaged . . . experiences” that replace the reality generated by our
own lives.35  Televised political advertising keeps people distracted,
molding and shaping public opinion with sound bites and visual
28. Id.
29. See generally McDougall, supra note 23.
30. “Prof.”, supra note 16.
31. Id.
32. See Bradley A. Harsch, Consumerism and Environmental Policy: Moving Past Con-
sumer Culture, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 543, 561 (1999).
33. See E.J. DIONNE, COMMUNITY WORKS: THE REVIVAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN AMERICA
111 (2000).
34. See Eric M. Uslaner, Social Capital, Television, and the “Mean World”: Trust, Optimism,
and Civic Participation, 19 POL. PSYCHOL. 441, 441-42 (1998).
35. LANGDON MORRIS, THE WAR FOR AMERICA: MORALITY, IDEOLOGY, AND THE BIG
LIES OF AMERICAN POLITICS 103 (2004).
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images.  Public affairs shows are little more than shouting matches be-
tween liberals and conservatives.36  The citizenry has become more
and more polarized and disconnected from the process.37  Public cyni-
cism and alienation have reached record highs.38
The role of big money,39 campaign consultants, and television at-
tack ads has steadily increased.40  Corporate opinion-makers use the
mass media—especially television—to manage elections and social
crises, using spectacle to shape political life, set the policy agenda, and
control public opinion.41  Television has its greatest impact on those
least politically aware.42
In the midst of the current economic downturn, the right wing
mobilizes support by demonizing immigrants and minorities as cul-
tural threats and competitors for jobs.43 Their vision of America re-
sembles the Old South in disturbing ways: political institutions
“dominated by and run for the benefit of a white elite,” poorer whites
and minorities set against one another, high levels of distrust, high
levels of income inequality, and low levels of support for education
and social services.44  Indeed, conservative Republican electoral suc-
cess is linked to a “Southern Strategy,” introduced by Richard Nixon45
and expanded by Ronald Reagan.46  The social movements that might
otherwise respond47—civil rights,48 women’s liberation49—have come
36. Id.
37. See GLENN W. RICHARDSON, PULP POLITICS: HOW POLITICAL ADVERTISING TELLS THE
STORIES OF AMERICAN POLITICS 62 (2d ed. 2008).
38. See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: HOW POLITI-
CAL ADVERTISEMENTS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE 2 (1997).
39. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CON-
GRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011) (describing how fundamentally good people, with good
intentions, have allowed our democracy to be co-opted by outside interests, and how this ex-
ploitation has become entrenched in the system).
40. JEROLD M. STARR, AIR WARS: THE FIGHT TO RECLAIM PUBLIC BROADCASTING 94
(2001).
41. See INFORMATION SOCIETY AND CIVIL SOCIETY: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON
THE CHANGING WORLD ORDER 123 (Slavko Splichal et al. eds., 1994).
42. See JEFFREY MCCALL, VIEWER DISCRETION ADVISED: TAKING CONTROL OF MASS ME-
DIA INFLUENCES 90-91 (2007).
43. See GREGORY W. STREICH, JUSTICE BEYOND “JUST US”: DILEMMAS OF TIME, PLACE,
AND DIFFERENCE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 39 (2011).
44. STEPHEN J. KUNITZ, THE HEALTH OF POPULATIONS: GENERAL THEORIES AND PARTIC-
ULAR REALITIES 134 (2007).
45. See KENNETH O’REILLY, NIXON’S PIANO: PRESIDENTS AND RACIAL POLITICS FROM
WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 6 (1995).
46. See id. at 360.
47. See DOUG MCADAM ET AL., DYNAMICS OF CONTENTION 14 (2001).
48. See DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
194 (1991).
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to focus more on inclusion in corporate society than on challenging
it.50
Manning Marrable describes the collapse of the civil rights move-
ment as proceeding from the co-optation of its reformist wing and the
marginalization of its more radical wing.51  The reformists were co-
opted into mainstream institutions (directorships of major corpora-
tions, membership in exclusive white clubs).  They shifted their focus
from group advancement to individual self-preservation, claiming that
their inclusion in the “citadels of power” was the ultimate aim of the
movement itself.52  The radical wing was hit full force while the re-
formers ducked for cover.  The black power movement in the early
1970s was crushed by “government destabilization and repression,”
for example, lessening participation by poor blacks.53  “The remnants
of the movement [began] to subdivide while losing touch with their
mass base.”54
Professionalization has greatly narrowed the number of people
actually involved in social movements.  Social activists of the 1960s
and 1970s movements retired from the field after the big battles were
won, leaving implementation to conventional associations and par-
ties.55  For example, the major funding for the environmental justice
movement has gone to professional organizations that lack a grass-
roots network.56
The decline of grassroots organizational structures and participa-
tion has also greatly weakened the progressive sector.  The collabora-
tion and participation of grassroots groups strengthens social
movements; lacking such energy, social movements “silo,” reducing
their opportunities to establish common cause among one another.57
49. See RUTH CLIFFORD ENGS, CLEAN LIVING MOVEMENTS: AMERICAN CYCLES OF
HEALTH REFORM 229 (2001).
50. See JOHN FOBANJONG, UNDERSTANDING THE BACKLASH AGAINST AFFIRMATIVE AC-
TION 64 (2001).
51. See SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE QUEST FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
1900-1990, at 99  (1991).
52. See id.
53. JOY JAMES, TRANSCENDING THE TALENTED TENTH: BLACK LEADERS AND AMERICAN
INTELLECTUALS 118 (1997).
54. CASHMAN, supra note 51, at 99.
55. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND DEMOCRACY 93 (Pedro Ibarra ed., 2003).
56. See DANIEL FABER, CAPITALIZING ON ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE: THE POLLUTER-
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 244 (2008). But see PHILANTHROPY IN
AMERICA: A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 136 (Dwight F. Burlingame ed.,
2004).
57. See THE WORLD AND US SOCIAL FORUMS: A BETTER WORLD IS POSSIBLE AND NECES-
SARY 25, 28 (Judith Blau & Marina Karides eds., 2008).
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These social movements then have a tendency to fragment, eroding
their communication networks, their levels of cohesion, their ability to
mobilize, and ultimately their ability to influence policy.58
Ironically, right-wing movements in the U.S. have become very
successful in aggressive mobilizing at the grass roots.  The Pro-Life
movement has a network of thousands of church-based grassroots or-
ganizations.59  The Pro-Choice movement, in contrast, depends on
professionalized national advocacy organizations that lack a grass
roots base.60
The Tea Party was prompted by CNBC correspondent Rick
Santelli’s 2009 negative comments on bailing out distressed homeown-
ers with taxpayer funds and by blogs such as Keli Carender’s “Liberty
Bell.”61  The Tea Party also used the Internet and social networks to
turn out protests ranging from a handful of individuals to a half a mil-
lion people. They began to take off when they attracted the attention
of the ultra- conservative and extremely wealthy Koch Brothers.62
Their focus has been almost exclusively on the electoral process and
political candidates.
III. IS SOCIAL MEDIA63 AN ANSWER?
Internet appeals can create a loose constituency around broadly
held grievances.  As New York Times reporter Matt Bai describes:
58. See SARAH MAXWELL, SUCCESS AND SOLITUDE: FEMINISTS ORGANIZATIONS FIFTY
YEARS AFTER THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 8-9 (2009).
59. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERI-
CAN COMMUNITY 154 (2001).
60. See id.; SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION AND
ACTIVISM IN ABORTION CONFLICT 93 (1991).
61. See Chike Chijioke, Social Upheaval-Occupy Wall Street Movement (Nov. 28, 2011)
(unpublished term paper, Howard University School of Law) (on file with the Howard Law
Journal) (citing Beth Rowen, History of the Tea Party Movement, INFOPLEASE (Nov. 23, 2011),
http://www.infoplease.com/us/government/tea-party-history.html (discussing the history of the
Tea Party and how diverse populations gathered under a general and unified message against
“big government, bailouts, and electorate positions gained” and referencing the tea party’s shifts
in focus since their beginning).
62. See Peter Finn, Tea Party Funding Koch Brothers emerge from Anonymity, U.S. NEWS
(Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/Peter-Fenn/2011/02/02/tea-party-funding-
koch-brothers-emerge-from-anonymity (speaking on how the Koch brothers are emerging from
their previous anonymity status and now coming into the forefront of American politics though
the Tea Party).
63. Damien S. Pfister & Getachew Dinku Godana, Deliberation Technology, 8 J. PUB.
DELIBERATION (2012) (“[A] reframing of Larry Diamond’s (2010) program of ‘liberation
technology’ around the idea of ‘deliberation technology.’  Although the liberation technology
program has been useful in supplying dissidents with a basic communication infrastructure
during the various revolutions of the 2011 Arab Spring . . . [in] the cases of Tunisia and Egypt . . .
deliberative vacuums have arisen after regime change.”).
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“The internet has transformed grassroots politics.  It has allowed new
groups of angry people—the most reliable footsoldiers of any political
campaign—to find and talk to each other.”64  Such new-found allies
might undertake “lowest threshold” actions like donating money, on-
line petitions, or even selective buying campaigns.65  Under the right
conditions, little-known groups can quickly become central organizing
hubs for more focused and sophisticated campaigns, such as mass mo-
bilizations,66 sit-in occupations, and “hacktivism.”67
Internet activism dates back to the early 1990s by the indigenous
EZLN Zapatista movement in the Chiapas region of Mexico.68  This
movement dramatized how new media and grassroots progressivism
might synergize, excite the world, and challenge the status quo.69  Ac-
tivists emerging in other contexts began to use the internet as well,
particularly to stage events against transnational corporate capitalism
and its instrumentalities.70  First came the “Carnival Against Capital,”
then the “Battle for Seattle” disrupting a World Trade Organization
meeting, as an international protest movement surfaced to resist cor-
porate globalization,71 filling the void left by the domesticated move-
ments of the 1960s and 70s.
Since then, as Time Magazine observed, broad-based, populist
political spectacles have become more and more commonplace.72  A
growing planetary citizenry now uses a whole new set of internet-
64. The Day of Netroots; Internet Grassroots Politics, ECONOMIST (Oct. 13, 2007), http://
www.economist.com/node/9941786.
65. JEROEN VAN LAER & PETER VAN AELST, Cyber-Protest and Civil Society: The Internet
and Action Repertories in Social Movements, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNET CRIME: CYBER-PRO-
TEST AND CIVIL SOCIETY 230, 236-44 (Yvonne Jewkis & Majid Yar eds., 2009).
66. See W. Lance Bennett, Communicating Global Activism: Strengths and Vulnerabilities of
Networked Politics, 6 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 143, 163 (2003), available at http://depts.washing-
ton.edu/gcp/pdf/communicatingglobalactivism.pdf.
67. See VAN LAER & VAN AELST, supra note 65, at 241-42, 244.  For a brief discussion on
the Zapatista Movement and Hacktivists in general, see Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, The Internet
and the Seattle WTO Protests, 13 PEACE REV. 331, 334-36 (2001).  Hacktivists are computer-
savvy individuals who work to counter threats to privacy posed by government monitoring agen-
cies.  They have created open-source software that allows members of oppositional groups to
exchange communications undetected by government monitoring software.
68. See Richard Kahn & Douglas Kellner, Internet Subcultures and Oppositional Politics,
UCLA.EDU (2003), http://gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/Internetsubcultures opposition-
alpolitics.pdf (discussing the use of the Internet in the Zapatista Movement and Seattle World
Trade Organization Meeting in 1999).
69. See Richard Kahn and Douglas Kellner, New Media and Internet Activism: From the
Battle of Seattle to Blogging, 6 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 87, 87 (2004).
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Anderson, supra note 1.
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based tools to become informed, to inform others, and to propose new
economic and political relations.73
Facebook, the “world’s most popular social network,” with 900
million users in 2012,74 functions like an open personal diary.  You-
Tube permits amateur videographers to share content with an inner
circle as well as provides a wide showcase for emerging profession-
als.75  A user-generated trove of information, Wikipedia today con-
tains more than three million articles in more than 250 languages on
every conceivable subject, written and edited by hundreds of
thousands of contributors.76  Twitter, created by Obvious, a small San
Francisco company, encourages users to be “always on.”77
These new “social media” formats enable masses of independent
individuals to act in concert, disrupting and upending the status quo.78
YouTube emerges as a major venue for politics and protest.79  Twitter
brings “microblogging” to the equation.80
The new formats have created volatile, highly-informed, autono-
mous communities that coalesce around everything from local lifestyle
choices to global political and economic demands.81 They can trans-
form uneducated and unconnected people into “smart mobs” of so-
cially active citizens, linked by notebook computers, PDAs, and
smartphones.82 They also help transcend silos, connecting people
from diverse communities such as labor, feminist, ecological, peace,
73. See id.
74. See David Goldman, Facebook Tops 900 Million Users, CNN MONEY (Apr. 23, 2012,
4:31 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/04/23/technology/facebook-q1/index.htm.
75. See Definition of: YouTube, PCMAG.COM (2011), http://www.pcmag.com/encyclope-
dia_term/0,2542,t=YouTube&i=57119,00.asp#fbid=XGyFNTyQT1q (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
76. See Definition of: Wikipedia, PCMAG.COM  (2011), http://www.pcmag.com/encyclope-
dia_term/0,2542,t=Wikipedia&i=54463,00.asp#fbid=XGyFNTyQT1q (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
77. Twitter, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/twitter/in-
dex.html (last updated Oct. 18, 2012).
78. CHRIS C. DEMCHAK, WARS OF DISRUPTION AND RESILIENCE:  CYBERED CONFLICT,
POWER, AND NATIONAL SECURITY 281 (2011).
79. Definition of: YouTube, supra note 75.
80. Twitter, supra note 77.
81. Howard Rheingold, Political Texting: SMS and Elections, THEFEATURE.COM (Apr. 12,
2004, 3:00PM), http://thefeaturearchives.com/topic/Culture/Political_Texting__SMS_and_Elec-
tions.html.
82. See id.; see also Kirkus Review, KIRKUS (Mar. 18, 2012), https://www.kirkusreviews.
com/book-reviews/van-jones/rebuild-dream/#review (reviewing VAN JONES, REBUILD THE
DREAM (2012)) (“[T]he idea that decentralized, self-organized groups harness a sort of collective
intelligence that renders them more resilient than vertical hierarchies.”).
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and various anti-capitalist groups, promising a new politics of alliance
and solidarity.83
There are limitations, however.  Internet-based campaigns often
struggle to focus. Without this focus, such campaigns may be reduced
to broad appeals to basic justice or fairness, relying heavily on “lifes-
tyle symbols” such as using celebrities to promote debt relief.84  Ironi-
cally, lifestyle symbols are also the stuff of most mass advertising,
directing one’s attention towards the consumption of products, which
symbolizes the American lifestyle.85  Businesses seem to find social
media a more useful tool, precisely because of these factors.86
Like businesses, Internet-based campaigners approach their audi-
ence as potential consumers rather than as compatriots.  Their cam-
paigns promote associations between their product (their particular
cause) and their target’s “social identity claims, personal and profes-
sional networks, neighborhood relations, social trends, work and fam-
ily schedules, health care needs, sexual preferences, fashion
statements, travel venues, entertainment, [or] celebrity cues . . . .”87
Thus, Internet campaigns can easily blur the boundaries between
politics, cultural values, and identity processes such as “expressive and
performance” activities, which focus on self-development rather than
collective action.88
Moreover, people are embedded in various social contexts, not
just the Internet,89 and people move in and out of social contexts con-
stantly, making it difficult for such campaigns to achieve a stable
83. Mobilize.org will be investing over $25,000 in projects led by Millennials that increase
civic engagement, community participation, and voter awareness. Millennial Civic Engagement
Summit 2012, MOBILIZE.ORG,  http://mobilize.org/get-involved/mcesummit/. See generally LAW-
RENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT
(2011).
84. See Bennett, supra note 66, at 151.
85. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, CONSUMED: HOW MARKETS CORRUPT CHILDREN, INFAN-
TILIZE ADULTS, AND SWALLOW CITIZENS WHOLE  114  (2007); HERBERT W. SIMONS ET AL.,
PERSUASION IN SOCIETY 64 (2001).
86. Cf. EILEEN BROWN, WORKING THE CROWD: SOCIAL MEDIA MARKETING FOR BUSI-
NESS 1 (2010) (discussing how social media can help businesses connect with customers); SUSAN
M. WEINSCHENK, 100 THINGS EVERY DESIGNER NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT PEOPLE § 61 (2011)
(discussing how the “weak ties” of social networking can be quickly formed and exploited).
87. Jackie Smith, Social Movements for Global Democracy: Themes in Global Social
Change 126 (2008).
88. See Peter Dahlgren, Forward to CYBERPROTEST: NEW MEDIA, CITIZENS AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS xii (Wim van de Donk et al. eds., 2004).
89. See Sabine U. O’Hara & Sigrid Stagl, Global Food Markets and Their Local Alterna-
tives:  A Socio-Ecological Economic Perspective, 22 POPULATION & ENV’T 533, 540, 542, 549
(2001).
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base.90  Thus, the organizational levels of “networked campaigns” are
often low, increasing the prospects for “unstable coalitions, greater
communication noise, lack of clarity about goals, and poor movement
idea-framing.”91
Internet-based networks can greatly reduce the cost of attracting
diverse players to issue and protest campaigns, but they might also
gloss over important differences in approach, setting up any move-
ment which emerges for real problems of ideology and focus.92  Their
functions thus tend to degenerate quickly into “pragmatic information
exchanges and mobilization systems.”93
Other limitations of the Internet include the “digital divide” or
inequality in Internet access94 and the easily broken “weak ties” that
Malcolm Gladwell cautions the Internet creates.95  Gladwell is very
much in favor of social change,96 but urges potential activists to bring
their intuition to a project,97 and use it to create a dynamic group
effort.98  He does not believe that the trust (i.e., social capital) needed
to make a group project a success can be supplied by Internet-based,
virtual relationships alone.99
IV. THE LESSONS OF ARAB SPRING AND OCCUPY
WALL STREET (OWS)
The Occupy Movement took its inspiration from another move-
ment, Arab Spring.  Both movements involved large mobilizations to
make a point, with considerable assistance from social media.
90. See Bennett, supra note 66.
91. Bennett, supra  note at 66, at 152.
92. See id. at 160.
93. See id.
94. See Jeroen van Laer & Peter van Aelst, Internet and Social Movement Action Reper-
toires Opportunities and Limitations, 13 INFO., COMM., & SOC’Y 1, 15 (2010).
95. See id. at 18.
96. See What Is the Tipping Point About?, GLADWELL.COM, http://www.gladwell.com/tip-
pingpoint/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
97. See What Is Blink About?, GLADWELL.COM, http://www.gladwell.com/blink/index.html
(last visited Feb. 11, 2013) (describing when a person first encounters a new person, product, or
the like and hoping that people take the concept of “rapid cognition” seriously in the book,
Blink).
98. See What Is Outliers?, GLADWELL.COM, http://www.gladwell.com/outliers/index.html
(last visited Feb. 11, 2013).  (“My wish with Outliers is that it makes us understand how much of
a group project success is.  When outliers become outliers it is not just because of their own
efforts.  It’s because of the contributions of lots of different people and lots of different circum-
stances . . . .”).
99. See Malcolm Gladwell, Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted, NEW
YORKER, Oct. 4, 2010, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_
fact_gladwell.
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A. Arab Spring
Nearly one in five people living in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) region today is a “youth” between the ages of fifteen
and twenty-four, producing an unprecedented ninety-five million peo-
ple by 2005.100  These powerful demographic changes created a large
working class as well as middle class people, educated youth, and pub-
licly active women.  Their futures as healthy and productive members
of their societies depended on how well their government invested in
the social, economic, and political institutions required to meet their
needs.101  The absence of such investment, and of formal channels for
them to express their concerns, led to public confrontations.102
The then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s technology advisor
stated that social media played an essential role as an “accelerant” in
the social protests of the Middle East that emerged as a result.103
Commentators agreed, pointing out that Internet access networked
like-minded groups of people and permitted real-time coordination in
movement building, shortening a “years-long process” into one that
took just weeks or months.104
Although the Egyptian revolution was not completely planned
online, the idea first surfaced on Facebook in 2008 as a group named
the “April 6 Youth Movement,” which openly criticized the Mubarak
government’s responses to striking textile workers in the northern city
of El-Mahalla El-Kubra.105  The majority of the group members had
never been actively involved with politics before joining, yet the
group’s discussion pages carried heated and informed debate.106  One
such discussion evaluated Muslim Brotherhood107 street protests in
100. Ragui Assaad & Farzaneh Roudi Fahimi,, Youth in the Middle East and North Africa:
Demographic Opportunity or Challenge?, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, 2007, at 1,1.
101. See id. at 3-4.
102. See Asef Bayat, Social Movements, Activism and Social Development in the Middle East,
UNITED NATIONS RES. INST. SOC. DEV., Nov. 1, 2000 at 1, 2.
103. See Ben Barrack, Is Hillary Clinton’s Senior Adviser Running Interference for the Mus-
lim Brotherhood?, BIG PEACE (June 26, 2011), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2011/06/26/
Is-Hillary-Clintons-Senior-Adviser-Running-Interference-For-The-Muslim-Brotherhood.
104. See Alex Chitty, Social Media and the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, WORDPRESS (May 9,
2011), http://alexchitty.wordpress.com/2011/05/09/247/; Alec Ross & Ben Scott, Social Media:
Power to the People?, NATO REV. (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/Social_
Medias/21st-century-statecraft/EN/index.htm;.
105. See Chitty, supra note 104.
106. See Samantha M. Shapiro, Revolution, Facebook-Style, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 25,
2009, at MM34.
107. See generally Sameh Naguib, The Muslim Brotherhood: Contradictions and Transforma-
tions, 29 CAIRO PAPERS IN SOC. SCI.: POL. & SOC. PROTEST EGYPT 157-58 (2009) (discussing the
growth of studies exploring Islamism in the context of social movements).
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Alexandria: “Something like this should happen in Cairo,” wrote one
user.108  Another called for more effective measures: “We need strong
actions, not protests like the brotherhoods where they sing religious
songs and go home.”109  Such exchanges foreshadowed the sentiments
expressed in 2011’s Tehrir Square.
Platforms like Twitter accelerated the pace of protest movements
causing the “rapid coalescence” of Tunisian and Egyptian demonstra-
tions.110  The incumbent regimes attempted to shut down mobile and
Internet networks to cripple the resistance;111 the Obama Administra-
tion urged restraint.112  The State Department began almost immedi-
ately on $30 million worth of Internet freedom projects, including
software enabling activists to manipulate firewalls imposed by oppres-
sive governments.113
Yet Egyptian protestors understood from the beginning that so-
cial media outlets could not substitute for face-to-face gathering and
organization.  They built an extensive organizational structure before
using social media to encourage people to leave their homes and join
them in Tehrir Square.114  The Egyptians used an “interdisciplinary”
approach: they held physical meetings to build solidarity, created
small satellite organizations to maintain face-to-face contact, yet uti-
lized social media to publicize these efforts as well.  They laid the
groundwork for their revolution by researching and mastering nonvio-
lent resistance and nonviolent organization.115  They studied the work
of Gene Sharp and worked with leaders from Otpor! regarding non-
violent revolution.116
108. See Shapiro, supra note 106, at MM34. .
109. Id.
110. Mary Beth Sheridan, U.S. Warns Against Blocking Social Media, Elevates Internet Free-
dom Policies, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2011, http://www?.washingto?npost.com/?wp-dyn/con?tent/
artic?le/2011/01?/28/AR2011?012804554_?pf.html.,
111. Mahlet Ayalew, Facebook and Twitter: They Accelerate Revolutions, But Do They Cre-
ate the Types of Change that Necessitate Revolutions (2011) (unpublished term paper, Howard
University School of Law) (on file with Howard Law Journal) (citing Garry Blight et al., Arab
Spring: An Interactive Timeline of Middle East Protests, GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2012, 10:45 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-
timeline).
112. Mary Beth Sheridan, Social Media Curbs Pose Hurdle for U.S., WASH. POST, Jan. 29,
2011, at A09.
113. Id.
114. 2011 Egyptian Revolution, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Egyptian_
revolution#Lead-up_to_the_protests (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
115. Id.
116. Id.
816 [VOL. 56:801
Social Change Requires Civic Infrastructure
The Egyptian April 6 group may have had only 75,000 Facebook
“friends,” but without organization and strategies in the street, they
could not have built a movement.117 Social media in Egypt created
domestic and foreign pressure by bringing awareness to the efforts,
but in isolation, it was not sufficient to bring about the intended
revolution.118
Libyan dissidents did not have such preparation  and perhaps
thought that social media alone could do the job.  They were mis-
taken.  Where the Egyptian uprising showcased the people’s techno-
logical ingenuity and adaptability,119 the Libyan experience showed
the limitations that can be imposed by a country’s online culture, state
limits on access, and the level of organization of groups using social
media.120
In Libya, traditional fear of the Gaddafi regime, mixed with a
kind of authoritarian populism, hindered the development of secular
youth and professionals like those in Egypt and Tunisia.121  Few Liby-
ans were Internet users, and even fewer used Facebook.  However, as
protest escalated, the “number of Facebook and Twitter users in Libya
rose dramatically” including expatriate Libyans and sympathizers
around the world.122
Despite their head start, Egyptian protesters have not yet created
an organization capable of operating the government, however.  As a
consequence, more organized forces have taken over.  Soon after
Mubarak resigned, the military stepped forward and took power, sus-
pending constitutional provisions unpopular with the protesters but at
the same time moving to limit demonstrations.  They have stifled the
Movement, re-engaging members of the old regime and adopting
many of its tactics.123
117. Bryan Farrell, How Peer Pressure Creates Social Change, WAGING NONVIOLENCE (June
3, 2011), http://wagingnonviolence.org/2011/06/how-peer-pressure-creates-social-change/.
118. Ayalew, supra note 111.
119. Id.
120. See Peter Beaumont, Can Social Networking Overthrow a Government? SYDNEY MORN-
ING HERALD (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/can-social-
networking-overthrow-a-government-20110225-1b7u6.html#ixzz1ZI0LvBBK (comparing
Libya’s experience of Internet disruption to be worse than the time when Egypt’s government
stopped the country’s Internet service).
121. Bayat, supra note 102, at 2.
122. BARRY LIBERT, THE REVOLUTION WILL BE TWEETED 5 (2011).
123. Ayalew, supra note 111 (citing Egyptians Grow Distrustful of Ruling Junta, ONISLAM
(Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.onislam.net/english/news/africa/454113-egyptians-grow-distrustful-
of-ruling-junta.html; 7 Months After Revolution Ousted Mubarak, Egyptian Military Maintains
Control, Suppressing Dissent, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.democracynow.org/
2011/10/4/7_months_after_revolution_ousted_mubarak).
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The protest movement, meanwhile, has begun to fragment and
lose momentum, its former “unity of purpose has given way to a mul-
tiplicity of demands, mirroring the divides that beset Egypt’s political
life.”124  Many protestors expected rapid success and did not plan the
next steps.  Their considerable skills as protest organizers did not
carry over to create a social movement capable of operating in post-
Mubarak Egypt.  Without an action plan—goals, strategies, tactics—
suited to the new conditions, they began to lose hope and burn out as
the movement lost momentum.125
B. Occupy Wall Street (OWS)
The Occupy Wall Street Movement grew from a small band of
activists protesting reduced social services in New York, to turnouts of
sixty to 100 participants protesting near Wall Street, and eventually to
mass demonstrations of more than 15,000 people across the nation.126
Arab Spring inspired them; they tailored Egyptian and Tunisian ap-
proaches to their own concerns—that the richest one percent of
Americans writes the rules of an unfair global economy that controls
the future of the other ninety-nine.127  OWS in turn inspired “Oc-
cupy” demonstrations in seventy United States cities, 600 United
States communities, and 900 cities worldwide.128
OWS dramatized America’s increasing economic polarization
and obsession with wealth, and struck a nerve.129  They gave a voice to
citizens increasingly dissatisfied with the lethargy of the American po-
litical process and the boundless greed of the rich.130  The broad base
of the population has come to believe their government works only
124. Egypt News — Revolution and Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
news/international/countriesandterritories/egypt/index.html (last updated Sept. 26, 2011).
125. Ayalew, supra note 111.
126. Chijioke, supra note 60 (citing Nathan Schneider, The Nation: From Wall Street to Eve-
rywhere, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/10/19/141501013/the-na-
tion-from-wall-street-to-everywhere).
127. See also NATHANIEL J. HIGGINS, THE REVOLUTION WILL BE TELEVISED 15 (2011) (cit-
ing Occupy Wall Street, OCCUPY TOGETHER (Jan 15. 2012, 5:15 PM), http://www.occupytogether.
org/occupy-wall-st/).
128. About, OCCUPY PROTEST, http://occupyprotest.net/about (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
129. See Paul Rogat Loeb, From Occupy Wall Street to Occupy the Neighborhoods, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-loeb/from-occupy-wall-street-
t_b_1085255.html.
130. Chijioke, supra note 61.
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for “large wealthy special interests . . . .”131 and that the democratic
process itself has been corrupted.132
Social media afforded OWS a forum to present new and im-
proved ideas about how to achieve their goals and spark conversations
as to how the movement can be strengthened.133  The Occupy move-
ment also used physical space, so people could come together to “plan
creative tactics, handle donations of food, address medical needs,
reach out to the media, create innovative art projects, clean the occu-
pation grounds, and ensure physical security.”134  Also, “[c]ommon
meals became a form of communion.”135  In these “free” spaces,136
participants found their voices and their problem-solving instincts.
They began to “talk, brainstorm ideas, make posters and banners,
[and] draw in the curious, including those just passing by.”137
OWS was initiated by “Adbusters,” a self-styled “culture jam-
mer” group.138  Such groups resist consumer culture139 with the goal
of “‘toppl[ing] existing power structures and forg[ing] major adjust-
ments to the way we will live in the twenty-first century,’” by changing
“the way we interact with the mass media and the way in which mean-
ing is produced in our society.’”140  Benjamin Barber describes culture
jammers as imaginative activists who engage in creative “demarket-
ing” campaigns.141
131. 107 CONG. REC. 183 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Luther) (discussing the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001); see WE ARE THE 99 PERCENT (Nov. 6, 2012), http://
wearethe99percent.tumblr.com/.  This blog provides real quotes and stories from members of the
Occupy Wall Street movement.  The members tell how they, and other members of the 99% are
essentially being denied the American dream.
132. See EDWARD SIDLOW & BETH HENSCHEN, GOVT 217 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing the con-
stitutional challenges of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002); WE ARE THE 99 PER-
CENT, supra note 131.
133. Jennifer Preston, Protesters Look for Ways to Feed the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2011,
at A28.
134. Loeb, supra note 129.
135. Id.
136. See SARA M. EVANS & HARRY C. BOYTE, FREE SPACES: THE SOURCES OF DEMO-
CRATIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, at ix (1992).
[W]e define free spaces as “public places in the community . . . in which people are able
to learn a new self-respect, a deeper and more assertive group identity, public skills,
and values of cooperation and civic virtue . . . setting between private lives and large-
scale institutions . . . with a relatively open and participatory character.”
Id.
137. Loeb, supra note 129.
138. Rod Mickleburgh, Anti-Wall Street Protests Take Off Thanks to a Canadian Idea,
GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 6, 2012, at A16.
139. BARBER, supra note 85, at 281.
140. Id. at 282.
141. Id. at 283-85.
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During the height of the OWS demonstrations, CNN aired a mis-
leading news program attempting to portray OWS as a group of anar-
chists led by the hacker group “Anonymous.”142  Culture jammers are
not hackers or anarchists, though both became OWS fellow
travelers.143
Instead, culture jammers work to change or subvert the symbolic
meanings of marketing symbols and “consumerism’s most seductive
features.”144  For instance, in response to post-holiday shopping days,
culture jammers started “Buy Nothing” days and attempted to
counter television marketing with a “TV Turnoff” week.145  Other ef-
forts at combating consumer culture include painting their “own bike
lanes, reclaim[ing] streets, ‘skull[ing]’ Calvin Klein ads, and past[ing]
GREASE stickers on tables and trays at McDonald’s restaurants.”
They also “organize swap meets, rearrange items on supermarket
shelves,” and make their software available free on the Net.146
The most fundamental limitation for culture jammers is that by
using counter-marketing techniques, the jammers simultaneously pro-
mote the very marketing they try to lampoon.147  In Barber’s words,
“[t]aking over capitalism with ‘good commodities’ is not the same
thing as subverting commoditization . . . . After all, the Blackspot shoe
may pretend to be an anticommodity, but an anticommodity is just
another commodity—at least when it’s a shoe.”148
Culture jammers are up against the wealthiest giants in market-
ing—“master jammers”— who, through irony, use negative marketing
to reinforce their products.149  As Barber describes, “[t]here has not
142. CNN Presents: Amber Lyon Profiles ‘Anonymous’, CNN PRESS ROOM BLOGS (Jan. 13,
2012, 9:40 AM), http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/13/cnn-presents-amber-lyon-
profiles-anonymous/.
143. See DMOZ, http://www.dmoz.org/desc/Society/Activism/Media/Culture_Jamming (last
updated Feb. 12, 2013) (describing the function of culture jammers as “media hackers”);  J.J.
Jackson, Return of the Summer Socialists and Sunshine Terrorists, LIBERTY REBORN (May 4,
2012),  http://www.libertyreborn.com/2012/05/04/return-of-the-summer-socialists-and-sunshine-
terrorists/ (last visited Feb. 12, 201), and  Nathan Schneider, Thank You, Anarchists, NATION
(Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/165240/thank-you-anarchists# (last visited Feb.
12, 2013) (describing how anarchists’ ideologies influenced the Occupy Movement, to get a bet-
ter understanding of how culture jammers or “media hackers” and anarchists are similar as it
relates to government).
144. BARBER, supra note 85,  at 284.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 282.
147. See id. at 286 (“[T]he underlying question remains whether anticonsumerist activists can
actually harness the entrepreneurial spirit . . . without playing the game whose rules they want to
subvert.”).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 288.
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yet been a symbol of resistance and transgression that has not been
effectively assimilated and reengineered as a marketing slogan or sales
logo.”150  Barber provides several examples of this reengineering in-
cluding: the 1970 Buick promise to “light your fire,” GM’s Oldsmobile
division’s sale of “Youngmobiles,” and the sale of Mao Tse-tung jack-
ets and Che Guevara T-shirts.151  Additionally, Barber sees the move-
ment’s forays into politics152 as diverting attention away from the
primary evil of consumerism and trivializing the aims of the culture
jammers.153
V. TOWARDS A NEW CIVIC INFRASTRUCTURE
The embers of Arab Spring and OWS are still warm.  To regain
their fire, Arab Spring needs to go beyond protest, and OWS needs to
go beyond culture jamming.  Most importantly, each needs a “civic
infrastructure” that is “sufficiently strong and well-organized to bal-
ance the shortcomings of both business and government.”154  This
civic infrastructure has several distinguishing characteristics.
First, this civic infrastructure should be community-based, at-
tracting the social capital of informal as well as formal leadership.155
Formal leaders include local elected officials, ministers, and heads of
traditional civil society organizations.  Digging deeper for informal
leadership,156 we find “go to” people (informal consultants and men-
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 284 (“As an eclectic movement . . .  the jammers have unavoidably adopted an
eclectic politics. . . . But calling President Bush or former Israeli Prime Minister Sharon terrorists
probably does not help critics of consumerism focus on the jammers’ primary issue.”).
153. Id.
154. “Prof.” supra note 15.
155. See Loeb, supra note 129, for a brief discussion of the SNOW Coalition, a coalition of
Anti-Iraq war activists in Seattle who divided themselves up by neighborhoods and acted in
communities where people were “more likely to know them as neighbors, coworkers, or
friends.” See Sound Nonviolent Opponents of War (SNOW Coalition), WASH. STATE ACTION
NETWORK, http://wanet.org/organizations/Sound-Nonviolent-Opponents-of-War-(SNOW-
Coalition).
156. See RICHARD C. HARWOOD, TAPPING CIVIC LIFE: HOW TO REPORT FIRST, AND BEST,
WHAT’S HAPPENING IN YOUR COMMUNITY (2d ed. 1996), http://www.pewcenter.org/doingcj/
pubs/tcl.  In relevant part:
Indeed, journalists tend to spend a lot of time in just two layers of civic life: the official
layer and the private layer.  They cover the official layer routinely. . . . “Think of them
as a pyramid with city officials at the top.  The deeper we probe into a community - past
the bureaucrats and then through the civic activists - the broader the pyramid gets.”
Id. (listing and describing the types of community leaders; the “Official Leaders,” “Civic Lead-
ers,” “Connectors,” “Catalysts,” and “Experts”).
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tors), “networkers” (people who are good at making connections),157
and “boundary crossers” (people fluent in diverse cultures and ac-
cepted in many).158
Second, this civic infrastructure should avoid bureaucracy, hierar-
chy, or top-down control—organizational and decision-making mod-
els that emerged in the Industrial Age.  The military, as the only
decision-making model for a large organization at the time of the in-
dustrial revolution, became the organizational model for engineering
and manufacturing in the United States.159  By the early twentieth-
century, the “Fordist” assembly-line model emerged—those at the
bottom performed highly specialized, repetitive tasks, with little room
for judgment or discretion, and instead, rules, procedures, and stan-
dards set from above governed their work.160  From the mid-19th cen-
tury, top-down models supplanted more democratic and cooperative
approaches in the United States, in civil society and government as
well as industry.
Top-down models are particularly unsuited for the knowledge-
based Information Age, however.161  The models worked in the
“slower, simpler, more predictable” Industrial Age, but they do not
work now.162  Such models exalt routinized procedure; internal com-
munications proceed at a snail’s pace.  “Not used to thinking for them-
selves, employees [in top-down models] wait for direction[,]” not
trusting their supervisors, let alone their own judgment.163  Organiza-
tional success in the fast-paced Information Age depends not merely
upon the commands of those at the top, but on deploying, coordinat-
ing, and improving the intellectual abilities of the whole workforce.164
Top-down models are too slow and inefficient for this task.
157. Scott London, Informal Networks: The Power of Organic Community Groups, 2010
HARWOOD INST. http://newpossibilitiesassociates.com/uploads/LSF_Informal_Networks_Final.
pdf.
158. See generally Neal Peirce & Curtis Johnson, Boundary Crossers: Community Leader-
ship for a Global Age (1997).
159. See generally JOHN X. WANG, WHAT EVERY ENGINEER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT DECI-
SION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2002) (discussing engineering decision-making).
160. TOM BENTLEY, LEARNING BEYOND THE CLASSROOM: EDUCATION FOR A CHANGING
WORLD 102 (1998).
161. DAVID K. BANNER & T. ELAINE GAGNE´, DESIGNING EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS:
TRADITIONAL & TRANSFORMATIONAL VIEWS 312 (1995).
162. MICHAEL H. HUGOS, BUSINESS AGILITY: SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY IN A RELENT-
LESSLY COMPETITIVE WORLD 41 (2009).
163. THOMAS J. CARTIN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
EXCELLENCE 32 (1999).
164. NELARINE CORNELIUS, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A MANAGERIAL PERSPEC-
TIVE 245-46 (2d ed. 2001).
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Finally, this civic infrastructure should move us toward a form of
“strong democracy.”165  Benjamin Barber, originator of the term, in-
sists that strong democracy can only emerge from a substantive con-
sensus of “common beliefs, values, and ends that precede
government” and constitute a community “in and through which indi-
viduals can realize themselves . . . .”166  How can such a consensus be
created in today’s context?  It must arise out of “common talk, com-
mon decision, and common work” carried on in a participatory con-
text, using conflict and transforming it to “common consciousness and
political judgment.”167
For a movement to succeed, it must build a strong social base and
formulate a coherent, “well-planned and organized agenda for
change.”168  At present, the windows of opportunity created by the
forces of democracy are quickly filled by more organized forces, usu-
ally in the form of new oligarchic elites or even holdovers from previ-
ous regimes.169
Mancur Olson argued in The Logic of Collective Action that ra-
tional, self-interested individuals would not act to achieve their com-
mon interests in large groups unless they receive financial incentives
(i.e., the market or “business” leg)170 or are coerced to do so (i.e., law
and enforcement—the “government” leg).171  Olson also predicts that
working for the common interest is too costly in terms of time and
165. Benjamin Barber, Making Democracy Strong: A Conversation with Benjamin Barber,
CIVIC ARTS REV., Summer-Fall 1996, at 2, available at http://car.owu.edu/pdfs/1996-9-3.pdf. (“[A
fuller democracy] would rely much more heavily on citizen participation.  A fuller democracy
does not mean participation of all the citizens all the time in all forms of public life.  But it has to
mean government by all of the people some of the time . . . .”).
166. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW
AGE 224 (2d ed. 2003).
167. Id.
168. ALI REZA ABOOTALEBI, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES 1980-1994, at 116 (2000).
169. See Ayalew, supra note 111.  Ayalew proposes that Egypt is categorized at Stage Five of
the Movement – the phase where an “active democracy is created.” Id.  At this phase, citizens
must address grievances prior to the Revolution, i.e., the neoliberal economic policies that cre-
ated wealth for a selected number of people. Id. (citing Sameh Naguib, Egypt’s Unfinished
Revolution, INT’L SOCIALIST REV. (Sept.-Oct. 2011), available at http://www.isreview.org/issues/
79/feature-egyptianrevolution.shtml).
170. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THE-
ORY OF GROUPS 2, 26 (1965) (“Only when the elasticity of demand for the industry is less than or
equal to the fraction of the industry’s output supplied by a particular firm will that firm have any
incentive to restrict its output . . . .”).
171. Id. at 1-2.
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money for groups like labor unions, farm organizations, cartels,  and
corporations.172
However, Olson conceded that small groups might be able to act
without being forced or paid, because “each member gets a substantial
proportion of the total gain simply because there are few others in the
group . . . .”173  Thus, small groups might achieve a collective good
through “voluntary, self-interested action.”174  To achieve larger ends,
however, they might need professional organizers.175
Neither Arab Spring nor the Occupy movements  developed or-
ganizational structures permitting activities beyond mobilization.  The
Muslim Brotherhood, in contrast, is very well organized, with an ex-
tensive “network of social service and religious organizations at the
local level” including “hundreds of schools, medical clinics, private
mosques, day-care centers, and job-training centers.”176
OWS, during an April 2012  national conference, discussed some
ways to take their issues back to their own neighborhoods, communi-
ties, workplaces, and campuses.177  Several models are available to ac-
complish these objectives, but I favor Swedish-style study circles178
and the citizen’s  assembly model pioneered by Thomas Jefferson.179
The Occupy Movement, should they attempt to regroup, might con-
sider using them, as I suggest in my memo to David Swanson and in
my Huffington Post blog entry.180
In the Huffington Post piece, I argue that the Citizen’s Assem-
blies, aggregated to scale in Congressional districts, could model
themselves on the Opposition in British Parliament, which primarily
“seeks to expose the deficiencies of Her Majesty’s Government, and
ultimately to replace it.”181 The Citizen’s Assemblies, however, would
172. Id. at 6-7, 11.
173. Id. at 34, 48.
174. Id. at 34.
175. Id. at 10-11.
176. BRUCE K. RUTHERFORD, EGYPT AFTER MUBARAK: LIBERALISM, ISLAM, AND DEMOC-
RACY IN THE ARAB WORLD 94 (2008).
177. Observation by Prof. McDougall, attending the OWS conference as an observer.
178. “Prof.”, supra note 16.
179. Id.
180. See McDougall, supra note 23.
181. R.M. PUNNETT, FRONT BENCH OPPOSITION: THE ROLE OF THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSI-
TION, THE SHADOW CABINET AND SHADOW GOVERNMENT IN BRITISH POLITICS 4, 10 (1973)
(“The Opposition is office-seeking in that its role is not merely to criticize those who are in
power, but is also to seek to replace them.”).  In contrast, The Assemblies could operate parallel
to government,  providing services such as community mediation. See “Prof.” supra note 17.  In
2000, the largest congressional district held 905,316 people.  The smallest district had 495,304.
The average size of a congressional district is 646,952 people. Congressional Apportionment,
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focus on deficiencies for the sake of accountability rather than to seek
formal political power for themselves.
How does a shadow government work? Since 1955, in the U.K.
there has been a formal182 “Shadow Government” mirroring the
structure of the formal Cabinet and Ministerial organization.183  Spe-
cifically, there is a leader of the opposition and a “front bench team”
of ministers184 including senior, deputy, and junior spokesmen, tempo-
rary assistant spokesmen (for some debates), and secretary and assis-
tant opposition whips.185
The Opposition chooses the subjects for debate186 and directly
faces and debates with the Prime Minister during Question Time.187
The ruling party, the press, and the public are made aware of the
Shadow Cabinet at the beginning of each session.188  With respect to
how much media coverage the Opposition front benchers receive,
“[w]hile Ministers receive some attention through their departmental
work . . . the Leader of the Opposition is almost alone among Opposi-
tion figures in receiving regular coverage by the news media.”189
The “shadow cabinet” refers to the opposition party representa-
tives  who concern themselves “with the tactical political considera-
tions of the Opposition and the affairs of the Opposition party.”190
The Shadow Cabinet decides “who will speak for the opposition in the
week’s debates, and who will lead the attack in Question Time.”191  In
addition to these responsibilities, the Shadow Cabinet determines “the
policy attitudes of the Opposition towards immediate issues,”192 man-
ages administrative affairs, and “concerns itself with long term party
policy, producing policy statements and manifestos, and planning poli-
cies in anticipation of future office.”193  Meetings of the cabinet are
NAT’L ATLAS (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.nationalatlas.gov/articles/boundaries/a_conApport.
html#two.
182. See PUNNETT, supra note 181, at 10 (“[T]he presence of Her Majesty’s Opposition is
formally recognized within the machinery of Government: the Opposition recognizes the Gov-
ernment’s right to govern, and in turn the Government officially recognizes the Opposition and
provides opportunities for the Opposition to function.”).
183. See id. at 5.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 75 fig.E.
186. See id. at 9.
187. See id. at 5.
188. See id.
189. Id. at 100.
190. Id. at 216.
191. Id. at 217.
192. Id. at 218.
193. Id.
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not called with any regularity.194  The Shadow Cabinet also utilizes
committees and small group arrangements that are generally ad hoc
and informal.195
The effect of the Opposition (which includes former ministers) to
debate and call into question the decisions of the prime minister and
ruling party196 provides a template for the civic infrastructure I de-
scribe.  The one Leader of the Opposition “acts as a public watchdog
by keeping the actions of the Government under scrutiny, and sec-
ondly he provides an element of choice for the electorate by posing as
an alternative Prime Minister at the head of the alternative
government.”197
Citizen’s Assemblies, representing many consumers and bank de-
positors, would have sufficient economic power to check business as
well.198  Past examples include the boycotts and selective buying cam-
paigns of the civil rights movement, and labor’s boycotts and public
“shaming” campaigns.199  During the Civil Rights Era, the NAACP
boycotted retailers, restaurants, and merchants that adhered to Jim
Crow practices, as well as engaged in selective buying campaigns in
cities that segregated public transportation services.200  Spelman Col-
lege students successfully picketed supermarkets with discriminatory
hiring practices.201  In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, businesses in
Claiborne County, Mississippi that lost customers as a result of a civil
rights boycott, sued for damages.202  The Supreme Court dismissed
the suit, concluding that the boycott activities, including speeches and
non-violent picketing, were constitutionally protected by the First
Amendment.203
194. See id. at 221.
195. See id. at 247.
196. See id. at 28 (“The presence in Parliament of ambitious critics, many of whom will be
former Ministers, and thus familiar with the workings of government, means that Ministers of
the Crown have to perform their duties in an atmosphere that is considerably more hostile than
that surrounding almost any other occupation.”).
197. Id. at 77.  The Assemblies could also perform some functions “parallel” to government,
such as community mediation. See Community Mediation: Resolving Conflicts Quickly, SAFE
HORIZON, http://www.blue-iceberg.net/www.safehorizon.org/Resources/Mediation_Brochure_
Eng.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2012).
198. McDougall, supra note 23.
199. Id.
200. GILBERT JONAS, FREEDOM’S SWORD: THE NAACP AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST RA-
CISM IN AMERICA 1909-1969, at 175 (2005).
201. See HARRY G. LEFEVER, UNDAUNTED BY THE FIGHT: SPELMAN COLLEGE AND THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1957/1967, at 45 (2005).
202. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 886 (1986).
203. See GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA: HOW IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY SHAPE
THE LEGAL MIND 122-23 (1999).
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In the 1970s, Cesar Chavez led migrant farm workers in a strike
against California grape growers triggering a nationwide grape boy-
cott, pressuring the growers to sign “equitable contracts with the
workers,” demonstrating the “power of moral passion, commitment,
and solidarity to bring about change in a democratic society.”204  La-
bor unions in the early 1980s pioneered “corporate” campaigns that
threatened the images of corporations in the eyes of consumers, inves-
tors, journalists, social interest groups, and other publics.205
A. Using Social Media
The Assemblies and their study circle components would no
doubt use social media such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube to
speed communication and Wikipedia to aggregate their insights and
goals.  These are all excellent tools, but I argue they must be put to
use by a human community existing in real time.
My research assistant, Sharaya Cabansag, commented in rejoin-
der that using social media to do this can soften the embarrassment
and “otherness” that is sometimes associated with public political dis-
play.206  She agrees with me that social media should not replace face-
to-face civic participation, but insists that social media allows the re-
cipient of the information the freedom to accept or ignore the call to
action.207  Just as a text message is read, sinks into the consciousness,
and then the receiver can either text back or ignore the message, so-
cial media puts the ball in the reader’s court.208  This relative anonym-
ity leaves the recipient with more wiggle room for inaction, but also
relieves them from feeling coerced in a face-to-face encounter.209
Sharaya’s concerns might best be met by a mixture of virtual and
face-to-face deliberation.  The “eLIDA CAMEL” and “Meet-Up” ap-
204. ALAN AXELROD & CHARLES PHILLIPS, WHAT EVERY AMERICAN SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT AMERICAN HISTORY: 225 EVENTS THAT SHAPED THE NATION 310 (3d ed. 2008).
205. See Bennett, supra note 66, at 10.  Functions “parallel” to business the Assemblies could
perform include “social” businesses such as food and energy co-ops. See Jeremy Rifkin, The
Third Industrial Revolution: How Lateral Power Will Transform Society, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-rifkin/the-third-industrial-revo_b_
981168.html.
206. See Memorandum from Sharaya Cabansag Commentary on Soul of a Citizen in Light of
the Social Media Research 1, 2 (2011) (on file with author).
207. See id. at 2.
208. See id.
209. See id.
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proaches blend these two modalities.210  Meet-Up enables users to or-
ganize their own face-to-face meeting group or join one of thousands
already established.  There are more than 2,000 Meet-Up groups oper-
ating in local communities each day.211
E-Learning Independent Design Activities (eLIDA) for Collabo-
rative Approaches to the Management of e-Learning (CAMEL) arose
as a way for British academics using e-learning techniques to share
perspectives and approaches, not only online, but also in a series of
“round robin” meetings at each of their home universities.212  In this
way, participants got to appreciate the context in which their col-
league’s ideas had emerged, and got to meet with students and admin-
istration, increasing their understanding.213  They also bonded more
closely through face-to-face interaction.214
Platforms such as “IMeet” and “Gotomeeting” provide even
more flexibility.  IMeet is a video conferencing option for purchase.215
Participants are placed in “cubes” through which they access the
software’s audio and video options.216  The platform can support fif-
teen people at a time, making the “meeting” seminar size, or about
the size of a large real-time study circle.217  Additional options include
posting documents, attachments, links to web pages, and YouTube
videos.218  Gotomeeting provides similar options.219
Electronic communications of all sorts can “accelerate” Assembly
processes.220  Feedback loops built into the Assembly’s Internet plat-
forms could facilitate the distribution of information and problem
210. See RunObama.com Enlists 6,500 Obama Supporters in First Two Weeks; Calls on
Obama Supporters to Gather 10,000 Signatures by Sunday, PR NEWSWIRE ASS’N (Dec. 7, 2006),
http://www.prnewswire.com.
211. About Meetup, MEETUP.COM , http://www.meetup.com/about (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
212. Interview with Prof. Mandla Muhkanya, Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of
Southern Africa (UNISA), South Africa’s ‘on-line’ University. Dr. Makhanya first alerted me to
the existence of the eLIDA CAMEL approach, which he planned to implement at UNISA.
Pretoria, South Africa, July 2008
213. Id.
214. See Project Details: Project Outcomes, ELIDACAMEL, http://elidacamel.cms.gre.ac.uk/
outcomes.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2012); see also Jill Jameson, The eLIDA CAMEL Nomadic
Model of Collaborative Partnership for a Community of Practice in Design for Learning, 6 ELEC-
TRONIC J. OF E-LEARNING 197, 197 (2008), available at www.ejel.org.
215. Matt Smolinger, IMeet Reviewed, SMALLNET-BUILDER (Mar. 31, 2011, 3:06PM), http://
smallnetbuilder.com/cloud/cloud-services-apps/321-imeet-reviewed.
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. See GOTOMEETING, http://www.gotomeeting.com/fec/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2012).
220. See VAN LAER & VAN AELST, supra note 65, at 230, 245-47; McDougall, supra note 23.
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solving techniques with the potential of becoming as commonplace as
“following one’s favorite TV shows, sports teams, or news stories.”221
“Teledemocracy,” a tool used to improve communication be-
tween citizens and their government representatives,  might be used
internally by the Assembly, stripped of its “VIP” implications.
Teledemocracy experiments such as the Public Electronic Network
(PEN) have been set up to create a channel of communication be-
tween city governments and their constituents.222  Thus far, using in-
formation and computer technologies (ICTs) in this way has served to
distance officials from citizens rather than bringing them closer to-
gether.  There is a tendency to refer to people as “users” or “custom-
ers” rather than citizens, seeking feedback rather than discourse and
deliberation.223
B. Social Media and Community Ties
The Assembly, with its face-to-face dimension, can “ground”
what would otherwise be purely virtual encounters.  Its face-to-face
meeting features would build empathic connections—“strong ties”
rather than weak ones.224  We are physiologically programmed for
community.225  When two people engage, each of their brains are be-
ing “sculpted and changed” by their impressions of one another.226
MRIs performed on both show a “mutual firing and mutual growth in
the social centers of the brain.”227
From infancy, our neurological circuits—“mirror neurons”—go
to work, internalizing what we see and hear of others’ feelings.228
These circuits are increasingly activated as we experience more such
“social exercise.”229  Parent and community nurturing of an infant, for
221. RICHARD HALSTEAD-NUSSLOCH, DESIGNING PERSONALIZED USER EXPERIENCES IN
ECOMMERCE 182 (Clare-Marie Karat, et al. eds., 2004).
222. See Patrick B. O’Sullivan, Computer Networks and Political Participation: Santa
Monica’s Teledemocracy Project, 23 J. APPLIED COMMC’N RES. 93, 94-95, 103-06 (1995).
223. See BARRY N. HAGUE & BRIAN LOADER, DIGITAL DEMOCRACY: DISCOURSE AND DE-
CISION MAKING IN THE INFORMATION AGE 13 (1999).
224. See Gladwell, supra note 99.
225. See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE EMPATHIC CIVILIZATION: THE RACE TO GLOBAL CONSCIOUS-
NESS IN A WORLD IN CRISIS 14-15, 109, 125-127 (2009).
226. DANA CROWLEY JACK & ALISHA ALI, SILENCING THE SELF ACROSS CULTURES: DE-
PRESSION AND GENDER IN THE SOCIAL WORLD 103 (2010).
227. Id. at 103.
228. See PETER A. LEVINE & MAGGIE KLINE, TRAUMA THROUGH A CHILD’S EYES: AWAK-
ENING THE ORDINARY MIRACLE OF HEALING 302 (2007).
229. See RIFKIN, supra note 225, at 83-90 (discussing the relation between biology and
culture).
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example, triggers its “mirror neurons,” establishing “empathic path-
ways in the brain.”230  Human connection is thus a primary ingredient
in psychological,231 cultural,232 and intellectual development.233
Empathic face-to-face connection builds trust, the social capital
needed to make Gladwell’s “group projects” work.  A high level of
social capital—“strong ties”—are also associated with cooperation,
reciprocity, civic engagement, and collective health.234  They are not
built on the Internet, but rather grow and endure through contact,
which is more intimate and frequent than that which characterizes cas-
ual acquaintance.235
Douglas North, a Nobel Prize winner in economics, makes a com-
plementary point.  North examined the “transaction costs” accruing
when two or more individuals must agree to cooperate in an en-
deavor—purchase goods and services, cast their votes, or agree to
work together in some community enterprise.236  North showed that
social capital—built in community237—also facilitates human commu-
nication in the market and in government because it broadens the
norms of honesty, integrity, and reliability.238  The greater the fund of
social capital in any society, the more efficiently it works.239
CONCLUSION
The early history of Arab Spring and the Occupy Movements
reveals the fault lines of the twenty-first century’s defining struggle.  It
is a struggle between the forces of democracy and freedom on the one
230. Id.
231. See JACK & ALI, supra note 226, at 103.
232. See Harold McDougall, Reconstructing African-American Cultural DNA: An Action Re-
search Agenda for Howard University, 55 HOW. L.J. 63, 69 (2011).
233. Leon Neyfakh, Are We Asking the Right Questions?, BOSTON GLOBE (May 20, 2012),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/05/19/justask/k9PATXFdpL6ZmkreSiRYGP/story.html?
camp=pm (“Wielded with purpose and care, a question can become a sophisticated and potent
tool to expand minds, inspire new ideas, and give us surprising power at moments when we
might not believe we have any.”).
234. See JULIA HA¨UBERER, SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY 56-57 (2010).
235. See id.; see also SANDRA C. DUHE, NEW MEDIA AND PUBLIC RELATIONS 96 (Sandra C.
Duhe ed., 2007) (discussing how “weak ties” or social networking with acquaintances requires
“very little time and interaction”).
236. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE (2005).
237. See JONG S. JUN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: INTERPRE-
TIVE AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 219 (2006).
238. See id.
239. See id. at 58.
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hand, and the forces of elite and oligarchic control on the other.240
The Occupy Movements showed that this struggle will be carried on in
developed countries as well as those that are less developed.  Protes-
ters in Egypt and throughout the Arab world will fight against tradi-
tionalist, self-aggrandizing elites,241 but protesters in the United States
and other developed countries will struggle against corporate elites.242
Traditional elites have been able to hold on to power by filling
the minds of the people with an ideology based on traditional values,
which Benjamin Barber collects under the symbol “jihad.”243  Corpo-
rate elites have been able to hold on to power by filling the minds of
the people with an ideology based on consumerism and individualism,
which Benjamin Barber collects under the symbol “McWorld.”244
Governing elites  reacting to the emergence of Arab Spring and OWS
disruptions were quick to exploit the people’s allegiance to either of
the two ideologies Barber identifies.245
In order for the forces of freedom and democracy to prevail, they
will have to break free of both these ideologies.246  Revolutionary
movements’ new problem-solving approaches must become a matrix
from which new norms and values may spring, as well as new patterns
of interaction and organization.247  Paul Loeb observed a  sense of fes-
tival at Occupy gatherings, “with puppets, colorful banners, drum cir-
240. See Josh Halliday, Hillary Clinton Adviser Compares Internet to Che Guevara, GUARD-
IAN.UK (June 22, 2011, 5:53PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/jun/22/hillary-clinton-ad-
viser-alec-ross (“Alec Ross said ‘dictatorships are now more vulnerable than ever’ as disaffected
citizens organise influential protest movements on Facebook and Twitter.”).
241. See CHRIS C. DEMCHAK, WARS OF DISRUPTION AND RESILIENCE:  CYBERED CONFLICT,
POWER, AND NATIONAL SECURITY 281 (2011).
242. See Lee Fang, As Tea Party Koch Brothers Earned an Extra 11 Billion in Recent Years,
They Laid Off Thousands, THINK PROGRESS ECON. (Feb. 11, 2011, 2:46PM), http://thinkpro-
gress.org/economy/2011/02/01/141767/david-charles-koch-jobs/; Sarah van Gelder & Brooke
Jarvis, Wisconsin Awakens a Sleeping Giant, YESMAGAZINE.ORG (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.yes
magazine.org/people-power/from-wisconsin-a-sleeping-giant-awakes;  Paul Street, Report from
North America: The Wisconsin Rebellion and Its Limits in a Global Context, NEWLEFT-
PROJECT.ORG (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/mayday/article/6285.
243. See generally BENJAMIN BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD: TERRORISM’S CHALLENGE TO
DEMOCRACY (1996) (discussing how Jihads focus on traditional notions of community and how
religion, generally, has become intertwined with the political landscape).
244. Id. at Part I (discussing consumerism as an ideology deriving from advertising); see also
BETTY MALEN, BALANCING LOCAL CONTROL AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR K-12 EDUCA-
TION 139 (2000) (discussing the social and political forces unleashed by globalization and how
the growth of multinational corporations encourages the development of a homogeneous world
culture).
245. See Ayalew, supra note 111.
246. Cory Siemaszko, Pakistani Teen Who Survived Taliban Shooting Flown to British Hos-
pital, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 15, 2012, 12:55PM), http://www?.nydailyne?ws.com/new?sworld/
pa?kistani-te?en-survive?d-taliban-?shooting-f?lown-briti?sh-hospita?l-article-?1.1183885.
247. See PIOTR SZTOMPKA, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIAL CHANGE 295 (1993).
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cles, radical marching bands, signs saying ‘I’ll believe corporations are
people when Texas executes one,’ and people dressed up as predatory
billionaires, Lady Liberty and dollar-spewing zombies who chant ‘I
smell money, I smell money.’”248  The “spirit of play echoes the defi-
ant folk and hip hop music of Tehrir Square and the Gandhi meets
Monty Python approaches of the Serbian youth movement Otpur,
who helped train the initial Tehrir Square occupiers.”249
Such movements, even if ephemeral, create new cultural patterns
in their wake, leavening both traditional and modern ideas.  Thus,
they might enhance and deepen traditional culture, but avoid extreme
notions of jihad that are really “opportunistic attempts at self-aggran-
dizement, rather than the preservation of . . . community.”250  At the
same time, they might root modern notions of autonomy and individu-
ality251 in practices and approaches, which do not serve the alienated
consumerist individualism of McWorld.252
New values alone will not suffice, however.  As these movements
appear, they must be urged to develop an organizational structure,
supple as well as sophisticated, that does not repeat the mistakes of
the past.  Social media has a role to play,253 as does public protest, but
small-group organizing and coalition-building, to create a progressive
civic infrastructure, is essential if the 21st century struggle for political
and economic democracy is to survive and flourish.
248. Loeb, supra note 129.
249. See id.
250. See also Richard Kahn & Douglas Kellner, Internet Subcultures and Oppositional Polit-
ics, UCLA.EDU (2003), http://gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/Internetsubculturesopposi-
tionalpolitics.pdf (discussing use of the Internet by terrorist groups). But see OLIVER LEAMAN,
ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 136-37 (2009).
251. This is possible because of “communication independence from the mass media.” See
Bennett, supra note 66, at 9.
252. See generally McDougall, supra note 232.
253. Cf. Katherine Kendrick, Activism 2.0, YALE GLOBALIST (Feb. 28, 2007, 8:33PM), http://
tyglobalist.org/focus/activism-2-0/  (describing the role of Moveon.org in changing the manner of
participation in American Politics); Howard Rheingold, supra note 81 (examining the correlation
between SMS text messaging and political activism around the world including: toppling the
Estrada Regime in the Philippines; changing election results in South Korea; turning an obscure
candidate into a frontrunner  in the United States; using texting to organize mass demonstrations
despite a ban in Madrid; and having a fair election with the highest number of voters experienc-
ing easily accessible election results as a result of the mobile phone).
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VI. POST-SCRIPT: COMMUNITY REENGAGEMENT
THROUGH THE REFORMATION OF ADVISORY
NEIGHBORHOOD COMMISSIONS
(with Crinesha Brooks)
The Occupy movement has faded.254  Arab Spring is in chaos.255
Yet the grand ideas that spurred them still give hope.  How might
their concepts of radical civic engagement be applied in a setting fa-
miliar to us at Howard?
Inspired by this Symposium, and by the desire of Howard Law
Journal students to produce a “legal” result, I thought about the Advi-
sory Neighborhood Commissions (ANCs) of the District of Columbia,
formed to liaise with Congress before the advent of Home Rule in the
District.  I asked my research assistant, Crinesha Brooks, to look into
the ANCs as a possible vehicle by which to implement some of my
civic infrastructure ideas. She wrote the following under my direction.
A. Reviewing the Decline in Citizen Engagement
Direct civic participation in local government is the most effective
means to ensure that policies of public concern are being imple-
mented.256  This is, in large part, due to local governments’ size and
accessibility.  However, since the 1960s Civil Rights Movement, citi-
zen engagement has dramatically declined.257  Robert Putnam attrib-
utes civic disengagement to the current family structure—referencing
the two-career household—increase in television consumption, and
generational shifts.258  Citizens have become less engaged in modern
254. See Star-Ledger Editorial Board, Occupy Wall Street Movement Has Faded, but the
Frustration Lives On, STAR LEDGER (Sept. 17, 2012, 8;20 PM), http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_
page/2012/09/occupy_wall_street_movement_ha.html.
255. See Syria Uprising: Assaad Says Arab Spring Brought Chaos, BBC NEWS, http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19671635 (last updated Sept. 12, 2012, 1:44 PM).
256. Matthew Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory and Neighborhood Coun-
cils: A New Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 137, 144 (2008).
257. See Nicole Turner Lee, The Challenge of Increasing Civic Engagement in the Digital
Age, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 19, 22 (2010).  During the Civil Rights Movement, citizens gathered in
church basements to plan and organize how to challenge the racially motivated policies.  That
generation of people was concerned with how local, state, and federal policies affected their lives
and their communities.  During this historic movement, and those of others, individuals can-
vassed, met publicly, knocked on doors, made telephone calls, and all other such things requiring
personal collective action.  Today, collective action is more passive such as blogging, retweeting,
or posting a status on Facebook.
258.  Id. at 22; Stephen Macedo, The Constitution, Civic Virtue, and Civil Society: Social
Capital as Substantive Morality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1580 (2001); see also Cynthia Es-
tlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (“Echoing
de Tocqueville, Putnam argues that the vitality and efficacy of democratic political institutions
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politics and government, which has led to an uninformed public.259
This lack of citizenry is apparent in low voter turnouts in local, state,
and federal elections.260  The belief is that when individuals lack civic
engagement, they lack the requisite knowledge that they would other-
wise have as it pertains to political and governmental issues relevant
to them.261  American political participation has been described as a
mix of long periods of “uninformed and apathetic disengagement” fol-
lowed by brief periods of “popular ferment and participation.”262
However, engaging in these brief periods of “popular ferment and
participation” interferes with the effectiveness of policy and our politi-
cal systems lack consistency.263
Many believe that we have entered into an era of personal de-
mocracy, where citizens are no longer interested in collective mobili-
zation.264  Instead, citizens’ engagement with the government has
become more privatized leading to less policy influence because of a
disinterest in policy-making.265  The collective community identity
that is essential in a democratic republic, such as ours, that would al-
low policy-makers the opportunity to become aware of issues more
relevant to respective communities has declined.266
Although Putnam attributes civic disengagement to the two-ca-
reer family structure,267 increase in television consumption, and gener-
ational shifts,268 the focus here is briefly on two aspects of the
depends crucially upon the society’s store of ‘social capital’— ‘networks, norms, and trust . . .
that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives.’ And it is
largely through their participation in voluntary clubs, associations such as the PTA, fraternal and
professional organizations, and even bowling leagues that citizens develop these social ties. Put-
nam contends further that, as Americans devote progressively less time and energy to these civic
associations, the store of social capital in American society is eroding.”).
259. Parlow, supra note 256, at 138.
260. Id.  This is with the exception of the 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections, which showed
a huge increase in voter turnout.   Josh Lederman, Voter Turnout Shaping Up to Be Less than
2008, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 7, 2012, 5:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/
voter-turnout_n_2088810.html (explaining that in 2008, 131 million people voted in the election
and about 126 million in 2012).
261. Parlow supra note 250, at 138.
262. Carlos E. Gonza´lez, Popular Sovereign Generated Versus Government Institution Gen-
erated Constitutional Norms: When Does a Constitutional Amendment Not Amend the Constitu-
tion?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 127, 215 (2002).
263. See Parlow, supra note 256, at 143 (“[The] communal experience, can, in turn, increase
the likelihood that citizens will participate in their government, enhance its effectiveness, and
give more credence to the policies adopted through their involvement.”).
264. Parlow, supra note 256, at 140-141.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Estlund, supra note 258, at 1.
268. See Lee, supra note 257, at 22;  Macedo, supra note 258.
834 [VOL. 56:801
Social Change Requires Civic Infrastructure
generational shift.  Two concerns due to the generational shift that
may be attributed to civic disengagement are the decline in civic edu-
cation and a Digital Age that replaces real with virtual contact.  With
the former, as Alexis de Tocqueville puts it, “In democratic countries
knowledge of how to combine is the mother of all other forms of
knowledge; on its progress depends that of all the others.”269 If citi-
zens are unaware of how to participate in society, they will not do so.
With the latter, as this new phenomenon increases, the chances of in-
creasing participation in the local town halls, church basements, and
community centers will continue to decrease.270
B. The Importance of Civic Education
Because the concept of democracy is not a given, it is something
that must be taught repeatedly.271  Civic education provides students
with the ability and understanding of what it truly means to be a citi-
zen.272  It sets the tone for understanding policy-making, mock trials,
self-governance, and various forms of dispute resolution.273  However,
civic education has decreased throughout schools in the United
States.274  Today, if the course in civics does exist or is part of a curric-
ulum, it is limited to the formation and organization of American gov-
ernment.275  Under this setting, civic virtues, duties and engagement
are overlooked, and students are not exposed to the many ways that
they may become involved in the political processes.  In 2009 Justice
Souter issued a call to action during an American Bar Association
(ABA) meeting in Chicago stating, “[W]e have to take on the job of
making American civic education real again . . . [w]hat more impor-
tant work can you do?”276  As a result of the decline in civic educa-
tion, disengagement runs prevalent within the younger community
and has increased.277
269. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 288  (Scott A. Sandage ed.,
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1969) (1840).
270. MATTHEW A. CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, DOWNSIZING DEMOCRACY: HOW
AMERICA SIDELINED ITS CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS PUBLIC 10-11 (2002).
271. Michael Palmer, Civic Education Through Civic Engagement, 31 VT. B.J. 30, 31 (2005).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Kevin Ryan, Lost in the Cave: Citizenship and the Decline of Public Education, 29 VT.
B.J. 7, 9 (2003-04).
275. See id.
276. Leo I. Brisbois, Civics: To Save a Village, Teach a Child, 66 BENCH & B. MINN. 7, 7
(2009).
277. Ryan, supra note 274, at 10 (“Far from being concerned about the public good, nearly
three-quarters of today’s youth set financial success as their highest priority in life.  Powerfully
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Before the Internet Age, citizens met in local coffee shops and
community town halls.278  Today, citizens engage in passive political
discussions on the Internet.279  The issue with this is that online access
is limited.280  Although there have been many positive changes due to
social networking and the Internet,281 the Digital Age has created a
form of social isolation.282  Barriers have been created for those who
are less educated, low-income, disabled, and elderly.283  Because the
Internet is far less accessible than our traditional public forums, it ex-
cludes segments of society that would serve to gain from civic
engagement.284
C. Previous Efforts to Redress Civic Disengagement
Federal, state, and local governments have created programs de-
signed to reengage the public in issues that are central to their com-
munities.  As will be discussed, the limitations experienced by those
programs were primarily due to the top-down approach.  Because the
federal and state governments lack the experience and connectedness
of the communities, it was more difficult to establish programs de-
signed to bridge the gap of community solidarity and policy-making.
Beginning with the War on Poverty, the government has made
several failed attempts at reengaging the public.285  Although the focal
point of many of these programs was to target a distinct and marginal-
ized group, the poor, the efforts still proved to be unsuccessful.286  Ex-
amples of such programs are the Community Action Program, the
Community Development Corporations, and various planning move-
illustrating their cynicism about working with others for public ends, trust for other people has
fallen dramatically among those between the ages of 15 and 25.”).
278. See Lee, supra note 257, at 20.
279. See id. at 22-23.  Frank Rusciano describes citizen engagement on the Internet as passive
discourse.  However, sociologist Barry Wellman views the Internet as a new forum for social
interaction and describes social networking sites as the new “vanguards” for public discourse.
Id.
280. See id. at 21, 25, 28-29.
281. Haiti and the 2008 Presidential election are examples. Id. at 20-21, 23.  KONY 2012,
Occupy Wall Street, and the shooting of Trayvon Martin are examples of how the Internet
brought these issues of public concern to the forefront.  Matt Mastricova, ‘Kony’ a Milestone in
Social Media, TARTAN (Mar. 26, 2012), http://thetartan.org/2012/3/26/forum/socialmedia.
282. Lee, supra note 257, at 25.  People with low-income are often unable to afford Internet
access; elders and the less-educated are not able to utilize these tools.  The disabled are also
unable to utilize the Internet without assistance, which places them in social isolation.
283. Id.
284. See id.
285. See Parlow, supra note 256, at 157-58.
286. See id. at 158.
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ments initiated throughout cities in the United States, which were cre-
ated as pathways for indigent citizens to become more directly
involved in redevelopment efforts in urban communities.287
However, these programs failed due to the program administra-
tors’, (usually federal and state officials) lacking experience in areas of
community planning and engagement; the belief that these programs
would be unsuccessful at the outset and essentially a “waste of time”;
unrealistic expectations; and inadequate funding.288  All of these rea-
sons were primarily due to the top-down approach.289  Rather than
these programs originating from local government and working their
way up, they originated at the top, federal and state governments,
making it even more difficult to obtain civic buy-in and
engagement.290
D. Proposal: ANCs Functioning as Ward Republics
As mentioned,  programs for collaborative neighborhood organi-
zations have been a phenomenon in a number of cities and/or
states.291  One such is the ANC for the District of Columbia, which is
tasked with representing neighborhoods in the eight wards throughout
the District, each of which comprises about 2000 residents.292  By stat-
ute, they are given the authority to make recommendations to the
City Council, the mayor, or other agencies as it relates to matters af-
fecting their prospective wards such as, traffic, parking, zoning, recrea-
tion, street improvements, liquor licensing, economic development,
287. See id.; Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Grassroots Consensus Building and Collaborative Planning,
3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 709, 712-13 (2000).
288. Parlow, supra note 256, at 158-159; Salsich, supra note 287, at 713.
289. Salsich, supra note 287, at 713.
290. See generally id. at 714. (discussing the decentralization of federal programs and its im-
plications for neighborhood collaborative planning).
291. Salsich, supra note 287, at 716-24; see ATLANTA CITY CODE §§ 6-3011-6-3019 (2012)
(establishing Neighborhood Planning Units within the City of Atlanta); see also CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 7-600 (2012) (requiring neighborhood planning commission to be limited to areas
with a “significant number of deteriorated property”); D.C. CODE § 1-207.38 (2012) (establishing
Advisory Neighborhood Commissions); DRAFT UNIFIED LOS ANGELES CITY CHARTER, art. IX,
§ 901 (2012) (creating the Office of Neighborhood Empowerment to assist with creating citywide
neighborhood councils); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.1831 (West 2012) (authorizing Minneapolis
and Saint Paul to establish neighborhood revitalization programs); MO. ANN. STAT. § 208.335
(West 2012).  The Missouri statute was created to alleviate property, however; this bill has since
been repealed. Id. Washington also has a similar statute. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.050
(LexisNexis 2012) (creating indirect neighborhood planning commissions).
292. ADVISORY NEIGHBORHOOD COMMISSIONS, http://anc.dc.gov/page/about-anc (last vis-
ited Nov. 30, 2012) [hereinafter ANC]; James Wright, ANCs Hold Elections, WASH. INFORMER
(Nov. 14, 2012, 1:47 PM), http://washingtoninformer.com/index.php/local/item/12339-ancs-hold-
elections.
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police protection, sanitation, trash collection, and the District’s annual
budget.293
Although ANCs were created to serve as a liaison between the
community and the federal government, ANCs have been under the
microscope for a host of issues surrounding corruption.294  The issue
with the ANCs is the lack of oversight, which in turn leads to local
corruption.295  The ANCs are given access to public funds to use for
public purposes, and too many times those funds have been misappro-
priated.296  One of the issues with local government today is the lack
of transparency in policy-making and resultant self-interested corrup-
tion.  The ANCs are no exception.297
Gary Hart describes America as a “procedurally deficient repub-
lic” as it pertains to resistance to corruption, civic duties, and civic
participation and civic engagement.298  Hart emphasizes the restora-
tion of the ward republic, which is described as “direct, personal and
collective action of citizens” in local governance.299
Professor McDougall and I propose that the Advisory Neighbor-
hood Commissions should look and function more like ward repub-
lics.  Functioning as a ward republic, ANCs would engage in more
activities requiring community engagement and direct citizen partici-
pation, which in turn, decreases local corruption.300
Participating in the political process is an obligation of citizen-
ship.301  Thomas Jefferson believed that the elementary ward republic
was the most appropriate forum to engage citizens in the political, so-
293. D.C. CODE § 1-309.10 (2012); ANC, supra note 292.
294. See Delia Gonc¸lives, Vice Chair Steps Down Two Weeks After Allegations Against
Chair, 9 NEWS NOW (June 27, 2011, 1:09 PM), http://www.wusa9.com/news/local/story.aspx?
storyid=155311; see also Policy Fellow, DC’s ANCs Should Put Their Financial Reports Online,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Apr. 17, 2012, 11:28 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/taxonomy/
term/Local-Corruption/ (discussing the chairman of one of the ANCs who stole about $30,000
from his ANC); Luke Rosiak, DC ANC Members Break the Rules Without Redress, WASH.
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/sep/29/dc-anc-members-
break-the-rules-without-redress/?page=all (discussing Regina James, who allowed taxpayers’
funds to disappear under her watch, punished individuals who requested accountability, closed
meetings to the public, and refused to give elected officials access to records).
295. See Policy Fellow, supra note 294; Gonc¸laves, supra note 294; Rosiak, supra note 294.
296. See Policy Fellow, supra note 294; Gonc¸laves, supra note 294; Rosiak, supra note 294;
Salsich, supra note 287, at 719.
297. Parlow, supra note 256, at 139.
298. GARY HART, RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC: THE JEFFERSONIAN IDEAL IN 21ST CEN-
TURY AMERICA 3 (2002).
299. Id. at 81.
300. See id. at 12-13.
301. Id.
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cial, and economic processes.302  He believed that the more dependent
citizens became on their elected officials, the less republican the gov-
ernment, which ultimately leads to corruption.303  However, under Jef-
ferson’s ward republic, there are restrictions on size and space.
Jefferson understood the difficultly of establishing “pure republics”
across the United States, especially in areas with a higher concentra-
tion of people.304  According to Jefferson “[r]epresentation could be
used to create a large republic so there would be small, pure republics
and a large, less pure republic based on representation.”305  The resto-
ration of the republic is to restore the reengagement, empowerment,
and accountability of citizens in concerns that are relevant to the com-
munity and nation.306  Ward republics would restore integrity to the
government and instill in future generations the conviction that the
only way to secure democratic rights is through exercising civic
duties.307
E. Reforming Commissioner Elections
The best way to address the issues of lack of transparency and
corruption with ANCs is to first reform the way they become commis-
sioners.  ANCs are chosen in nonpartisan elections in each ward, ad-
302. Id. at 8.
303. Id. at 12-13.
304. Community Involvement and the Ward Republic, PER-FIDEM, http://www.per-fidem.org/
codex/wardrepublic.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
305. See id. To get a better idea of what Jefferson had in mind in terms of size and number of
wards, Jefferson proposed an education bill in 1779, as well as an education plan for William and
Mary. See Frank Shuffelton, Thomas Jefferson and the People’s Government, JEFFERSON LEG-
ACY FOUND., http://www.jeffersonlegacy.org/Winter2003.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
The 1779 bill proposed a three-tiered system of public education from primary schools,
through what we would know as high schools, and finally to college.  Because the Col-
lege of William and Mary already existed, the Bill focused on the primary and secon-
dary levels. Jefferson’s Bill proposed that each county would be divided into “hundreds
. . . so as that they may contain a convenient number of children to make up a school,
and be of such convenient size that all the children within each hundred may daily
attend the school to be established therein.” Jefferson’s deliberate use of the term
“hundreds” echoes the Anglo-Saxon term for such a political sub-division because he
along with many of his contemporaries believed that English liberties —and by exten-
sion American liberties –- were rooted in Anglo-Saxon political life. Moreover, in these
“hundreds” we see the origins of Jefferson’s later conception of “ward republics,” polit-
ical units so small that “every citizen, can attend, when called on, and act in person.”
(Political Writings, 212)   Just as the schools were envisioned as a tiered system, so the
ward republics were the smallest, most intimate scenes of political life and the basis for
state republics and the national republic.
Id.
306. HART, supra note 298, at 10.
307. Id.
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ministered by the D.C. Board of Election and Ethics.308  Often,
elected officials are more prone to lean towards their own self-inter-
est, so to remedy this, the ANC elections could take the form of a
caucus.  Caucuses, like that of Iowa,309 are more community-ori-
ented.310  This communal political experience allows for a platform
where the community can engage and discuss issues of concern before
casting a vote.311
Unlike ANCs current system of write-ins, those interested in the
position would have to attend these caucuses being held in their re-
spective single-member districts and discuss issues.312  If commissioner
elections for ANCs were done in this manner, more responsible and
trustworthy officials would be in office, and when issues such as local
corruption arise, there would be opportunities for accountability.  The
idea is that when small groups of people come together to share a
common interest, it is easier to hold one another accountable.  This
format assists potential candidates in becoming familiar with the is-
sues that are relevant to the community, and the community can feel
engaged and involved in policy-making.
F. Extending ANCs to Public Education
Once the ANC elections are reformed, one way to imagine how
ANCs would function as a ward republic is with public education.
The public school system is linked to community solidarity: “School
reform initiatives that encourage kids to attend smaller, more commu-
nal schools may have the unintended result of increasing both student
308. See Salsich, supra note 287, at 719.  The only qualifications to have your name on the
ballot for commissioner are that you must live in a single-member district for at least sixty days
prior to the election, be a registered voter for the District of Columbia, and file an “Affirmation
of Write-In Candidacy” if you decide to run as a write-in. ADVISORY NEIGHBORHOOD COMMIS-
SIONS, http://anc.dc.gov/page/anc-elections (last visited Nov. 23, 2012).
309. Iowa has 1,774 districts, which all either meet at local churches, schools, or other public
venues to discuss issues before voting.  Only those who are registered party members may attend
the caucus, so those who are not registered are not allowed to attend the caucus. David Sessions,
How the Iowa Caucuses Work: Delegates, Secret Ballots, More Details, DAILY BEAST (Jan.1,
2012, 11:13 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/01/01/how-the-iowa-caucuses-work-
delegates-secret-ballots-more-details.html.  On its face, it may seem absurd that people are ex-
cluded because they are not registered party members, but this could potentially provide encour-
agement to others.  If the issues are that important, then more than likely you will register and
attend the caucus.
310. Dean Praetorius, What Is a Caucus? How the Iowa Caucus Works, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 30, 2012, 12:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/03/what-is-a-caucus-iowa-
2012_n_1181069.html.
311. Id.
312. See id.
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and parental involvement in clubs, classroom activities, governing
bodies, and education lobbying groups.  In this way, such education
reform could be an engine of civic reengagement.”313  A current local
issue in D.C. is its public school system.  Recently, D.C. Public School
Chancellor (DCPS) Kaya Henderson announced that she will be con-
solidating twenty schools across six wards for the 2013-14 school
year.314  The reason for the consolidation is due, in large part, to un-
derenrollment and funding.315  DCPS Chancellor Henderson has
asked for community engagement in determining how to execute the
consolidation plan.316  This is the perfect opportunity for the Advisory
Neighborhood Commission to step up and either assist or advocate on
behalf of the parents so that we can be sure that they are a part of this
call to action.317
Although the rights revolution emphasized the role of education
and the need for social equalization, over time schools have lost their
local identities.318  Since 1940, the number of local school districts has
contracted by eighty-seven percent primarily due to consolidation.319
This phenomenon provides good reason as to why D.C. residents
should answer the Chancellor’s call and become proactive in this new
consolidation plan.  The role of education must be put back into our
communities.  As Hart correctly puts it, “[A] central purpose of re-
publican government [is] to empower the citizen to participate in the
affairs of the local polis both as a forum for constructive service and as
a forum for conflict resolution.”320  It is the citizen’s duty to assist in
resolving this consolidation issue.  Many parents view the federal gov-
ernment’s control in education as the reason for the decline in the
313. HART, supra note 298, at 188.
314. See D.C. PUB. SCHS. DCPS Invites Community Feedback on Proposed List of School
Consolidations, (Nov. 13, 2012), http://dcps.dc.gov/DCPS/About+DCPS/Press+Releases+and+
Announcements/Press+Releases/DCPS+Invites+Community+Feedback+on+Proposed+List+
of+School+Consolidations [hereinafter DCPS].
The portfolio of schools in DCPS will shift dramatically after these consolidations.  The
average school enrollment will increase to 432 students, up from 376. Overall building
utilization rate will be 84 percent, an increase from 72 percent. Only 26 elementary
schools will have fewer than 350 students, instead of 41. 1,700 additional students will
have the opportunity to attend school in a modernized building.
Id.
315. Id.  DCPS allocates funds based on enrollment.  Schools that are under-enrolled do not
receive adequate funds to sustain a quality education.
316. Id.
317. See Salsich, supra note 287, at 732-33 (discussing the two main types of participation
alternatives).
318. HART, supra note 298, at 189-90.
319. See id. at 190.
320. Id. at 191.
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quality of public education.321  Because of this control, the middle-
and upper-middle-class families favored the privatization of education
through charter and private schools, and home schooling.322  If this
trend is to continue, the quality of public schools will continue to de-
crease.323  Because public education is central to our communities,
civic engagement in education would help restore the local identities
of our communities.324
Currently, D.C. ANCs may be described as passive recommend-
ers, in that they make recommendations without pushing for more di-
rect civic engagement.  This approach taken by ANCs would have to
be reformed so that they are targeting community members to be ac-
tively engaged and responsive.  Two potential participation alterna-
tives are the advocacy/confrontation approach and the collaborative/
consensus building approach.  Under the advocacy/confrontation ap-
proach, the ANC commissioner would serve as an activist tasked with
uniting the community around a particular issue and advocating on
their behalf to the government.325  Under the collaborative/consensus
building approach, commissioners would focus on neighborhood or-
ganization so that eventually these groups of people may function on
their own.326  Regardless of the approach taken by ANCs, it must be
one that focuses on how to best engage citizens.  However, this is not
to say that the two approaches may not be executed together.327  We
need more parents at these meetings led by DCPS officials and other
civic organizations pertinent to the vitality of the community.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of local government is to provide a forum for indi-
viduals to gather within their prospective communities and deliberate
about issues of common concern.328  Today, local governments have
become less transparent and less accountable for their actions.  The
best way for individuals to protect their rights is through civic engage-
ment and participation in their local government.  By reforming orga-
321. See id. at 192.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. See id.
325. See Salsich, supra note 287, at 732 (noting that this model was popularized in the 1950s
and 1960s in Chicago).
326. Id. at 733.
327. Id. at 736 (“One of the lessons of the confrontation models of the 1960s is that confron-
tation before consensus building is not likely to produce lasting improvements.”).
328. See Parlow, supra note 256, at 144-45, 153.
842 [VOL. 56:801
Social Change Requires Civic Infrastructure
nizations such as the District of Columbia’s Advisory Neighborhood
Commissions, and by shifting their focus to the engagement of the
citizens, we can hold each other accountable.  Due to the decline of
civic education in our school systems, our potential future leaders
have not been exposed to the importance of civic engagement and its
effect on democracy.  Also, the Digital Age does not have to hinder
our public discourse.  As we have seen, and as has been discussed, a
number of movements have been led by interactions on the Internet.
Although we may not be in a time where we can meet in coffee shops
or at the local community center, there are still open forums at our
disposal that we may use to reengage the public.
Education is where we start.329  In order for our citizens to par-
ticipate in the political processes, they must be educated.  As has been
discussed, DCPS is struggling to provide quality education to all of its
students.330  This is the perfect time for citizens in the D.C. area to
become involved in this issue.  The public education system is the core
of the community.  It is essential that those who live in these commu-
nities who are facing consolidation step up and become active partici-
pants in the political processes rather than passive bystanders.
In 1840, de Tocqueville described America as the following: “In
towns it is impossible to prevent men from assembling, getting excited
together and forming sudden passionate resolves.  Towns are like
great meetinghouses with all the inhabitants as members. In them the
people wield immense influence over their magistrates and often carry
their desires into execution without intermediaries.”331  This commu-
nal identity that de Tocqueville described is no longer present within
our communities.  The most effective protection of individual rights is
widespread participation in governmental affairs, and remote central-
ized government and citizen detachment is the greatest danger.332
329. See Ryan, supra note 274, at 7-8 (“A long tradition of political thought, running from
Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle through Locke, Rousseau, and the American Founders, has seen
a properly designed and delivered education as the prerequisite of a stable polity.”).
330. DCPS, supra note 314.
331. In Search of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE TOUR EX-
PLORING DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, http://www.tocqueville.org/chap5.htm (last visited Nov. 30,
2012).
332. HART, supra note 298, at 12; see Parlow, supra note 256, at 187. (“It is important to
remember that ‘[s]ince the earliest days of the Republic, the maintenance of political participa-
tion by its citizens has been viewed as essential to the preservation of free government.’”).
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INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the past several decades, economic inequality
in the United States has grown rapidly.  Not only is economic inequal-
ity in this country at its highest level since the years before the Great
Depression,1 but the United States also continues to be among the
most economically unequal countries in the industrialized world.
While the very affluent in this country continue to increase their share
of the country’s income and wealth, the middle class has been
squeezed, and record numbers of Americans find themselves in
poverty.2
1. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY 5 (2012).
2. Kevin Fagan, Federal Funding Cut Hurts S.F. Food Bank, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 9, 2012),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Federal-funding-cut-hurts-S-F-Food-Bank-3929513.php
(indicating that 49.1 million Americans are now in poverty).
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Not only is there dramatic economic inequality in the United
States at this time, but there has also been reduced intergenerational
economic mobility in the United States.  This increasingly has resulted
in what social scientists refer to as stickiness, at the top and bottom of
the income distribution, which means that it is increasingly likely that
children born to very affluent and very poor families will replicate
their parents’ economic status when they become adults.  Further-
more, though measuring economic mobility is an inherently back-
wards-looking type of analysis as one must compare the economic
status of people who have been adults for a long period of time to the
economic status of their parents during a similarly long period of their
adult years, there are many reasons to believe that children in our
society today will experience less economic mobility than their parents
did.
Without question, millions of Americans of all races have suf-
fered economically over the course of the past several years.  Never-
theless, by one measure, African Americans and Hispanics as a whole
were downwardly mobile and net losers in terms of their income sta-
tus during the period of 2001-2011, while whites were net winners.3
Not only has the Great Recession hit African Americans and Hispan-
ics particularly hard economically but also the economic decline for
these groups started several years before the official beginning of this
recession.4  A review of any number of economic measures including
wealth,5 unemployment,6 and poverty7 yields evidence of this down-
3. Fewer, Poorer, Gloomier: The Lost Decade of the Middle Class, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 12
(Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/08/pew-social-trends-lost-decade-of-
the-middle-class.pdf (determining net winners and losers in terms of changes in income status
since 2001 by analyzing the difference in a group’s percentage in the upper-income category
from the change in a group’s percentage in the lower-income category).
4. See, e.g., Kitty Calavita, The Struggle for Racial Justice: The Personal, the Political, and
. . . the Economic, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 495, 498 (2010); Richard Lempert, A Personal Odyssey
Toward a Theme: Race and Equality in the United States: 1948-2009, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 431,
442-44 (2010).
5. See infra notes 39 to 47 and accompanying text.
6. In 2011, the white unemployment rate was 7.9 percent; the black unemployment rate
was 15.8 percent; and the Hispanic unemployment rate was 11.5 percent. U.S. BUREAU OF LA-
BOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND
ETHNICITY, 2011, at 41 (2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsrace2011.pdf.  In contrast,
in 2001, the white unemployment rate was 4.2%, the black unemployment rate was 8.6%, and
the Hispanic unemployment rate was 6.6 percent. Id.
7. In 2011, 12.8% of whites lived in poverty; 27.6% of blacks lived in poverty; and 25.3%
of Hispanics lived in poverty. People in Poverty by Selected Characteristics: 2010 and 2011, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (2011), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/incpovhlth/2011/table3.
pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
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ward mobility for African Americans and Hispanics relative to white
Americans.
Part I presents a summary of the overall trends in income and
wealth inequalities in the United States.  This section also establishes
that the United States is more economically unequal than most other
industrialized countries.  Part II establishes that as economic inequal-
ity in the United States has increased dramatically, intergenerational
economic mobility has fallen.  As a result, the likelihood that those
born to the more affluent will be affluent themselves as adults and
that those born into poverty will remain in poverty when they become
adults has increased considerably over the course of the past few de-
cades.  Part III establishes the fact, notwithstanding the Occupy Wall
Street movement, that there has been very little sustained, broad-
based protest in the United States in recent decades pertaining to is-
sues of economic fairness and equality.  This section identifies some of
the factors, which suggest that it is unlikely that a mass social move-
ment will emerge and endure over a long period of time to address
economic inequality and poverty.  Part IV claims that greater eco-
nomic equality in the United States is achievable only if policymakers
make fundamental changes in certain key areas of public policy.  Al-
though it is unlikely that the legal system can serve as a primary tool
to reduce economic inequality in any substantial way, there are a
number of legal strategies and initiatives that lawyers and legal orga-
nizations, including law schools, could pursue in an effort to increase
economic equality and security for many Americans, including for
many persons of color.
I. OVERALL TRENDS IN INCOME AND
WEALTH INEQUALITIES
Since the mid-1970s, income inequality in the United States has
grown dramatically.  Growth in income inequality has been particu-
larly pronounced at the very top of the income distribution.  Though
the distribution of income has become more and more unequal, at
present, wealth is even more highly concentrated among those at the
top of the wealth distribution than income is among the highest in-
come earners.  Further, in our country there are persistent and dra-
matic racial income and wealth gaps, though the racial wealth gap is
particularly galling.  Furthermore, the economic developments in our
country over the past several decades that have resulted in dramatic
income and wealth inequalities appear to have resulted in much less
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intergenerational economic mobility in the past quarter century than
was the case in the aftermath of World War II through the 1970s.  This
decreased mobility calls into question a fundamental underpinning of
the notion of the American dream.
A. Trends in Income Inequality
Between the end of World War II and the mid-1970s, family in-
come roughly doubled in inflation-adjusted terms for families,
whether these families were at the top, middle, or bottom of the in-
come distribution.8  To this end, according to the United States Cen-
sus Bureau (Census Bureau), between 1947 and 1975, family income
in the bottom four quintiles of the income distribution increased be-
tween 90.3% and 99.2%, while family income for those in the top five
percent of the income distribution increased by 85.5%.9  As will be
discussed below, this general pattern of equitable income accumula-
tion during this period masks significant income earning gaps along
racial and gender lines.
The period of general shared prosperity for the majority of
American families came to an end beginning in the early- to mid-
1970s.10  By the end of the 1970s, a pattern began to emerge in which
those in the lower to middle rungs of the income ladder experienced
only modest income growth while those at the top of the income dis-
tribution experienced much more rapid income growth.11  This pattern
has not only persisted over the course of the past three decades but
also has intensified quite dramatically, with only very limited
exceptions.12
Between 1975 and 2010, according to the Census Bureau, those
families in the bottom two quintiles of the income distribution exper-
ienced a 3.7% and 13.2% increase in family income, respectively.13  In
8. Chad Stone et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, CTR.
ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, 7–8, http://www.cbpp.org/files/11-28-11pov.pdf (last modi-
fied Oct. 23, 2012).
9. Percentage Change in Family Income 1947-1975 and 1975-2010, RUSSELL SAGE FOUND.,
[hereinafter Percentage Change] http://www.russellsage.org/sites/all/files/chartbook/real-median-
individual-income-by-race-large.jpg (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
10. Id.
11. Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007, CONG. BUDGET
OFF. 2-3 (Oct. 2011), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/10-25-House
holdIncome.pdf.
12. U.S. Cong., Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007,
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 17 (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/at
tachments/10-25-HouseholdIncome.pdf.
13. Percentage Change, supra note 9.
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contrast, families in the second highest quintile of the income distribu-
tion experienced a 39.3% increase in their incomes, while families in
the top five percent of the income distribution experienced a 56.7%
increase in their incomes.14  Using more comprehensive and sophisti-
cated measures of income,15 the Congressional Budget Office’s
(CBO) analysis of after-tax household income growth between 1979
and 2007 is consistent with the Census Bureau’s analysis of income
growth for the period between 1975 and 2010 in terms of demonstrat-
ing that income inequality in this country grew sharply during this pe-
riod.  However, the CBO’s analysis provides some finer grain analysis.
Although the CBO report indicates that income for households in
the lowest quintile grew somewhat more than the Census Bureau re-
port indicates, the CBO report demonstrates that income at the very
top of the income distribution grew at an incredible rate.  To this end,
the CBO report indicates that after-tax income growth for the lowest
quintile was 18%, which is almost 15% higher than the Census Bu-
reau’s analysis of income growth—using a different methodology to
calculate income—for the lowest quintile.16  Further, the CBO report
demonstrates that after-tax income for those households in the 81st
through 99th percentiles grew by 65% between 1979 and 2007.  Much
more dramatically, after-tax income for those households in the top
1% of the income distribution grew by 275%, which means that
household income for these extremely high income earners nearly
quadrupled between 1975 and 2007.17
Furthermore, although federal taxes and government transfer
payments are progressive in the United States, in the past several
years they have had only a very small impact on reducing the concen-
tration of income.  For example, in 2007, the top 1% of households in
terms of income received 21% of overall income before federal taxes
and transfer payments; these households received 17% of overall in-
come after federal taxes and transfers.  Similarly, the top 81 to 99% of
households in terms of income received 39% of overall income before
federal taxes and transfer payments; these households received 35%
of overall income after federal taxes and transfers.  Furthermore, due
14. Id.
15. Stone et al., supra note 8, at 8.
16. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 12, at 3.
17. Id.  The CBO is able to provide a better analysis of income at the top of the income
distribution in part because the Census Bureau’s information is more limited information with
respect to income at the top of the income distribution for both methodological and policy rea-
sons.  Stone et al., supra note 8, at 3.
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to changes in federal tax law and in government transfer programs
over the course of the past several years, federal taxes and federal
transfer programs now have less of a redistributive effect on market
income18 than federal taxes and transfers had on redistributing market
income in 1979.  These developments have resulted in increased in-
come inequality.19
As compared to other major industrialized countries, the United
States has one of the highest levels of income inequality after account-
ing for the redistributive effect of federal taxes and government trans-
fers.20  In fact, though a couple of industrialized countries, such as
Belgium and France, have a higher degree of pretax income inequality
than the United States, after-tax income inequality in the United
States is much higher than it is in most other industrialized countries
including Belgium and France because taxation in this country redis-
tributes far less income than it does in most other industrialized coun-
tries.21  Furthermore, a cross-country study of income inequality from
the mid-1970s to 2000 revealed that in the United States income ine-
quality continued to rise from the mid-1970s through 2000.22  In con-
trast, in most other industrialized countries, levels of inequality rose
for a number of years but then slowed in the latter years of the period
under study.23  Furthermore, the United States ranks amongst the de-
veloped countries with the most unequal distributions of income in
part because the federal government in the United States provides far
less government support to its citizens with respect to public services,
higher education, pensions, and other forms of support than do gov-
ernments in other developed countries.24
18. Market income includes income earned from labor, business income, capital gains, capi-
tal income, and other sources of income including any income an individual receives in retire-
ment in consideration of past services. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 12, at II.
19. See id.
20. Linda Levine, The U.S. Income Distribution and Mobility: Trends and International
Comparisons, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 9-10 (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42
400.pdf.
21. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION
SYSTEM 257–58 (2007).
22. Levine, supra note 20, at 9.
23. Id.
24. Tami Luhby, Global Income Inequality: Where the U.S. Ranks, CNN MONEY (Nov. 8,
2011, 3:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/08/news/economy/global_income_inequality/index
.htm.  Other reasons that account for the exceptionally high level of income inequality in the
United States than in other developed countries are the comparatively steeper decline in union
membership in the United States and the greater restrictions that countries in Europe place
upon executive compensation which results in lower levels of executive compensation in Europe
than in the United States. Id.
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B. Trends in Wealth Inequality
Family wealth, also known as net worth, is the gross assets a fam-
ily owns minus the financial liabilities the family has incurred.25  As-
sets fall into two categories: consumable assets, which include equity
in homes and vehicles; and financial assets, such as stocks, bonds, mu-
tual funds, 401(k) accounts, rental property, the equity in a business,
and assets one owns that are held by a bank or other financial institu-
tion.26  Liabilities may be secured, such as is the case with mortgages
on real estate one owns or vehicle loans, or unsecured, such as credit
card debt or student loans.27
The discourse about economic inequality in our society tends to
predominately focus upon income inequality.  Nevertheless, wealth in-
equality in the United States is substantially more concentrated than
income inequality.28  Given that there is substantial overlap between
those at the top of the income and wealth distributions, overall eco-
nomic inequality as measured by the economic resources under the
control of the very well-off is greater than one might glean from ana-
lyzing income or wealth inequality in isolation.
In 2007, those in the top 1% of the income distribution received
21% of all income; however, the top 1% of the wealth distribution
held 35% of wealth in this country.29  More broadly, though the top
10% of the income distribution received 47% of income in 2007, the
top 10% of the wealth distribution in 2007 held 74% of our country’s
wealth.30  Although these data clearly demonstrate that the distribu-
tion of wealth is much more skewed in favor of the very wealthy than
income is skewed in favor of those at the top of the income distribu-
tion, income inequality in this country has been increasing much more
rapidly than wealth inequality.31
25. Stone et al., supra note 8, at 10.
26. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 106 (1997).
27. Twenty-to-One: Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites, Blacks and Hispan-
ics, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 7 (July 26, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT-
Wealth-Report_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf.
28. Stone et al., supra note 8, at 10.
29. Id. at 12.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 10.
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C. Racial Income and Wealth Gaps
1. Racial Income Gaps
In addition to substantial income and wealth inequalities among
those differentially situated on the income and wealth distributions,
significant gaps exist in terms of both distributions when one com-
pares median non-Hispanic white income with median African Amer-
ican and Hispanic incomes.  These gaps have been longstanding,
though the income gap between white households and African Ameri-
can households has remained constant since the early 1970s, while the
income gap between non-Hispanic whites and Hispanic households
has increased slightly during this same time period.  In 2011, the ratio
of black to non-Hispanic white household income was 0.58, a ratio
which has stayed constant in terms of statistical relevancy for the past
four decades.32  In comparison, the ratio in 2011 for Hispanic to non-
Hispanic white household income was 0.70, which represents a statisti-
cally significant decline from the 1972 ratio of 0.74.33  For 2011, black
real median individual income was 79% of white real median individ-
ual income, and Hispanic real median individual income was 72% of
white real median individual income.34
Non-Hispanic white households, African American households,
and Hispanic households each had lower household incomes in 2011
than each of these groups had just before the 2001 recession.  Even so,
the 7% decline in non-Hispanic white household income during this
period was lower than the decline was for the other groups.  In con-
trast, African American households have experienced a 16.8% decline
in household income during this period, which was by far the largest
decline for any racial or ethnic group during this period.35
2. Racial Wealth Gaps
More than fifteen years ago, Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro
published a groundbreaking book that attempted to reframe an im-
portant aspect of the economic debate on racial inequality by shining
the light on the vast racial wealth gap between African Americans and
32. Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United
States: 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 9 (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-
243.pdf.
33. Id.
34. Percentage Change, supra note 9.
35. DeNavas-Walt et al., supra note 32, at 8.
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white Americans.36  Using one measure of wealth, Oliver and Shapiro
demonstrated that the median white household in 1988 had approxi-
mately twelve times the net worth of the median black household.37
Given that most academic study and policy analysis about economic
inequality previously had tended to focus on the significant and persis-
tent income inequality between African Americans and whites, it ap-
peared that Oliver and Shapiro’s book could serve as a catalyst in
fundamentally transforming the academic study of and public policy
responses to racial economic inequality.  In fact, the book received a
very positive reception from a diverse group of readers, including
from some people and groups in important positions of power in cer-
tain sectors.  For example, the Ford Foundation has provided support
to a number of individuals and organizations that have been working
to address the racial wealth gap in one way or another.  Among these
organizations is the Insight Center for Community and Economic De-
velopment, which has developed an ongoing initiative called the Clos-
ing the Racial Wealth Gap Initiative.38
In spite of all of the efforts that academics, foundations, nonprofit
organizations, government, and others have made over the past fifteen
years or so to narrow the racial wealth gap, a gap that was already
quite alarming fifteen years ago, the racial wealth gap has become
dramatically larger during this period.  By one measure, the white-to-
black median wealth ratio increased from eleven to one in 2005 to
twenty to one in 2009.39  By this same measure, the white-to-Hispanic
median wealth ratio increased from seven to one in 2005 to eighteen
to one in 2009.40
The black-white and Hispanic-white racial and ethnic wealth gaps
have been increasing in large part as a result of the different exper-
iences these different racial and ethnic groups have had with respect
to homeownership over the course of the past several years.  Over the
course of the past several years, the black homeownership rate has
declined sharply (and likely will continue to decline in the next few
years).  By 2011, the gap in the black-white homeownership rate in-
creased by 2.3% over what it was in 2001 when the white homeowner-
36. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 106.
37. Id. at 86.
38. See Closing the Racial Wealth Gap Initiative, INSIGHT CTR. FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV.,
http://www.insightcced.org/communities/Closing-RWG.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
39. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 27, at 14.
40. Id.
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ship rate was 26.6% higher than the black homeownership rate.41  The
Hispanic homeownership rate has also declined steadily since 2005
when it reached 49.5% (a record high), and the current Hispanic-
white gap in homeownership rates stands at 26.9%, which is virtually
unchanged from 2001.42  Though steeply declining values for owner-
occupied homes account for the greatest erosion in household wealth
for all racial and ethnic groups over the course of the past several
years, Hispanics have experienced the greatest loss in home equity.
From 2005 to 2009, Hispanic homeowners lost 51% of their home eq-
uity, as measured by the median value of home equity for Hispanic
homeowners during this period.43  In contrast, African Americans lost
23% of their home equity, and white Americans lost 18% as measured
by the median value of home equity for these groups during this
period.44
More broadly, wealth gaps between the median white household
and the median African American and Hispanic households increased
dramatically between 2005 and 2009, despite the fact that the median
white household lost nearly $22,000 in net worth during this period,
which represented a 16% drop in white household wealth.45  The
wealth gaps increased because African American and Hispanic house-
holds experienced a far greater percentage reduction in their net
worth.  African American households lost more than $6,400 in net
worth between 2005 and 2009, and this loss represented a 53% decline
in net worth for these households during this period.46  Hispanic
households lost more than $12,000 in net worth between 2005 and
2009, and this loss represented a 66% decline in net worth for these
households during this period.47
41. In terms of homeownership, the black homeownership rate was 44.9% in 2011, which
represented nearly a three percentage point drop from the 47.7% black homeownership rate in
2001.  Homeownership Rates by Race and Ethnicity of Householder: 1994 to 2011, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/annual11/ann11t_22.xls tbl.22 (last modified Sept.
21, 2012, 4:00 PM).  The black homeownership rate has been declining steadily from the 2004,
49.1% black homeownership rate, which represented the high-water mark for black homeowner-
ship in this country’s history. See id.  In addition, the last time the black homeownership rate
was below 45% was in 1997 when it was 44.8%. See id.  By contrast, the white homeownership
rate was 73.8% in 2011 and in 2001 it was 74.3%. Id.  In addition, the white homeownership rate
in 2011 was 23.4% higher than the 46.9% Hispanic homeownership rate. See id.
42. See id.
43. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 27, at 2.
44. See id. at 4.
45. Id. at 14–15.
46. Id. at 15.
47. Id.
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A significant reason black and Hispanic households lost substan-
tially more wealth in percentage terms between 2005 and 2009 is due
to the fact that both black and Hispanic families derived much more
of their net worth from home equity in 2005 than did white families.
In 2005, black households derived 59% of their net worth from home
equity, and Hispanic households drew 65% of their net worth from
home equity.48  In contrast, though home equity was the largest asset
by far for white households, it accounted for 44% of net worth for
white households.  In short, in analyzing comparative data on mean
net worth for households, black and Hispanic households had asset
portfolios that had a much higher percentage of home equity from
ownership of a primary residence and were much less diversified in
terms of financial assets such as stocks, mutual funds, IRAs, and Ke-
ogh accounts.49  As a result, the sharp decline in real estate values in
this country from 2005 to 2009 had an especially large and negative
impact on the net worth of black and Hispanic households.  The fact
that many other types of assets fared much better than real estate did
during this period did not cushion the loss black and Hispanic house-
holds experienced in their real estate holdings as much as it did for
white households given that white households had much more diversi-
fied asset portfolios than either black or Hispanic households.
In analyzing the data that the government first began collecting
on household wealth in the early 1980s, it becomes apparent that,
through 2009, white households and African American and Hispanic
households have had very different experiences in terms of being able
to build and maintain wealth, despite the fact each group lost wealth
between 2005 and 2009.  Although, as discussed above, white house-
holds experienced a significant decline in their wealth between 2005
and 2009, white household wealth in 2009 was substantially higher
than it was for many if not most years between 1984 and 2009.50  In
contrast, black and Hispanic households possessed less wealth in 2009
than in any year since the Census Bureau began publishing data on
household wealth in 1984.51  Further, not only were the 2009 ratios of
white household wealth to black and Hispanic household wealth re-
spectively higher than they ever had been based upon the data the
Census Bureau began collecting on household wealth in the early
48. Id. at 24.
49. Id. at 25.
50. Id. at 29.
51. Id.
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1980s, but they were also about double the ratios for the pre-2009
years the Pew Research Center used in its 1984-2009 time series
analysis.52
II. AS INEQUALITY HAS RISEN, ECONOMIC
MOBILITY HAS DECLINED
A. Trends in Economic Mobility in the United States
Academics—mostly in the fields of sociology and economics—
have long studied intergenerational mobility.  Sociologists have
tended to focus upon mobility in terms of status as measured by com-
paring the occupations (or some other similar indicator of status) of
parents with the occupations of their children.53  Economists, on the
other hand, have primarily measured mobility in terms of income by
using a statistic known as intergenerational elasticity in earnings,
“which is the percentage difference in earnings in the child’s genera-
tion associated with the percentage difference in the parental genera-
tion.”54  In terms of this statistic, there is more economic mobility in
countries with lower measures of intergenerational elasticity.  Never-
theless, the academic literature on the relationship between economic
inequality and intergenerational mobility is somewhat underdevel-
oped, although there appears to be growing academic interest in stud-
ying this relationship.55
Despite high levels of income inequality in this country, Ameri-
cans do not support the redistribution of market income by the gov-
ernment to the degree that citizens in other Western democracies
support such governmental redistribution.56  In fact, in a twenty-
seven-country study on social attitudes, only 33% of Americans
agreed with the view that the government has a responsibility to help
reduce income inequalities, which resulted in the United States being
the country in the study with the lowest percentage of its citizens hold-
52. See id.
53. Miles Corak, Inequality from Generation to Generation: The United States in Compari-
son, in THE ECONOMICS OF INEQUALITY, POVERTY, AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
109 (Robert S. Rycroft ed., forthcoming Mar. 2013).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Dan Andrews & Andrew Leigh, More Inequality, Less Social Mobility, 16 AP-
PLIED ECONS. LETTERS 1489, 1489 (2008), http://econpapers.repec.org/article/tafapeclt/default16.
htm.
56. Isabel Sawhill & Sara McLanahan, OPPORTUNITY IN AM., at 3 (2006).
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ing this view.57  Such aversion to more robust redistribution can be
explained in part by a long-held conviction among most Americans
that nearly everyone in this country has the opportunity to achieve
upward economic mobility based upon their intelligence and skills ir-
respective of the economic circumstances into which they are born.58
Of course, throughout American history there have been many exam-
ples of people such as Benjamin Franklin, Henry Ford, and Oprah
Winfrey, to name just a few, who have achieved remarkable upward
mobility despite starting life in relatively humble or even impover-
ished circumstances.59  Moreover, there is strong evidence that eco-
nomic mobility in the United States in the nineteenth century and in
the early part of the twentieth century was exceptional as compared to
many other countries.60
In the years before the onset of the Great Recession, there was
little popular discussion about whether people in the United States
were as economically mobile as they had been in the decades after
World War II or whether people in the United States in fact have
greater opportunities for upward mobility than people in other com-
parable countries.61  Further, despite growing economic inequality in
the United States, many Americans believe that the overall economic
system in the United States is fair because they believe that economic
mobility in the United States is especially high as compared to other
countries.62  Nevertheless, there is fairly strong evidence that some-
57. Julia B. Isaacs, International Comparisons of Economic Mobility, in GETTING AHEAD
OR LOSING GROUND: ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 37–38 (Julie Clover & Ianna Kachoris
eds., 2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/2/econo
mic%20mobility%20sawhill/02_economic_mobility_sawhill.pdf.  The percentage of Americans
who held this view was significantly lower than the percentage of respondents who held this view
in any other country in the study as between 46% and 89% of respondents in all of the other
countries held this view. Id. at 38.
58. See Sawhill & McLanahan, supra note 56. In a twenty-seven-country study of social
attitudes, the United States had the highest percentage of respondents (69%) who agreed with
the statement that “people are rewarded for intelligence and skill” and one of the lowest per-
centage of its people (19%) who consider it essential or very important to be born into a wealthy
family in order to get ahead economically.  Isaacs, supra note 57, at 37.
59. See Trina Jones, Race and Socioeconomic Class: Examining an Increasingly Complex
Tapestry: Article: Race, Economic Class, and Employment Opportunity, 72 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 57, 58 n.7 (2009); Jason DeParle, Harder for Americans to Rise from Economy’s Lower
Rungs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1; Sawhill & McLanahan, supra note 56 at 3.
60. Joseph P. Ferrie, HISTORY LESSONS: THE END OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM? MO-
BILITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1850, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 199, 214 (2005).
61. But cf. DeParle, supra note 59 (showing how the discussion of American economic mo-
bility has recently moved towards center stage).
62. See Isabel Sawhill, Trends in Intergenerational Mobility, in GETTING AHEAD OR LOSING
GROUND: ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 27–29 (Julie Clover & Ianna Kachoris eds., 2008),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/2/economic%20mobil
862 [VOL. 56:849
Growing Inequality
time between 1980 and 1990, intergenerational mobility in the United
States declined sharply from the rates of intergenerational mobility
that had prevailed in this country from 1950 to 1980.63
It also appears that the decline in intergenerational economic mo-
bility is not evenly distributed.  Although many Americans continue
to experience significant upward and downward mobility, economic
opportunity for many others is very sticky, which means it may de-
pend to a significant degree upon the economic status of the family
into which one is born.  Very well-off families and poor families have
transferred their respective privileged and impoverished economic
statuses to their children over the course of the past few decades at a
much higher rate than is the case for middle-income families in which
there has not been a strong link between parents’ income and the
earnings of their children.64  To this end, a 2008 study concluded that
42% of children born into families in the bottom fifth of the income
distribution remained in the bottom fifth as adults, and that 39% of
children born into the top fifth of the income distribution remained in
the top fifth as adults.65
Although traditional measures of economic mobility are back-
wards-looking, which means they cannot be used to predict the eco-
nomic mobility for today’s generation of children,66 there is great
cause for concern for the prospects of economic mobility for today’s
generation of children in the United States.  To this end, some re-
searchers have demonstrated that there is significantly less intergener-
ational economic mobility in countries that have comparatively
greater economic inequality than countries that have less economic
ity%20sawhill/02_economic_mobility_sawhill.pdf; DeParle, supra note 59.  In fact, there are
some economists who argue that countries throughout the world depend economically upon so-
called cutthroat capitalist countries such as the United States that tolerate great economic ine-
quality.  They argue that the form of capitalism found in the United States provides the proper
incentives for innovation and technological breakthroughs, and that in turn, such innovation and
technological breakthroughs fuel global economic growth that in turns benefits other countries
including countries that have a more so-called cuddly form of capitalism. DARON ACEMOGLU ET
AL., CAN’T WE ALL BE MORE LIKE SCANDINAVIANS? ASYMMETRIC GROWTH AND INSTITU-
TIONS IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 1–4 (2012), available at http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/
acemoglu/paper.
63. Bhashkar Mazumder, Is Intergenerational Economic Mobility Lower Now Than in the
Past?, CHI. FED LETTER (2012).
64. Corak, supra note 53, at 116; DeParle, supra note 59.
65. ISABEL SAWHILL, OVERVIEW, IN GETTING AHEAD OR LOSING GROUND: ECONOMIC
MOBILITY IN AMERICA 4 (Julie Clover & Ianna Kachoris eds., 2008), available at  http://www.
brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/2/economic%20mobility%20sawhill/02_econo
mic_mobility_sawhill.pdf.
66. Mazumder, supra note 63.
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inequality.67  One reason that there may be less economic mobility in
countries with high income and wealth inequalities is that parents who
are better off economically are often able to make investments of
money and time to improve their children’s development of forms of
human capital that the market values than are parents who are less
well-off.
An exceptionally important form of human capital is education.
Despite the great potential that education can have in terms of pro-
moting social and economic mobility, in the United States, “the aver-
age effect of education at all levels is to reinforce rather than
compensate for the differences associated with family background and
the many home-based advantages and disadvantages that children and
adolescents bring with them into the classroom.”68  The public K-12
school systems in the United States provide at best “only a modest
boost to poor and minority children’s chances of moving up the eco-
nomic ladder.”69
In addition, the way the labor market in a given country rewards
people based upon their educational attainment can have a significant
impact upon economic mobility.  Therefore, to the extent that labor
market returns increase in a particular country for those with more or
better education than for others with less or inferior education, par-
ents will have an incentive to invest more in their children’s educa-
tion.70  If there is significant economic inequality in a given country,
the parents with both the incentive and the wherewithal to make
greater investments in their children’s education inevitably will be the
wealthier parents.71  Further, if the wealthier parents do increase their
investments as one rationally would expect, economic mobility is
likely to decline in that country unless public policies with respect to
education sufficiently counteract market forces by providing a net
benefit to the economically disadvantaged as opposed to those who
are not so disadvantaged.72
In the United States, wealthier parents have in fact been increas-
ing their investments of time and money into their children’s educa-
67. Corak, supra note 53, at 114–15; Andrews & Leigh, supra note 55, at 8–10.
68. Sawhill, supra note 65, at 6.
69. Id. at 98.
70. Gary Solon, A Model of Intergenerational Mobility Variation Over Time and Place, in
GENERATIONAL INCOME MOBILITY IN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE 37, 41 (Miles Corak ed.,
2004).
71. CORAK, supra note 53, at 114.
72. Id.
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tion over the course of the past number of decades.73  As of yet, public
policies in the area of education have not benefited disadvantaged
families in any substantial way to counteract the increased invest-
ments that wealthier parents have made in their children’s education.
In fact, there has been a reduction in the commitment to provide re-
sources to poor and minority students in public kindergarten through
12th grade school systems over the course of the past three decades or
so.74  Further, over the course of the past several years, the share of
financial aid benefitting low-income undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents has been falling “as needs-based assistance has been increas-
ingly replaced by merit-based aid.”75
Not only has the education system in the United States done little
to improve economic mobility in the country over the course of the
past few decades, it appears that the education system may well be
contributing to growing income and wealth inequalities.  Without sig-
nificant reforms, this pattern may persist for generations.  A few ex-
amples make this point.  At a time in this country’s history in which a
person’s ability to attain economic security depends more and more
upon the extent to which one has high levels of educational achieve-
ment, a wide achievement gap has opened between the rich and the
poor.  To this end, the gap in test scores sorted by family income has
73. Robert Haveman & Timothy Smeeding, The Role of Higher Education in Social Mobil-
ity, OPPORTUNITY IN AM.,125, 128 (2006); see also Jason DeParle, Leap to College Often Ends in
a Hard Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2012, at A1.
Certainly as the payoff to education has grown . . . affluent families have invested more
in it.  They have tripled the amount by which they outspend low-income families on
enrichment activities like sports, music lessons and summer camps . . . [and] upper-
income parents, especially fathers, have increased their child-rearing time, while the
presence of fathers in low-income homes has declined.
DeParle, supra note 73, at A1.
74. See THE EDUCATION TRUST, The Funding Gap 2005: Low-Income and Minority Stu-
dents Shortchanged by Most States 2 (2005) (“Across the country, $907 less is spent per student
in the highest-poverty districts than in the most affluent districts. . . . Across the country, $614
less is spent on students in the districts educating the most students of color as compared to the
districts educating the fewest students of color.”); William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When “Ade-
quate” Isn’t: The Retreat From Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56
EMORY L.J. 545, 571 (2006); New Data from U.S. Department of Education Highlights Educa-
tional Inequities Around Teacher Experience, Discipline and High School Rigor, U.S. DEPT.
EDUC. (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/new-data-us-department-educa
tion-highlights-educational-inequities-around-teache.  The data on the funding gaps between
rich and poor students actually understate the amount by which poor students are being short-
changed relative to wealthier students given that those who work on education policy commonly
employ a forty percent adjustment in calculating the financial resources students who grow up in
poverty need to achieve the same outcomes as wealthier students. THE EDUCATION TRUST,
supra at 74.
75. Haveman & Smeeding, supra note 73, at 137.
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grown by thirty to forty percent for children who were born in 2001, as
compared to children who were born in 1976.76
There are also huge gaps in educational attainment by socioeco-
nomic status that make achieving greater economic mobility in this
country much more unlikely.  Based upon one measure of family in-
come to family needs, 71% of youth from families in the top quartile
of the “family permanent income-to-needs” distribution attended col-
lege as compared to just 22% of youth from families in the bottom
quartile.77  Further, there was a 35 point gap in college graduation
rates between families in the top and bottom quartiles of the distribu-
tion with only 6-9% of youth from families at the bottom of the distri-
bution managing to graduate from college.78  Additionally, one study
divided all four-year colleges and universities in the United States into
four tiers. The study revealed that 74% of students in the entering
classes for the 146 colleges and universities in the top tier were from
families in the highest socioeconomic quartile and that just 3% of stu-
dents in the entering classes for these colleges and universities were
from the lowest quartile.79
B. Assessing Claims of American Exceptionalism in Terms
of Mobility
Over the course of the past two decades, a significant number of
academic studies have undermined the conventional wisdom that peo-
ple in the United States enjoy a particularly high degree of economic
mobility as compared to people in many countries that are otherwise
significantly comparable to the United States.80  These studies come
to similar conclusions, regardless of whether they measure intergener-
ational mobility in terms of income or in terms of occupation.81
Though studies appear to demonstrate that Americans enjoy a reason-
76. Sean Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich and the
Poor: New Evidence and Possible Explanations, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY? RISING INEQUAL-
ITY, SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN’S LIFE CHANCES 91, 91 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murname
eds., 2011).
77. Haveman & Smeeding, supra note 73, at 131.
78. Id.; see also DeParle, supra note 73 (noting that while a greater percentage of rich and
poor Americans alike have completed college over the course of the past thirty years, there is
now a forty-five point gap between the percentage of wealthy Americans who earn a bachelor’s
degree and poor Americans who earn a bachelor’s degree and that the gap thirty years ago was
thirty-one percent).
79. Haveman & Smeeding, supra note 73, at 130.
80. DeParle, supra note 59.
81. Emily Beller & Michael Hout, Intergenerational Social Mobility: The United States in
Comparative Perspective, OPPORTUNITY IN AM., 19, (2006).
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ably high degree of occupational mobility, the United States is just
average in terms of occupational mobility when compared to other
industrialized countries.82
In addition, among many rich countries, the United States ranks
below average in terms of income mobility.83  In fact, in a study that
measured intergenerational elasticity of earnings in twenty-two coun-
tries, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States each had in-
tergenerational elasticity estimates of approximately 0.5, which
resulted in these countries being ranked as the least economically mo-
bile countries of the wealthy countries in the study.84  Not only did the
United States rank significantly below countries such as Germany, Ja-
pan, and Australia in terms of mobility, but the United States also had
an elasticity measure that was two to three times as large as the
wealthy countries with the greatest degree of mobility.85  To this end,
the estimate of intergenerational mobility in the United States was
approximately two-and-a-half times larger than the estimate for in-
tergenerational mobility in Canada.  Given how similar the two coun-
tries are otherwise in many respects, the difference in economic
mobility between the countries suggests that Canada and the United
States have among other differences some key public policies that are
very different and that the labor market in Canada operates some-
what differently from the labor market in the United States.86  These
apparent differences in public policy and in how the labor market op-
erates in the two countries appear to make Canadians significantly
more economically mobile than Americans.
C. Intergenerational Income Mobility for African Americans
Without question, there has been significant intergenerational ec-
onomic mobility within the African American community over the
course of the past several decades.  In 1940, 90% of African American
men and women lived in poverty; full-time working black men earned
just 43% of what comparable white men earned on average; and just
2% of African Americans who were aged twenty-five to twenty-nine
82. Id. at 30.  Occupational mobility is higher in Canada, Sweden, and Norway than it is in
the United States. Id. In contrast, occupational mobility is lower in West Germany, Ireland, and
Portugal than it is in the United States. Id.
83. Id.
84. Corak, supra note 53, at 111,
85. Id.
86. Id. at 120.
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were college graduates.87  By 2000, the poverty rate for African Amer-
icans was 30%; full-time working black men earned 73% of what com-
parable white men earned on average; and 15% of African Americans
who were aged twenty-five to twenty-nine were college graduates.88
Despite the fact that economic conditions have improved dramat-
ically for African Americans over the course of the past several de-
cades, African Americans remain much less upwardly mobile and
much more downwardly mobile than white Americans when one con-
siders the overall distribution of income.  In terms of cycles of poverty,
42% of black children born in the bottom tenth of the income distri-
bution remain in the bottom decile of income as adults, as compared
to 17% of comparable white children.89  African Americans also have
been unable to move up from the bottom rungs of the income distri-
bution to the top nearly as frequently as white Americans.  Fewer
than 4% of African American children born into families in the lowest
quartile of the income distribution have ended up in the top quartile
as adults, as compared to 14% of comparable white children.90  Con-
versely, black children born in the top quartile of the income distribu-
tion have just a 15% chance of remaining there as adults while
comparable white children have a 45% chance of remaining in the top
quartile in their adult years.91
III. WHY ISN’T THERE A MORE SUBSTANTIAL SOCIAL
MOVEMENT FOR GREATER ECONOMIC EQUALITY?
At first blush, one might think that the socioeconomic conditions
that millions of Americans have endured over the course of the past
few years would create the conditions for a broad-based social move-
ment and that those in such a movement would relentlessly press both
decision-makers in both the public and private sectors to take actions
that would promote greater equality.92  With the growing concentra-
tions of income and wealth, many more people in this country should
be similarly situated economically, given that the middle class has
87. Melissa S. Kearney, Intergenerational Mobility for Women and Minorities in the United
States, OPPORTUNITY IN AM., 37, 38 (2006).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 48.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 49.
92. See Bekad Mandell, Putting Theory into Practice: Using a Human Rights Framework
and Grassroots Organizing to Build a National Revolutionary Movement, 1 COLUM. J. RACE &
L. 402, 408 (2012).
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struggled considerably as the affluent have become much more afflu-
ent, which in turn has resulted in greater polarization among those in
different economic classes.93  Nevertheless, consistent with what oc-
curred during some other periods of economic crisis in this country’s
history, the overwhelming majority of Americans—including the
overwhelming majority of the disadvantaged or those who have re-
cently experienced significant downward mobility—have not taken to
the streets or otherwise participated in any social movement.94
Why do Americans appear to have little appetite for building any
mass social movement to address inequality or for challenging in some
other ways those who may be in positions to alleviate the economic
suffering millions are enduring?  Obviously, the reasons are complex.
However, this phenomenon can be explained in part by how Ameri-
cans misperceive their individual economic circumstances and how
they improperly estimate the overall distribution of income and
wealth in this country, by longstanding internal divisions within those
otherwise similarly situated in terms of class status, and by the manner
in which some with substantial economic and political power have
been able to foster conflict among middle and working class people.
A. Americans’ Perceptions and Misperceptions about Economic
Inequality and the Economy
Americans’ perception of their own economic status, as well as
the overall distribution of wealth in this country, undercuts the effort
to challenge the United States’ actual (and very high) degree of eco-
nomic inequality.  In terms of wealth distribution, professors from
Harvard Business School and Duke University’s Department of Psy-
chology have demonstrated that Americans severely underestimate
the degree of wealth inequality in this country.95  The nationally rep-
resentative group of more than 5,500 Americans who responded to
the survey that Norton and Ariely developed estimated that the
wealthiest 20% of Americans held approximately 59% of the wealth,
though the actual percentage these Americans held at the time of the
survey was approximately 84%.96  Further, in response to the question
asking these respondents for their ideal distribution of wealth, the re-
93. Id. at 408–09.
94. Id. at 409.
95. Michael I. Norton & Dan Ariely, Building a Better America – One Wealth Quintile at a
Time, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 9, 9 (2011).
96. Id. at 10.
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spondents indicated that they preferred the top 20% to hold 32% of
wealth and for those in the bottom three quintiles to receive a sub-
stantially larger share of the overall wealth than they (incorrectly) be-
lieved these groups held at the time of the survey.97
Though there were small differences between some of the differ-
ent demographic groups of respondents in terms of perceptions of the
actual distribution of wealth and construction of an ideal distribution
of wealth, there was much more consensus.  No group, whether com-
prised of those by income status, party affiliation, or gender, believed
that the wealthiest 20% of Americans held more than approximately
60% of the wealth in this country.98  Perhaps unexpectedly, there was
general consensus among the different groups of respondents that the
wealthiest 20% of Americans should hold somewhere between ap-
proximately 30% and 40% of the country’s wealth and that the bot-
tom four quintiles in the wealth distribution should hold a
substantially higher percentage of the country’s wealth than is pres-
ently the case.
Many Americans also appear to have a significant misperception
about their place in the income distribution.  A recent Gallup poll in-
dicates that 55% of Americans consider themselves to be middle class
or upper-middle class and that this percentage has remained stable
over the course of the past several years, though it was slightly higher
before the onset of the Great Recession.99  In addition, 31% of Amer-
icans identify themselves as working class, a percentage that has re-
mained almost unchanged over the course of the past eleven years.100
Though Gallup reports that the percentage of Americans who per-
ceive themselves as lower class has grown over the course of the past
decade from 3% to 10%, there is some evidence that low-income
Americans overestimate their standing in the income distribution101
and that wealthy Americans underestimate their position in the in-
come distribution.102
97. Id.
98. Id. at 11.
99. Andrew Dugan, Americans Most Likely to Say They Belong to the Middle Class, GAL-
LUP (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/159029/americans-likely-say-belong-middle-
class.aspx.
100. Id.
101. Catherine Rampell, Everyone Is “Middle Class,” Right?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011, 9:30
AM, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/everyone-is-middle-class-right/.
102. Id.
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The misperceptions Americans have about their relative eco-
nomic standing likely negatively impact support for redistributive pol-
icies. This may be the case because many lower-income people who
overestimate their earnings incorrectly believe they would benefit by
supporting regressive tax and other governmental policies favoring
wealthier Americans, and many wealthy Americans believe their taxes
are far too high based upon an incorrect belief that they are not in fact
upper income (and despite the fact that many of these wealthy Ameri-
cans believe that the wealthy as a group pay too little in taxes).103
Even to the extent that low-income Americans properly estimate their
position in the income distribution, studies indicate that many such
Americans are overly optimistic about the opportunity for upward so-
cial and economic mobility in this country, which may explain why
many of these people do not support greater redistributive policies.104
Whether or not black and Hispanic Americans severely mis-
perceive their current economic circumstances or are overly optimistic
about their future economic opportunities, they feel more optimistic
about the national economy at this time and their economic prospects
for the future than whites.  This is the case despite the fact that the
Great Recession had a particularly devastating impact upon African
Americans and Hispanics, and despite the fact that they otherwise
have been unable over the past few decades to close in any substantial
way some of the more longstanding economic gaps that have sepa-
rated them from whites.105  Despite these facts, a substantially higher
percentage of blacks and Hispanics believes that their economic con-
dition will be better in the next several years than is the case for white
Americans, and three times as many blacks and Hispanics aged eigh-
teen to thirty-four as compared to similarly situated whites believe
they will be better off economically than their parents during the
course of their lives as adults.106  Substantially higher percentages of
middle-class African Americans and Hispanics than white Americans
indicate that they are now financially better off than they were before
103. See id.; Catherine Rampell, Rich People Still Don’t Realize They’re Rich, N.Y. TIMES
Apr. 19, 2011, 1:41 PM, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/rich-people-still-dont-re
alize-theyre-rich/.
104. Norton & Ariely, supra note 95, at 12.
105. See Luke Reidenbach & Christian Weller, The State of Minorities in 2010: Minorities Are
Suffering Disproportionately in the Recession, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1 (Jan. 15, 2010), http://
www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/01/pdf/state_of_minorities.pdf.
106. See Yolanda Young, Blacks, Hispanics Find Reasons for Optimism, USA TODAY, Dec.
15, 2011, 5:36 PM, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/story/2011-12-15/blacks-
hispanics-white-economy-optimism/51980916/1.
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the onset of the Great Recession107 although substantially more mid-
dle-class African Americans and Hispanics than middle-class whites
report that they endured two or more negative economic experiences
in the past year or so.108
In terms of political activism, it seems clear that blacks and His-
panics have not been engaged in mass protests in the past several
years in any substantial way, and they show no signs of preparing to
engage in any mass protests in which they would demand greater eco-
nomic opportunities or greater economic equality in terms of class and
race.109  Given the fact that blacks and Hispanics first passed whites in
expressing greater levels of satisfaction with the national economy in
2008 and 2009 around the time of President Barack Obama’s historic
election and during the early months of his presidency,110 it will be
interesting to track whether this racial trend in reported satisfaction
with the national economy will continue after President Obama’s sec-
ond term ends, especially if our country’s next President is not a per-
son of color who receives widespread support from racial and ethnic
minorities.
B. The Role Low-Income People and the Working Class Play in
Creating Self-Reinforcing Inequality
Throughout the history of the United States, it has often been a
challenge for those in similar social or economic classes to work to-
gether in a collective way in an effort to achieve greater economic
equality for all.  Oftentimes, certain groups of working or middle-class
people have taken actions which have disadvantaged others in the
working class or middle-class.  Though one might think that during
periods of economic crisis and growing economic inequality, working
and middle-class people would be more inclined to work in solidarity
with one another to improve their collective economic circumstances,
oftentimes just the opposite has happened.  Instead of working to-
gether in solidarity during these times, many in the working and mid-
107. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 3, at 3 (reporting that just 28 percent of middle-class
whites claim they are better off now than they were before the recession while 49 percent of
middle-class blacks and 43 percent of middle-class Hispanics report that they are better off).
108. Id. at 3.
109. See Paul Taylor, Losing Wealth, Not Faith, WASH. POST, July 29, 2011, at A17.
110. See id.
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dle-class have competed against each other based upon the notion
that economic opportunities overall represent a zero sum game.111
There have been many reasons that Americans who are consid-
ered working or middle-class, in terms of their income or wealth, have
not worked together in greater numbers to achieve greater economic
equality in this country or have not supported public policies that
would provide particular benefits to those in the working or middle-
class.  I will highlight three of these reasons.  First, many people who
are working class or middle-class by economic status form a greater
sense of themselves along identity axes of race, gender, religion, geog-
raphy, sexual orientation, or culture, for example, as opposed to along
economic lines.112  Second, the working class is segmented in impor-
tant ways, which often creates economic incentives for different
groups of people in the working class to be in conflict with other
groups of working-class people.113  Third, and consistent with the sec-
ond reason just noted, racial and ethnic conflict often has resulted in
many working-class people of one race or ethnic group failing to sup-
port or even actively working against working-class people of another
race or ethnicity for economic and non-economic reasons.114  Not only
have there been conflicts or divisions between whites and minorities
in the working class, but there often have also been inter-minority
conflicts among working-class people.115
Many political scientists, economists, and others worry that eco-
nomic inequality may become self-reinforcing because the more afflu-
ent may be able to use their wealth to gain more political influence
that they use in turn to enhance their wealth, while those who are
poorer lose political influence and as a result the ability to secure for
themselves vital governmental resources that are often needed for up-
111. Sherry Linkon, The Changing Working Class, in WORKING-CLASS PERSPECTIVES: COM-
MENTARY ON WORKING-CLASS CULTURE, EDUCATION, AND POLITICS (Nov. 19, 2012), http://
workingclassstudies.wordpress.com/category/issues/understanding-class/ (“[Claiming that con-
temporary] workplaces no longer provide as many opportunities for workers to come together or
recognize their shared interests, and in a tight economy, working-class people sometimes see
each other as the competition.”).
112. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1783
(2011).
113. See Thomas Kleven, Systemic Classism, Systemic Racism: Are Social and Racial Justice
Achievable in the United States, 8 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 207, 216 (2009).
114. See id. at 245, 249.
115. See id. at 249 n.171.
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ward mobility.116  Nevertheless, two political scientists have recently
concluded that during periods in which economic inequality increases,
the rich and the poor alike both become more conservative and ex-
press decreased support for government policies that would reduce
economic inequality.117  Though this conclusion may seem counterin-
tuitive to many, a recent Pew Research Center report that in part
evaluated the percentage of Americans who support a government so-
cial safety net offers some support.  According to the report, in 1987,
71% of Americans supported the view that the government is respon-
sible for taking care of people who cannot take care of themselves;
however, in 2012, just 59% of Americans agreed with this view.118
While public support for a government safety net has decreased over
the course of the past twenty-five years or so, inequality has
increased.119
C. Examples of Internal Divisions Among Working-Class People
The following paragraphs will present two examples of how divi-
sions among working-class and middle-class Americans have made it
more difficult to address economic inequality.  The first example, and
a very contemporary example, describes the political battles and mass
protests in Wisconsin that began in February 2011 after Governor
Scott Walker announced his intention to eliminate, for all intents and
purposes, collective bargaining for most public employees who were
members of public sector unions.  This example highlights the manner
in which many working-class and middle-class Americans are bitterly
divided along political lines with respect to important economic issues
and the fact that there are limits to the efficacy of mass protests given
the level of partisan division among the electorate.
116. See JACOB S. HACKER ET AL., INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY, in INEQUALITY AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN 156, 197–200
(Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005); see also Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 39–52.
117. Nathan T. Kelly & Peter K. Enns., Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The
Self-Reinforcing Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI.
855, 867–69 (2010).
118. See Partisan Polarization Surges in Bush, Obama Years: Trends in American Values:
1987-2012, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 55 (2012), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-
pdf/06-04-12%20Values%20Release.pdf.
119. It should be noted, however, that the Pew Research Center’s study does indicate that
there was some downward and upward fluctuation in levels of support of a government safety
net between 1987 and 2012.  Even so, the overall trend has been downward over this period of
time and public support for a government safety net fell steadily from the onset of the Great
Recession through 2012. Id.
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The second example is an example from the New Deal.  Though
the New Deal era is widely considered a very progressive period in
American history, New Deal policy and the general public’s response
to government efforts to address the dire economic circumstances mil-
lions of Americans experienced during this period were highly racial-
ized.  Though the New Deal example is obviously from a prior period
in this country’s history, some of the dynamics that contributed to
government officials in the New Deal providing many minorities with
much less support than they needed based upon their economic cir-
cumstances have also informed the way that government officials to-
day have responded to the economic conditions many minorities face.
1. Protests and Labor Strife in Wisconsin: A Cautionary Tale on
the Limits of Large-Scale Protests to Affect Political
Change in a Time of Polarization
Without question, there is an incredibly high level of polarization
and divisiveness in the body politic in the United States today.120  Al-
though significant gaps in values persist between different demo-
graphic groups of Americans sorted in terms of their race and
ethnicity, educational attainment, economic class, religiosity, and gen-
der, these divisions have neither increased nor decreased appreciably
over the course of the past quarter century.121  In contrast, the gap in
values between those who identify as Democrats or as Republicans
has almost doubled in the past twenty-five years, and this partisan gap
now represents the largest gap among all other demographic divi-
sions.122  Not only has the partisan gap overtaken the racial and edu-
cational gaps, it is now fifty percent larger than the racial values gap,
which represents the second largest values gap.123
In terms of political polarization, many now believe that the state
of Wisconsin, a state previously long known for civility in its polit-
ics,124 is the most politically divisive state in America.125  In 2011, polls
120. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 3, at 2 (explaining the high level of polarization in
American politics).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Dan Kaufman, Land of Cheese and Rancor, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2012, http://query.
nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9804E6DA1E3CF934A15756C0A9649D8B63&pagewanted
=1
125. Dan Kaufman, How Did Wisconsin Become the Most Politically Divisive Place in
America?, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/27/magazine/how-did-wis
consin-become-the-most-politically-divisive-place-in-america.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; see
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showed that the gap between Democrats and Republicans in terms of
whether they approved or disapproved of Governor Scott Walker
made Governor Walker one of the most, if not the most, polarizing
governors in the United States, given that the so-called partisan gap in
approval ratings for Governor Walker was 78%.126  Governor
Walker’s announcement of his decision to seek to end collective bar-
gaining rights for most public employees who were members of public
sector unions127—rights which Wisconsin public employees gained in
1959, making them the first public employees in any state to be
granted collective bargaining rights128—sparked massive protests in
February and early March of 2011.129  During this period, tens of
thousands of people participated in protests against Governor Walker
and the Republicans who controlled the state legislature, with 100,000
or more people joining one of the protests on February 26, 2011.130
Many believe that the massive protests in Wisconsin provided some
significant inspiration for the Occupy Wall Street movement.131
After the Republican-controlled legislature passed the bill strip-
ping most public employees of their collective bargaining rights, Gov-
ernor Walker signed the bill into law on March 11, 2011.132  Those
who opposed Governor Walker next turned their attention to seeking
to recall certain Republican lawmakers, including Governor
also Bob Secter, Bruised-Purple Wisconsin Takes Political Beating State’s Near-Even Red-Blue
Split Fuels Barrage of Attack Ads in Tight Races for Senate, President, CHI. TRIBUNE, Nov. 2,
2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-11-02/news/ct-nw-wisconsin-wrap-20121102_1_wis
consin-dells-republican-party-chairman-scott-walker.
126. See Craig Gilbert, Scott Walker Could Be the Most Polarizing Governor?, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL Mar. 8, 2011, at A1.
127. Michael A. Fletcher, Thousands Turn Out for Latest Protest Against Wis. Governor’s
Budget Plan, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2011/03/05/AR2(011030503728.html; see also Barbara Rodriguez, Madison, Wis.: Protests Mark
Year Since Gov. Scott Walker’s Collective Bargaining Law, TWINCITIES.COM (Mar. 10, 2012, 8:37
PM), http://www.twincities.com/wisconsin/ci_20148202/madison-wis-protests-mark-year-since-
collective-bargaining.
128. WLHS Primer on Wisconsin Labor History, WIS. LABOR HISTORY SOC’Y, http://www.
wisconsinlaborhistory.org/?page_id=34 (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
129. See Fletcher, supra note 127; Rodriguez, supra note 127.
130. See Abby Sewell, Protesters Out in Force Nationwide to Oppose Wisconsin’s Anti-Union
Bill, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/26/nation/la-na-wisconsin-
protests-20110227.
131. Kira Zalan, The Wisconsin Protests’ Widespread Influence – From Obama to Occupy
Wall Street, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/arti
cles/2012/03/02/the-wisconsin-protests-widespread-influencefrom-obama-to-occupy-wall-street.
132. Stephanie Condon, Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker Signs Anti-union Bill — But Demo-
crats Say They’re the Political Victors, CBS NEWS (Mar. 11, 2011, 11:19 AM), http://www.cbs
news.com/8301-503544_162-20042122-503544.html.
876 [VOL. 56:849
Growing Inequality
Walker.133  After those who opposed the governor filed more than
one million signatures of people seeking to recall and remove him
from office, many in Wisconsin and in the country assumed that Gov-
ernor Walker would have a very difficult time becoming the first gov-
ernor in United States history to survive a recall election.134
However, in spite of the massive protests and the huge number of
Wisconsinites who signed the recall petition, Governor Walker con-
vincingly won the recall election by more than seven points.135  In an
election that featured the issue of collective bargaining for union
members, the exit polls provided evidence of the substantial polariza-
tion of the Wisconsin electorate, even among those in the working and
middle classes.136  Fifty-six percent of middle-class voters, as well as
56% of those without a college degree, voted for Governor Walker.137
What may be particularly surprising to many is the fact that of the
one-third of the voters who either belonged to a union or who had
someone in their household who belonged to a union, 38% voted for
Governor Walker.138  Though it is likely that many of these voters
were in households that had people who were members of the police,
firefighters, and State patrol unions—public sector unions exempted
from the collective bargaining bill139—it is also apparent that many
other people from union households supported Governor Walker.140
133. See Rachel Weiner, Wisconsin Recall Petition Gets Over 1 Million Signatures; Demo-
cratic Challenger Falk Steps Forward, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/wisconsin-recall-petition-gets-over-1-million-signatures-democratic-challenger-falk-
steps-forward/2012/01/18/gIQAD4sr8P_story.html.
134. See id.
135. Clay Barbour et al., Re-Affirmed: After More Than a Year of Fierce Partisan Battles,
Gov. Scott Walker and His Fellow Republican Lawmakers Dominate the Polls on Tuesday, WIS.
STATE J., June 6, 2012, at A1.
136. Wisconsin Recall Exit Polls: How Different Groups Voted, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/06/05/us/politics/wisconsin-recall-exit-polls.html.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Steven Verburg, Special Collective Bargaining Status for Police and Fire Unions
Causing Problems, WIS. STATE J., Jan. 7, 2012, 6:50 AM, http://host.madison.com/news/local/
govt-and-politics/special-collective-bargaining-status-for-police-and-fire-unions-causing/article_c
8900f50-38c7-11e1-a949-0019bb2963f4.html.
140. Sarah Dutton & Jennifer De Pinto, How Scott Walker Won the Wisconsin Recall Elec-
tion, CBS NEWS (June 6, 2012, 1:07 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57447980-
503544/how-scott-walker-won-the-wisconsin-recall-election/.
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2. Government Officials and Politicians Have Felt Constrained to
Deal with Racial Disparities Including in Times of General
Economic Crisis
Just as they are today, African Americans were significantly over-
represented among the poor in the early 1930s.  Further, for most Af-
rican Americans, the Great Depression simply worsened their
longstanding economic plight and oppression.141  If Congress and the
Roosevelt Administration had designed many New Deal programs in
a universal way to benefit Americans largely on the basis of demon-
strated need, and if they had implemented such programs in a nondis-
criminatory way, the New Deal would have dramatically improved the
socioeconomic status of African Americans, as well as the socioeco-
nomic status of other people of color.  Nevertheless, the government
designed or administered many New Deal programs in a racially dis-
criminatory way in part to appease certain powerful economic inter-
ests and many white Americans.
Racial discrimination in these programs took many forms.142  In a
particularly damaging manifestation of racism, certain New Deal pro-
grams excluded an extremely large percentage of impoverished Afri-
can Americans.  For example, three major New Deal legislative acts
explicitly excluded agricultural laborers and those who worked in the
domestic service sector.  These acts included the Social Security Act,
the National Labor Relations Act, and the Fair Labor Standards
Act.143  The exclusion of these occupational categories, which ac-
counted for two-thirds of black employment in the United States and
between seventy and eighty percent of black employment in many
parts of the South144 helped solidify racial divisions within the labor
market.145
While our country is still recovering from the worst economic cri-
sis Americans have experienced since the Great Depression, many
politicians and government officials still feel constrained to address
141. Robert C. Weaver, The New Deal and the Negro: A Look at the Facts, 13 OPPORTUNITY:
J. OF NEGRO LIFE 200, 200 (1935).
142. See Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimina-
tion in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335, 1353–71 (1987).  Over time, most of the discrimina-
tory provisions included in different pieces of New Deal legislation were stricken. Id. at 1336.
143. Juan F. Perea, Destined for Servitude, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 245, 250 (2009).
144. IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 43 (2005).  By amendment to the origi-
nal Social Security Act, domestic laborers were added in 1950 and agricultural laborers were
added in 1954. Id.
145. Mandell, supra note 92, at 407.
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the range of economic issues particularly facing minorities because
they often worry that focusing on these type of issues would generate
backlash from white Americans.  To be clear, few people claim that
the federal programs that were designed to heal the economy in the
wake of the Great Recession and that were enacted into law after
President Barack Obama took office have been racialized to the detri-
ment of minorities in the way that many New Deal programs were
racialized.  Nevertheless, there are many who believe that President
Barack Obama and others in his administration have shied away from
developing policies to specifically address severe racial issues in our
society out of a concern that addressing issues of racial injustice would
erode the support he has received from white Americans and would
prevent him from building upon this support.146  These purported con-
cerns are not unfounded, as President Obama has experienced politi-
cal setbacks when he has addressed certain racial issues in an open
way no matter how sensitively he has sought to address them.147  Nev-
ertheless, one commentator claims that severe racial economic gaps
together with other serious racial gaps “are becoming unremarkable
features of the post-racial world” in which critical and unresolved ra-
cial issues are not framed, for pragmatic political reasons, as arising
from racial discrimination or injustice.148
IV. THE LEGAL PROFESSION CAN DO MORE TO
PROMOTE GREATER ECONOMIC EQUALITY
A. A Multifaceted Strategy Is Needed to Reduce Economic
Inequality
The effort to reduce economic inequality and to increase in-
tergenerational economic mobility in this country must draw upon the
expertise of many different types of people and organizations from a
broad spectrum of backgrounds.  In terms of such an overall strategy,
law will not play the largest role or perhaps even a central role in
efforts to promote more economic equality, including in the effort to
reduce the substantial racial economic gaps that now exist in our
146. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to
Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1336 (2011).
147. Paul Glastris, Introduction: Race, History, and Obama’s Second Term, WASH.
MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2013, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/january_
february_2013/features/introduction_race_history_and042044.php?page=1.
148. Crenshaw, supra note 146, at 1336–40.
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country.149  Nevertheless, there is an important role for lawyers and
legal institutions of one kind or another to play in the effort to in-
crease economic opportunities for millions of Americans, so that the
American dream can become more of a reality for a broader swath of
the American public.
To create greater income equality and economic mobility in the
United States, there is broad consensus among academics, policymak-
ers, and others that we, as a country, must dramatically improve the
educational system and educational opportunities for poor and low- to
moderate-income Americans.150  Many others believe that to reduce
income inequality, our tax system also needs to be changed to make it
much more progressive and more like tax systems in many other in-
dustrialized countries that do much more to redistribute pretax in-
come.151  Others suggest that to reduce economic inequality in the
United States, we must reform our criminal justice system, given that
the United States incarcerates more people per capita than any other
country in the world.152  Still others argue that major reforms are
needed with respect to our country’s policies impacting family struc-
ture and the capacity of parents to make important financial and non-
financial investments in their children, among other relevant areas of
policy.153 Although reforming policies in any of the aforementioned
policy areas would help promote greater equality in this country, for
inequality to be addressed in a substantial way, significant reforms
would need to be made in a number of different policy areas, whether
in areas implicating education, tax, the criminal justice system, health
care and nutrition, family life, housing, etc.
149. See, e.g., Calavita, supra note 4, at 499; Jones, supra note 59, at 87.
150. See, e.g., Ron Haskins, Education and Economic Mobility, in GETTING AHEAD OR LOS-
ING GROUND: ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 101 (Julie Clover & Ianna Kachoris eds., 2008),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/2/economic%20mobili
ty%20sawhill/02_economic_mobility_sawhill.pdf; Dan Ariely, Americans Want to Live in a
Much More Equal Country (They Just Don’t Realize It), ATLANTIC (Aug. 2, 2012, 12:41 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/08/americans-want-to-live-in-a-much-more-
equal-country-they-just-dont-realize-it/260639/; Beller & Hout, supra note 81, at 31; Haveman &
Smeeding, supra note 73, at 143; Jones, supra note 59, at 87; Sawhill, supra note 62, at 4–5.
151. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 273–74; Calavita, supra note 4, at 500; Ariely, supra
note 150.
152. See Eduardo Porter, At the Polls, Choose Your Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2012, at
B1.
153. See, e.g., Beller & Hout, supra note 81, at 31; Corak, supra note 53, at 120.  However,
there is not universal agreement on the extent to which changes in family structure in the United
States alone have contributed to increased economic inequality.  Hacker et al., supra note 116, at
163.
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In terms of promoting greater wealth equality, a number of orga-
nizations that are not primarily legal organizations have developed de-
tailed policy agendas setting forth policies that would enable low- to
moderate-income individuals and households to build wealth.  One
such leading organization is the Corporation for Enterprise Develop-
ment (CFED).  CFED’s policy agenda addresses the following five is-
sue areas: financial assets and income, businesses and jobs, housing
and homeownership, education, and health.154  Within these five issue
areas, a limited number of CFED’s proposals do have an explicitly
legal component, such as proposals encouraging states to adopt more
robust laws designed to prevent foreclosure or to protect some of the
assets of those who have their property foreclosed.155
In terms of efforts to address racial economic gaps, those working
on behalf of the Insight Center for Community Economic Develop-
ment’s Closing the Racial Wealth Gap Initiative have developed policy
briefs and papers to address strategies to close racial wealth gaps.156
Just like CFED’s policy proposals, some of the policy proposals that
are part of the package of proposals that those (including this author)
working on behalf of the Closing the Racial Wealth Gap Initiative have
developed have an explicit legal component.157  Further, over the
course of the past four years, a few organizations have sponsored an
annual African American economic summit to address the many se-
vere economic challenges currently facing the black community.
Howard University hosted this year’s fourth annual summit on Febru-
ary 1, 2013,158 and a number of the university’s departments and cen-
ters, as well as the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies and
Duke University’s Research Network on Racial and Ethnic Inequal-
ity, sponsored the summit.159  It is somewhat striking that no legal or-
154. See Policy Agenda, CORP. FOR ENTERPRISE DEV., http://cfed.org/policy/policy_agenda/
(last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
155. See Policy Brief: Foreclosure Prevention and Protections, CORP. FOR ENTERPRISE DEV.,
(2012), available at http://cfed.org/assets/scorecard/2013/pb_Foreclosure Prevention_2013.pdf.
156. See Publications and Materials, INSIGHT CENTER FOR COMTY. ECON. DEV., http://www.
insightcced.org/index.php?page=Policy (last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
157. SeeThe Racial Gap in Land Retention, Acquisition, and Development, INSIGHT CTR. FOR
CMTY. ECON. DEV., (2009), available at http://www.insightcced.org/uploads/ CRWG/Racial-Gap-
Land-Retention-6-09.pdf.
158. See Michael A. Fletcher, Financial Picture for Black Americans Bleak, Scholars Say,
WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2013, at A10; Fourth Annual Economic Summit, HOW. U. DEP’T. ECON.,
http://www.coas.howard.edu/economics/news&events_livestream.html (last visited March 1,
2013).
159. See Fourth Annual Economic Summit, supra note 158.
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ganization took part in the summit and that no practicing attorneys
participated as speakers.
B. Legal Organizations Should Develop Detailed Strategic Plans
Setting Forth Legal Strategies to Promote Greater
Economic Equality
Irrespective of whether it is in a leading or supporting way, there
is a very important role for lawyers and legal organizations to play in
the broader effort to promote greater economic equality in this coun-
try.  Just as some primarily non-legal organizations have developed
detailed policy proposals designed to promote economic equality in
general or to address economic challenges that various communities
of color are experiencing, more legal organizations can also develop
such comprehensive policy agendas or legal strategies.  In some in-
stances, legal organizations that would develop these types of agendas
or legal strategies could help complement the initiatives that many
non-legal organizations have pursued.  In other instances, legal orga-
nizations that would develop such policy agendas or legal strategies to
promote greater economic equality could play a leading role in ad-
dressing certain relevant stand-alone legal issues, given that many if
not most non-legal organizations lack a comparative advantage to ad-
dress these types of legal issues in a sophisticated way.
Though there are many legal and non-legal organizations that
promote social justice or civil rights that have made promoting eco-
nomic justice a central part of their work,160 there is still much room
for other legal institutions committed to social justice to promote
greater economic equality in a more robust way.  To this end, there
are important roles for lawyers with expertise in many different sub-
stantive areas of the law to play, including those with expertise in busi-
ness and transactional areas of the law.  In terms of developing this
generation’s social engineers in the field of law, law schools with a
commitment to promoting social justice and civil rights should make
an intentional effort to make sure that their law students appreciate
the fact that many different types of lawyers can play a meaningful
160. See, e.g., Letter from Marc H. Morial, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Nat’l Urban
League, to Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader of the U.S.
House of Representatives & John Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, avail-
able at http://nul.iamempowered.com/content/national-urban-league-calls-president-obama-con
gressional-leaders-make-economic-opportunity; Economic Equality, LAW. COMM. FOR CIV. RTS.
S. F. BAY AREA, http://www.lccr.com/economic-equality.php (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
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role in helping to promote economic justice and equality.  Finally,
given that the goal of reducing economic inequality in our society rep-
resents an enormous, long-term challenge, lawyers and legal organiza-
tions committed to addressing the issue should utilize every legal tool
and resource that they can deploy in the struggle to promote greater
equality, including some that public interest and civil rights lawyers
have underutilized in some significant ways to date.
C. Examples of How the Law Could Be More Effectively Utilized
to Promote Equality
Based upon the work I have done in the area of real property and
real estate law, I will offer two concrete examples of ways in which
lawyers and legal institutions could play a more significant role in pro-
moting economic equality.  These examples serve as examples of what
can be done in other areas of law as well.  Though these particular
examples address the role lawyers can play in addressing certain racial
economic issues, the examples also offer insight into the role lawyers
can play in addressing the overall issue of reducing economic inequal-
ity in this country.
1. Lawyers Should Play a More Active Role in Developing
Strategies to Increase Minority Homeownership and to
Make Such Ownership More Secure
Given that equity in a primary residence represents the largest
asset most Americans of any race or ethnicity possess in their asset
portfolios, lawyers should undertake efforts to increase homeowner-
ship within the African American and Latino communities, particu-
larly given the current substantial racial homeownership gaps between
these groups and white Americans.  As indicated earlier, 28.9% fewer
African Americans own their own homes as compared to white Amer-
icans, and this gap is larger than it was in any year between 1994 and
2009.161 This means that all the progress that had been made in nar-
rowing the black-white homeownership gap in the mid to late 1990s
and early 2000s has been reversed.  Similarly, the progress made dur-
ing the late 1990s and early 2000s in narrowing the Hispanic-white
homeownership gap has been set back as the Hispanic-white home-
161. Homeownership Rates by Race and Ethnicity of Householder: 1994 to 2011, supra note
41.
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ownership gap has been growing in recent years and is now approxi-
mately as large as it was in 2001.
Nevertheless, those who advocate for a renewed push to increase
minority homeownership must learn important lessons from the drive
to increase minority homeownership during the 1990s and 2000s.
Many who began advocating for increased minority homeownership
approximately two decades ago had all the best intentions and did in
fact develop detailed strategies to accomplish their goal.162  However,
the progress that was made in increasing minority homeownership in
the 1990s and early 2000s masked a number of troubling issues that in
the end contributed to washing away all of the gains that African
Americans and Latinos made in increasing their homeownership
rates.  Not only have many African Americans and Latinos lost their
homes, they have also lost tens of billions of dollars in home equity
over the course of the past several years.
In terms of lessons that should be learned, it has become clear,
for example, that a number of troubling aspects of the way in which
lenders made subprime loans resulted in homeownership resting on a
foundation of sand for far too many.  For many, terms in many sub-
prime loans that did not allow for prepayment of the loan or that re-
quired balloon payments many times the size of the normal monthly
payment, for example, were factors that contributed to driving home-
owners into foreclosure.163  In other instances, there is evidence that
lenders steered minorities into taking out subprime loans, though they
may have qualified for prime loans that had much lower interest rates
and more favorable terms for the borrower.164  Some of those who
advocated for increased minority homeownership in the 1990s now
realize that the efforts to increase minority homeownership in the past
couple of decades did not place enough emphasis on the role that the
law could play in making homeownership for minorities more viable
and sustainable.  One of these advocates now claims that legal reform
in the areas of foreclosure law and fair lending practices, among other
areas, must “become central to public policy debates” about minority
homeownership.165
162. Taylor, supra note 109.
163. Thomas M. Shapiro, Race, Homeownership and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53,
69–70 (2006).
164. See, e.g., Thomas W. Mitchell et al., Forced Sale Risk: Class, Race, and the “Double
Discount”, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 654–55 (2010); Shapiro, supra note 163, at 72.
165. Shapiro, supra note 163, at 71–72.
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To this end, more legal organizations committed to promoting
civil rights and social justice should consider how they can play a
meaningful role in helping minorities become homeowners in a finan-
cially sustainable way and in helping those who are homeowners
maintain their homes.  At the national level, more civil rights and pub-
lic interest legal organizations should seek to participate in a proactive
way in developing and championing policy agendas that include the
legal reforms necessary to address critical housing issues impacting
minorities.  Law schools that have a commitment to promoting civil
rights and social justice should consider undertaking initiatives to en-
hance in a substantial way the real estate offerings that are available
to their students, including by developing real estate certificate or con-
centration programs.166
Students who would take advantage of these enhanced real estate
offerings would be able, once in practice, to provide effective counsel
to prospective minority homeowners considering various options they
may have to finance a purchase of a home, including financing options
with complex legal terms.  Many of these students also would be bet-
ter positioned once in practice than many other law graduates who did
not take many real estate-related courses in law school to advise mi-
norities who already own homes who may be experiencing financial
problems about the legal options they may have to retain their
homes—or at least, the wealth associated with such homes.  Still
others who pursued a real estate concentration in law school would be
well positioned once in practice to advise developers interested in
building affordable housing or, in some cases, could even become af-
fordable housing developers themselves.  In addition, some of these
students would be in a better position than students who lack such
training in real estate law and finance to work within a few years of
graduating from law school with others on developing public policy in
the areas of housing and real estate.
166. A few years ago at the University of Wisconsin Law School, I worked with a number of
other professors, administrators, and members of the practicing bar to develop a real estate
concentration and certificate program. See Real Estate Law Concentration, U. WIS. L. SCH.,
http://law.wisc.edu/academics/courses/concentrations/realestate.html (last updated Nov. 10,
2011).  Students interested in obtaining a real estate law certificate in our program must take a
number of real estate and business law courses, as well as a course at our business school that
reviews the business fundamentals of a real estate transaction. Id.
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2. Developing National Model State Statutes to Promote Greater
Economic Equality in Certain Areas of the Law
Over the course of the past several decades, thousands of minor-
ity landowners have lost their land as a result of court-ordered parti-
tion sales of property owned under the tenancy in common form of
ownership.167  These partition sales have been a major source of black
land loss.  Over the course of the past forty to fifty years, in an effort
to stem black land loss, law professors and public interest attorneys
have proposed many legal reforms including legal reforms to the law
governing partition of property that people own under the tenancy in
common form of ownership.  However, those reform proposals as a
whole got little, if any, traction, and the legislative reform proposals
more specifically did not fare any better in state legislatures across the
country.  Nevertheless, significant progress has been made on parti-
tion law reform in the past few years.  Progress began to be made after
a group of lawyers was able to convince the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) to form a drafting
committee in 2007 to develop a uniform act designed to reform parti-
tion law in many important ways.
In terms of law reform, NCCUSL, which is commonly known as
the Uniform Law Commission, has developed national model statutes
for possible enactment at the state level over the course of the past
121 years, making it the most prominent organization that has devel-
oped model state statutes during this period.168  The Uniform Law
Commission has promulgated more than 300 uniform acts—the termi-
nology it uses for its model state statutes that it advocates should be
adopted in their entirety without significant revision by various juris-
dictions—since its establishment.169  It is best known for promulgating
the Uniform Commercial Code, which it developed in conjunction
with the American Law Institute.170  NCCUSL also promulgated the
Uniform Partnership Act, the Uniform Probate Code, the Uniform
Conservation Easement Act, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
167. See Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black
Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in
Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 579 (2001).
168. ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW 12–13
(1969).
169. See Frequently Asked Questions, Unif. Law Comm’n, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narra
tive.aspx?title=Frequently%20Asked%20Questions (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
170. Fred H. Miller & William B. Davenport, Introduction to the Special Issue on the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 45 Bus. Law. 1389, 1389 (1990).
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Act, and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, among its many other uni-
form acts.171
Notwithstanding the critical role NCCUSL has played in re-
forming many state laws around the country, very few civil rights or
public interest law organizations have developed proposals requesting
the Uniform Law Commission to establish drafting committees to de-
velop uniform laws that would benefit low- to moderate-income and
minority individuals and communities.  Civil rights and public interest
law organizations have done so little to develop uniform acts through
the Uniform Law Commission because most of these organizations
are unfamiliar with the Uniform Law Commission, the procedures it
uses in considering proposals to develop a uniform act, and the proce-
dures it uses once it does establish a drafting committee to develop a
uniform act.  In contrast, those who represent the interests of power-
ful interest groups are quite familiar with the process that is used to
develop uniform acts, and these representatives repeatedly play a role
in the development (or sometimes in the stymieing to one degree or
another) of uniform acts from the proposal phase to the drafting
phase to the enactment phase.172
Nevertheless, a group of law professors and lawyers, including
civil rights and public interest lawyers, did work with the Section of
Real Property, Trust and Estate Law of the American Bar Association
(ABA) to develop a proposal to submit to the Uniform Law Commis-
sion in 2006 requesting the Uniform Law Commission to develop a
uniform act reforming the law of partition as that law applies to ten-
ancy-in-common property that families have owned for a long period
of time.173  The Uniform Law Commission accepted this proposal in
171. ROBERT A. STEIN, FORMING A MORE PERFECT UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (forthcoming June 2013) (manu-
script at app. F at 1-10, on file with author).
172. See, e.g., Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism and the Uniform Laws
Process: Some Lessons from the Universal Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 120 (1993).
173. Letter from David J. Dietrich, Co-Chair Property Preservation Task Force to Shannon
Skinner, ABA Rep. to NCCUSL Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts (Nov.
27, 2006) (on file with author). The Property Preservation Task Force was a task force of the
ABA’s Section of Real Property, Trust & Estate Law. See Section of Real Property, Probate &
Trust Law: 2006-2007 Leadership Directory, 2006 A.B.A. SEC. OF REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. 26.
The author served as one of the members of the Property Preservation Task Force and was able
to convince the co-chairs of the task force to consult with certain civil rights and public interest
lawyers who had significant experience working with poor and minority landowners in preparing
the proposal that the ABA’s Section of Real Property, Trust & Estate Law sent to NCCUSL.
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2007.174 After the drafting committee spent three years working on
developing a uniform act to reform the law of partition, NCCUSL
promulgated the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act (UPHPA)
in 2010.175  The ABA approved UPHPA in 2011 as a uniform act that
was appropriate for states to consider enacting into law.176  So far,
Georgia, Montana, and Nevada have enacted UPHPA into law, while
legislatures in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii and
South Carolina are currently considering it as well.177
The development of UPHPA was quite unusual in several impor-
tant ways from how most other uniform acts have been developed by
NCCUSL.  As mentioned, it was quite unusual that civil rights and
public interest legal organizations—most of which were local and re-
gional as opposed to national organizations—played an important
role in developing the proposal that was sent to NCCUSL in the first
instance requesting NCCUSL to establish a drafting committee to de-
velop a uniform act that could be used to reform partition law.  Sec-
ond, I served as the Reporter, the person tasked with the primary
responsibility for drafting a uniform act, for UPHPA, and became just
the second African American ever to serve as a Reporter on a uni-
form act project for the Uniform Law Commission.  I was selected not
just because of my national reputation for being an expert scholar on
partition law and black landownership but also because of the exten-
sive outreach work I had done with, among others, the ABA and a
large number of public interest law and community-based organiza-
tions that work on property matters impacting poor and minority
communities.  Third, a large part of the success we have had so far
with the act is attributable to the decision of many civil rights and
public interest legal organizations together with some community-
based organizations—organizations that for the most part had not had
174. NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’R ON UNIF. ST. LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE MEETING IN ITS 116TH YEAR 191 (2007).
175. See Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act, NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’R ON UNIF. ST.
LAWS (2010), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/partition%20of%20heirs%20
property/uphpa_final_10.pdf.
176. See Approval for the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act, ABA NOW, http://www.
abanow.org/2011/01/109a/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
177. See Partition of Heirs Property Act, NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’R ON UNIF. ST. LAWS, http://
www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Partition%20of%20Heirs%20Property%20Act (last vis-
ited Mar. 16, 2013).
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any history of working together in a collective way—to form an organ-
ization called the Heirs’ Property Retention Coalition (HPRC).178
This coalition actively participated in the drafting of UPHPA and
has played a very important role in working to enact UPHPA into law,
complementing the excellent enactment work NCCUSL has done.  In
addition to HPRC’s letter endorsing UPHPA, some individual HPRC
members have submitted letters to NCCUSL endorsing UPHPA, in-
cluding the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and the
Federation of Southern Cooperatives.179  Finally, HPRC made a very
important decision to seek a partner at one of the country’s largest
law firms who had expertise in real estate law who would serve as
HPRC’s pro bono legal representative during the drafting of UPHPA.
The partner who agreed to serve as HPRC’s pro bono counsel played
an indispensable role in helping HPRC advocate for reforms that
would improve the ability of those who own heirs’ property to retain
their property or at least their heirs’ property-related wealth.
Those of us who have worked with the American Bar Association
and the Uniform Law Commission to develop UPHPA and to get it
enacted into law hope that our example will inspire other civil rights
and public interest legal organizations to consider developing strate-
gies to pursue law reform initiatives through institutions such as the
Uniform Law Commission and other prominent institutions that work
(at least in part) on law reform, such as the various state law revision
commissions across the country and the American Law Institute.
Given the magnitude of the challenges civil rights and public interest
organizations face in addressing vital issues such as economic inequal-
ity, lawyers within these organizations should use every legal tool at
their disposal in their effort to promote social justice including tools
that have been underutilized to date.
CONCLUSION
Though reversing the trends in economic equality and intergener-
ational mobility in this country will require fundamental changes in
public policy as it relates to our tax system and educational system,
among other areas, lawyers and law schools can play an important
role in promoting greater economic equality and security for many in
178. See, e.g., HPRC News, HEIRS’ PROP. RETENTION COAL., http://www.southerncoalition.
org/hprc/(last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
179. See Partition of Heirs Property Act, supra note 177.
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this country.  Law schools committed to promoting social justice
should consider whether there is more they could be doing to promote
civil rights and reduce economic inequality, including by enhancing
the range of business and transactional courses and programs offered
at their schools.  Efforts should be made to involve a greater number
of lawyers, whether these lawyers are public interest lawyers or law-
yers in private practice, and whether these lawyers are litigators or
transactional attorneys, in legal efforts to reduce economic inequality.
Civil rights and public interest law organizations should consider
whether there are legal strategies and tools that they have underutil-
ized to date that would help them better promote their social justice
agendas.  If lawyers and legal organizations make more of an effort to
coordinate their work in addressing economic inequality with others
who are working on this issue, and if more legal tools are used in the
effort to address economic inequality, law can play a more substantial
role in promoting economic justice.
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Boycotts, Black Nationalism, and Asymmetrical Market Failures
Relating to Race seeks to defend black nationalism in 21st century
legal discourse, and examines the comparative efficacy of boycotts
as a black nationalist project over traditional public legal responses
to racist phenomena.  It deploys the concept of racism as asymmet-
rical market failures to identify serious affronts to racial economic
equality and deploys the concept of interest convergence/divergence
to distinguish those situations amenable to legal responses from
those best addressed by effective private protests like boycotts.  It
ultimately proposes the creation of an organization dedicated
strictly to the efficient execution of boycotts for racial justice, eco-
nomic and otherwise, and concludes that asymmetrical imperfec-
tions relating to race and information—e.g., media stereotyping,
mis-education, under-education—are least susceptible to legal re-
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sponses and, thus, ripest for black boycotts and other types of “re-
fusals to deal.”
INTRODUCTION
In 1858, after a series of newly-enacted laws disenfranchised a
burgeoning black community in California from their civil, political,
and economic rights, a group of approximately 800 blacks from
around the San Francisco area—led by activist, entrepreneur, aboli-
tionist and newspaper publisher, Mifflin Wistar Gibbs—emigrated
from the United States to Vancouver Island, British Columbia.  The
California legislature had passed laws stripping blacks of the right to
vote, to own property, to attend public schools, and to testify against
whites in courts of law.  Perhaps most galling, all colored people in
California were required to wear distinctive badges.  Rather than face
de jure second-class status, hundreds of black miners boycotted the
state of California.  In the annals of African-American history, this
“refusal to deal” ought to be placed on a level with the Montgomery
Bus Boycott, a century later.1
Blacks decided to boycott the state of California because the
market freedom that enticed them to migrate to California in the first
place closed rapidly in front of their eyes.  A free market is supposed
to be a progenitor of wealth and, perhaps more importantly, mer-
itocracy.  But when the market is open for some and closed for others,
those who succeed cannot confidently claim that their wealth is en-
tirely deserved.  Racism is and perhaps always has been less about
hatred and animus and more about an economic ordering or caste sys-
tem petrifying whites in the aggregate at the top of the economic lad-
der and blacks in the aggregate at the bottom.  The means for
accomplishing this end is a marketplace whose structures are asym-
metrical as they relate to race.  The California legislature closed the
market for blacks and expanded it for whites.  Recognizing the inevi-
table consequence of this market structure, the blacks of San Fran-
cisco refused to play the game.
Economists tend to agree that a free market, one that efficiently
and meritocratically distributes goods and services, requires that eve-
ryone be a rational thinker and vigorous profit maximize; that each
person can compete in whatever industry they choose or leave which-
1. See generally MIFFLIN W. GIBBS, SHADOW AND LIGHT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY WITH RE-
MINISCENCES OF THE LAST AND PRESENT CENTURY (1995).
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ever industry does not profit them; everyone has perfect information
about goods, services, and each other; and that there are neither trans-
action costs nor externalities or that externalities that exist are evenly
or equitably distributed.  But when the free market is not free, when
individuals because of their race are discouraged from pursuing their
wealth and/or happiness, when blacks are prohibited from competing
in the marketplace either because of discrimination or the withholding
of capital, when information about blacks is designed to promote in-
feriority and information available to blacks is less abundant and re-
liabile than information available to whites, when a lack of political
rights vested in the black community leads to the disproportionate
zoning of externalities such as environmental hazards, crime, and vice
into black communities, when the structures that uphold the free mar-
ket are designed to subordinate blacks . . . it is time to protest.  It is
time to boycott.
I. BLACK NATIONALISM?
In calling for the creation of an organization designed to imple-
ment boycotts towards reducing economic inequality relating to race,
I reject the notion that we are currently in a post-racial era.  I agree
that, in some respects, individual blacks have more opportunity to ad-
vance economically than ever before.  I would even concede that ra-
cism as a global system of white economic and political supremacy has
been in slow decline for about one hundred years.  But I disagree that
its complete disintegration is inevitable.  Its decline has been due to
the strident efforts and sacrifice of justice-minded people, and no less
is required to finish the job.
To the extent post-racialism is based on the idea that racism and
racial inequality ended with de jure discrimination, it is simply wrong.
Consider a game of Monopoly where one of the players is not
allowed to go around the board for a significant number of dice rolls,
meanwhile all of the other players are not so restricted and are able to
earn money and invest in property.  The game is not fair once the
restricted player is allowed to participate on equal terms, because the
other players have accumulated more wealth and property to use to
their advantage.  Not only will the disadvantaged player find it hard to
stay afloat, he or she will likely be put out of the game.  A truly absurd
consequence, known to all who have played Monopoly, is that when a
player is unlikely to earn enough money to pay for the expenses they
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are likely to incur going around the game board, they roll the dice
often hoping to land in jail.  Moreover, the game cannot be considered
fair by pointing to the fact that once every so often a once-disadvan-
taged player who with cunning, skill, and a few lucky rolls of the dice
will overcome the initial circumstance and win the game.  It is to that
person’s credit that she succeeded against enormous obstacles.  It does
not discredit others who were unable to fight through the disadvan-
tage.  In shorter words, neutral rules and principles alone do not nec-
essarily produce equal opportunity.
Daria Roithmayr’s work shows how segregation and other racial
phenomena of the past “lock in” inequality.2  For example in the early
twentieth century, whites used several tactics to prevent blacks from
moving in their neighborhoods, including homeowners associations
with restrictive covenants, real estate boards that created ethical stan-
dards requiring the steering of blacks away from white neighbor-
hoods, lending discrimination in private and federal mortgage
programs, etc.  Combined with public school financing and other dem-
ographic phenomena, the benefits of homeownership multiplied, as
did the burdens of exclusion.
That early neighborhood advantage has now become locked-in
via certain self-reinforcing neighborhood effects, namely through pub-
lic school finance and neighborhood job referral networks. Because
the (white) “rich get richer” in neighborhoods with good schools and
good job networks, non-whites are relatively less able to move into
more expensive white neighborhoods.3  Housing discrimination is but
one example.
But since race is not real, it should be disavowed entirely, say the
postracialists.4  Race cannot be boiled down to a phenotypical, biolog-
2. See generally Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 197
(2004); Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Inequality: The Persistence of Discrimination, 9 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 31 (2003); Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimi-
nation, 86 VA. L. REV. 727 (2000).
3. See Roithmayr, Locked In Segregation, supra note 2, at 197.
4. TOMMIE SHELBY, WE WHO ARE DARK: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF BLACK
SOLIDARITY 2 (2005) (“In recent years, the concept of ‘race’ has come under attack from a
number of academic quarters, including the biological sciences, the social sciences, philosophy,
history, legal studies, literary theory, and cultural studies . . . .  ‘[R]ace’ is not a sound basis for
social identities, cultural affiliations, membership in associations, public policy, or political move-
ments.  Some argue that racial identities and the forms of solidarity that they (allegedly) sustain
are irrational, incoherent, rooted in illusions, or morally problematic.  Others contend that in
light of increasing interracial antagonism and the need for multiracial cooperation, any form of
racial particularism is invidious and needlessly divisive.  Still others maintain that race-based
solidarity is incompatible with widely cherished ideals such as racial integration, the affirmation
of a shared American identity, and a color-blind society.”).
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ical, or cultural essence.  Race is constricting and stands in the way of
one’s personal autonomy.  It is divisive.  And yet, it is merely an ideo-
logical construct.  Naomi Zack asks, if race has no consistent basis in
biology, genetics, phenology, why acknowledge it at all?5
While it is true that race is a “mere” ideological construct, so is
the line between the United States and Mexico, and pretending that it
does not exist invites certain consequences.
As Cheryl Harris once stated, whiteness is property; there are
privileges in society assigned to those perceived as white and demerits
for those perceived as black.6  Steven Garcia and his colleagues at the
University of Michigan’s Center of the Study of Group Dynamics re-
cently confirmed as much.7  Although whiteness does not have the
value it once had,8 it would be foolhardy for black people to disavow
racial solidarity when others have not.9  Embracing blackness is, then
an act of self-defense, for the political and economic fates of blacks
have improved in times before only to be retarded by those who
would enjoy the benefits of greater white cohesion.  The remarkable
life of the Honorable Mifflin Wistar Gibbs (1823-1915) is testimony
towards this.10
Postracialism fails to recognize or address the historical redistri-
bution of wealth from blacks to whites along with the foreclosure of
many lucrative markets to blacks.  Postracialism refuses to recognize
or address imperfections in the market relating to race, including and
especially those least susceptible to public, legal interference.  Pos-
tracialism refuses to recognize that race relations and civil rights for
blacks improved in the past only to be viciously and violently taken
away, consider that the gains of Reconstruction were taken away, and
slavery re-instituted under the convict leasing-sharecropping system.11
5. See generally NAOMI ZACK, RACE AND MIXED RACE (1993).
6. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
7. Stephen M. Garcia et al., Profit Maximization Versus Disadvantageous Inequality: The
Impact of Self-Categorization, J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING, 18, 187-198 (2005).  This study sur-
veyed many challenges to the rational choice model assumption that everyone is a profit maxi-
mizer, and found that self-categorizing individuals will forego profit for the sake of protecting
the relative position of their group.
8. Harris, supra note 6, at 1758 (“Even as the capacity of whiteness to deliver is arguably
diminished by the elimination of rigid racial stratifications, whiteness continues to be perceived
as materially significant.”).
9. CHARLES W. MILLS, BLACKNESS VISIBLE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND RACE 41 (1998)
(“That race should be irrelevant is certainly an attractive ideal, but when it has not been irrele-
vant, it is absurd to proceed as if it had been.”).
10. See generally GIBBS, supra note 1.
11. See generally DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVE-
MENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008).
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Postracialism refuses to recognize that the absence of black solidarity
contributed to the African slave trade in the first place.  Ultimately,
postracialism allows for a racial caste socio-political-economic system.
Against the want for postracialism, Harvard philosopher Tommy
Shelby defends the concept of Black Nationalism.  He recognizes a
black solidarity “that urges a joint commitment to defeating racism, to
eliminating unjust racial inequalities, and to improving the material
life prospects of those racialized as ‘black,’ especially the most disad-
vantaged.”12  His affection for individual autonomy is great, however,
and he is quite cautious about conceptions of blackness that he be-
lieves trends towards fascism.  He seeks “one that is compatible with
what John Rawls calls political liberalism.”13  Ultimately, blackness,
for Shelby, not only is justified by self-defense, but should be defined
and limited as such.14  Adherents to Shelby’s “thin” blackness are
likely to support the NAACP but are unlikely to wear a kufi or cele-
brate Kwanzaa.15
Professor Charles Mills, for one, promotes a stronger form of
black nationalism.  He recognizes the systematized discrimination and
disadvantage of dark people globally and that the systemization of the
disadvantaged is designed towards a color caste system.16  For Profes-
sor Shelby, the shared experience of blacks while in the United States
should lead towards a willingness to defend each other against acts of
racism, but not towards any distinct cultural identity.  For Professor
Mills, on the other hand, the shared experience of blacks under global
white supremacy necessarily promotes an alternative epistemology, or
black consciousness, which black people do not have to create
intentionally.
I tend to agree with Professor Mills, but regardless of which of
these conceptions of blackness is right or most useful, Professor
Shelby is certainly correct that political, economic, and social solidar-
ity should be deployed strategically, morally, and pragmatically.  Stra-
tegically, in the sense that one need not and cannot be 100% black all
day, every day.  Blackness should neither subsume the autonomy of
the individual, nor should it remove Black people from the human
12. SHELBY, supra note 4, at 3-4.
13. Id. at 6-7.
14. Id. at 11-12 (“I defend a conception of solidarity based strictly on the shared experience
of racial oppression and a joint commitment to resist it.”).
15. Id. at 11 (“[A] collective identity . . . is a legacy of black nationalist thought that African
Americans do better to abandon.”).
16. See generally MILLS, supra note 9.
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family.  Morally, in the sense that its internal means and structures
should guard against promoting sexism, homophobia, essentialism,
and other non-liberal values, that alienation of those within the group
weakens its purpose and effectiveness.  Pragmatically, in the sense
that the need for black solidarity is greater in times of strife and open
oppression but less in times of increased racial harmony.17
The question I pose here is, then, under what circumstances, if
ever, will Professor Shelby’s “thin blackness” support a boycott?
What mechanism might thin blackness accept as an appropriate tool
for determining when boycotts are appropriate and when they are
not?  Is a standing organization dedicated to organizing boycotts to-
wards economic and political justice too thick?
I contend that a standing organization dedicated to boycotts for
racial equality can do the work needed to fight racism as Professor
Mills conceives it, yet stay within Professor Shelby’s moral confines.  I
intend to demonstrate that by deploying the concept of racism as
asymmetrical market failures, a boycott organization dedicated to ra-
cial justice can identify situations where black solidarity is more effec-
tive than a multi-racial coalition, while also standing on guard against
sexism, homophobia, etc.
II. BLACK NATIONALISM AND PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
The legal system of the United States has been trending away
from so-called civic republicanism—where legal rules are supposed to
be the product of reasoned deliberation over what is best for the body
politic as a whole—and towards public choice theory, where myriad
interest groups compete and negotiate over the existence, content,
and application of legal rules.18  In this public choice environment, Af-
rican-Americans should see themselves as black, organize around that
principle, and compete vigorously for a proper share of all benefits
inuring from the protections of the United States of America.
17. SHELBY, supra note 4, at 30 (“In speaking here of pragmatic nationalism, my use of the
term pragmatic is not meant to be philosophically loaded. . . .  August Meier . . . has proposed
that ‘nationalist tendencies tended to be salient during periods when conditions were becoming
worse and white public opinion more hostile, while the integrationist became salient when the
blacks’ status was improving and white public opinion becoming more tolerant.’  I suspect that
Meier’s hypothesis is correct, and my account of the relationship between classical and prag-
matic strands in black nationalist theory is, I believe, perfectly compatible with it.”).
18. For a discussion of public choice theory, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics
Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L.
REV. 275 (1988).
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Consider an example from my colleague, Professor Carlton
Waterhouse, who is concerned with environmental racism.  Blacks,
particularly those in impoverished communities, endure dispropor-
tionate exposure to toxic waste, with the effects on black children and
their educational success and thus their future economic prospects be-
ing astoundingly depressing.  Community activists who complain typi-
cally have bare resources.  According to Professor Waterhouse, the
federal Environmental Protection Agency tends to respond primarily
to “big business” and “big green,”—“big green” being the large na-
tional and international environmental coalitions like GreenPeace and
the National Resource Defense Council—neither of which has much
of an established coalition with black organizations, national or other-
wise.  Environmental hazards in the inner city tend to be ignored.19
There was hope upon the election of President Obama that the
EPA would take it upon itself to give greater attention to the long-
standing environmental concerns of poor black communities.  But
rather than generate and institute a program that would signal a com-
mitment on behalf the nation as a whole to address the disproportion-
ate toxicity of urban environments, the EPA proposed to institute
educational and training programs designed to increase the capacity of
poor communities to fight for themselves.  The point here is not to
demean the Obama Administration generally or the EPA’s efforts
specifically, as they have indeed committed significant resources to
these programs.  The point here is to show that the legal environment
of the United States is not in a civic-minded mood, but a public
choice, one where the community is expected to fight for itself.20  And
if this is true, black political solidarity is not merely a desire but an
indispensable means towards the fulfillment of this nation’s claims of
fairness and equal opportunity.
Supreme Court jurisprudence accepts and promotes blackness
and black nationalism.  The Court has decided a litany of cases involv-
ing race without questioning whether it in fact exists.  Supreme Court
Justice Clarence Thomas stated in Adarand Constructors v. Pena,
“Government cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, respect,
19. See, e.g., Carlton Waterhouse, Abandon All Hope Ye That Enter? Equal Protection,
Title VI, and the Divine Comedy of Environmental Justice, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 53
(2009).
20. A counterpoint to this would be the Obama Administration’s creation of an Office of
African American Education.
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and protect us as equal before the law.”21  In Grutter v. Bollinger, the
Court made clear that neither will it permit governmental entities to
affirmatively act against institutionalized white supremacy, nor will it
soon permit affirmative action to remedy specific prior acts of racist
behavior.22  The task of effecting racial equality then is left to the peo-
ple and their social institutions.  But, as Stephen Garcia’s experiment
demonstrated, black people ought not expect non-black people and
non-black institutions to dedicate themselves to racial equality.
Moreover, social institutions are legally obligated to their
chartered purposes, which rarely include racial equality as an objec-
tive.  Thus, social institutions are legally restricted from affirmatively
acting for racial equality unless their commercial or charitable inter-
ests converge with the interests of black people.23  When the interests
of blacks and the rest of society diverge, the responsibility to correct
the maldistribution of wealth and privilege lie with blacks themselves.
If it is true that this historic maldistribution remains not through the
vestiges of slavery or discrimination, but instead because of black peo-
ple’s embrace of sloth, violence, and prurience—as some black con-
servatives contend—then it is even more clear that blacks themselves
must correct it through solidarity and organization.24
As his quote attests, Justice Thomas favors the idea of law as an
impartial referee over a fair competition between any and all interest
groups, including race-based ones.  But some have accused Justice
Thomas as being a sell-out, or one who is not racially black or who
rejects his black identity.  The criticism stems from his conservative
views on affirmative action, as well as regarding state power in the
criminal context.  He is aware of these critics and the fact that some
people say he is not black.25  If blackness is defined by one’s commit-
21. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).
22. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
23. Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
24. SHELBY, supra note 4, at 5 (“Conservatives who believe that the fight for racial justice
has already been won naturally reject black nationalism.  They see calls for black political soli-
darity as symptomatic of a pathological ‘victim’s mentality’ and generally urge African Ameri-
cans to stop complaining about their situation and instead to take advantage of the many
opportunities that America offers.  As they see it, the color line is not a serious problem in the
twenty-first century. Indeed, some conservatives insist that the roots of black America’s
problems lie in the self-defeating attitudes and dysfunctional behavior of blacks themselves.”).
25. Robert Barnes, Thomas Concedes That ‘We the People’ Didn’t Include Blacks, WASH.
POST, (Sept. 16, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-16/politics/35497087_1_public-
library-justice-clarence-thomas-black-kids.
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ment to opposing racism, then one can choose to be black or not, and
Justice Thomas’s critics contend that he has chosen not to be.  How-
ever, instead of not being black, Justice Thomas should perhaps be
understood as one of Professor Shelby’s thin black nationalists, whose
commitment to blackness is rooted solely in the shared experience of
discrimination and disadvantage and does not extend to a cultural
identity.  Proof that he accepts blackness as a shared experience and
commitment to combating racism is in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70
(1995).
In Missouri v. Jenkins, Thomas criticized the federal courts for
accepting and promoting the notion of black inferiority.26  There, the
lower courts required the school district to address segregated schools
by instituting a magnet program to prevent or reverse “white flight”
from the city to the suburbs.  The mere fact that the school district had
become overwhelmingly black  (over 90%) meant to the lower courts
that the black students were stigmatized and psychologically harmed
by the absence of white children.  Thomas seized the opportunity to
chastise his fellow judges, “It never ceases to amaze me that the courts
are so willing to assume that anything that is predominantly black
must be inferior.”27
Thomas continues, “[T]he court has read our cases to support the
theory that black students suffer an unspecified psychological harm
from segregation that retards their mental and educational develop-
ment. This approach not only relies upon questionable social science
research rather than constitutional principle, but it also rests on an
assumption of black inferiority.”28  His black critics should concede
that very few have had and seized the opportunity to scold learned,
presumably ‘nonracist’ federal judges about their tendency to accept
black inferiority and the ensuing cycle of paternalism and dependency
it promotes.
Perhaps Thomas refuses to sanction legal and governmental ac-
tivity in the realm of race because there is little reason for a student of
history to trust a predominately white male judiciary to consider race
in a way that benefits blacks, or, if they attempted such, to do it well,
26. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 114-116.  (“The District Court also concluded that because of the KCMSD’s fail-
ure to ‘become integrated on a system wide basis,’ the dual system still exerted ‘lingering effects’
upon KCMSD black students, whose ‘general attitude of inferiority’ produced “low achievement
. . . which ultimately limits employment opportunities and causes poverty. . . .  Without more, the
District Court’s findings could not have supported a finding of liability against the state.”).
28. Id.
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i.e., in a way that does not accept and promote black inferiority and
dependence.29  Perhaps Justice Thomas remembers “when affirmative
action was white,” when white majorities enacted legislation specifi-
cally and explicitly for the benefit of whites.30  For example, in 18th
century South Carolina, the legislature required planters who used
slaves to sell their products at market to hire a white male for every
five slaves deployed as vendors.31
Perhaps Thomas absolutely rejects the government’s use of race
because it provides an opportunity for whites to invoke race for their
own benefit.  After slave insurrections, South Carolina also took af-
firmative steps towards attracting white men to the “lo country” to
provide protection for white life and property.  After a violent revolt
by the likes of Denmark Vesey or Nat Turner, I think it quite likely
that a white federal district judge in 18th or 19th century South Caro-
lina would find race-based legislation, like lowering or eliminating the
poll tax for white men, a narrowly tailored program to further a com-
pelling government interest.
The point here is not to analyze affirmative action or Thomas’s
constitutional jurisprudence for its propriety or utility, but to defend
Justice Thomas’s blackness, however “thin.”  Justice Thomas’s black-
ness comports with Professor Shelby’s description of a thin, pragmatic
black nationalist.  Shelby distinguishes between classic black national-
ists who tend to promote a black cultural or religious identity as well
as economic or political separation as goals in themselves, versus prag-
matic black nationalists who  adopt these strategies only to the extent
they are useful towards resisting oppression.32  Shelby’s pragmatic na-
tionalist increases his or her solidarity with other blacks in hard times,
but embraces more of his or her own individual autonomy in good
times.  For Shelby, these times are good, and by stating that white
racism is “not incorrigible” he can envision things getting better.33
29. See generally ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DEICSION MAKING FROM LE-
GAL FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 109-110 (2d ed. 2005).
30. See generally IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UN-
TOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2006).
31. George Ruble Woolfolk, Taxes and Slavery in the Antebellum South, 26 J.S. HIST. 180,
186 (1960).  See generally ROBIN EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY (2006).
32. SHELBY, supra note 4, at 5 (“Yet there are conservative forms of black nationalism.
These typically eschew political programs aimed at structural transformation, opting instead for
group self-help strategies that emphasize the need for in group responsibility . . . .  They believe
. . . that African Americans should form self-reliant black communities without making further
demands on the state for racial reform.”).
33. But see Derrick Bell, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM (1992).
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Unfortunately, Shelby does not develop a framework for deter-
mining whether times are ripe for greater solidarity, organization and
protest.  So here again we return to the question of boycotts.  When
might a “conservative” black person, when might a thin nationalist,
when might a black person of Justice Thomas’s ilk and stature join a
boycott?  Consider also that Shelby warns against uninformed and
haphazard protests, as well as those that focus on “less serious” racial
phenomena.  Consider also that Shelby warns against the kind of
black solidarity that leads to black fascism.  How might a boycott or-
ganization or any 21st century civil rights organization properly oper-
ate under these prescriptions?
III. BLACK BOYCOTT ORGANIZATION
In Consumer Boycotts Versus Civil Litigation: A Rudimentary Ef-
ficiency Analysis, I contend that “boycotts . . . ought to have a special
role in today’s society because litigation strategies to combat racism
have been severely curtailed by Supreme Court decisions, and there
are numerous discriminatory practices existing entirely outside the
reach of the legal system that affect the prosperity of Black people.”34
Not only do I maintain that position, I also reiterate that “[t]o further
facilitate the advantages of consumer boycotts, an organization (newly
created or an arm of an existing civil rights organization) should be
established and dedicated to the specific task of effecting economic
justice using the market power of black consumers.”35
A boycott organization can overcome certain obstacles and hin-
drances, like minimizing the costs to boycott participants by identify-
ing substitute and alternative goods, gathering reliable information,
countering misinformation, and distinguishing lawful protestors from
the unlawful and the overzealous.  To be effective, a boycott organiza-
tion should identify discriminators and their practices; coordinate de-
cisions on which entities to boycott, the amount of resources to
dedicate, and whether to accompany a refusal to deal with picketing
and other forms of persuasion; as well as publicize the target, reasons
for the boycott, and demands.  Once a boycott has started, a sponsor-
ing organization ought to assume accountability for the boycott, de-
velop appropriate strategies for influencing would-be patrons of
34. Andre L. Smith, Consumer Boycotts v. Civil Litigation: A Rudimentary Efficiency Anal-
ysis, 43 HOW. L.J. 213, 213 (2000).
35. Id. at 241.
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discriminators, and provide or identify alternative goods and services
for boycotters.  As part of the end game, an organization must demon-
strate resolve, negotiate the terms of ending the boycott, and defend
against empty promises by monitoring the targeted entity for compli-
ance with the negotiated terms.36
From 1966 to 1972, the NAACP sponsored a boycott of Port Gib-
son, Mississippi.  Merchants sued the NAACP for tortuous interfer-
ence with business practices.  But the Supreme Court held that
boycotts for basic dignities and governmental and economic justice
are considered speech and protected by the First Amendment.  The
Court found that the merchants lost business due to speech, rather
than from intimidation by “the black hats,” a group of black men who
monitored the stores to determine whether other blacks were adher-
ing to the boycott.37  Therefore, an organization must ensure that
monitors do not use violent or intimidating tactics that destroy or
overwhelm the speech aspect of the boycott.  In realist or critical fash-
ion, Gary Minda reminds us that whether a boycott is protected by the
First Amendment depends in part on the imagery the boycott
invokes.38
Moreover, an organization must ensure that the boycott is dedi-
cated to economic racial justice for black people as a whole, and not
primarily for the benefit of any particular entity or individual.  In Su-
perior Court Trial Lawyers Association (SCTLA), Wiley Branton,
then Dean of Howard University School of Law (to whom this sympo-
sium piece is dedicated) advised the SCTLA that it should take bold
actions to send a message to the public regarding the inadequate com-
pensation of public defenders, but the resulting boycott of cases by
those public defenders was held to be an illegal price-fixing scheme
because the benefits of their successful boycott inured directly to each
individual boycott participant: the public defenders.  By extension, a
boycott organization totally funded by competitors of a targeted busi-
ness may discredit the speech characteristics of the boycott.39
Boycotting the Washington, D.C. court system, as the Superior
Court Trial Lawyers did, is an example of how boycotts can be
deployed outside of the consumer context.  The essence of a boycott is
36. Id. at 237.
37. See generally NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
38. GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA: HOW IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY SHAPE THE
LEGAL MIND 83-84 (1999).
39. Smith, supra note 34, at 240.
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simply a “refusal to deal.”  Therefore, where and whenever black peo-
ple determine that it is not to our aggregate benefit to maintain a par-
ticular association or relationship, the withdrawal from that
association or relationship can be considered a boycott.  Recall that
the international boycott of South Africa had such a profound effect
because it combined a consumer/tourism boycott with a divestment
campaign.  The divestment campaign was an organized refusal to in-
vest in companies who invested or did significant business with the
apartheid regime.  It too was a boycott.  Similarly, by leaving en masse
for British Columbia, Mifflin Wistar Gibbs and the black miners of
California staged a boycott against the state of California.40
Expatriation is not typically viewed as a boycott or protest tactic.
But this is a mistake.  As Professor Shelby points out, yes, there are
some black nationalists, Rastafarians for example, who still view repa-
triation to Africa as a duty, as a necessary fulfillment of destiny for
black people.41  But Shelby also points out that most of the black lead-
ers who have advocated for expatriation throughout U.S. history are
typically “pragmatic” black nationalists, who evaluated all protest tac-
tics in terms of their costs and benefits (however accounted).42  From
Martin Delaney to Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Du Bois to Bob Mar-
ley, each advocated expatriation not necessarily as a means of fulfil-
ling destiny but as a means of countering racism and oppression.
Black nationalists like Shelby do not care to leave one form of oppres-
sion to endure another simply because it is “black.”  Ultimately, the
decision to expatriate, like the decision to boycott in all circumstances,
should be made based largely on long-term utility.43
Now, if we are to inject the concept of utility and cost/benefit
analysis into the boycott equation, then perhaps we should deal with
the warnings of Nobel Prize winner Gary Becker, who in his seminal
work, The Economics of Discrimination, argued some years ago that
black expatriation would harm black workers economically.44  He re-
fers specifically to Marcus Garvey’s UNIA movement.45  Becker
presents mathematical equations purporting to demonstrate how a
40. GIBBS, supra note 1, at 63.
41. See SHELBY, supra note 4, at 28.
42. See SHELBY, supra note 4, at 87.
43. See id.
44. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 24 (2d ed., 1971).
45. Id. at 24 n.7.
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complete boycott of trade with whites will lessen the incomes of black
workers.46
[T]his analysis demonstrates that complete segregation reduces
the absolute and relative income of the minority and therefore in-
creases, rather than decreases, the market discrimination against it.
Effective discrimination occurs against a minority partly because it
gains so much by “trading” with the majority; accordingly, complete
segregation does not avoid the bad economic effects of discrimina-
tion but only multiplies them.47
Becker also compares the economic position of blacks favorably
with that of Native Americans.  “If, when the Negro slaves were freed,
their per capita resources were no greater than the Indians’ per capita
resources, one can reasonably attribute some of the present difference
between per capita Negro and Indian incomes to differences in their
contact with whites.”48  It would seem that for Becker it is better for
blacks to have a subordinate relationship with whites than no relation-
ship at all.
Becker’s analysis is a fantastic example of how economic analysis
is an incredibly useful tool, but far too myopic or reductionist to deal
with real world problems by itself.  Becker’s model takes no account
of non-economic values such as dignity, solidarity, heritage, and cul-
ture.  It is not unreasonable to argue that Native American nations,
because of their refusals to deal, forced or otherwise, have held on to
their dignity, solidarity, heritage, and culture more so than blacks.  To
some, dignity and heritage and culture are priceless.  Consider the
Amish or priests in other religious orders who consciously and strate-
gically forego economic benefits for the preservation of their personal
dignity or collective personality.  Examples abound why fully rational
people do not always commit to profit maximization.
Another blindspot in Becker’s analysis is his singular focus on
black labor and the lack of analysis regarding the potential benefits of
expatriation to black capital.  One might expect that if self-segregation
by blacks were harmful to black capital, Becker would make this point
as well, but he does not.  So, while it may be “dangerous” to extract
any conclusions about black capital from Becker’s work, The Eco-
nomics of Discrimination leaves the impression that black capital
might benefit from what Becker calls “complete segregation.”  Anec-
46. Id. at 22 n.6.
47. Id. at 24.
48. Id.
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dotally, the experiences of Mifflin Wistar Gibbs and the flight of black
miners to British Columbia suggest that short- and long-term opportu-
nities for black entrepreneurs may exceed the short-term losses in em-
ployment income.
Becker’s model also ignores alternative opportunities and alter-
native trading partners.  There is nothing about expatriation that pre-
vents blacks from selling labor to non-white entrepreneurs, be they
black, Asian, Latino, or otherwise.  Becker’s model does not account
for this.  Plus, the identification of alternatives would be one of the
primary responsibilities of a standing boycott organization.  Thus, af-
ter considering the price of dignity, solidarity, heritage, and culture,
the long-term benefits of a successful boycott, the potential positive
effect on black capital, and the possibility of alternatives, one can ac-
cept Becker’s claim that boycotts tend to place burdens upon black
workers and consumers economically, and yet still advocate for boy-
cotts because the long-term benefits of a successful boycott exceed the
short-term costs.
This paper is not about expatriation.  Instead, expatriation, as
perhaps the ultimate protest tactic, is deployed here simply as an ex-
ample of how broad the concept of boycott can be and how a standing
organization might make boycotting more efficient and effective.  At
this first stage of the 21st century, there is very little political energy
behind black expatriation.  Unlike the Wistar Gibbs’s black miners of
California, blacks today enjoy at least de jure legal equality, nation-
ally.  And black enthusiasm towards the election of Barack Obama
suggests that black people today seek to engage more with the federal,
state, and local government rather than boycott and refuse to deal
with it.  Therefore, the following section considers a framework for an
organization to determine when a boycott would be useful in today’s
racial climate.
IV. CHOOSING WISELY: ASYMMETRICAL MARKET
FAILURES AND INTEREST DIVERGENCE
After seriously considering how broad a concept “boycott” can
be, the usefulness of an organization dedicated to organizing boycotts
should become apparent.  Because of the short-term burdens boycotts
tend to place on black workers and consumers, a publicized group
boycott should be deployed only against serious instances of racial in-
justice, and perhaps only when lawsuits or changes in the law are ei-
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ther not forthcoming or likely to be ineffective even if garnered.
Individuals are always free to reject, disassociate, and generally refuse
to deal with entities and phenomena that intentionally or unintention-
ally maintain or exacerbate racial inequality.  But an organization
dedicated to boycotts for racial justice should deploy some framework
for determining first, whether a racial circumstance warrants protest
at all and second, whether an appeal to the public at large would be
insufficient.
An organization should determine whether the aims of the boy-
cott are worthy.  Consider calls to boycott certain aspects of the justice
system, like jury nullification,49 where juries were encouraged to
forego convictions of non-violent drug dealers because of the dispro-
portionate nature of the punishment, or “stop snitching” campaigns,50
where some in the streets of urban cities promote a campaign of non-
cooperation with law enforcement.  What complicates the call for jury
nullification and non-cooperation with law enforcement is the fact
that just as much as the benefits of the protest are intended for poor,
misguided youths, there is also no denying that the benefits of nullifi-
cation and non-cooperation inure also and perhaps more greatly to
malevolent drug dealers who care nothing about the communities they
are destroying through drug trafficking and violence.  A boycott or-
ganization may determine that a refusal to deal with law enforcement
produces no net benefit at all.
Similarly, an organization dedicated to boycotts for racial justice
must determine whether the call to boycott in a particular circum-
stance is not otherwise a distraction from more meaningful protest.
This is a question of opportunity costs.  Black boycotts should have a
grander objective than merely keeping a single, popular television
show with a predominately black cast on network television, for exam-
ple; recognizing, of course, that the unwarranted canceling of a single
popular show could under the right circumstances represent and illus-
trate a much deeper inequity.  And so here is also where an organiza-
tion might improve the efficacy and efficiency of a boycott by
identifying and stating precisely the grander goals of the protest.
The framework I offer to an organization for determining when
to sponsor a boycott involves two constructs: one, racism as asymmet-
49. See generally Paul D. Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Crim-
inal Justice System, 105 YALE L. J. 677 (1995).
50. See generally Bret D. Asbury, Anti-Snitching Norms and Community Loyalty, 89 OR. L.
REV. 1257 (2011).
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rical market imperfections relating to race and, two, interest conver-
gence theory.  Racism as asymmetrical market imperfections is
designed to help identify those instances of racial subordination seri-
ously impacting aggregate racial economic inequality.51  Then, Derrick
Bell’s interest convergence theory is meant to determine which of
these instances is likely to be addressed publicly because the interests
of whites and blacks relating to the matter tend to converge, versus
instances in need of private protest by blacks because the interests of
most whites and blacks relating to the matter tend to diverge.
Describing racism as asymmetrical market imperfections is a
means for distinguishing between phenomena which is susceptible to
governmental interference of a legislative, judicial, or executive char-
acter versus that which must be confronted if at all through private
protest tactics.  A racially asymmetrical market imperfection exists
where the supposedly-free market is manipulated to favor a dominant
group over a subordinate group, e.g., whites over blacks, males over
females, heterosexuals over homosexuals.  In neoclassical economic
theory, a free market distributes goods and services and ideas to indi-
viduals based on merit.  This theoretical free market can perform its
equitable distribution function only upon the existence of four
precepts—profit maximization, perfect competition, perfect informa-
tion, and zero transaction costs.  However, even some neoclassical
economists acknowledge that none of these conditions exist perfectly,
not even substantially in some cases.52  In fact, law is most easily justi-
fied to the extent it is designed to repair structural flaws in the market
for goods, services, and ideas.53
Racism then can be described as those structural flaws in the free
market that maintain or exacerbate white supremacy in the market for
goods, services, and ideas.  Specifically, racist phenomena include le-
gal and cultural phenomena that prevent or discourage blacks from
maximizing profits or personal utility (asymmetrically imperfect profit
maximization), that prevents or discourages blacks from competing in
segments of the market (asymmetrically imperfect competition), that
51. Andre L. Smith, Race, Law, and the Free Market:  A Critical Law and Economics Con-
ception of Racism as Asymmetrical Market Failure, 4 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP.
39, 49 (2012).
52. See, e.g., RICHARD KOZUL-WRIGHT & PAUL RAYMNET, THE RESISTIBLE RISE OF MAR-
KET FUNDAMENTALISM: RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN AN UNBALANCED WORLD
(2008).
53. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: 2009-
2010 SUPPLEMENT 4 (2009).
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provides less useful information to or skews information about black
people (asymmetrically imperfect information), and that burdens
blacks with costs greater than that endured by similarly situated
whites (asymmetrically distributed transaction costs).
An organization dedicated to sponsoring boycotts for racial jus-
tice might promote or defend a boycott based on the prevalence of
asymmetrically distributed transaction costs.  “Asymmetrically distrib-
uted transaction costs” describes how harmful byproducts of other-
wise useful transactions are designed to burden black communities
more than whites.  Environmental racism—the placement of harmful
substances in predominately black neighborhoods—is a prime exam-
ple of asymmetrically distributed transaction costs.  Toxic waste and
other harmful pollutants are a byproduct of an otherwise useful trans-
action and are far too often dumped in predominately black neighbor-
hoods.  Unequal voting rights, along with lack of voter engagement,
education, and mobilization are primary mechanisms for producing
asymmetrical transaction costs (as well as other asymmetries).
Examples of asymmetrically distributed transaction costs abound.
The costs associated with the War on Drugs are borne in greater pro-
portions by predominately black neighborhoods.54  Disproportionate
law enforcement relates to asymmetrical transaction costs in several
ways: disproportionate protection of predominantly white neighbor-
hoods, lack of protection in predominately black neighborhoods, ra-
cial profiling, disproportionate application of prosecutorial discretion,
disparate sentencing, etc.55  Even the disparate treatment of blacks in
tort law fits within the rubric of asymmetrically distributed transaction
costs.56  Taxes are perhaps the quintessential transactions costs, and
critical tax theorists discuss how the benefits and burdens of federal
taxation are asymmetrically distributed.57
Asymmetrically distributed transaction costs are on the one hand
an example of disparate treatment based on race.  But more impor-
tantly, they demonstrate how the free market does not operate in the
54. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2012); Kenneth B. Nunn,
Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on Drugs” Was a “War on
Blacks”, 6 IOWA J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 381 (2002).
55. See generally Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race:  The Power and Privilege of Dis-
cretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998); Tracy Maclin, Race and the Fouth Amendment, 51
VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998).
56. DOROTHY A. BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
98-138 (Dorothy Brown ed., 2003).
57. See generally BRIDGET J. CRAWFORD, CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
(Anthony C. Infanti ed., 2009).
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glorious way its proponents suggest and that asymmetrical imperfec-
tions in the free market will likely generate greater economic inequal-
ity in the future.  Entities (commercial, government, or other) that
seek to produce, allow, or maintain asymmetrically distributed trans-
actions costs should be subject to protest actions, including boycotts.
Mifflin Wistar Gibbs’s black miners proved that a boycott could be
launched against an entire state, and the international boycott of
South Africa showed that a boycott can influence a whole nation.  The
same goes for entities that contribute to asymmetrically imperfect
competition, asymmetrically imperfect information, and asymmetri-
cally imperfect commitments to profit maximization.
An organization dedicated to sponsoring boycotts for racial jus-
tice might promote or defend a boycott based on the prevalence of
asymmetrically imperfect competition.  “Asymmetrically imperfect
competition” relates to phenomena that disproportionately prevent
blacks from entering markets they wish to enter or leaving markets
they wish to leave.  Slavery was the ultimate restriction on competi-
tion.  Slaves could not choose markets that were lucrative to them,
and could not exit markets assigned to them.  After Reconstruction,
whites in the Jim Crow South reinstituted slavery by combining a sys-
tem of sharecropping and convict leasing to practically eliminate com-
petition for black labor and agricultural produce.58  In the North,
black were excluded by social institutions such as labor unions and
trade associations, etc.59
Historically, boycotts for racial justice have typically been justi-
fied on the grounds of asymmetrical competition.  The Montgomery
Bus Boycott dealt with segregation, which at its heart prevents black
competition over goods and services deemed “white” and restricts
blacks to markets deemed “black” or “colored.”  That whites were
similarly restricted in terms of competition was important towards the
defeat of Jim Crow laws.  The NAACP boycott of Port Gibson, Missis-
sippi was based on the inability of blacks to compete for jobs.  Even
the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association boycotted for the pur-
pose of receiving compensation sufficient enough to compete fairly in
halls of justice.  While all restrictions on competition do not necessa-
rily justify a boycott, it seems most boycotts are justified in part as a
response to anti-competitive behavior.
58. See generally Blackmon, supra note 11.
59. See generally Daria Roithmayr, Racial Cartels, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 45 (2010).
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An organization dedicated to sponsoring boycotts for racial jus-
tice might promote or defend a boycott based on the prevalence of
asymmetrically distributed information.  “Asymmetrically imperfect
information” relates to disproportionate availability of information to
black people as well as stereotypes and other misinformation about
black people within and without the educational system.60  Primary
and secondary school desegregation and affirmative action in col-
legiate admissions have become the normal means for addressing the
lack of educational opportunities available to black people, the typical
means by which society as a whole was willing to address asymmetri-
cally distributed information.  But many commentators criticize deseg-
regation efforts as half-hearted and ineffective.  And, as far as
affirmative action is concerned, the Supreme Court has indicated that,
whatever its actual worth, its days are numbered.  Black folks have
taken to boycotting the public schools by dropping out, advocating for
private school vouchers, resorting to home schooling, etc.
Stereotypes and other misinformation about black people can be
summed up in one word: inferiority.  Institutions, from those in the
educational system to corporate media outlets, continue to describe
black people as naturally or inherently inferior to whites (and others).
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, those who would maintain
white economic, political, and cultural supremacy could indiscreetly
advance the notion of black inferiority.  Today, it is taboo to openly
question the legal equality of blacks.  According to some conservative
black scholars, black people are not inherently inferior but adhere to
an inferior culture of sloth, prurience, and irresponsibility.61  What is
left unexplained by these critics of black culture is how this immoral
black culture has come to be.  If black people created this inferior
culture autonomously and, moreover, are blindly attached to it, this
suggests that black people just cannot think straight and that their in-
feriority is inherent.
On the other hand, those who believe that black adherence to a
degraded culture is promoted by  educational and media institutions
that sell black inferiority to their main constituents (whites) are more
apt to boycott the school system and corporate media offerings, and
60. Smith, supra note 51, at 44.
61. Kimberle´ Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Le-
gitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1379 (1988) (presenting some of
the claims of conservative black economist Thomas Sowell).
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more apt to promote Afrocentric education and black-owned or pro-
duced media.  No less than Albert Einstein declared that:
It seems to be a universal fact that minorities, especially when
their individuals are recognizable because of physical differences,
are treated by majorities among whom they live as an inferior class.
The tragic part of such a fate, however, lies not only in the automat-
ically realized disadvantage suffered by these minorities in eco-
nomic and social relations, but also in the fact that those who meet
such treatment themselves for the most part acquiesce in the
prejudiced estimate because of the suggestive influence of the ma-
jority, and come to regard people like themselves as inferior.  This
second and more important aspect of the evil can be met through
closer union and conscious educational enlightenment among the
minority, and so an emancipation of the soul of the minority can be
attained.  The determined effort of the American Negroes in this
direction deserves every recognition and assistance.62
Einstein understood that the most pernicious vestige of slavery
and institutionalized white supremacy is the frequency with which
black people see themselves as inferior.  Terms like “slave mentality”
and “self-hatred” are often used to describe this condition.  I do not
mean to include here those blacks who have chosen for religious or
political reasons to withdraw from or boycott the entire American po-
litical-economic system and who fully dedicate themselves towards
pursuing non-commercial utility functions.  However, under a law and
economics conception of racism, we can describe a collective lack of
vigor as an asymmetrical commitment to profit maximization or ra-
tionality.  Thus, “asymmetrically imperfect profit maximization” re-
lates to phenomena which disproportionately discourage blacks from
seeking to maximize economic returns for personal effort.
Of course, the primary responsibility for shedding a destructive
collective personality falls within the group itself.  However, there
have historically been several kinds of offenses against black people
designed to reduce the collective desire to participate in our national
economic system, including the assassination and pre-textual prosecu-
tion of black civil rights leaders, whippings, beatings, rapes, lynchings,
and other murders, the destruction of successful black towns like
Black Wall Street in Oklahoma and Rosewood in Florida, etc.  Less
obviously, media stereotyping and systemic mis-education have the ef-
fect of convincing some that black people ought to not participate vig-
62. FRED JEROME & RODGER TAYLOR, EINSTEIN ON RACE AND RACISM 9-10 (2005).
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orously in commerce for reason of their likely failure.63  It is in this
sense that segregated schools are ‘stigmatizing.’  Moreover, racial in-
sults and hate crimes are also designed to discourage blacks from vig-
orously pursuing happiness in whatever form.  Thus, an organization
dedicated to sponsoring boycotts for racial justice might promote or
defend a boycott against entities that seek to discourage black profit
maximization.
If a public response or less costly protest tactic will adequately
address the issue, an organizational boycott should be forestalled until
such time as it is determined that a public response is not forthcoming
or that an alternative protest tactic is not working.  Boycotts consume
resources, and those who participate in the boycott will have to con-
sume alternative and sometimes inferior goods.  Also, boycotts may
lose some expressive character if deployed too often.  Therefore, over
some of these issues—explicit prohibitions on black competition, for
example—the interests of whites and blacks converge, and a public
response may be likely.
To determine when a boycott may be appropriate, a boycott or-
ganization might deploy a framework around asymmetrical market
failure.  White people, or at least those with wealth, benefit from the
notion (real or imagined) that America operates a free market be-
cause a free market is a guarantor of meritocracy.64  If this is true, that
America is a meritocracy, then the wealth they have is deserved be-
cause it is due to effort and successful competition.  But to the extent
and degree America does not operate a free market, black claims re-
garding inequitable distributions of wealth become more salient and
persuasive.  Thus, whites have an interest, nominally, at least, in cor-
recting market failures generally and market failures relating to race
specifically. “To bring a fundamental challenge to the way things are,
whites would have to question . . . the economic and the racial myths
that justify the status quo.”65
The degree of interest convergence over the structure of the free
market, and thus the likelihood that a public response can be counted
upon to address racist phenomena, depends first on the ease with
63. RICHARD H. SANDER & STUART TAYLOR JR., MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT 4 (2012).
64. Crenshaw, supra note 61, at 1380 (“Race consciousness also reinforces whites’ sense
that American society is really meritocratic and thus helps prevent them from questioning the
basic legitimacy of the free market.”).
65. Id. at 1380.
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which the phenomenon can be described either as asymmetrical profit
maximization, competition, information, or transaction costs.  Second,
the degree of interest convergence is greater when the phenomenon
produces, maintains, or exacerbates a number of asymmetries.  For ex-
ample, slavery and the system that supported it represented asymmet-
rical profit maximization in that it conceived blacks as less than
people, asymmetrical competition in that it almost completely pre-
vented blacks from entering or leaving markets, asymmetrical infor-
mation in that it was based on and perpetuated a false notion of black
inferiority, and asymmetrically distributed transaction costs in that
whites attempted to pass as much of the burdens of society on black as
they could.  Similarly, re-enslavement under Jim Crow-style share-
cropping and convict leasing could be easily described as an affront to
the concept of a free market.  Moreover, all de jure discrimination can
be degrading (asymmetrical profit maximization), stigmatizing (asym-
metrical information), anti-competitive (asymmetrical competition),
and burdensome (asymmetrically distributed transaction costs).
There is little wonder, then, why public institutions defend the notion
of a free market by prohibiting explicit or indiscreet racist conduct of
the explicit and indiscreet kind.
But the interests of whites and blacks do not always converge;
sometimes they are divergent.  Consider that slavery was beneficial to
white property owners, but slave labor crowded out Yeomen white
farmers and skilled laborers, all the while reducing labor competition
in the North.  Yeomen white farmers, Northern capitalists, and skilled
laborers who should have rejected slavery as against their economic
interests were compensated with cultural superiority over blacks.66
Thus, cultural superiority, which most often takes the form of false
notions of Black inferiority, is where the interests of whites in the ag-
gregate and blacks in the aggregate tend to diverge.
The false notion of black inferiority is maintained by media and
the educational system.  While, according to Gary Becker, the wealth
of a nation is truly in the human capital of all its citizens, and thus it is
against the interest of the United States of America as a collective to
inadequately and improperly educate black children and to promote
their inferiority through media; the benefits to whites (and others)
66. Id. at 1374 (“[R]acial privilege could and does serve as a compensation for class
disadvantage.”).
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from the notion of black inferiority are subtle yet ubiquitous.67  The
notion of black inferiority is indispensable to a socio-economic politi-
cal caste system.  Thus, the recalcitrance of this interest divergence
suggests a proper opportunity to boycott.
Black parents of various social classes, religious beliefs and politi-
cal leanings are increasingly turning towards private school vouchers,
charter schools, home schooling, and Afrocentric education as ways to
counteract the tribulations of our nation’s public schools in terms of
both under-education and mis-education.  The inadequacy of public
education has been a progenitor of racial inequality since its begin-
nings in the United States.  At first, it was not provided to blacks at
all, where all resources towards education were dedicated to white
children.  Then only in a de jure segregated manner, where the lion’s
share of public funds for education was dedicated to whites-only
schools.  And now primarily in a de facto segregated manner, where
the lion’s share of public funds for education are dedicated to schools
in neighborhoods where the residents just happen to be primarily
white.68  While many are still fighting for equal education for all chil-
dren, some black people are refusing to deal with the public school
systems as we know it.  Vouchers, charter schools, home schooling,
and Afrocentric education are becoming ordinary and prevalent ways
to protest a government-run system that does not respond to the
needs of blacks as a discrete and identifiable group and, to some, is
nothing more than a way station or pipeline to prisons for poor black
youths.
CONCLUSION
Blackness is neither my skin tone, nor my place of origin, nor the
culture I embrace.  Indeed, there is little useful purpose in being black
unless it is against institutionalized white supremacy in education, en-
tertainment, economics, labor, law, politics, sex, religion and war; un-
less it is against what Charles Mills calls a Herrenvolk Ethic; unless it
is against the institution of a loose racial caste system.  I believe this
conception of blackness and racism is consistent with the ideas ex-
pressed in Derrick Bell’s Faces at the Bottom of the Well, subtitled the
Permanence of Racism.
67. Gary S. Becker, The Age of Human Capital, in EDWARD P. LAZEAR, EDUCATION IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3 (2002).
68. See generally San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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Professor Bell demonstrated how the need for America to appear
meritocratic was the true catalyst for Brown v. Board of Education
and the dismantling of legal American apartheid.  At this time in his-
tory, nations must compete vigorously over those with the intellectual
capacities to solve the worsening energy puzzle.  Success in recruiting
intellectuals is crucial since American education in math and science
continues to lag.  Just as Martin Luther King surmised that America
could not claim the moral high ground in the Cold War while it prac-
ticed apartheid, blacks and whites in America today should realize
that maintaining white supremacy hinders America’s efforts to win the
hearts and minds of non-white peoples in the time of the so-called
War on Terror.  Thus, incorporating asymmetrical market imperfec-
tions within American legal theory is a public means to foster greater
meritocracy and greater standing for America in the world.
But sometimes the benefits derived from the appearance or myth
of merit will not exceed the benefits of white privilege and cultural
supremacy.  This interest divergence seems to present itself most often
in the context of asymmetrical information, where whites (and others)
tend to benefit from the false notion of black inferiority.  To the ex-
tent the notion of black inferiority is produced externally, blacks
should boycott those media outlets and educational institutions that
promote or maintain it.  An organization dedicated to boycotts for
racial justice, utilizing the framework of asymmetrical market failures
as a proxy for racism and economic injustice, should be created as a
means for making such protests meaningful, effective, and efficient.
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“Social Security has served this nation well.  As a vital symbol of the
compact between present generations and those yet to come, it de-
serves the utmost intellectual and political effort to preserve it from
obsolescence or even extinction.”1
Meet Jack and Jill.2  More than a decade ago, the couple fell in
love and had dreams of one day having a family.  Arguably, Jack and
Jill had it all: successful careers, loving families and friends, and a
large home in suburbia complete with the white picket fence.  One
thing was missing from their cookie-cutter Pleasantville existence,
however: children.  Their dreams of having a family were stalled when
1. ANDREW ACHENBAUM, SOCIAL SECURITY VISIONS AND REVISIONS 9 (1986).
2. This introductory story is fictional.  The story will depict facts typical of a case on appeal
regarding a denial of survivorship benefits to a posthumously conceived applicant.
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Jack was diagnosed with cancer.  In an effort to preserve the possibil-
ity of Jill conceiving his biological child, Jack underwent sperm cry-
opreservation prior to commencing chemotherapy.  His doctors feared
that any chemotherapy treatments might render him sterile.  Jack did
not want to take any chances.
His genetic material was frozen and preserved to—possibly—be
used later.  Because of the conservation process, Jill could later be
artificially inseminated with Jack’s sperm and the couple’s dreams of a
family could turn into reality.  However, the couple never discussed
when Jill would be artificially inseminated, in the event that Jack be-
came sterile.  The couple never discussed whether Jill could use the
sperm in the unfortunate event of Jack’s death.  In fact, the couple had
very few substantive discussions regarding Jack’s frozen genetics.
Sadly, after only a brief bout with cancer and multiple futile chemo-
therapy treatments, Jack lost his battle with cancer.  Jack died intes-
tate and without expressly consenting to Jill’s use of his sperm during
his life or after his death.
Jill, stricken with grief, decided to find some sense of absolution
by having a child—Jack’s child.  Shortly after burying her husband, Jill
was artificially inseminated with Jack’s sperm—the sperm that she ob-
tained without Jack’s consent.  Nine months later, she gave birth to
Jack’s biological twins.  Jack never had the chance or opportunity to
acknowledge the children in writing.  Jack was never judicially de-
creed to be the father of the children.  Jack never lived with the chil-
dren, supported the children, or contributed to the upbringing and
welfare of the children.  Nevertheless, Jill applied on behalf of her
children to receive Jack’s Social Security survivorship benefits.  How-
ever, the Social Security Administration determined that Jill’s chil-
dren were ineligible for Jack’s benefits.  Jill was shocked and surprised
when she was subsequently denied receipt of survivorship benefits for
her children who did not survive Jack but were born after his death.
Accordingly, the Social Security Administration determined that Jill’s
children were not eligible for survivorship benefits.
According to the Social Security Administration Commissioner,
an administrative law judge, and a federal district court, Jill could not
receive survivorship benefits on behalf of her twins, because Jill’s chil-
dren were not considered “children” under the meaning of the statute.
Her next resort was an appeal to a federal circuit court.  However, she
was to learn that the outcome of her appeal, would not depend en-
tirely upon the language of the Social Security Act or any federal case
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law.  The outcome of her case would be dependent on intestacy prop-
erty laws of the state in which her husband was domiciled prior to his
death.
INTRODUCTION
President Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act (“Act”) into
law in 1935 during one of America’s worst economic times.3  Many
considered the law as a way to protect individuals who could no
longer help themselves.4  Individuals began receiving their benefits
monthly in 1940.5  Although the Act was originally enacted to protect
individuals from becoming poverty stricken, Congress enacted several
amendments in the 1960s to provide protection to individuals who
were dependent upon the wage earner.6  These amendments provided
survivorship benefits and included definitions of individuals who
would and could be considered survivors.  Whether an individual fell
under the definition of a “child” is provided, expressly.7  However,
whether an individual that was conceived posthumously is a “child”
under the statute is not clear.8
The statute provides that the way to determine whether a posthu-
mously conceived child is a “child” under the Act depends on the
3. Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SSA, http://www.ssa.gov/
history/briefhistory3.html (last modified Nov. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Historical Background].
4. Id.  For example,
A woman in South Carolina scrawls a note to a man in Washington whom she
addresses as “Dear Mr. President.” “I’m 72 years old and have no one to take care of
me.” Another letter comes to the White House from Virginia. “I’m a 60 year-old widow
greatly in need of medical aid, food and fuel, I pray that you would have pity on me.”
Letters such as these came by the thousands from old folks across the country to the
President, to Mrs. Roosevelt, to almost everyone in Washington whose name was famil-
iar to them.
Id.
5. FAQ, SSA, http://www.ssa.gov/history/hfaq.html (last modified Nov. 14, 2012).  The
monthly benefit payments were designed to help surviving family members of a deceased age
earner and the benefit payments  “are among the Act’s family-protective measures.” See, e.g.,
Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012).
6. FAQ supra note 5; see also Edmund L. Andrews & Eduardo Porter, Social Security:
Help for the Poor or Help for All?, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2005, at 1 (discussing that the Social
Security Act has now become a way in which people who have worked hard may retire with the
money that they paid into and earned).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2006).  Child means “the child or legally adopted child of an individ-
ual . . . .” Id.
8. Id.  The legal status of a posthumously conceived child in the context of the Act and
survivorship benefits will depend upon state property laws. See id. at § 416(h)(2)(A).  Further, it
is safe to say that “the technology that made [posthumous conception] and birth possible . . . was
not contemplated by Congress in 1939 and 1965 when those provisions were enacted . . . .”
Adam Liptak, Children Not Entitled to Dead Father’s Benefits, Justices Rule, N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 2012, at A1 (internal quotations omitted).
920 [VOL. 56:917
Death, Sperm Heists, and Test Tube Babies
Commissioner of Social Security’s application of state intestacy laws
“of the state in which the insured was domiciled upon his death . . . .”9
Understandably, when the amendments to the Act were enacted, re-
productive technology was not what it is today.10  Now, reproductive
technology enables families to procreate in a number of ways, includ-
ing artificial insemination; in vitro fertilization; donor eggs; and surro-
gate wombs.11  Because these technologies did not exist in the 1940s,
there are no express provisions regarding the status of posthumously
conceived children.
Posthumously conceived children should not be permitted to re-
ceive survivorship benefits unless they are considered children under
the plain meaning of the Social Security Act to prevent inevitable
abuse and/or Social Security abuse.  Further, Congress is the appropri-
ate body to change the meaning of “child” under the Act, not the
judiciary.  This Comment discusses the circuit split regarding the issue
of whether a posthumously conceived child is eligible for survivorship
benefits, and analyzes why the recent Supreme Court decision, which
resolved the circuit split, in Astrue v. Capato12 is correct.  Although
the laws are well behind the advancement in reproductive technology
(and technology in general), any changes to the Social Security Act, as
the Justices unanimously agreed,13 should be made by the legislature,
not the courts.  Though a man may freeze his semen and have it stored
in a sperm bank, this action does not give his surviving wife free reign
to use his sperm—to heist his sperm, specifically—and conceive chil-
dren after he dies.14  Thus, support for a posthumously conceived
9. § 416(h)(2)(A).
10. See Liptak, supra note 8.
11. See What Is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last up-
dated Feb. 12, 2013) (explaining that the most common procedures to help women conceive
include the transfer of fertilized human eggs into a woman’s uterus, which is known as in vitro
fertilization).  Since 1981, Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) has been used across the
United States to help women have children. Id.  Although a seemingly low percentage, “over
1% of all infants born in the United States every year are conceived using ART.”  The use of
ART procedures has doubled over the years. Id. See generally CDC, 2010 ASSISTED REPRO-
DUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT (2010) [hereinafter CDC, 2010 REPORT]
(discussing the current trends regarding ART and data on the outcomes of ART).
12. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2029 (2012) (holding that posthumously conceived
twins are not entitled to Social Security benefits). See generally Robert Barnes, Supreme Court
Rules Twins Conceived Posthumously Can’t Get Social Security Benefits, WASH. POST, May 21,
2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-05-21/politics/35457880_1_karen-capato-robert-
capato-social-security-survivor-benefits (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Astrue v.
Capato).
13. Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2026.
14. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father’s Last Will, 46 ARIZ. L.
REV. 91, 93-95 (2004).
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child should be provided for in a testamentary document to prevent
abuse and ensure acknowledgement and consent.
Part I briefly explores the social context and history surrounding
the enactment of the Social Security Act.  Part II examines the defini-
tion of “child,” discusses individual state property laws concerning in-
testacy and posthumously conceived children, and the advancements
in reproductive technology.  Part III examines the first federal appel-
late case that held that posthumously conceived children are children
under the Social Security Act and should receive survivorship bene-
fits.  Part IV discusses the decision in Schafer v. Astrue15 that created
a circuit split by holding that a posthumously conceived child cannot
receive survivorship benefits,16 and this Part also discusses the subse-
quent Eighth Circuit decision, which held similarly.  Part V explores
briefly the recent Supreme Court decision, Astrue v. Capato, that re-
solved the circuit split by holding that posthumously conceived chil-
dren should only be permitted to receive survivorship benefits if they
are expressly authorized pursuant to their respective state property
laws; any changes to this approach should be made by Congress and
not the Court.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
AND THE SURVIVORSHIP PROVISION AT ISSUE17
A. The History and Purpose of the Social Security Act
A 1984 New York Times editorial piece provided that the pur-
pose of the Social Security program was to provide fiscal security to
those who failed to have the foresight to set aside enough money for
their own retirement, or were insolvent and did not have the means to
provide for their own retirement.18  However, this view is hardly per-
15. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011).
16. Id. at 63.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006).
18. Whom Social Security Was Created to Protect, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1984, at A22 [here-
inafter Created to Protect].  Jonathon L. Gifford conjectured that the purpose of Social Security
“‘was to provide income security for those too shortsighted or too poor to provide for their own
retirement.’  He evidently believe[d] that the main and mistaken objective of the program was to
alleviate the condition of such people.  Referring to them, he asks, ‘Ought they to be stigma-
tized?’  He answers: ‘I say yes. The Government ought not to be neutral about shortsighted-
ness.’” Id. In fact, the purpose of the social security legislation (H.R. 2260) provides: An act to
provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal old-age benefits, and by
enabling the several States to make more adequate provision for aged persons, blind persons,
dependent and crippled children, maternal and child welfare, public health, and the administra-
tion of their unemployment compensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; to raise
revenue; and for other purposes.  Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 401 (2006).
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suasive considering the context and fluctuating state of the economy
when the Act was created in the 1920s and the notorious economic fall
in 1929.19
Additionally at this time, retirement plans and pensions were
fruitless or non-existent, banks were failing, and millions of Ameri-
cans were unemployed.20  Thus, as the editorial notes, these condi-
tions could hardly be ignored and those who “failed to have the
foresight to put money away” did not deserve to be stigmatized.21
Thus, Social Security was not created to help those who failed to help
themselves, but it was created to prevent individuals from “falling into
abject poverty” at a time when the likelihood of this occurrence was
certain.22  This purpose leads to several questions, one of which must
be addressed here: if the purpose of the Social Security Act was to
protect individuals and families in failing economic times from falling
into abject poverty, should Social Security benefits extend to children
conceived without the knowledge or consent of a decedent individual?
No.
B. The Social Security Act Survivorship Benefits Process
The Social Security Act contains a number of provisions to limit
problems associated with unemployment, poverty, old age, and “the
burdens of widows and fatherless children.”23  The process to limit
“the burdens of . . . fatherless children” is facially, simple.  If a child
wishes to receive benefits, he must file an application or have his
guardian apply on his behalf.24  Next, the applicant must meet certain
19. See generally Gene Smiley, The U.S. Economy in the 1920s, ECONOMIC HISTORY ASSO-
CIATION (Feb. 1, 2010, 5:21 PM), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/smiley.1920s.final (discussing
the state of the U.S. economy during the 1920s).  In 1929, the vast majority of American homes
earned an annual income below $2000 and the income for a single person at the time was $1000.
Created to Protect, supra note 18, at A22.
20. Created to Protect, supra note 18, at A22.
21. Id. “In a period when industrial pensions were rare and grossly inadequate and with
bank failures, the lack of unemployment insurance and catastrophic illness often wiped out one’s
life savings, were these the shortsighted who deserve to be stigmatized? Or is Mr. Gifford think-
ing of the 15 million or 20 million unemployed who from 1930 to 1941 were so busy looking for
work and raising families that they neglected to save for their retirement years?” Id.
22. Andrews & Porter, supra note 6, at 1.  Accordingly, “Social Security is not a poverty
program, it is a retirement system . . . .” Id (emphasis added).  Justice Ginsburg also notes that
the Social Security Act included a “child insurance benefit” that was a “family protective mea-
sure” to assist surviving family members after the death of a wage earner.  Astrue v. Capato, 132
S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2012)).
23. ACHENBAUM, supra note 1, at 25-26.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(A) (2006).  Specifically, a parent may receive insurance benefits
for a child so long as they meet the eligibility requirements of § 416(e) and  “(A) . . . [file an]
application on behalf of the child for child’s insurance benefits.” Id.
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eligibility requirements.25  Equally important, the applicant must have
been dependent upon the wage earner—the decedent—at the time of
the wage earner’s death.26
However, there are certain requirements that must be made prior
to commencing this process.  In regards to that process, Congress
made several amendments to the Social Security Act to protect family
members who had been dependent upon the wage earning during his
or her lifetime.27  One of those provisions includes a test to determine
whether a child was in fact a “child” of the decedent wage earner.28
This test is codified in the United States Code at title 42, § 416(e)(1).
It includes many ways in which one can be deemed a child under the
Act.29  An individual may be considered a child if the child is “a le-
gally adopted child of [the wage earner],” a step-child, or a grandchild
of the wage earner.30
If an individual does not satisfy the definitional requirements of a
child, then the next “gateway”31 to be deemed eligible to receive ben-
efits is whether the individual would be able to take intestate personal
property from the deceased wage earner in the state that the wage
earner “was domiciled at the time of his death.”32  The provision pro-
vides in part:
In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully
or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the
Commissioner of Social Security shall apply such law as would be
applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property
by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domi-
ciled at the time such applicant files application, or, if such insured
individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domi-
ciled at the time of his death, or, if such insured individual is or was
25. Id. § 402(d)(1)(B).  These requirements include being under a certain age or being un-
married, for example. Id.
26. Id. § 402(d)(1)(C)(ii).
27. Social Security Act of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1362 (amended 1965).
28. § 416(h)(2)(A).
29. Id. § 416(e).  An individual can be deemed a child by being “(1) the child or legally
adopted child of an individual, (2) a stepchild who has been such stepchild for not less than one
year immediately preceding the day on which application for child’s insurance benefits is filed or
(if the insured individual is deceased) not less than nine months immediately preceding the day
on which such individual died, [or] (3) a person who is the grandchild or stepgrandchild of an
individual or his spouse . . . .” Id.
30. Id.
31. “Section 416(h) is a gateway through which all applicants for insurance benefits as a
child must pass.”  Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2029 (2012) (citing Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.
3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2011)); see Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011).
32. § 416(h)(2)(A).
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not so domiciled in any State, by the courts of the District of
Columbia.33
The Social Security Administration has acknowledged, however,
the advancements in reproductive technology and posthumous repro-
duction.34  Posthumously conceived children may meet the definition
of a “child” under the Act, if they are “able to inherit under state
law.”35  Therefore, the test appears to be quite simple: if the posthu-
mously conceived child applicant would not be able to inherit the
wage earner’s intestate property under the appropriate state law, then
the applicant is not eligible for benefits.36
II. REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENTS
AND STATE PROPERTY LAWS
The advancements in reproductive technology made it possible
for Jack and Jill to initially conceive the idea to proceed with the cry-
opreservation process after learning of Jack’s illness.  By taking pro-
phylactic measures and having Jack’s sperm frozen, before his
cancerous tumors were treated, the couple could continue with their
plans of having a family.  However, those advancements in reproduc-
tive technology made it possible for Jill to conceive after Jack’s
death—not during his life—by posthumously conceiving twins.
A. An Overview of Advancement in Reproductive Technology
What exactly is a child: a boy or girl?  Not surprisingly, as with all
legal answers, the answer to that question is: it depends.  A child is “a
person under the age of majority; a boy or girl; a young person; a son
or daughter.”37  However, the plain meaning of the word is insuffi-
33. Id.
34. See discussion infra Part II.A.
35. See § 416(h). But see Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656
(Sept. 22, 2005) (explaining how the Ninth Circuit established “child” statutes under the Act
solely because the children were “the biological children of the insured”).  The Ninth Circuit
determined that state intestacy laws were irrelevant in determining whether an individual was a
“child” under the statute if “parentage was not in dispute.” Id; see discussion infra Part III.A.
36. See Barnes, supra note 12 (“[T]he Social Security Administration’s decision to look to
state inheritance laws is more in tune with the act’s design to ‘benefit primarily those supported
by the deceased wage earner in her or her lifetime’”). But see Social Security Acquiescence
Ruling 05-1(9), supra note 35.
37. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  A child is also defined as “[a] person be-
tween birth and puberty. A human fetus. An infant; a baby.  One who is childish or immature.  A
son or daughter; and offspring.  A member of a tribe; descendent.” AMERICAN HERITAGE COL-
LEGE DICTIONARY 243 (3d ed. 1997).
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cient under the Social Security Act.38  Under the Act, a “child” may
be a “legally adopted child of an individual,” a “step-child who has
been such for not less than a year,” or a “grandchild,” but to deter-
mine whether an applicant is a child under the Act, state intestate
personal property laws of the state in which the insured lives or lived
are controlling.39
However, there are other ways in which an individual may be
considered a child.40  Thus, the term “child” under the Act is much
broader than the denotations, above, and whether a person is deemed
a child under the Act is determinative in whether a posthumously con-
ceived applicant may receive survivorship benefits.41  The Social Se-
curity Administration’s website provides a rudimentary description of
survivor benefits for children.42  The webpage explains that a worker’s
biological children, stepchildren, grandchildren, and adopted children
may be able to receive survivorship benefits.43  There is no mention of
posthumously conceived children whatsoever.  Thus, with the ad-
vancements in reproductive technology, the definition of a “child” is
not so clear.
There have been several advances in reproductive technology,
which are not only changing “the practice of medicine” but also the
law.44  These reproductive advancements fall into the general category
as forms of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART).45  “ART in-
cludes in vitro fertilization . . . (IVF) . . . sperm injection . . . and
38. See § 416(e).
39. § 416(h)(2)(A).  This provision permits persons who would be permitted to receive in-
testate personal property under state laws to be deemed a “child.” Id.
40. § 416(h)(2)(B); Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 05-1(9), supra note 35.
41. See discussion infra Part III.V.
42. See If You’re the Worker’s Minor or Disabled Child, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, http://
www.ssa.gov/survivorplan/onyourown4.htm (last modified Oct. 19, 2012) (follow “Survivors”
hyperlink; follow “how your family members are protected if you die” hyperlink; follow “You as
a Survivor” hyperlink; follow “If You’re the Worker’s Minor or Disabled Child” hyperlink).
43. Id.  “If you are an unmarried child under 18 of a worker who dies, you . . . can be
eligible to receive Social Security survivor benefits.” Id; see also SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRA-
TION, BENEFITS FOR CHILDREN (2011) [hereinafter BENEFITS] (explaining that “[your] child can
get benefits if he or she is your biological child, adopted child or dependant stepchild”).
44. See, e.g., The Ethics of Reproductive Technology Debated, MEDICALNEWS TODAY (May
6, 2008), http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/releases/106429.php (last visited Oct. 18, 2011) (ex-
plaining the ethical concerns that have emerged as a result of the advancements in reproductive
technology).  Note, however, that “[t]he first recorded case of artificial insemination took place
in 1790.” PETER N. SWISHER ET. AL. FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 315 (2d
ed. 1998) (quoting Moshetta v. Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1218 (1994) (explaining that a tur-
key-baster could be used to artificially inseminate a woman in 1790)).  Advancements in repro-
ductive technology have come a long way since the use of a mere turkey-baster.
45. What Is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, supra note 11.
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gamete (GIFT) and zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT).”46  More
simply, ART is a process in which sperm and eggs are combined in a
laboratory and then placed in a woman’s womb.47  By 2010, ART was
responsible for more than 47,000 live births (deliveries of living in-
fants) and nearly 62,000 infants.48  Cryopreservation has many bene-
fits according to Cryogenic Laboratories who boast as the first sperm
bank in the United States.49  People are amassing their own sperm to
“preserve fertility . . . prior to cancer treatment, military deployment,
a vasectomy, or other circumstance[s,] which may result in sterility.”50
ART has led to more women and men fulfilling dreams of having chil-
dren, but there are social implications, which result from such ad-
vancements;51 medical experts, donors, and parents are growing
concerned.52
46. Id.  “ART does not include intrauterine (artificial) insemination only or use of ovarian
stimulation medications without egg retrieval.” Id.; see CDC, 2010 REPORT, supra note 11, at 73-
75.
47. What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, supra note 11.
48. CDC, 2010 REPORT, supra note 11, at 3; see also Ann-Patton Nelson, A New Era of
Dead-Beat Dads: Determining Social Security Benefits for Children Who Are Posthumously Con-
ceived, 56 MERCER L. REV. 759, 762 (2005) [hereinafter Nelson, Dead-Beat Dads] (explaining
the prior decade’s ART birth rates in the U.S.).  These figures are likely larger due to a number
of clinics that do no report ART data. See CDC, 2010 REPORT, supra note 11, at 3.
49. Cryopreservation is a process in which organic matter is frozen. See Jenna M. F. Sup-
pon, Note, Life After Death: The Need to Address the Legal Status of Posthumously Conceived
Children, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 228, 230 (2010) [hereinafter Suppon, Life After Death]; CRYOGENIC
LABORATORIES (2012), http://www.cryolab.com/?_kk=sperm%20banks&_kt=5b7da77f-980d-49
8e-a1df-0c6e63a366ee&gclid=CPO6_7qPhq4CFYXd4AodUWlY3Q.The lab boasts as being
founded forty years ago offering “superior donor sperm and sperm banking services, including
sperm storage and embryo storage.” CRYOGENIC LABORATORIES, supra.
50. DONOR SPERM STORAGE: CHOOSE NOW, USE LATER, CRYOGENIC LABORATORIES
(2012), http://www.cryolab.com/choosenow_uselater.shtml.
51. See generally Jacqueline Mroz, One Sperm Donor, 150 Offspring, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/health/06donor.html?_r=1&ref=artificialin
semination (explaining the social implications that may emerge when one sperm donor is used
by hundreds of different donor recipients).
52. Id.  These people have grown concerned after learning of stories in which one sperm
donor lead to more than a hundred offspring. Id.  Further concerns include the use of genetic
material as a million dollar business in which some sperm banks sell sperm and embryos in the
same manner as a pair of jeans. See, e.g., The Ethics of Reproductive Technology Debated, supra
note 44 (explaining the ethical concerns that vary from country to country as physicians select
the technique that either fights infertility to gender preference).
Instead of keeping your fingers crossed for potential availability in the future, buy
doses now and store them. This is the only way to guarantee the availability of your
donor, since it is already put aside for you. With this decision, you won’t find yourself
disappointed if he sells out at a later time. A donor’s availability is always subject to
change and he can sell out at any time; being prepared makes sense . . . . You may
return any unused specimens that were purchased at regular prices and have never left
our facility and receive half the original purchase price back. This includes ANY speci-
men purchased at ANY time. There are also NO limits to the number of vials you can
return for this partial refund. There are NO RESTRICTIONS regarding the status of a
client’s account. Please note that our Vial Buy Back program is not offered on speci-
mens that have been transferred by the original owner.
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The most important result of advancements in reproductive tech-
nology—as it relates to this Comment—is posthumous conception.
Posthumous conception occurs when a child is conceived after the
death of a biological parent.53  Through cryopreservation of sperm
and eggs, posthumous reproduction is possible.54  Cryopreservation
allows organic material—like reproductive tissue—to be preserved
and stored for years, often more than a decade.55  Healthy sperm can
also be extracted and preserved within a day after the man’s death
and frozen for years and years.56
Some other concerns that arise with cryopreservation are parent-
age and property rights.57  The result of cryopreservation may be a
child born months or even years after one of his or her parents have
died.  Additionally, “[because] reproductive material may be success-
fully preserved for over a decade, many children have been conceived
a number of years after the death of one of their biological parents.  A
child that has been born under such circumstances is classified as a
posthumously conceived child.”58  Even more determinative of receipt
of survivorship benefits are the state intestacy property laws; the Su-
preme Court has found that although a child “[is] to some extent . . . a
purely physical relationship, [the word child] also describes a legal sta-
tus which requires a reference to the law of the state which [created]
those legal relationships.”59  Therefore, each state’s respective intes-
tacy property laws should be examined to have a complete under-
standing of the meaning of a “child” under the context of the Social
Security Act and rights to survivorship benefits.
DONOR SPERM STORAGE, supra note 50.
53. See John A. Roberson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 Ind. L.J. 1027, 1027 (1994); Sup-
pon, Life After Death, supra note 49, at 230.
54. See Roberson, supra note 53.
55. Suppon, Life After Death, supra note 49, at 230.
56. Robert Salladay, The Nation: Dead Dads Bill Takes on Difficult Legal Question; The
Proposed State Law Gives Inheritance Rights to Children Born From Frozen Embryos, Sperm,
L.A. TIMES, May 17, 2004, at A1.
57. See discussion infra Part II.B; Nelson, Dead-Beat Dads, supra note 48, at 773 (explaining
that “[q]uestions remain concerning the property rights of reproductive materials (i.e., frozen
sperm), the legality of paid surrogacy, intestacy rights for posthumous children conceived or
implanted after the genetic parent’s death, and the determination of parentage and custody of
such children.”). See generally Ginsberg, Note, FDA Approved? A Critique of the Artificial In-
semination Industry in the United States, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 823 (1997).
58. Suppon, Life After Death, supra note 49, at 230.
59. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Astrue v. Capato, No. 11-159, 2011 WL 3511023
(citing De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956)).
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B. An Overview of States’ Property Laws
Less than half of the fifty states recognize the familial relation-
ships of parents and their posthumously conceived children.60  These
states vary by region.61 However, whether states recognize posthu-
mous familial relationships is not determinative of whether a posthu-
mously conceived child applicant will receive survivorship benefits—
the determining factor turns on the state’s property laws.62  Many
state inheritance laws require the child to be born prior to one of the
parents’ death to be considered an heir or heir-apparent and entitled
to the receipt of personal property.63  Some states require even more
evidentiary support to prove that a posthumously conceived child is
the “lawful heir” of a deceased parent.64  The remainder of this sec-
tion will examine several of the states’ laws regarding intestacy as it
relates to the issue of whether posthumously conceived children are
heirs of a deceased parent.
60. See Stephen Clark, Children Conceived After Death of Parent Face Uphill Battle for
Inheritance Rights, FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/03/26/
children-conceived-death-parent-face-uphill-battle-inheritance-rights (“[O]nly 11 states recog-
nize the biological relationships of children conceived posthumously[.]”).  Twenty-eight states do
not address posthumous conception as it relates to property laws at all. See Kristine Knaplund,
Opinion Analysis: Genetic Link not enough for Social Security survivor benefits, SCOTUSBLOG
(May 22, 2012, 4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/05/opinion-analysis-genetic-link-not-
enough-for-social-security-survivors-benefits/.
61. See Clark, supra note 60.  The states are: California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Loui-
siana, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming. Id.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 416 (H)(2)(A) (2006). Contra Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 05-1(9),
supra note 35.
63. See Nelson, Dead-Beat Dads, supra note 48, at 774 (discussing that the instances in
which a man and a woman naturally conceive and a man subsequently dies are addressed by
most states in their intestacy property laws, but because technology is light-years ahead of the
laws, whether a posthumously conceived child may take intestate property varies greatly from
state to state).
64. Lisa Medford, Note, Family Law and Estate Law—Reproductive Technology—Use of
Artificial Re-Productive Technologies After the Death of a Parent, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 91, 94 (2010).
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1. States with Laws Expressly Permitting Posthumously Conceived
Children to Receive Intestate Property
State Code & Explanation
Alabama Alabama property laws provide legal recognition of posthumously con-
ceived children.65
Posthumously conceived children are placed on the same footing as any
child born to parents still living with respect to “property [to be] devised
and . . . property coming by descent as other children of the same par-
ent.”66
Delaware Section 505 of the Delaware code explicitly provides that posthumously
conceived children are considered to be living at the time of death of their
parent.67
District The District of Columbia code does not treat children born during the life
of Columbia of a person any differently than a child born after the death of a person.68
Hawaii Similar to Delaware, Hawaii’s code regarding posthumously conceived
children’s inheritance rights states that: “Posthumous children shall . . .
inherit in the same [manner] as if they had been born during their father’s
lifetime.69
Idaho In Idaho, property laws recognize posthumous children and permit posthu-
mous children to inherit in the same manner as if living at the time of
death of their parent.70
Missouri Missouri recognizes intestate property rights of children not born prior to
the death of a parent.  The state of Missouri permits posthumous children
to inherit intestate in the same manner as any child born prior to the
death of a parent.71
New York New York Law provides that “[a] decedent’s posthumous child is one of
his next of kin entitled to distribution of intestate personal property.”72
65. ALA. CODE § 35-4-8 (2011).  Posthumously conceived children are entitled to “take the
estate in the same manner as if born before the death of the parent.” Id.
66. Id.; see also  Barnett v. Pinkston, 191 So. 371, 374 (Ala. 1939).
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 505 (West 2011) (“Posthumous children, born alive, shall be
considered as though living at the death of their parent.”).
68. D.C. CODE § 19-314 (2001) (“A child born after the death of the intestate has the same
right of inheritance as if born before his death.”).
69. HAW. REV. STAT. § 532-9 (West 2011) (“Posthumous children shall, in all cases, inherit
the same as if they had been born during their father’s lifetime.”).
70. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-108 (2011) (“When a future interest is limited to successors,
heirs, issue or children, posthumous children are entitled to take in the same manner as if living
at the death of their parent.”).
71. MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.050 (West 2011) (“All posthumous children, or descendants, of
the intestate shall inherit in like manner, as if born in the lifetime of the intestate; but no right of
inheritance accrues to any person other than the children or descendants of the intestate, unless
they are born and capable in law to take as heirs at the time of the intestate’s death.”).
72. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (Consol. 2011).
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2. States with Laws Prohibiting Posthumously Conceived Children
to Receive Intestate Property or Requiring a Showing of
Certain Prerequisites
State Code & Explanation
Arkansas In Arkansas, a child cannot inherit from a deceased parent unless the child
was conceived and born prior to the death of the property owner.73  Post-
humously conceived children  have no entitlement to any property rights.
California California requires a showing of dependency.74  A showing of dependency
in California may be satisfied when: (1) dependency is established at the
time of the death of the parent; (2) legitimacy like that in Gillett-Netting75
is established; or (3) intestacy is established from California property laws.
Colorado Pursuant to Colorado intestacy laws, a parent-child relationship between a
child conceived through ART and the individual who is not the mother
depends on intent and consent.76  Further, if that individual is the parent
of a child conceived with the help of ART and that individual dies, the
child is considered to be in gestation at the time of the individual’s death
if the child is: “[1] in utero not later than thirty-six months after the indi-
vidual’s death; or [2] [born] not later than forty-five months after the indi-
vidual’s death.”77  Whether a child conceived through ART is in gestation
at the time of the individual’s death determines intestate succession.78
Thus to determine intestate succession, whether a parent-child relationship
exists must be determined, first.
Florida In Florida, a 1993 statute was drafted and enacted, which prohibited all
posthumously conceived children from receiving inheritance rights.79
73. See generally Finley v. Astrue, 372 Ark. 103 (2008).
74. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West Supp. 2011) (explaining that in situations where a
woman uses donated sperm from a source other than her husband for the purposes of assisted
reproduction, the sperm donor is not treated as the natural father under law unless he has con-
sented in writing prior to conception); see also Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1005 (9th Cir.
2009).
75. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that legitimate
children are considered to be dependent upon the wage earner).  However, legitimacy does not
necessarily affect intestacy rights.  Intestate rights are statutorily determined by the states. See
discussion infra Part III.A.
76. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-120(6) (West 2011).  The individual who is not the
mother must consent to the assisted reproduction and have the intent to be treated as the other
parent of the child. Id.  The aforementioned provision is not applicable if the birth mother is
married to the other individual. Id.  at § 15-11-120(48).  So long as the husband provided the
sperm and the sperm is used within his lifetime, a parent-child relationship is presumed to exist.
§ 15-11-120(4).
77. § 15-11-120(11).
78. Id; see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-104(b)(1) (West 2011) (stating that § 15-11-
104(b)(1) will not be applicable if the result would lead in the state of Colorado taking the
intestate estate).
79. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2012); see also  Medford, supra note 64, at 102.
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Iowa Iowa passed a law after a case arose regarding the Social Security Admin-
istration’s decision to deny survivor benefits to a posthumously conceived
applicant.80  The Iowa statute provides three situations in which a posthu-
mously conceived child is the legal child of the decedent: (1) the child was
born no more than two years after the death of the decedent parent; (2)
the decedent parent has consented to his spouse using his genetic material
after his death in a signed document; and (3) a genetic relationship
exists.81
Maine Maine laws do not address posthumously conceived children.  The code
only addressed children conceived during the life but born after the death
of the decedent parent.82
Massachusetts Unlike Arkansas and Florida, Massachusetts does not completely bar post-
humously conceived children from having inheritance rights.83 If a posthu-
mously conceived applicant wishes to receive the survivorship benefits of
his or her deceased parent, the burden rests with the surviving parent to
show three elements.84
Minnesota In Minnesota, posthumously conceived children are not afforded the same
property benefits as children born prior to the death of an individual,
adopted children, or step-children.85  Thus a parent-child relationship does
not exist “between a child of assisted reproduction and another person
unless the child of assisted reproduction is in gestation prior to the death
of such person.”86
Nevada In Nevada, although the rights of a posthumously conceived child are not
expressly addressed in the state code, the Nevada code does express that a
posthumous child is considered to have been born prior to the death of
the parent.87
80. See Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2011).  Because the law was not retro-
active, it did not apply to Patti Beeler’s case. See IOWA CODE § 633.220A (stating that the stat-
ute’s effective date begins on July 1, 2011); see also discussion infra  Part IV.B.
81. IOWA CODE § 633.220A.
82. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-108 (1981) (“Relatives of the decedent conceived
before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the
decedent.”).
83. See Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E. 2d 257, 272 (Mass. 2002); Medford,
supra note 64, at 97.
84. The surviving parent must show: “(1) a genetic relationship between the child and the
deceased parent; and (2) that the deceased parent “affirmatively consented to posthumous con-
ception.” Woodward, 760 N.E. 2d  at 272.
85. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-120 (West 2010).  “Notwithstanding any other provision of
this section . . . a parent-child relationship does not exist between a child of assisted reproduction
and another person unless the child of assisted reproduction is in gestation prior to the death of
such person.” Id.
86. Id. § 524.2-120(10).
87. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132.290 (West 2010) (“A posthumous child is deemed living at
the death of his or her parent.”).
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Ohio Ohio does not recognize inheritance rights for posthumously conceived
children.88  Children conceived prior to death but born after death do
have rights of intestacy of the deceased parent, but all other children can-
not inherit unless they were in fact living prior to the death of the par-
ent—thus prohibiting posthumously conceived children from receiving
survivorship benefits.89  However, this statutory provision is on file to be
amended.90
South Dakota Along with many of the previous states codes such as Maine, a child is
permitted intestacy rights so long as the child was conceived prior to the
death of the parent.91
West Virginia West Virginia is another state that does not recognize the rights of posthu-
mously conceived children—at least not expressly.  In West Virginia, a
child that was not in gestation prior to the death of the deceased parent
may not inherit pursuant to West Virginia intestacy laws.92
III. COURT RULINGS: POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED
CHILDREN ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE
SURVIVORSHIP BENEFITS
Jill’s story is similar to the women in both decisions discussed be-
low.  Their husbands died intestate and the widows decided—without
prior consent—to conceive children using their husbands’ stored se-
men.  This section discusses cases in which the courts permitted survi-
vorship benefits to posthumously conceived applicants.
A. A Ninth Circuit Court Decision: Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart
The Ninth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to decide a
case regarding posthumous conception and survivorship benefits.  The
court held that the posthumously conceived child was entitled to re-
ceive survivorship benefits.93  Similar to the introductory story, in Gil-
lett-Netting v. Barnhart, Gillet-Netting and her husband wanted to
88. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (2011) (“Descendants of an intestate begotten before
the intestate’s death, but born after the intestate’s death, in all cases will inherit as if born in the
lifetime of the intestate and surviving the intestate; but in no other case can a person inherit
unless living at the time of the death of the intestate.”).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-3-16 (2011) (“A future interest, depending on the contin-
gency of the death of any person without successors, heirs, issue, or children, is defeated by the
birth of a posthumous child of such person, capable of taking by succession, if the posthumous
child was conceived prior to the decedent’s death, was born within ten months of the decedent’s
death, and survived one hundred twenty hours or more after birth.”).
92. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-8 (West 2011) (“Any child in the womb of its mother at, and
which may be born after, the death of the intestate, shall be capable of taking by inheritance in
the same manner as if such child were in being at the time of such death.”).
93. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir. 2004).
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conceive.94  However, Netting was diagnosed with cancer and chemo-
therapy treatments were certain to make him sterile.95  Netting de-
cided to have his sperm frozen so his wife could be artificially
inseminated later.96  Netting subsequently died and months later Gil-
lett-Netting was artificially inseminated with Netting’s sperm.97  Nine
months later, Gillett-Netting gave birth to twins and filed an applica-
tion for Social Security Benefits based on Netting’s earnings.98
The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied her application,
as did an Administrative Law Judge, after a hearing for reconsidera-
tion.99  Next, Gillett-Netting filed a complaint in district court, claim-
ing that the SSA was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.100
Similarly, the district court held that SSA did not violate the children’s
equal protection under the law.101  Further, the court found that the
children did not qualify for the benefits because the children were not
Netting’s “children” under the Act;102 they were not dependent on
Netting prior to his death.103
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “reproductive
technology has outpaced federal and state laws, which currently do
not directly address the legal issues created by posthumous concep-
tion.”104  In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit observed the issues
regarding dependency and that the children were Netting’s natural
and biological children.  The court found that the children were Net-
ting’s legitimate children and thus dependent upon Netting under the
Act and entitled to his benefits, despite the fact that the children were
conceived posthumously.105  The court addressed the issue of whether
94. Id. at 594-95.
95. Id. at 594.
96. Id.  “Netting confirmed that he wanted Gillett-Netting to have their child after his death
using his frozen sperm.” Id. at 595.
97. Id. at 594.  Through the ART process of in vitro fertilization (in vitro fertilization is a
type of assisted reproductive technology in which an egg is fertilized outside a woman’s body and
after fertilization the egg is placed into a woman’s womb), Gillett-Netting’s egg that had been
fertilized with Netting’s sperm was placed in her womb ten months after Netting’s death. Id. at
595.
98. Gillet-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595.
99. Id.  The ALJ denied Gillett-Netting’s claim because the children were not dependent on
Netting’s wages because they were born after his death. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citation omitted).
102. Id.  Gillett-Netting filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, which reviewed the district
court’s decision de novo. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 595-96.
105. Id. at 596-97, 599.  The court found that under 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2006), if the child is
unmarried or a minor at the time of the application to received benefits, then the child is deemed
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the children were statutorily dependent upon Netting under the
Act.106  However, case law suggests, “it is well-settled that all legiti-
mate children automatically are considered to have been dependent
on the insured individual, absent narrow circumstances.”107  The
Ninth Circuit did not find any narrow circumstances in the case that
would render the children non-dependent on Netting.108  The SSA
Commissioner, argued however, that under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3)
(2006), the children cannot be deemed to be dependent because they
did not meet state inheritance requirements.109  The Ninth Circuit
found this argument unpersuasive.  Specifically, the court reasoned
that because children are able to prove dependency based on legiti-
macy; “nothing in the Act suggests that a child who is legitimate under
state law separately must prove legitimacy under the Act.”110  The
court refused to use Arizona property laws to reach its decision, but it
reasoned that the children were recognized as legitimate in Arizona
based on Arizona parentage laws.111  After finding that the children
were Netting’s legitimate children under Arizona laws and thus de-
pendent on Netting, the court concluded that the children were enti-
tled to Netting’s benefits.112
to be dependent on the wage earner;  the court did not find any facts which would dispute that
the children were not Netting’s biological children and thus, dependent on Netting under the Act
and entitled to benefits. Id. at 598-99.  The SSA Commissioner conceded that the children were
Netting’s biological children. Id. at 597.  The Ninth Circuit interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) as
only applying when an applicant’s parentage is disputed. Id.  Thus, if the applicant is found to be
the biological child of the decedent than the applicant is deemed a child under the Act and
eligible for benefits. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597.
106. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597-98.
107. Id. at 598 (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 502 (1976)).  Legitimate children,
regardless of dependency under statute are entitled to survivorship benefits.  Smith v. Heckler,
820 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1987).
108. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598-99.  Further, the children were considered legitimate
under Arizona state laws as well because Arizona has done away with the status of illegitimacy.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-601.  “Every child in Arizona . . . is the legitimate child of her or his
natural parents.” Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 599.
109. Id.  42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (2006) provides that “[if] they also are able to inherit from
[the insured parent] under state intestacy laws[,]” they may be deemed dependent. Gillett-Net-
ting, 371 F.3d at 598. But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-237(A) (2013) (“When a future estate
is limited to heirs, issue or children, posthumous children shall take as if born before the death of
the parent.”).
110. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 599.
111. Id. at 599 n.8.
112. Id. at 599.
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B. A Third Circuit Decision: Capato v. Astrue
The Third Circuit held similarly to the Ninth Court’s decision re-
garding posthumously conceived children and survivorship benefits.113
In Capato, after being diagnosed with cancer, Robert Capato depos-
ited his sperm in a sperm bank in hopes that he and his wife could one
day have children, in the likely event that chemotherapy treatments
sterilized him.114  Nonetheless, the couple conceived, naturally.115
However, they wanted their son to have siblings and discussed having
more children.116  Unfortunately, Robert Capato died before the
couple could have any additional children.117  The decedent had exe-
cuted a will, which listed his beneficiaries as his son, his wife, and his
two children from a prior marriage.118  The will did not contain any
provisions that bequeathed any property to any unborn children.
Prior to his death, the couple had discussed providing for their unborn
children in his will, but no such provision was incorporated into the
will.119  A year later, with the help of in vitro fertilization, plaintiff
gave birth to twins and subsequently applied for survivorship benefits
on behalf of the twins.120
The Third Circuit found that “[this] is a case where medical-scien-
tific technology has advanced faster than the regulatory process.”121
Pursuant to the Act, whether an applicant is a child under the Act is
dependent upon state intestacy laws.122  However, the Third Circuit
113. See Capato v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 632 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom.
Astrue v. Capato,  132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).  Although the Third Circuit agreed with the Ninth
Circuit’s use of § 416(e), the court applied the § 412(h)(2)(A) definition of a child, which turns
on whether the state intestacy laws permit the individual to take property. Id. at 630.  The Third
Circuit based its decision on state familial legitimacy laws and not state intestacy laws. Id. at 629,
631.  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Gillett-Netting was determined by the SSA to only
be applicable to the Ninth Circuit.  Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 05-1(9), 70  Fed. Reg.
55,656 (Sept. 22, 2005).
114. Capato, 631 F.3d at 627.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 627-28.
119. Id. at 628 (“Although Ms. Capato claims that she and her husband spoke to their attor-
ney about including ‘unborn children’ in the will, ‘so that it would be understood that . . . they’d
have the rights and be supported in the same way that [their natural born son] was already
privileged to,’ the will did not contain any such provision.”).
120. Id.
121. Id.  The ALJ found similarly on this issue that the regulatory process lagged behind
technological advancements.  Whereas it appeared intuitive to provide Social Security benefits in
a sad case such as this one, the ALJ could not extend benefits to an applicant that was not
recognized under the Act’s regulation as one entitled to such benefits. Id.
122. See id. at 629.
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agreed with the Ninth Circuit in finding that there is no rational rea-
son why an applicant’s determination of whether he or she is a child
should not be determined under state intestacy laws.123  This is espe-
cially true, the court found, when parentage is not an issue—it is clear
that the twins are the decedent’s biological children.124
Additionally, the court noted that there are concerns that will
need to be addressed in the future.125  Those concerns surround the
ever-changing reproductive technology such as donor eggs,126 in vitro
fertilization, artificial insemination, and surrogate wombs, which could
lead to “at least five potential parents.”127  However, the court noted
that the aforementioned issues are not ripe.  Ultimately, the Third Cir-
cuit sided with the Ninth Circuit, defying seventy-years of traditional
interpretation of the Act,128 by vacating the district court’s order and
remanding the case for a determination that the children were
deemed dependent on Robert Capato prior to his death.129
Arguably, there are policy reasons that support the Ninth and
Third Circuit decisions.  It is undisputed that the law is behind the
technology.130  The courts, as well as other legal scholars and repro-
ductive doctors, believe that advancements in reproduction technol-
ogy mean that posthumous conception will become more common.131
Although there is very little statistical data concerning the various as-
pects of posthumously conceived children, there is a strong likelihood
of increased cases of posthumous conception.132  Therefore, Social Se-
123. Id. at 631.
124. Id.  Further, the purpose of federal benefits is to ensure that the child receives the sup-
port that the child would have received had their parent not died—it is not a general welfare
provision. Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 632.
126. Id.  Donor eggs—this is a process similar to sperm donation in which women donate
their eggs and women with diminished egg quality or quantity receive donor eggs to increase
chances of conception. See Donor Egg IVF, GENETICS & IVF INST., .http://www.givf.com/dono
reggivf (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
127. Capato, 631 F.3d at 632.
128. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Astrue v. Capato, 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011) (No.
11-159), 2011 WL 3511023.
129. Capato, 631 F.3d at 632.  The Third Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit in finding that
there is no rational reason why an applicant’s determination of whether he or she is a child
should be determined under state intestacy laws. Id. at 630.
130. Id. at 628.  It further found that technology was advancing “faster than the regulatory
process.” Id.
131. See Julianne Wojay, Posthumously Conceived Child Isn’t Eligible for Survivorship Bene-
fits, 79 U.S.L.W. 2407 (2011) [hereinafter Wojay, Posthumously Conceived Child].  “Posthumous
reproduction is here to stay.” Id.
132. See Christopher A. Scharman, Note, Not Without My Father: The Legal Status of the
Posthumously Conceived Child, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1001, 1006-07 (2002).
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curity laws and other laws will need to change to address new reali-
ties.133  Nonetheless the law—the Social Security Act, specifically—
has not yet changed and is subject to varying interpretations.134
IV. COURT FINDINGS: POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED
CHILDREN NOT ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE
SURVIVORSHIP BENEFITS
Applying the arguments that the courts in the following section
found to be persuasive would prohibit Jill from receiving survivorship
benefits for her children.  This section discusses cases in which the
courts did not permit survivorship benefits to posthumously conceived
applicants, showing that some posthumously conceived children are
not successful in being eligible to receive survivorship benefits like the
Gillett-Netting children.135
In a 2011 decision, the Fourth Circuit split with the Ninth and
Third Circuits, which did not surprise many legal professionals be-
cause of the “schizophrenic” nature and reasons for the prior courts’
decisions.136  “[State] laws in [the area of posthumously conceived
children and survivorship benefits] vary widely, leading to dramati-
cally different results [from state to state].”137
A. A Fourth Circuit Decision: Schafer v. Astrue
In Schafer v. Astrue,138 seven years after her husband’s death,
plaintiff gave birth to her late husband’s child with the help of in vitro
fertilization.139  Four months after the husband was diagnosed with
133. See, e.g., Wojay, Posthumously Conceived Child supra, note 131 (“The Social Security
laws, as is the law in general, are woefully behind the medical technology with which such babies
are born after one of their parents’ death.”).
134. See Morgan Kirkland Wood, Note, It Takes a Village: Considering the Other Interests at
Stake When Extending Inheritance Rights to Posthumously Conceived Children, 44 GA. L. REV.
873, 911 (2010).
135. Id. (“[Not] all posthumously conceived children share the Gillett-Netting children’s suc-
cess . . . .”).
136. John T. Brooks, et al., Posthumously Conceived Children and Their Survivor Benefit,
WEALTH MGMT. FOR EST. PLAN.  (Oct. 21, 2009, 9:30 AM), http://wealthmanagement.com/finan
cial-planning/posthumously-conceived-childrenand-their-survivor-benefit.
137. Id.
138. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011).
139. Id. at 50 (“There is significant evidence that [the minor child] is Don Schafer’s biological
child, born almost seven years after Don’s death.  There is also evidence that Don intended for
Janice to use the stored semen to conceive a child after his anticipated death, though he never
expressed consent in writing to be the legal father of a child resulting from posthumous in vitro
fertilization.  In 2001 a Texas court purported to declare Don Schafer [as the minor child’s]
father.”).
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cancer, he deposited sperm samples in a long-term storage facility
before he was scheduled to have chemotherapy.140  The husband died
three months later.  Plaintiff applied, but was subsequently rejected
for survivorship benefits for her child.  The child’s claim was rejected
because he was not considered a “natural child.”141  Because the child
was conceived posthumously via assisted reproductive technology, the
child was not eligible to “inherit from the decedent under state intes-
tacy law or satisfy certain exceptions . . . in order to count as [a child]
under the [Social Security] Act.”142  A child that seeks to receive sur-
vivorship benefits must meet certain eligibility requirements.143
For example, the child must have been dependent upon the indi-
vidual prior to the individual’s death.144  However, before the court
would make a finding as to whether the child met the aforementioned
requirements, it first had to determine if the child was in fact a “child”
under the meaning of the statute.145  To determine whether an appli-
cant is a child of the decedent, state property law must be ex-
amined.146  If the applicant would be able to lawfully take intestate
personal property as a child, then the applicant would fit under the
definition of a “child.”147  Accordingly, in Virginia, a child born ten
months after a parent’s death was not recognized as the parent’s child
for property inheritance purposes.148
140. Id.
141. Id.  The court addressed that the term “child” meant either child or the “legally adopted
child of an individual,” but the court recognized that the term did not necessarily shed light on
the meaning of “natural child” and thus “this definitional tautology . . . does not provide much
guidance as how the SSA should go about making that child status determination.” Id. at 52, 54.
142. Id. at 50-51 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(2), (h)(3)(C) (2006)).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 402 (d)(1)(A) (2006).  These eligibility requirements include the “child” be-
ing unmarried, not attaining the age of eighteen or still in primary or secondary school prior to
the age of nineteen or under a legally recognized disability with formed prior to the child reach-
ing the age of twenty-two.  § 402(d)(1)(B).
144. § 402(d)(1)(C).
145. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52; see 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006).
In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or currently insured
individual for purposes of this [the Act] the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply
such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal prop-
erty by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the time
such applicant files application, or, if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of
the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death, or, if such insured individ-
ual is or was not so domiciled in any State, by the courts of the District of Columbia.
Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to taking
intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such.
Id.
146. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 53.
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After using two forms of legal argument (text and intent), the
court concluded that Congress intended the Social Security Act to use
state property laws, contrary to plaintiff’s argument.149  Plaintiff
claimed that her posthumously conceived child was entitled to bene-
fits because the requirements for 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(1) were met,
which is similar to the argument made by the Petitioner in Gillett-
Netting.150  The court distinguished this case from the Gillett-Netting
court’s interpretation of the Social Security benefits provision by look-
ing to Chevron USA, Inc. v. Resources Defense Council, Inc.151  The
Chevron case provided a two-part test concerning an agency’s inter-
pretation of a statute.152  First, if Congress expressly interpreted a pro-
vision within a statute, then an agency cannot interpret the statute in a
manner contrary to Congress.153  Second, if the first requirement is
not met and/or Congress is silent or ambiguous in regard to a provi-
sion of a statute, than the agency’s answer must be based on a reason-
able interpretation of the statute.154  Applying Chevron to the Schafer
case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court and
expressed that the “[agency’s—the Social Security Administration—]
view best reflects the statute’s . . . aim of providing benefits primarily
to those who unexpectedly lose a wage earner’s support.”155
The Court found that, although the facts of this case are disheart-
ening, it could not deviate from the plain language of the statute and
Congress’s intent.156  Therefore, because plaintiff’s posthumously con-
ceived child was not considered the decedent’s child under Virginia’s
state property laws, the child could not be considered a child under
the Social Security Act; the child was ineligible for survivorship
benefits.157
149. Id. at 59.
150. Id.  at 53.
151. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 842.
154. Id. at 843.
155. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 63.
157. Id. The Court found that although the facts of this case are disheartening, it cannot
deviate from the plain language of the statute and Congress’s intent. Id.
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B. An Eighth Circuit Decision
In the same year that the Ninth Circuit created a split by holding
that a posthumously conceived child was not entitled to survivorship
benefits, the Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion.158
As with the other cases before it, the facts in this case were like
the others.  Here, Bruce and Patti Beeler’s dreams of conceiving a
child were deterred after Bruce was diagnosed with acute leukemia.159
Nearly a year after Bruce died from the cancer, Patti conceived a child
using Bruce’s sperm, which had been preserved prior to his chemo-
therapy treatments.160  Additionally, it is undisputed that Bruce is the
child’s father.161  Patti filed an application on behalf of her posthu-
mously conceived child to receive benefits.162  Patti’s application was
denied—like the many widows who have filed on behalf of their post-
humously conceived children.163  The SSA found that the child was
not a child of the wage earner within the meaning of the Act.164
V. EXAMINING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND THE SUPREME
COURT’S RESOLUTION IN ASTRUE V. CAPATO
According to the SSA, the number of survivorship applicants that
were conceived posthumously is increasing.165  Although the actual
number of applications may appear insignificant—there are over
100—it is the increasing rate of these applications that show that this
trend is here to stay.166  This, combined with the number of cases re-
garding survivorship benefits and posthumously conceived children
that are pending before the courts,167 serves as a strong reason why
this circuit split needed to be addressed by the Supreme Court.
158. Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011).
159. Id
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.; see discussion supra Part III.
164. Id.
165. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Astrue v. Capato, 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011) (No.
11-159), 2011 WL 3511023.
166. Id.
167. See id.
2013] 941
Howard Law Journal
A. Sperm Heists: Acting Without the Consent of the Decedent
Spouse
Early in 2002, a Massachusetts attorney coined, the “test tube
trailblazer,” was allegedly told by a Social Security representative that
if he was successful in his client’s case to receive benefits for posthu-
mously conceived grandchildren, that he “should go down to the
sperm bank with [his] business card.”168  Although the alleged re-
marks are hostile, at best, there is a message behind the statement.
Widows who act without the consent of her decedent spouse and use
his sperm to conceive posthumously are committing a heist of the
sperm bank.  The risk of abuse is substantial.169  A widow has the pos-
sibility to heist sperm, again and again and again, which could result in
multiple children conceived decades and scores after the decedent’s
death.170  This would result in the widow applying for benefits on be-
half of several posthumously conceived children further depleting al-
ready emaciated governmental funds.
Additionally, a requirement that only a genetic tie is sufficient for
a posthumously conceived child to attain inheritance rights would
leave the decedent parent’s estate “at the mercy of the unilateral
choices of his or her surviving partner to conceive a posthumous
child” who could—in good faith or not—take a large portion of the
estate.171  Further, a man or woman that has decided to undergo the
cryopreservation process does not necessarily intend for his or her
wife or husband to use the genetic material after death.172
[G]ranting inheritance rights to posthumously conceived babies may
complicate life for earlier-born heirs.  “In an era in which serial
marriages, serial families, and blended families are not uncommon,
according succession rights under our intestacy laws to posthu-
mously conceived children may, in a given case, have the potential
168. Elisabeth Preis, Test-tube Trailblazer; Bar Talk, AM. LAWYER, Apr. 2002, at 141.
169. See Knaplund, supra note 14, at 93 (“Once frozen, sperm may be viable almost indefi-
nitely . . . .”).
170. Id. at 92-94.
171. Wood, supra note 134, at 903.
Likewise, when an individual participates in an attempt to conceive through artificial
means and intends to be the parent of any resulting child, he knows he is taking on the
associated responsibilities of support.  But when an individual is deceased before con-
ception occurs, he often makes no such active decision. If he preserved his gametes
during his lifetime, it is quite possible that he did not even consider the possibility that
they might be used to conceive a child after his death -a child who would never know
him and would not be raised by him, a child whom he would never have the opportu-
nity to love.
Id.
172. Knaplund, supra note 14, at 93.
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to pit child against child and family against family,” she said, since
the later child’s share of the inheritance would reduce the amount
available to any older children.173
B. The Inevitable Risk of Abuse
The “[Social Security Administration’s] . . . aim of providing [sur-
vivorship] benefits is primarily to those who unexpectedly lose a wage
earner’s support.”174  The Legislature foresaw many problems that
could and would arise without defining the word “child” in the Social
Security Act and created the eligibility rules as a prophylactic of gov-
ernmental funds “while helping qualified children.”175  “In addition to
protecting the Social Security trust fund, the eligibility requirements
are substantially related to the important governmental objective of
using reasonable presumptions to limit benefits to those children who
lost a parent’s support.”176
As discussed in Part I, the purpose of the Social Security Act was
to provide for the general welfare of American citizens and protect
individuals from falling into abject poverty.177  Also discussed in that
same Part was whether the purpose of the Act could be realized by
extending benefits to children conceived after the death and without
the knowledge or consent of an individual.178  It must be reiterated,
that these benefits should not be extended to posthumously conceived
children unless expressly authorized by the statute.179
As discussed in Schafer v. Astrue, the Social Security Act is not a
general welfare program “benefitting needy persons,” but it was cre-
ated as a means of protection from hardship in the event that a depen-
dent’s wage earner was no longer able to support the family.180
Therefore, it is difficult to defend arguments that a posthumously con-
173. Tamar Lewin, The Nation: Taking After Father; A Frozen Sperm Riddle, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2002, at 3.
174. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51 (emphasis added).
175. MaryClaire Dale, NJ Mom seeks survivor benefits for twins conceived in vitro after hus-
band’s cancer death, STARTRIBUNE (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.startribune.com/templates/Print_
This_Story?sid=113022274.  As of June 2011, 4.4 million children receive over $2 billion per
month in survivorship benefits.  Although these “dollars help to provide the necessities of life for
family members and help . . . to stabilize the family’s financial future,” $24 billion dollars a year
is a substantial amount of money and protection of these funds is not only important, but should
be addressed by those elected by American tax-payers—the legislature and not the courts. BEN-
EFITS, supra note 43.
176. Dale, supra note 175.
177. Andrews & Porter, supra note 6, at 1.
178. See discussion supra Part I.
179. See discussion supra Part I.
180. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 58 (4th Cir. 2011).
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ceived child—especially a child conceived several years later—could
be dependent on a decedent’s wages.  How can survivorship benefits
be extended to persons that did not exist, let alone survive181 the wage
earner?  Social Security survivorship benefits are a part of a national
program, which provides support to the child who has lost his or her
parent.182  Because the posthumously conceived child never met his or
her decedent parent, logically, the child was never dependent upon
the decedent parent.
The Fourth Circuit went even further and discussed that in addi-
tion to a posthumously conceived child not being dependent upon the
wage earner, because the posthumously conceived child comes into
being after death, “survivorship benefits would serve a purpose more
akin to a subsidy.”183  This subsidy would merely provide aid to future
reproductive plans.184  Therefore, Congress drafted amendments to
the Act, which protected natural born children and provided child sta-
tus to children whose parentage was not in dispute185 by including a
state’s intestacy laws as a gatekeeper to benefits for children who do
not meet the Act’s statutory provisions to receive survivorship
benefits.186
Of course, if state intestacy laws permit a posthumously con-
ceived child to receive property of their decedent parent then, accord-
ing to the Act,187 the posthumously conceived child is a child within
the meaning of the statute and should be permitted to receive bene-
fits.  However, state intestacy laws must be analyzed carefully.
Facially, many of the state statutes address the issue at hand in rela-
tion to the taking of intestate property; however, these laws speak to
181. A survivor is a person that outlives another. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
If the literal meaning of a survivor is one who has outlived another, and an individual did not
outlive another because that individual did not exist at the time of the “other’s” death, is that
individual truly a survivor?  No.
182. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d at 58.
183. Id. at 59.  The court discussed that posthumously conceived children differ from the
“core beneficiary class.” Id.  The first difference was that a posthumously conceived child could
not have been dependent upon the wage earner and the second difference is the effect that
because posthumously conceived children come into being after the death of one of the parents,
permitting the child to receive benefits has the effect of creating a subsidy for continuing repro-
ductive plans. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 58 (citing McMillian v. Heckler, 759 F.2d 1147, 1149-59 (4th Cir. 1985)).
186. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).  “Where state intestacy law provides that a
child may take personal property from a father’s estate, it may reasonably be thought that the
child will more likely be dependent during the parent’s life and at his death.” Id. at 514; see 42
U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A).
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posthumous children, not necessarily posthumously conceived chil-
dren.188  This argument does not suggest that all posthumously con-
ceived children should not receive survivorship benefits.  But, this is
an argument that the judiciary is not the appropriate body to deter-
mine who should and should not receive benefits and should practice
judicial restraint in reviewing such administrative decisions.189  Fed-
eral and state legislatures are the appropriate bodies to determine
who should receive benefits, especially in this context of reproductive
health, property law, and family law, which “constantly requir[es] ad-
justments . . . to account for Wchanging technological and social
realities.”190
Further, with the advent of advancements in reproductive tech-
nology that allows for genetic material to be preserved and subse-
quently used for artificial conception nearly a decade after the death
of an individual,191 the legislature is the appropriate body to guard
against the risk of abuse.  For example, some cryopreservation clinics
allow widows and widowers access to her or his deceased spouse’s re-
productive material without consent.192  “A 1998 survey of 324 [ART]
clinic found that 45% of the responding clinics prohibited the use of
[cryopreserved sperm and eggs] by a widow or girlfriend [or widower
or boyfriend] after . . . death while 355 of clinics allowed such use.”193
According to recent data, posthumously conceived children are
rare, although nearly half a million frozen embryos are stored across
the nation.194  This further supports the premise that the judiciary is
not the proper body to address any changes in the Social Security
Act—posthumously conceived children are rare—thus, the legislature
is the proper body to address any and all changes.  The Legislature is
the more appropriate body because of their proximity and under-
standing of the needs of their constituents.
188. See discussion supra Part II.B.
189. See generally Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (explaining that the
Court will pass on a constitutional question regardless if it is properly presented to the Court and
if there is another way in which redress or an answer can be provided (e.g., state law)).  The
Court should only deal with a constitutional issue if it is absolutely necessary to resolve the
matter. Id.
190. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 62.
191. Suppon, Life After Death, supra note 49, at 230.
192. Knaplund, supra note 14, at 93 (citing Stern, et al., Access to Services at Assisted Repro-
ductive Technology Clinics: A Survey of Policies and Practices, 184 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY 591, 595 (2001)).
193. Id.
194. Nelson, Dead-Beat Dads, supra note 48.
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Additionally, granting survivorship benefits to persons who are
not survivors also appears to be antithetical to the purpose and legisla-
tive intent of the Social Security Act.  A survivor is an individual who
outlives a person that he or she had a legal or recognized relationship
with prior to the person’s death.195  Under the legal definition of a
survivor, a posthumously conceived child cannot survive his or her de-
cedent parent’s death.  The posthumously conceived child was not in
existence prior to the parent’s death.  The child has not survived the
parent.  The child was never depended upon the parent.  Thus, grant-
ing survivorship benefits to non-survivors—posthumously conceived
children—is similar to granting equivalent disability benefits to a fully
capacitated person.
There are other statutes that have addressed the issue of the legal
relationship between individuals and their posthumously conceived
children.196  The Uniform Parentage Act does not recognize a parent
child relationship between a posthumously conceived child and a de-
ceased parent unless the parent “consented in record” that it was his
or her express will that the posthumous reproduction occur after his
or her death.197  Thus, it follows that if Congress can draft the afore-
mentioned legislation to include an express provision regarding post-
humously conceived children, Congress may certainly draft similar
amendments to the Social Security Act.  Again, this is a matter for the
Legislature, not the courts.  “But in light of the many complexities
arising from rapid technological changes in this area, Congress has
chosen, so far to leave the matter to [the] states.”198
All arguments aside, however, the Supreme Court recently re-
solved the circuit split.199  Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Gins-
burg wrote that to determine whether an individual is eligible to
receive survivorship benefits, attention must be to state intestacy
195. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see also Knaplund, supra note 14, at 93
(“Once frozen, sperm may be viable almost indefinitely; scientists are unsure how long it will
last, but are confident that sperm can be stored for at least ten years.  Freezing one’s sperm,
however, does not necessarily mean that one wants children postmortem.”).
196. See Uniform Parentage Act § 707 (amended 2002), available at http://www.aals.org/
profdev/family/sampson.pdf/.
197. Id.
198. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16-17, Astrue v. Capato, 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011)
(No. 11-159), 2011 WL 3511023.
199. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2022 (2012) (holding that the Social Security Admin-
istration’s longstanding interpretation was reasonable and permissible under Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.).
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laws.200  Should a posthumously conceived individual not be eligible
to take under state property laws, the individual was not eligible to
receive benefits.  This interpretation, according to the Court, was
found to be reasonable, and thus “entitled to deference under Chev-
ron.”201  Thus, the Capato children were not entitled to Social Security
benefits because they could not inherit under Florida’s property
law.202
CONCLUSION
Although hindsight is always 20/20, let us return to the story of
Jack and Jill and what should have been done to adhere to the statu-
tory requirements of the Social Security Act to receive survivorship
benefits.  More than a decade ago, the couple fell in love and had
dreams of one day having a family.  They had it all, except children.
After being diagnosed with cancer, Jack had his sperm preserved in
case the chemotherapy rendered him sterile.
Because of this cryopreservation, Jill could later be artificially in-
seminated (or conceive through another means of reproductive tech-
nology) with Jack’s sperm and the couple’s dreams of a family could
turn into reality.  As a precaution, however, the couple discussed
when and how Jill would be artificially inseminated.  Additionally, the
200. Id. at 2025 (“[R]eliance on state intestacy law to determine who is a ‘child’ serves the
Act’s driving objective, which is to ‘provide . . . dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family
with protection against the hardship occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured’s] earnings.”).
201. Id.; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  If, however, the court determines Con-
gress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.  ‘The power of an administrative agency to
administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation
of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Con-
gress.’ If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are ar-
bitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative dele-
gation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a
case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
202. See discussion supra Part III.B and accompanying notes. See generally Capato, 132 S.
Ct. 2021.  This decision abrogated the Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d. 593 (2004) decision.
Id.
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couple discussed what would happen in the unfortunate event that
Jack did not survive his disease.  Jack provided for protection of his
assets in his will for his wife and for any children born after his death.
Further, Jack consented in writing to the use of his sperm by Jill.  The
consent document also included the number of children that the
couple wished to conceive using his frozen sperm unless multiple chil-
dren are conceived through the artificial reproductive process (which
is common).  In the event that Jill conceived more than the number of
children consented to during one pregnancy, then she would not use
his sperm to conceive any additional children.  And unfortunately, af-
ter a brief bout with cancer, and multiple futile chemotherapy treat-
ments, Jack lost his battle with cancer.
Jill, stricken with grief, decided to find some relief by having a
child—Jack’s child.  Shortly after burying her husband, Jill was artifi-
cially inseminated with Jack’s sperm—in a manner consistent with the
terms the couple had agreed to prior to Jack’s death.  Nine months
later, she gave birth to not one, but two children—Jack’s biological
children.  Jill applied on behalf of her children to receive Jack’s Social
Security survivorship benefits and after completing the process man-
dated by the Social Security Administration, Jill was able to receive
benefits on behalf of her posthumously conceived children.  No ad-
ministrative or court action was necessary.  Although hindsight is in-
deed 20/20, the aforementioned story should be the standard that
every couple takes to ensure that survivorship benefits are received,
sperm is not heisted, and the Social Security system is not abused.
Finally, posthumously conceived children should not be permit-
ted to receive survivorship benefits beyond the scope of the plain
meaning of the text of the Social Security Act.  If state property laws
permit a posthumously conceived child to take intestate personal
property, then a parent-child relationship should be recognized be-
tween the posthumously conceived child and deceased parent.  Any
additional interpretation should not be made by the court.  A testa-
mentary document would better serve the needs of, and benefit, the
child.  Further, Congress is the appropriate body to interpret and give
meaning to “child” under the Act, not the courts.  The courts should
not be the body to interpret what a “child” means under the Social
Security Act.  Allowing posthumously conceived children to receive
survivorship benefits will likely result in a slippery slope of abuse to
the already emaciated social security program.  Permitting posthu-
mously conceived children to receive survivorship benefits should be
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permissible only under the language of the statute.  Any changes are a
matter for the lawmaker—the legislature—not the courts!
“Posthumous conception is a difficult process and an emotional
one.  On top of trying to get benefits for your child, you’re going
through the mourning of your husband.”203  However, “if sad facts
make hard cases, we cannot allow hard cases to make bad law.”204
203. Clark, supra note 60.
204. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 63 (4th Cir. 2011). But see id. at 70 (Davis, J., dissenting)
(“[T]hat truism has never defined a ‘hard case.’ What must be recalled is that judicial opinions,
like the statutes they interpret, are not merely words arranged on paper.  They have real effects
on people.”).
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“[P]rivacy is dead, get over it.”1
INTRODUCTION
While speaking to a live audience, Mark Zuckerberg, Chief Exec-
utive Officer and co-founder of Facebook, mentioned that if he had
the opportunity to “create Facebook again today, user information
would by default be public, not private . . . .”2  Even though Mark
Zuckerberg recently experienced a privacy breach that led to the pub-
lic disclosure of his privately marked photos,3 Mark Zuckerberg will
1. Internet Privacy: The Impact and Burden of EU Regulation: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 1
(2011) [hereinafter Internet Privacy Hearing] (statement of Rep. Mary Bono Mack, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade) (“I do not subscribe to the theory that privacy is dead,
get over it.”).
2. Marshall Kirkpatrick, Facebook’s Zuckerberg Says the Age of Privacy is Over, READ-
WRITEWEB (Jan. 9, 2010, 9:25 PM), http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/facebooks_zuck
erberg_says_the_age_of_privacy_is_ov.php.
3. Kashmir Hill, Mark Zuckerberg’s Private Photos Exposed Thanks to Facebook Flaw,
FORBES (Dec. 6, 2011, 2:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/12/06/mark-zuck
erbergs-private-photos-exposed-thanks-to-facebook-flaw/ (discussing how an individual used
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unlikely change his belief that the “rise of social networking online
means that people no longer have an expectation of privacy.”4
Today, we live in an age of online sharing.  People feel more com-
fortable each day sharing personal information over the Internet.  In
2011, Facebook executives reported that each day 4 billion “things”
were publicly shared on Facebook, a figure that they project to stead-
ily increase.5  Twitter executives announced that in 2011, users
tweeted 200 million times a day, voicing their opinions on various
trending topics.6  These websites’ vast popularity is quite explainable.
Social media websites not only provide individuals with the opportu-
nity to connect with friends, family, and acquaintances across the
world, but also a platform that projects the individuals “voice,” which
otherwise might not be recognized.  Through their immense popular-
ity and unique services, there is no doubt that social media websites
have established the sharing of information as a social norm.
As users continue to publicly share personal information at such
a high rate over the Internet, the focus becomes on whether “sharing”
has truly replaced “privacy” as the overarching social expectation.  As
already stated, Mark Zuckerberg, along with other chief executives of
social networking websites, believes that it has.7
Social media websites paint the sharing of information as a posi-
tive, social interaction, but they strategically disguise a lucrative busi-
ness model that centers upon the concept of online behavioral
advertising.8  Although attempting to “‘make the world a more open
place,’”9 and help people “understand the world” around them,10
Facebook’s pornographic material self-reporting mechanism to expose Zuckerberg’s private
photos).
4. Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder, GUARD-
IAN (Jan. 10, 2010, 8:58 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy
(highlighting Zuckerberg’s opinions on individuals’ level of privacy expectations in the online
social media world).
5. See Alexia Tsotsis, Mark Zuckerberg Explains His Law of Social Sharing [Video],
TECHCRUNCH (July 6, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/07/06/mark-zuckerberg-explains-his-
law-of-social-sharing-video/ (explaining the formula, “Y = C *2^X,” used to demonstrate how
the amount of materials that people share today is doubled from a year ago and will double a
year from now).
6. 200 Million Tweets Per Day, TWITTER BLOG (June 30, 2011, 1:03PM), http://blog.twitter.
com/2011/06/200-million-tweets-per-day.html.
7. See Johnson, supra note 4.
8. See Jose Antonio Vargas, The Face of Facebook: Mark Zuckerberg Opens Up, THE NEW
YORKER (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/09/20/100920fa_fact_vargas.
9. Id.
10. Mark Zuckerberg, 200 Million Strong, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (Apr. 8, 2009, 9:27 AM),
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=72353897130.
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Facebook and other social media websites engage in transactions
where they exchange relatively free services for the ability to monitor
and market online behavior.  When each individual uses the websites’
services, technological devices monitor the individual’s behavior and
collect information such as the individual’s interest, likes and dislikes.
The accumulated information is stored in a personally identifiable on-
line folder.  Then social media websites sell the online folder, typically
to online advertising agencies that pay big money for the ability to
selectively market products according to the individual’s identified
interest.11
While the presence of social media websites and the consistent
rise of online advertising revenue in the United States may appear
economically sound,12 the profitable business model negatively im-
pacts online privacy and consumer trust, which appear to be gradually
fading away.  Online privacy includes the individual right of personal
privacy and protection over the storing, repurposing, selling, and dis-
playing of personally identifiable and non-identifiable information
over the Internet.13  It forms the underlying basis of consumer trust,
where individuals confidently trust that as they engage in online trans-
actions, their personal information will be used appropriately and ac-
cessed by only authorized individuals.
With the prevalence of identify theft and fraud within society, it
has become an international agenda to ensure adequate online privacy
protections and to secure consumer trust.  More importantly, without
a national privacy law, the United States has recently conducted Con-
gressional hearings in order to determine how to balance the con-
sumer trust with the success of online businesses through online
behavioral advertising, seeking uniformity and low regulatory burden.
In an opening statement, Representative Mary Bono Mack, then
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and
11. See Vargas, supra note 8 (discussing the increase in revenue generated as online users
continue to upload vast amounts of information onto Facebook).
12. See Press Release, IAB, Internet Advertising Revenues Hit $7.3 Billion in Q1 ‘11 High-
est First-Quarter Revenue Level on Record According to IAB and PwC (May 26, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.iab.net/about_the_iab/recent_press_releases/press_release_archive/press_rel
ease/pr-052611 (explaining how $7.3 billion in advertising revenue in the first quarter alone in
2011, a 23% increase from the prior year, displays the relevance of digital marketing and adver-
tising); see also Internet Privacy Hearing, supra note 1, at 18 (statement of  Rep. Pete Olson,
Member, Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade) (referencing the 23% increase from the first
quarter of 2010).
13. See “Internet Privacy” Definition, GEARDOWNLOAD.COM, http://www.geardownload.
com/tags/internet-privacy.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
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Trade, stated that while “e-commerce in the United States will top
$200 billion this year for the first time, there is still a Wild, Wild West
feel to cyberspace, leaving many consumers wondering if there is a
sheriff in town or whether they are completely on their own when it
comes to protecting themselves and their families.”14
The European Union, recognized as a leader of online privacy
protection, has taken the role of “sheriff,” implementing stringent
laws that place the user in control over their personal data.  While
agreeing that online privacy is slowly fading away and arguably does
not exist, the debate among United States legislatures centers upon
the question of whether the United States should follow in the steps of
the European Union.  Particularly, should the United States enact
similar privacy regulations that establish a barrier of online privacy by
placing users in control over their personal data while potentially sti-
fling businesses that rely on the free flow or exchange of personally
identifiable data?
This Note argues against the implementation of European Union
privacy laws in the United States.  Instead, I argue that the United
States should enact a national privacy law that incorporates a “base-
line set of principles”15 that will foster economic growth while ensur-
ing adequate privacy protections for online users by limiting the
online tracking of users without the user’s express consent.  Part I will
discuss how social media networking sites operate, particularly focus-
ing on how privacy is implicated.  Part II will highlight the European
Union’s and the United States’ approaches to online privacy, includ-
ing their underlying theories.  Part III will address the interpretation
and implication of these different online privacy perspectives.  Part IV
will argue why the United States should not implement the European
Union privacy regime but, instead, enact a “baseline set of principles”
similar to the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights that gives the user ade-
quate online privacy protection, stimulates continuous economic
growth, and holds both users and businesses accountable for decisions
made under personal autonomy.
14. Internet Privacy Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Rep. Mary Bono Mack, Chair-
man, Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade).
15. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Plan to Protect Privacy in the Internet Age
by Adopting a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/fact-sheet-plan-protect-privacy-internet-age-adopt
ing-consumer-privacy-b.
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I. PRIVACY’S FIGHT TO CO-EXIST WITH SOCIAL
MEDIA WEBSITES
Accessing the Internet has arguably become one of the most use-
ful tools of modern day society as it has been estimated that as of
2011, nearly 2.1 billion people, one-third of the Earth’s population,
utilize Internet services.16  Among these services are social media
websites, which have evolved from simple networking circles to con-
venient pit stops that allow users to actively participate in online com-
merce.  Almost 62% of adults worldwide regularly access social media
websites, accounting for 22% of Internet usage.17  However, while at-
tempting to harness the variety of services and benefits these integral
websites offer, individuals place their online privacy in jeopardy as
they are typically unaware of the constant monitoring and trading of
their personal information.  Without any doubt, the commercialization
and social networking face of the Internet have introduced a reality
where “privacy harms are no longer short-lived and innocuous.”18  As
technology continues to permeate and dominate societal functions,
numerous privacy advocates are urgently pushing for privacy reform
to eradicate the growing mentality and fear that “online, ‘you have
zero privacy.’”19  The European Union and the United States seek to
extinguish this fear through online privacy reform.  However, before
determining which approach is the most effective, it is critical to un-
derstand how social media websites restrict privacy.
A. How Social Media Websites Operate
All social-networking websites operate around one common pur-
pose: to connect people with others regardless of location.20  Primarily
16. Internet Usage Statistics: The Internet Big Picture, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.
internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
17. Cara Pring, 99 New Social Media Stats for 2012, THE SOCIAL SKINNY (May 10, 2012),
http://thesocialskinny.com/99-new-social-media-stats-for-2012/.
18. Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One’s Own: On Privacy and Online Social Net-
works, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 75 (2007).
19. Id. at 87.
20. See About, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?v=info (last visited Mar. 2,
2013) (“Facebook’s mission is to give people the power to share and make the world more open
and connected.”); Mark Evans, Twitter’s New Mission Statement, TWITTERRATI (Jan. 11, 2011),
http://www.twitterrati.com/2011/01/11/twitters-new-mission-statement/ (“Twitter . . . has a new
mission statement: ‘[t]o instantly connect people everywhere  to what’s most important to
them.’”); Company Overview, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/ (last visited
Mar. 2, 2013) (“Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and make it universally
accessible and useful.”); see also  Interview by Kara Swisher with Dick Costolo, CEO, Twitter, at
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designed to map out the relationships between people,21 social media
networks enable “people [to] communicate more efficiently with their
friends, family and coworkers.”22  As users remain active and utilize
the website’s services, social media websites are able to accomplish
this objective and more.
Facebook, Twitter, Google +, and LinkedIn—all are considered
the prominent leaders within the vast social media market.23  Each
social media website allows members to create an online account
where they are given the opportunity to depict who they are to the
online world.  Users begin developing a personalized profile by pro-
viding basic information such as “name, sex, age, location, [and] hob-
bies/interests.”24  They are able to enhance their online profile by
answering surveys and questionnaires about themselves and their in-
terests.  Then, they are given the tools to upload pictures and media
files that include personally made videos.  Once they complete their
profiles, individuals are able to fully maximize the services offered by
the particular social media website.  Users can download applications,
establish contacts, and keep up with the latest events, trends, and ac-
tions of their friends.  Through the users’ uploaded personal informa-
tion and online activity, social media networking websites now have
the ability to target and connect a user with others of similar interests
and backgrounds.  Typically, these websites have technology that
mimics social graphing by drawing smaller, concrete networks that in-
timately identify the user to a larger network.
One of the most attractive aspects of social media websites is the
low economic cost for membership.  Individuals are able to become
members, create an online profile, and utilize basic services without
providing any monetary compensation.  However, while some have an
estimated value in the billions, social media networks generate their
revenue through online advertising and purchases.  Social media web-
CES 2011 (Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://allthingsd.com/20110117/full-dces-interview-video-
twitter-ceo-dick-costolo/.
21. Dave Roos, How Networking Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://money.howstuffworks.
com/business-communications/how-social-networks-work.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
22. About Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/peering/ (last visited Mar. 2
2013); cf. Facebook in Education, The Social Environment of Facebook Communication,
FACEBOOK (Feb. 15, 2011, 8:23 AM), http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=1015041368
2665570 (discussing that communication through online social networks mainly consists of “small
talk,” which is important for developing close, interpersonal relationships) (citations omitted).
23. See Roos, supra note 21.
24. Dave Roos, Setting Up Social Networking Accounts, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://money.
howstuffworks.com/business-communications/how-social-networks-work4.htm (last visited Mar.
2, 2013).
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sites exploit the users’ online activity and shared information as a
means to increase revenue through online behavioral advertising.  The
social graph and the sharing of personal information provide compa-
nies and engineers with “the opportunity to build a business” by
“deeply integrat[ing] with the . . . website and gain[ing] access to mil-
lions of users.”25  Online businesses solicit the information gathered
from the website by actively monitoring the users’ behavior.  Then,
they purchase the collected information along with advertising space
as they vigorously pursue avenues to effectively and selectively adver-
tise products considered relevant to particular users.  Thus, social-
networking websites maximize profits by selling the shared informa-
tion while businesses reduce operational costs by only advertising per-
tinent products related to the user’s recorded interest.
B. Privacy Implications
Social media websites such as Facebook and LinkedIn operate
behind a corporate philosophy where they allow users to “control . . .
their experiences so [that] they can express themselves freely while
knowing that their information is being shared in the way they in-
tend.”26  As part of the granted control, users can install privacy set-
tings that either permit or prevent access to their personal profiles.
Through selected privacy settings, users can dictate who views their
profiles and what specifics parts of their profiles are viewable.  Yet,
even with fairly strict privacy settings, individuals remain vulnerable
and open to third parties obtaining their personal information.
Although appearing to provide users adequate privacy protec-
tion, privacy settings constantly change and, at times, become difficult
to manage.  Most social-networking websites do not install default pri-
vacy settings.  Therefore, the user’s profile remains accessible to the
public unless the user opts-out by selecting privacy settings for their
profile.27  This opt-out method presents two main challenges.  First,
privacy policies and settings typically consume a large amount of time
and effort to decipher.28  It is estimated that the average privacy pol-
25. One Young Kashmir, Facebook Factsheet, FACEBOOK (Oct. 26, 2010, 12:31 PM), http://
www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=164122353611720 (addressing Facebook’s platform).
26. Id. (speaking on Facebook’s privacy, safety, and security guidelines).
27. See, e.g., Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/ (last modi-
fied July 27, 2012).
28. See, e.g., Alexis Madrigal, Reading the Privacy Policies You Encounter in a Year Would
Take 76 Work Days, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2012, 2:25 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/techno
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icy contains 2,514 words and takes 10 minutes to read.29  In a fast-
paced society, it is not uncommon for users to refrain from reading a
website’s privacy policy and, ultimately, for them to inadvertently fail
to place pertinent privacy settings.  In addition, new innovative fea-
tures present another challenge as websites enhance their services.
For example, Facebook added a new timeline and open graph applica-
tions.  Allegedly created to enhance users’ activity, these new features
“allowed” the users’ profile to revert back to public access.30  The
presence of long and challenging privacy policies coupled with new
features and updates make it difficult for users to manage their pri-
vacy settings.
Additionally, privacy settings alone are not fully capable of re-
stricting Internet “cookies.”  More than a sweet taste, these techno-
logical cookies “scan in real time what people are doing on a Web
page, then instantly assess location, income, shopping interests and
even medical conditions.”31  They give the website the ability to easily
track the user’s online behavior and collect for storage all uploaded
personal information and observed content.32  Internet cookies con-
tinue to work even after a user leaves the website and can automati-
cally identify the individual and his associated information when the
user returns to the website.33  Furthermore, users can delete Internet
cookies within their history tab.  However, Internet cookies are en-
crypted with the power to “surreptitiously re-spawn themselves even
after users try to delete them.”34  This capability practically makes it
nearly impossible for a user to opt-out of being tracked.35  In fact,
occasionally referred to as “frictionless sharing,” Internet cookies al-
low websites to continue to track the individual’s online behavior and
logy/archive/2012/03/reading-the-privacy-policies-you-encounter-in-a-year-would-take-76-work-
days/253851/.
29. Id.
30. See Consumer Groups Ask FTC to Investigate Facebook-Datalogix Data-Matching Ar-
rangement, Facebook Privacy: Latest News/Events, EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/
(last visited Mar. 2, 2013) (speaking on the comments that EPIC submitted concerning the pro-
posed settlement agreement between the FTC and Facebook).
31. Behavioral Targeting, Privacy Today: A Review of Current Issues, PRIVACY RTS.
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/Privacy-IssuesList.htm (last revised Jan. 2013).
32. See id.
33. What is a Cookie?, Cookies: Frequently Asked Questions, ABOUTCOOKIES.ORG, http://
aboutcookies.org/Default.aspx?page=5 (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
34. Rretta, I’ll Be Watching You!, FRANKLIN COUNTY VA. PATRIOTS (June 27, 2011), http://
www.franklincountyvapatriots.com/2011/06/27/ill-be-watching-you.
35. Slade Cutter, The 7 “Creep Factors” of Online Behavioral Advertising, VENTUREBEAT
(Feb. 22, 2012, 5:53 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2012/02/22/the-7-creep-factors-of-online-behav
ioral-advertising/.
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activity even after the user has logged out of the website, not necessa-
rily leaving momentarily as previously described.36  Ultimately, social-
media websites activate Internet cookies to facilitate the sale and ex-
change of personal data to online businesses and advertising agencies,
generally without any notice given to the user.37
At times, the impact of cookies can be unascertainable.  This
year, privacy advocates petitioned the FTC and European regulators
to investigate the activity of Google, which has been accused of using
a code that enabled cookies to bypass established privacy settings.38
While stating that they utilize cookies “to improve [the] user[‘s] expe-
rience and . . . quality of [their] services,” Google, in an effort to re-
vamp their privacy policy, now employs cookies and anonymous
identifiers designed to collect all information whenever one interacts
with any of its services.39  Google combines all the collected informa-
tion found from the different services for processing typically outside
the user’s national residence.  However, Google enables the user to
update or delete that information unless Google must “keep that in-
formation for legitimate business or legal purposes.”40  Although
Google shares the collected information with their affiliates, Google
explicitly mentions that the new privacy policy does not cover the in-
formation practices utilized by companies or organizations who adver-
tise on its website.41
In light of the technology and operational means used by social
networking websites, users consistently face the possibility that their
personal information is treated improperly and may come in contact
with the wrong person.  Online privacy should protect the user’s per-
sonally identifiable and non-identifiable information on the Internet.
But, society lives in an age where identity theft, fraud, and exposure of
personal items that can potentially humiliate an individual are preva-
36. See Emil Protalinski, Facebook Tracks You Online Even After You Log Out, ZDNET
(Sept. 25, 2011, 7:59 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebook-tracks-you-online-
even-after-you-log-out/4034; see also Christopher Williams, Facebook Criticised for “Tracking”
Logged-Out Users, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 26, 2011, 4:04 PM) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/tech
nology/facebook/8789942/Facebook-criticised-for-tracking-logged-out-users.html (reporting on
an incident where an Australian entrepreneur discovered that Facebook cookies were tracking
him after he was logged out of the social network).
37. Cutter, supra note 35.
38. See Jon Brodkin, US, Europe Investigate Google’s Bypass of Safari Privacy Settings, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 16, 2012, 9:17 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2012/03/us-europe-
investigate-googles-bypass-of-safari-privacy-settings.ars.
39. See Privacy Policy, supra note 27.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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lent.  With the presence of these serious privacy concerns, some solu-
tions have developed.
C. Solutions Leading to Different Approaches
Although few in number, privacy solutions have been made to
give users a sense of confidence and trust while roaming and using
services on the Internet.  In an effort to protect privacy from a suc-
cessful business scheme, various companies and organizations have
formulated privacy programs that provide privacy security.  These
programs range from privacy seals to software products whereby con-
sumers pay for privacy protections.  But, as previously mentioned,
these programs may garner some protection but will leave the individ-
ual subject to privacy breaches.
III. COMMON PURSUIT, SEPARATE METHODS,
CONTRASTING RESULTS
Both the European Union and the United States pursue a com-
mon mission: to protect its respective citizens from harm.  Both na-
tions realize the need of protecting fundamental rights; yet, the
manners in which they protect fundamental rights differ.  Under the
concept of human dignity, the European Union stands firm by their
belief that one’s fundamental rights require keen protection.  On the
other hand, the United States uses the broad scope of liberty to guard
one’s fundamental rights while harmonizing the demands of an organ-
ized free society.42  Both nations identify privacy as a fundamental
right; but, with different outlooks, different results have occurred.
A. The European Union’s Mission to Protect Online Privacy
It is a prevailing fact that today’s society encompasses a growing
digital age where the collection of personal information presents a val-
uable economic asset.43  Nonetheless, the European Union persists
42. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. See Press Release, European Commission, Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Re-
form of Data Protection Rules to Increase Users’ Control of Their Data and to Cut Costs for
Businesses (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-46_en.htm (“In
the digital age, the collection and storage of personal information are essential.  Data is used by
all businesses – from insurance firms and banks to social media sites and search engines.”).
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upon protecting the individuals whose information is being consist-
ently tracked, collected, and transferred from one party to another.44
1. Current European Union Privacy Laws Concerning Data
Protection
In 1995, the European Union constructed a Privacy Directive on
Data Protection behind two foundational principles: (1) the protection
of information privacy and (2) the prevention of restrictions of the
free flow of personal information, for reasons of privacy protection.45
Although this Directive originally provided adequate privacy pro-
tection, European Union leaders such as Viviane Reding sought to
renovate this Directive in light of the continual increase of vast tech-
nological advances.46  Focused on “the necessity of enhancing individ-
uals’ control over their own data,”47 legislatures erected the following
“pillars” of online privacy protection: (1) the right to be forgotten; (2)
transparency; (3) privacy by default; and (4) protection regardless of
data location.48  These pillars of protection promote a multifaceted
“opt-in” framework, where the online user has control through exer-
cising and retrieving his consent.49  The individual no long bears the
burden of demonstrating that the collection of their personal data is
not necessary.  Instead, data controllers bear a heavier burden that
requires them to prove that keeping the accumulated personal infor-
mation is a necessity.50  Transparency presents online users with the
capability of being informed, particularly about what personal data is
44. See id. (explaining that the fundamental right to the protection of personal data is ex-
pressly supported and acknowledged by Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Human
Rights and the Lisbon Treaty).
45. Graham Greenleaf, The European Privacy Directive – Completed, 2 PRIVACY L. &
POL’Y REP. 81 (1995), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/PLPR/1995/52.html; see
also Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 34 [hereinafter EU Directive], available at http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1995:281:FULL:EN:PDF.
46. See Viviane Reding, Vice President, European Comm’n, Privacy in the Cloud: Data
Protection and Security in Cloud Computing (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_SPEECH-11-859_en.htm (speaking on how new technology such as cloud comput-
ing has presented the need to update the current EU privacy laws).
47. Viviane Reding, Vice President, European Comm’n, Your Data, Your Rights: Safe-
guarding Your Privacy in a Connected World (Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_SPEECH-11-183_en.htm.
48. Id.
49. See id. (“[P]eople shall have the right – and not only the ‘possibility’ – to withdraw their
consent to data processing.”).
50. Id.
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being tracked and gathered and how that data is being used.51  The
objective is to implement a nationwide standard where privacy is af-
forded at the very beginning and without any “considerable opera-
tional effort.”52  The desired outcome is for personal data to be
collected only for purposes designated by the specified user.53
While realizing that the first three pillars may not be enough, the
European Union solidified its desire for complete online privacy re-
form through the last pillar.  As an enforcement measure, the last pil-
lar places all organizations across the world on notice that European
Union Privacy laws apply regardless of data location.54  If an organiza-
tion or company operates within the European Union’s market or
targets European Union citizens as consumers, then the European
Union’s privacy laws apply even if the organization is not located in
the geographic parameters of the European Union.55  Although there
are no formalized means of ensuring compliance of outside companies
with European Union privacy laws, the Commissioner has delegated
broad discretion and power to privacy watchdogs.56  Therefore, with
the addition of the four pillars to the adequacy standard premised
within the original privacy directive, social media websites such as
Facebook, Twitter, and Google will have to take reasonable precau-
tions while operating in the European Union and targeting European
Union consumers.57  Irrespective of the impact, regulations will be en-
forced by the European Union to protect the fundamental right of
privacy.
2. Impact, Interpretation, and Implementation of European Union
Privacy Law
The European Union is guided by a political and economic mis-
sion to standardize the laws of all member countries in an effort to
function as one unified market where people, goods, services, and cap-
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. Id. (“[H]omogeneous privacy standards for European citizens should apply indepen-
dently of the area of the world in which their data is being processed.”).
55. Id.
56. Id. (“To enforce the EU law, national privacy watchdogs shall be endowed with powers
to investigate and engage in legal proceedings against non-EU data controllers whose services
target EU consumers.”).
57. See id.
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ital are able to move freely among member states.58  Part of a unique
political framework, each member state retains its status as an inde-
pendent sovereign nation while delegating some of its decision-mak-
ing authority to the law-making triangle embodied within the
European Union.59  Consisting of the European Parliament, the
Council of the European Union, and the European Commission, this
law-making triangle possess the power to enact directives, which re-
quire member states to achieve a particular result without imposing
the manner in which member states achieve the desired outcome.60
Accordingly, the 1995 Data Protection Directive, along with its pro-
posed renovations, seeks to strengthen online privacy rights but ap-
pears to have undesired results as each member state implements
corresponding legislation.
As usual, for every action, there is a reaction, and for every regu-
lation, there is a cost to be paid.61  The stricter privacy guidelines are
intended to increase consumer trust with the objective of facilitating
the acquisition of cheaper goods and services.62  Granting greater pro-
tection to users has enlarged the cost to online businesses both in effi-
ciency and equity.63  Obligated by law, online businesses must
maintain a detailed record of the user’s data and quickly respond to
58. How the EU Works, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/in
dex_en.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (explaining that the objective of the European Union is
to allow citizens to secure a maximized benefit from the European Union acting as one united
resource).
59. EUROPEAN UNION, HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION WORKS: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE
EU INSTITUTIONS 3 (June 2003), available at http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/docu
ments/virtual_library/08_euro_en.pdf.
60. Id. at 3–4.  Directives are typically used in order to align different national laws that
usually affect the operation of the single market. Application of EU Law, EUROPEAN UNION,
http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/introduction/what_directive_en.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
61. Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and Interna-
tional Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Data Protection Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 17
(2000).
62. Viviane Reding, Vice President, European Comm’n, The Reform of the EU Data Pro-
tection Directive: The Impact on Businesses (May 18, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_SPEECH-11-349_en.htm (“Trust in the treatment of personally identifiable infor-
mation collected on and off the Internet is essential for businesses to succeed.”) (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted); EUROPEAN UNION, HOW WILL THE EU’S DATA PROTECTION RE-
FORM BENEFIT EUROPEAN BUSINESSES?, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/
document/review2012/factsheets/7_en.pdf; see also Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at
1–2, SEC (2012) 72–73 final (Jan. 1, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protec
tion/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf.
63. Shaffer, supra note 61, at 17–20 (explaining the increase of transactional cost on busi-
nesses as a direct result of complying with the mandates of the privacy directive).
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any inquiries concerning the data’s particular use.64  Against the no-
tion of efficiency, this alone will require more operational and man-
power hours, increasing total operational cost.65  In terms of equity,
online businesses encounter the possibility that consumers will deny
consent.66  As a result, both the online businesses and the direct mar-
keting companies forego potential revenue generated from the ex-
change of personal data.67  In essence, the sovereignty of private
business decision-making becomes constrained through compliance.
For businesses outside the European Union, additional costs arise
from attempting to “‘adequately’” comply.68  To adequately comply, a
set of criteria must be satisfied.  The criteria provides that these orga-
nizations must: (1) process data for a limited specific purpose which
will be made known to the affected individual; (2) provide informa-
tion to ensure fair processing must be given to the affected individual;
and (3) the third party transfers may only occur in countries that af-
ford the same levels of protection.69  This heavy burden of compliance
poses a major risk to foreign jobs, exports, and businesses.
Furthermore, member states decide the manner of implementa-
tion.70  Through this inherent power, various interpretations of key
provisions within the Directive have expanded cost to the European
Union and businesses.  An example revolves around the consent pro-
vision.71  Some member states have interpreted this provision to mean
64. Id. at 17; see also Ben Beeson, Data Protection Rules Impact EU Businesses, LOCKTON
MARKET UPDATE (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.locktonmarketupdateblog.com/lmu/2012/01/data-
protection-rules-impact-eu-businesses/ (describing other requirements of EU privacy laws).
65. See Shaffer, supra note 61, at 20.
66. Id. at 17.
67. Id. at 18.
68. Internet Privacy Hearing, supra note 1, at 68 (written statement of Peter Swire, Profes-
sor, Moritz College of Law of the Ohio State University).
69. See U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_
main_018476.asp (last updated Apr. 26, 2012) (explaining the importance behind the safe harbor
program, which allows non-European Union businesses to comply with the stringent privacy
laws enacted by the European Union).
70. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Pro-
tection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities
for the Purposes of Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or
the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and the Free Movement of Such Data, at 2 SEC (2012) 73
final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:52012PC0010:en:NOT (“Moreover, because of its nature and content, the Framework
Decision leaves a large room for manoeuvre to Member States’ national laws in implementing its
provisions.”).
71. See generally Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 On the Defini-
tion of Consent, 01197/EN, WP 187 (July 13, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/poli
cies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp187_en.pdf (providing analysis of the concept of consent as
used in the Data Protection Directive and e-Privacy Directive).
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expressly given and at times requiring the consent be given in writ-
ing.72  Alternatively, other member states interpret this provision to
encompass implied consent.73  With various interpretations, online
businesses face increasing transactional and operating costs as they
attempt to comply with the Directive and the various laws in member
states.74  Administratively, European Union authorities face an in-
creased cost in enforcement due to non-compliant member states and
differing interpretations.75  With a declining European economy, such
costs can only add to the decline.
B. Is Liberty Enough?  The United States’s Quest for Online
Privacy Reform
With only a sector-by-sector privacy regime and no over-arching
privacy law, the United States seeks to implement a national privacy
law that will remain consistent with American jurisprudence while
balancing the needs for e-commerce with the need for online privacy
protection.  Liberty includes one’s privacy interest and respects auton-
omy.76  However, with the recent Obama Privacy Bill of Rights, it has
not been conclusive whether liberty will protect consumers over busi-
nesses or vice versa.
1. Current State of Privacy Laws Within the United States
American jurisprudence has identified privacy rights in connec-
tion with an improper or unwarranted intrusion.77  Focused on the
idea of an “unjustifiable intrusion,” the challenges typically involve
intrusion by the government or by the press that “affect[s] the very
72. See id. at 5.
73. See id. at 9 n.13 (explaining the privacy directive implemented by Germany).
74. Shaffer, supra note 61, at 20.
75. NEIL ROBINSON ET AL., RAND EUROPE, REVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN DATA PROTEC-
TION DIRECTIVE 35, 37 (2009), available at http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/
data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/review_of_eu_dp_directive.pdf.
76. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Right of Privacy in State Constitutional Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J.
971, 972-73 (2006).
77. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.  To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”) (emphasis omitted); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right
of personal security, personal liberty, and private property . . . .”).
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essence of constitutional liberty and security.”78  It is through these
challenges that the Supreme Court has been able to craft the essence
of privacy conceived by liberty as used in the U.S. Constitution.
Under the Fourth Amendment, the Court endorses a two-step
analysis in determining an improper search or seizure by government
actors.79  The Court begins by evaluating whether the victim exhibited
an actual or subjective expectation of privacy.80  If affirmative, the
Court concludes by exploring whether that expectation is one that so-
ciety is prepared to recognize as reasonable.81  This legal framework
permits the Court to defend its belief that the right to privacy is “the
right most valued by civilized men.”82  But, at the same time, the
Court acknowledges the value of personal autonomy, holding citizens
accountable for their decisions and corresponding actions.
Operating through this mindset, the Court prohibits the improper
intrusion within the sanctity of one’s home.83  From the Court’s per-
spective, the sanctity of one’s home embraces the “most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime.”84  These choices
stem from the inherent dignity and autonomy within each person,
which mandates proper safekeeping under the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment.85  Central to the core of liberty, these choices in-
clude the right of a woman to have an abortion,86 the right of same-
sex couples to engage in sexual conduct,87 and the right to control the
upbringing of one’s child.88  This jurisprudence demonstrates the
78. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (explaining the principles established in privacy cases “apply to all
invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and
the privacies of life.”).
79. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (interpreting the
protections of privacy within the realm of the Fourteenth Amendment).
80. Matthew L. Hodge, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Issues on the
“New” Internet: Facebook.com and MySpace.com, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 95, 100 (2006).
81. Id.
82. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 477.
83. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating a state law that pro-
hibited sodomy between two consenting partners within the sanctity of their home.).
84. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
85. See id.
86. See generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. at 833 (reaf-
firming the constitutional protected right to have an abortion); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973) (overruling the Georgia law against abortions); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (hold-
ing that a woman possesses a right to have an abortion that is balanced against the state’s legiti-
mate interest in both protecting prenatal life and the health of the mother).
87. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private
lives. . . .  ‘It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty that the
government may not enter.’”) (citations omitted).
88. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (ruling that the challenged law
impeded “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of chil-
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Court’s unwillingness to undermine the worth of autonomy and how it
defines who we are as a people.89
More appropriately, advocates for many years argued that pri-
vacy encompasses the protection from the press.90  Samuel D. Warren
and Louis D. Brandeis questioned whether American laws would pro-
tect privacy when the press overstepped the threshold of propriety
and decency.91  These prominent legal figures recognized the capabili-
ties of current devices and their potential technological advances and
argued for greater protection from the evil lying within the power of
the press.92  After decades passed, the Court indirectly accepted their
argument, holding that privacy includes the protection from the
press.93
While privacy advocates lobbied early on for privacy protection
from the press, no consideration was given to the idea that eventually
innovation would develop social media websites that both benefit peo-
ple and implicate grave privacy concerns.  As the Internet began to
take a stronghold in the lives of American citizens, legislatures passed
laws that grant privacy security to particular individuals in particular
sectors.  For example, the Children’s Online Privacy Act of 1988 pro-
hibits websites that market to children from collecting a child’s per-
sonal information.94  The Privacy Act of 1974 established a code of
fair information practices that govern how federal agencies collect,
maintain, use, and disseminate personally identifiable information
stored in their systems of records.95  The Fair Credit Reporting Act
promotes the fairness, accuracy, and privacy of personal information
dren.”); Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (invalidating state law that unreasonably
interfered with the parent’s inherent right “to give [their] children education suitable to their
station in life.”).
89. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. at 851 (“At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of life.”).
90. See generally Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy”, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) (arguing that the law of privacy should follow the trend that common
law evolves to satisfy societal demands).
91. Id. at 196-97.
92. See Id. at 195 (“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make
good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops.’”).
93. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 722-23 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he enjoy-
ment of one’s good name and reputation has been recognized repeatedly in our cases as being
among the most cherished of rights enjoyed by a free people, and therefore as falling within the
concept of personal ‘liberty’ [contemplated by the due process clause].”); supra notes 82-88.
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2006).
95. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006).
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gathered by credit reporting agencies.96  Even though these laws
speak to some of the privacy concerns, there remains absent a general
privacy law that targets both private businesses and addresses their
abilities to track and disseminate personal identifiable information.
2. Unfulfilling Impact Sparking the Proposed Privacy Bill of Rights
With no general privacy law that speaks to the tracking and col-
lection of personal data by private businesses such as Facebook and
Google, American legislatures have felt the heat from American con-
stituents to enact such legislation.  This heat singes from recent pri-
vacy breaches that leaked personal information to the hands of
undesired people.
In an effort to cool off this heat, the Federal Trade Commission
has taken an active role in holding social networking websites ac-
countable for their actions.  In 2009, Facebook decided to alter user’s
privacy settings by making users’ personal information that included
their friend lists and application usage data accessible by the public
and business affiliates.97 After investigating and filing an eight-count
count complaint against Facebook, the Federal Trade Commission ne-
gotiated a settlement, in which Facebook agreed not to change privacy
settings in the future without affirmative consent.98  In 2011, Twitter
faced allegations by the Federal Trade Commission when hackers
gained administrative access over the website and caused multiple se-
curity breaches.99  Again reaching a settlement, Twitter agreed to take
stronger security measures.100  Although active, the Federal Trade
Commission remains an independent agency that promotes consumer
protection, focusing on anti-competitive business practices.101  While
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
97. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived
Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 2011), http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/
privacysettlement.shtm.
98. See id.; see also Facebook, Inc., Docket No. C-4365, File No. 092-31843-4 (F.T.C. July 27,
2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/120810facebookdo.pdf.
99. See Twitter, Inc., 151 F.T.C. 162, 167-69 (2011).
100. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Accepts Final Settlement with Twitter for
Failure to Safeguard Personal Information (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/twit
ter.shtm.
101. Our Mission, ABOUT FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last
visited Mar. 2, 2013) ( “[explaining the need t]o prevent business practices that are anticompeti-
tive or deceptive or unfair to consumers; to enhance informed consumer choice and public un-
derstanding of the competitive process; and to accomplish this without unduly burdening
legitimate business activity.”).
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fostering change, the Federal Trade Commission typically acts after
action or damage occurs.
Accordingly, legislatures have conducted several congressional
hearings within the last year to discuss what avenues to take in imple-
menting privacy reform.102  Congressional members have proposed
various legislations such as the Do Not Track Bill.103  While these leg-
islations are not appearing to pass muster, the Obama Administration
proposed the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights in an effort to combat
the sophisticated means of online companies in tracking and collecting
personal data.104  The belief is that this bill of rights will serve as a
“blueprint guid[ing] efforts to protect privacy and assure continued
innovation in the Internet economy.”105
Through extensive consultation, the Consumer Privacy Bill of
Rights seeks to outline principles that “should be reflected in a pri-
vacy law” by fostering a relationship where Internet industry leaders
and Congress work together to enhance privacy protection.106  The
proposal refrains from hampering innovation but desires to imple-
ment flexible codes of conduct that will guarantee the future success
of the Internet economy, which directly contributes to the U.S. econ-
omy.107  It delegates strong authority to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion to enforce a company’s public promise to abide by a code of
conduct as part of the design to increase interoperability between the
United States and its trading partners.108  The end result will balance
privacy interests and continue economic growth.109
102. See Internet Privacy Hearing, supra note 1; Privacy and Data Security: Protecting Con-
sumers in the Modern World: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 112th
Cong. (2011)
103. See Cecilia Kang, Sen. Rockefeller Introduces ‘Do Not Track’ Bill for Internet, WASH.
POST (May 9, 2011, 4:23 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/sen-rockefel
ler-introduces-do-not-track-bill-for-internet/2011/05/09/AF0ymjaG_blog.html (mentioning the
proposed bill would allow Internet users to block online companies from tracking their Internet
activity); Sarah Kessler, Do Not Track Bill Introduced in Congress, MASHABLE (Feb. 11, 2011),
http://mashable.com/2011/02/11/do-not-track-bill/ (addressing the proposed bill that would allow
online users to “opt-out” that was introduced in the House of Representations by California
Democrat Jackie Speier).
104. See Press Release, supra note 15.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. (“These approaches will provide consistent protections for consumers, reduce
compliance costs for companies, guide U.S. efforts to clarify data protections globally, and en-
sure the flexibility that is critical to innovation in the commercial world.”).
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Under this framework, the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights
presents seven building blocks to a national privacy law: (1) individual
control; (2) transparency; (3) respect for context; (4) security; (5) ac-
cess and accuracy; (6) focused collection; and (7) accountability.  With
these building blocks in place, companies have to abide by “reasona-
ble” restrictions and limitations upon their personal data practices.110
Companies must assess privacy risks cultivated by their business hab-
its and install “reasonable safeguards.”111  They must take into consid-
eration the age and sophistication of the consumers they built a
relationship with, limiting the use and disclosure of personal informa-
tion to purposes consistent with the creation of that relationship and
the context for which that information was supplied.112  Companies
must collect no more than the necessary amount of personal informa-
tion and provide consumers “reasonable measures” to access and cor-
rect the collected personal information.113  The consumers possess the
right to control the collection, use, and dissemination of their personal
information.114  This right requires companies to be transparent in
their privacy risk and data collection practices.115  However, the key
ingredient behind the success of this proposal lies with accountability,
where companies should be held accountable by enforcement authori-
ties to ensure compliance with these principles.116
While appearing to mimic the European Union’s privacy direc-
tive and its recent proposed amendments, the Consumer Bill of Rights
proposed by the Obama Administration presents a “reasonable” ap-
proach to online privacy reform.  Although not law, it serves as a
blueprint for legislatures to follow upon enacting a national privacy
law.117  While appearing to favor businesses and economic growth,
this proposal embodies the American jurisprudence involving liberty,
balancing privacy interests with the demands of an organized free so-
ciety.118  The concern is whether this blueprint is the necessary guide-
line to online privacy reform.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
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III. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES’S
UNDERLYING FOUNDATION FOR ONLINE
PRIVACY PROTECTION
“[C]onsumer trust is essential for the continued growth of the
digital economy. . . .  For businesses to succeed online, consumers
must feel secure.”119  International leaders, including President
Obama, have recognized that technological innovation such as online
behavioral advertising not only enhances the growth and prosperity of
online businesses but also the national economy.  More importantly,
these leaders have identified consumer trust as the core ingredient
that enables online businesses to achieve such profitable outcomes.
While acknowledging the value of consumer trust, online businesses
remain active in their strategic pursuit to make a greater profit by
lowering cost.  They can lower operational costs by selectively market-
ing only products likely to be purchased by the user and operating
behind an uniform privacy system.,  As social media websites make a
profit and online business reduce operational costs, online privacy
fades away as user’s personal data is consistently tracked and
processed by third parties.  Therefore, with the lack of effective pri-
vacy laws that provide adequate privacy protection for online users,
legislatures have pushed for privacy laws or a privacy bill of rights that
will provide the missing protections.  While the European Union and
the United States agree that online privacy reform is necessary, they
have pursued different avenues.  The distinct methodologies behind
the chosen avenues have outlined current and proposed laws regard-
ing online privacy protection.
A. Protecting Privacy as a Fundamental Human Right: The
European Union’s Approach to Online Privacy Protection
Taking an active role in preventing the exploitation of personally
identifiable information, the European Union remains steadfast in
protecting user’s online privacy as an essential fundamental human
right.120  Through this perspective, the European Union enacted pri-
119. Press Release, White House, We Can’t Wait: Obama Administration Unveils Blueprint
for a “Privacy Bill of Rights” to Protect Consumers Online (Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/we-can-t-wait-obama-administration-unveils-
blueprint-privacy-bill-rights.
120. See Chuan Sun, Perspective, The European Union Privacy Directive and Its Impact on
the U.S. Privacy Protection Policy: A Year 2003 Perspective, 2 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 5, 6
(2003); EU Directive, supra note 45, at 38.
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vacy laws that give individuals greater control over their personal
data.  For instance, users have the right to delete any personal identifi-
able information as they chose.121  Following an “opt-in” concept, the
European Union places users’ online privacy over online businesses’
economic objectives.  With such a strong stance,  wonder where this
perspective derives from.  The obvious, on its face answer comes from
the European Union’s governing documents, but the truth lies in the
history that sparked the formation of the European Union.
“[Human] [d]ignity is a social concept”122 that began at the heart
of the European Union as several independent countries united for
the advancement “of civilization, progress and prosperity, for the
good of all its inhabitants.”123  With the lingering effects of two world
wars, a holocaust, and a societal infrastructure of class divisions, the
European Union believed that protecting this social norm would miti-
gate and possibly eliminate the potential of any future bloodshed, dis-
grace, and humiliation.124
Until the 21st century, the continent of Europe has been plagued
with an institutionalize system of class division.125  This system of per-
ceived hierarchy began early with vast economic disparities that trig-
gered unequal political power.126  Political and judicial officials
designed and enforced laws in a manner that sheltered the elites, leav-
ing the working and middle class in a constant struggle for equality.127
Through this economic and political fight, a “slow-maturing revolt
against . . . status privilege” developed.128  Sparking several historical
events such as the French Revolution, this revolt reached its pinnacle
during World War II with the emergence of the Nazi and Fascist re-
121. See Reding, supra note 47.
122. Avner Levin & Mary Jo Nicholson, Privacy Law in the United States, the EU and Ca-
nada: The Allure of the Middle Ground, 2 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 357, 388 (2005).
123. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe pmbl., 2004 O.J. (C 310) 3 [hereinafter
European Const.], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:
HTML.
124. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1166 (2004).
125. Id. at 1165-66 (discussing the European history of social status and hierarchy and focus-
ing on the effects that these social class divisions had on the implementation and need for in-
crease protection of human dignity).
126. Id. (explaining the exercise of political power from one’s social status).
127. Id. (“In earlier centuries, though, only persons of high social status could expect their
right to respect to be protected in court.”).
128. Id. at 1166.  Professor Whitman describes a European revolution where people of lower
status began to fight back in an attempt to enjoy the same legal protections given to the elites.
Id.
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gimes.129  Behind ideals of restoring political order, reviving patriot-
ism, and replenishing work and bread for the lower classes, Hitler and
Mussolini gained political control within Germany and Italy respec-
tively.130  Although established with socially driven principles, these
regimes evolved into dictatorships that produced the most heinous
acts mankind has witnessed.  Most notably, Hitler initiated an on-
slaught attack against the Jews in an effort to annihilate the entire
race, deeming anything less than the Arian race as inferior.131  These
horrifying indignities left the continent of Europe in a state of humili-
ation and in need of social transformation.132
At its conception, the European Union instituted principles of
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as its primary values.133
By establishing these values, the European Union adhered to the
framework constructed by the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions.134  The Assembly, in1948, composed the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights which illustrated the Assembly’s belief that the pro-
tection of “the inherent dignity and . . . inalienable rights of all mem-
bers of the human family [lays] the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world.”135 In 1999, various European political leaders
held a convention to draft a fundamental rights document entitled the
European Charter of Fundamental Rights.136  This document defined
human dignity as an inviolable right that must be respected and pro-
129. See John Mangion, The Rise of Fascism in Italy, SCHOOLNET.GOV, http://schoolnet.gov.
mt/history/Options/Italy/RiseFascism.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2013); Third World Traveler, The
Rise of Nazism in Germany, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Fascism/Rise_Nazism_Germany.
html (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
130. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
131. See Introduction to the Holocaust, HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.ushmm.org/
wlc/en/?ModuleId=10005143 (last visited, Mar. 2, 2013). See generally RAUL HILBERG, THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (2003) (explaining the attempt for racial annihilation).
132. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/
NR0/043/88/IMG/NR004388.pdf?OpenElement  (“[The] disregard and contempt for human
rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind.”).
133. European Const., supra note 123, at 3; COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Council of Europe’s Rela-
tions with European Union, http://www.coe.int/t/der/eu_EN.asp.
134. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 132 (“Whereas the peoples of
the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have
determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.”).
135. Id.
136. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European of the European Union, EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
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tected.137  The European Union, favoring the ideals and principles
embodied in this Charter, incorporated this Charter into its constitu-
tion.138 Leaving no room for error, the drafters of the European
Union Constitution explicitly wrote, “[t]he Union is founded on the
values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the
rule of law and respect for human rights.”139  After a history of con-
stant disregard for human rights, it became facially evident that the
European Union is going to protect human dignity of its citizens at all
cost.
B. Commercial Exploitation: The United States’s Attempt to
Maintain the Co-Existence of Online Privacy and
Economic Innovation
With no over-arching privacy law, the United States seeks to re-
vamp its approach by finding the “sweet spot” between excessive reg-
ulation that creates a regulatory burden and a lack of regulation,
which fails to protect one’s liberty interest.140  This “sweet spot” will
serve as a guide that will provide uniformity and ensure that industries
protect American consumers while prohibiting government from suc-
cumbing to its usual pattern of overreaching in the marketplace.141  In
other words, the “sweet spot” allows the United States to secure
“smart ways to protect consumers . . . [while permitting] . . . e-com-
merce to continue to flourish.”142  What motivates the United States
to grasp a privacy regime that neither favors online businesses nor
137. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 9, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2000:364:0001:0022:EN:PDF
(“Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.”).
138. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 13 (“The Union recognizes the rights, freedoms
and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 Decem-
ber 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg . . . which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.”).
139. Id. at 11.
140. Internet Privacy Hearing, supra note 1, at 2.  While the U.S. has not implemented a
general privacy law, legislators believe that a general privacy law should be enacted and have
been working hard to determine how to find the “sweet spot” that can properly balance the
competing needs. See id.
141. See Internet Privacy Hearing, supra note 1, at 2.  As the subcommittee chair, Represen-
tative Mary Bono Mack wanted to clarify the concerns that the subcommittee believes could
cause potential consequences if not enough legislation or too much legislation was enacted. Id.
142. Internet Privacy Hearing, supra note 1, at 2.  Throughout the subcommittee hearing,
expert witnesses were questioned on the benefits and consequences of implementing privacy
laws that are similar to the European Union; while admitting that the U.S. needs to implement
better privacy laws, the consensus of the experts believed that there should be a better way to
ensure adequate consumer protections and at the same time allow businesses and ultimately the
economy to flourish. See generally id. at 7-90 (discussing the subcommittee hearings).
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online users but seeks to satisfy all parties?  Similar to the European
Union, the answer lies within the underlying principle upon which the
United States was founded.
Liberty sparked not only the Revolutionary War but also ignited
individuals to establish a nation where all were free from tyranny.143
The Founding Fathers of this great nation sought to establish “a new
nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all
men are created equal.”144  Although originally focused on govern-
mental oppression and individual liberty, they understood that liberty
from all forms of oppression and for all would foster national prosper-
ity.  Thus, they drafted the United States Constitution with a purpose
to “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the com-
mon defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty. . . .”145  Since acquiring national independence from the
political tyranny of England, the United States has allowed the es-
sence of liberty to direct its steps future steps.
Consequently, “‘[l]iberty’ is a political value”146 that has been
fully integrated into American jurisprudence where one’s liberty in-
terest cannot be violated or infringed upon without due process of the
law.147  Although not fully defined by the United States Supreme
Court, the term “liberty” encompasses a “rational continuum” and “a
conception that sometimes gains content from the emanations of
other specific guarantees . . . or from experience with the require-
ments of a free society.”148  Through this broad definition, the Court
maintains its strong mindset that constitutionally protected rights are
those that are vital to the underlying functions of liberty.149  Yet, the
Court appreciates and acknowledges that the demands of an organ-
ized free society constantly reshape the overall scheme of liberty, fur-
143. See Liberty! The American Revolution: “Blows Must Decide” 1774-1776 (PBS broadcast
Nov. 23, 1997) (discussing the influence of liberty beginning with the American Revolution to
the current government struggles).
144. President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
145. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
146. Avner & Nicholson, supra note 122, at 388.
147. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
148. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 517, 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing liberty to encompass a
“rational continuum”); see also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 532 (1934); Holden v. Hardy,
169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
149. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 540 (1975) (citations omitted); Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (explaining that constitutional protected rights are those that are
“fundamental [to the] principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions”) (citation omitted); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (cita-
tions omitted); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (citations omitted).
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nishing the Court with the aptitude to balance the Founding Fathers’
original intent with the societal needs of an evolving society.150
Among the current societal needs is online privacy protection.
While American history incorporates liberty from improper govern-
mental intrusion, little has been done to deal with liberty in the pri-
vate sector, including online business tracking.
IV. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT ADOPT THE
EUROPEAN UNION’S PRIVACY LAWS
In an effort to combat serious privacy risks that pose a risk of
grave harm to each individual, how does the United States simultane-
ously foster economic innovation and extinguish privacy threats?  The
answer lies in the principle that served as the foundational tool to
build this prominent nation, liberty.
As the history of American jurisprudence denotes, liberty has
consistently saved the day, solving threats to individual rights created
by societal demands and changes.  As it did in the past, the concept of
liberty and its interpretation will allow congressional and judicial
members to respectively enact and enforce a privacy law that will pro-
mote autonomy, facilitate economic growth, and maintain
accountability.
While containing flaws, the Obama Administration’s Consumer
Privacy Bill of Rights serves as a resource that illustrates how liberty
can ensure proper online privacy reform.  Although congressional
members may be “skeptical of the need for legislation,”151 Congress
should enact a privacy law that replicates the principles embodied in
the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.  The fear that governmental leg-
islation will harm the Internet by not being able to keep pace with the
vast technological advances is evident.152  However, through support
from industry leaders, a privacy law can be enacted that guarantees
flexibility coupled with practical data collection principles.
150. See Ullman, 367 U.S. at 542 (interpreting liberty broadly as “the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that
liberty and the demands of organized society”).
151. Balancing Privacy and Innovation: Does the President’s Proposal Tip the Scale? Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 112th Cong. (2012) [hereinafter Balancing Privacy and Innovation], available at http://
energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/balancing-privacy-and-innovation-does-presidents-proposal
-tip-scale (statements of Mike Zaneis, Senior Vice President and General Counsel for Interactive
Advertising Bureau and Jonathan Zuck, President of the Association for Competitive
Technology).
152. Id.
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A. Liberty Promotes the Respect for Autonomy
Each day, online consumers make the decision to directly or indi-
rectly upload personally identifiable information.  As they use the ser-
vices offered by social media websites, they make available personal
information containing personal interests, activities, residence, em-
ployment, thoughts, and other information that they might not neces-
sarily want the public to see.  These decisions to make a profile in an
effort to connect with others can be considered a part of the decisions
central to liberty and autonomy.  In essence, these decisions cultivate
the opportunity for these individuals to continue to define their own
existence.
However, as online consumers exercise their autonomy right, on-
line users must recognize an inherent privacy risk through Internet
activity. Through continual public reports of privacy breeches, users
are on constant notice that they remain vulnerable to any potential
privacy breech at any given moment; yet, they continue to make use of
these valuable services.  Does that truly mean that users do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy?  Are online users accepting an as-
sumption of potential risks by continuing to use these Internet ser-
vices and thus precluded from alleging privacy claims?  While it seems
that online consumers do not have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, the reality is far from it.  Consumers’ reasonable expectation of
privacy is connected to the relationship developed when a user be-
comes a member or utilizes these companies’ services. The expecta-
tion of privacy lies in the concept of consumer trust.  Even industry
leaders admit that without consumer trust their online businesses will
fail.
Industry leaders believe that self-regulation will better allow busi-
nesses to foster consumer trust.153  The European Union decided al-
ternatively and enacted stringent laws that give users complete control
of their personal data, enforcing an “opt-in” approach and granting
the individual the right to be forgotten.154  The Obama Administra-
tion’s Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, while still favoring individual
control, focuses on the relationship between the user and the online
business.155  With this focus, the Obama Administration recognizes
the value of autonomy to economic prosperity and presents flexibility
153. Id.
154. See Reding, supra note 47.
155. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 119.
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that will allow autonomy to not only co-exist but also promote further
economic growth.  Companies providing users with “appropriate con-
trol,” including the “means to withdraw or limit consent,” accomplish
this objective.156  This flexibility balances the autonomy of the individ-
ual as they upload personal information and the contractual arrange-
ment, in which businesses seek to provide effective services.
Through flexibility, autonomy will be respected, and the economy
will continue to flourish.  By granting individual control through “ap-
propriate control,” individuals will feel more comfortable utilizing so-
cial media services, and businesses will not be as restricted by an “opt-
in” framework that requires increase operational costs.
B. The Preservation of Continual Economic Innovation and
Growth
“Too much is at stake for us to get this wrong.”157  Representative
Mary Bono Mack’s statement accurately depicts the economic situa-
tion.  The facts are self-evident.  Per year, online retail sales total $145
billion in the United States.158  The Internet supplies $175 billion to
the U.S. economy through direct economic value.159  This includes $85
billion in online retail transactions, $70 billion to Internet service
providers, and $20 billion in advertising services.160  This economic
success branches from the consistent technological advances that in-
clude efficient online behavioral advertising through personal data
tracking.  With such a vast economic impact that heavily relies on con-
tinual technological updates, it is understandable why congressional
members are “skeptical of Congress’ or a government regulator’s abil-
ity to keep up with the innovative and vibrant pace of the Internet
without breaking it.”161  However, preserving consumer trust will ulti-
mately preserve the economic pace of the Internet.
Valuing the importance of consumer trust, the European Union
addresses its privacy concerns primarily through the “opt-in” frame-
work. Their privacy laws mandate that companies receive explicit con-
sent from the user, individuals have the ability to delete their data,
156. Id.
157. See Balancing Privacy and Innovation, supra note 151 (statement of Rep. Mary Bono
Mack, Chairman, Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade).
158. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 119.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Balancing Privacy and Innovation, supra note 151 (statement of Rep. Fred Upton,
Chairman, Energy & Commerce Comm.).
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and companies uphold a high level of transparency.  Companies are
required to maintain detailed records and answer any inquiries made
by consumers. The problem with such privacy legislation is that is
hampers the Internet’s economic innovation by increasing operational
and efficiency costs to online businesses.  Online businesses make
greater profits from the ability to use personal data to efficiently ad-
vertise.  Consumers benefit from possessing the capability of seeing
only goods that matter to them, lowering time allocated on the In-
ternet.  The effects of such privacy legislation are seen through its im-
plementation.  Businesses are faced with compliance costs across the
board, posing a threat to the economy and jobs.
Alternatively, the proposed Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights
seeks to implement a flexible guideline that promotes, not stifle, eco-
nomic growth.  It focuses on the essence of the contractual relation-
ship formed by the user and the companies.  Under such proposed
legislation, companies will be obligated to only collect and use per-
sonal data that is required to fulfill its purposes behind the formation
of the relationship.  If businesses desire to use the data for other pur-
poses, they must use heighted transparency and disclose the other pur-
pose in an easily actionable manner to the consumer.  Thus,
businesses will be able to still effectively advertise through the use of
personal data without severe restrictions.
By not placing finite, harsh restrictions on businesses, the Con-
sumer Privacy Bill of Rights fosters economic innovation.  Internet in-
dustry leaders believe that it is better equipped to answer concerns
from an ‘evolving Internet ecosystem.’162  However, the proposed bill
of rights only seeks to implement a baseline set of principles that
should guide industry leaders and congressional members. It promotes
an open line of communication between industry leaders and govern-
mental authorities.  While regulation is most likely not desired, the
fact remains that companies still manipulate personal data for eco-
nomic purposes.  Legislation similar to the proposed Consumer Pri-
vacy Bill of Rights will only ensure that the industry adheres to fair
business practices.
162. Press Release, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade Sub-
committee Discusses President’s Privacy Proposal (May 29, 2012), http://energycommerce.house.
gov/press-release/commerce-manufacturing-and-trade-subcommittee-discusses-presidents-priv
acy-proposal (quoting Mike Zaneis, Senior Vice President and General Counsel for Interactive
Advertising Bureau).
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C. Accountability Remains Key to the Success of Online Privacy
Reform
At times, the Internet can be deceptive, and users may not know
how their personal information is being used.  This feeling of the un-
known presents the possibility that third parties will exploit users for
economic gain.  Accountability helps alleviate this concern.
The European Union fails to present accountability as a key pillar
of its privacy regime.163  Instead, the European Union speaks to en-
forcement regardless of data location.164  In other words, all busi-
nesses operating in the European Union market or targeting
European Union citizens must comply with the European Union pri-
vacy laws.  To guarantee enforcement, privacy watchdogs are set in
place, but not necessarily ascertained.
On the other hand, the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights seeks to
hold companies accountable to their public commitments to safeguard
privacy.  It delegates strong authority to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion to ensure that companies remain true to their promises.  This
component of accountability again focuses on the contractual relation-
ship formed by the consumer and the online company.  Companies
will have an incentive not to cheat or bypass privacy settings to gain a
profit.  Additionally, consumer trust increases as consumers feel more
comfortable with the idea that online companies are acting as they say
they are.  Also, this method of accountability facilitates the interna-
tional exchange of goods and services between the United States and
its trading partners.  As companies adhere to the privacy legislation
similar to the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, foreign countries will
trust that their citizens’ privacy will not be exploited.
With an additional focus of accountability, the Consumer Privacy
Bill of Rights adds security to consumer trust.  Such value will only
assist in the free flow of information and economic growth.
CONCLUSION
Although the congressional leaders may not be hearing the public
outcry for privacy legislation, the need for online privacy reform is
apparent.165  The question is what should this online privacy reform
163. See Reding, supra note 47.
164. Id.
165. See Balancing Privacy and Innovation, supra note 151 (statement of Rep. Mary Bono
Mack, Chairman, Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade).
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look like in the United States?  The Internet provides an economic
boost as websites, such as Google and Facebook, track personal data
in order to sell that data to businesses desiring to effectively market
their products.  The obvious goal is not to stifle economic innovation;
however, consumers must feel safe and able to trust companies if com-
panies want users to continue to use their services.  Consumer trust is
a requisite for this business scheme to continue reaping success.  Leg-
islation that mimics the principles within the Consumer Privacy Bill of
Rights will enhance consumer trust by flexibly balancing the need for
economic innovation and the societal need for privacy protection.
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INTRODUCTION
“I was a victim before I was a defendant.”1
That night we got into an argument with each other and he
came after me with a gun.  During the course of the struggle, I was
able to get the gun away from him.  He [eventually] went into the
bedroom and fell asleep.  During the course of when he actually did
fall asleep, I took the gun back and I shot him.
I just felt so strongly at that point [in the] evening [that] it was
going to be a matter of his life or my life.  That was the second time
that he had tried to use a gun on me[,] and it was also two weeks
before [that] he had actually tried to commit suicide. . . .
I clearly felt that if he was going to take his own life, that he
would take my life first and then take his life.2
The scenario described above is just one instance of an abused
woman who survived after years of living in fear of her abusive part-
ner.  Unfortunately, not every woman is provided with the opportu-
nity to safely regain control of her life.  “In the United States, women
are more likely to be attacked, injured, raped, or killed by a current or
former male partner than by all other types of assailants combined.”3
Domestic violence occurs between members of a household when
one member uses a pattern of coercive tactics in order to establish and
maintain power and control.4  Many battered women who do survive
1. Coalition for Women Prisoners Memo in Support of the Domestic Violence Survivors
Justice Act (A.7874/S.5436), DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT, http://www.dv-
survivorsjusticeact.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/DV-SJA-CWP-Spt-Memo-5-24-11-FINAL.
pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Coalition Memo] (quoting Kate, who was sentenced
to eight and one-third to twenty-five years incarceration for killing her abuser with a gun.  She
was denied parole four times and served seventeen years before her release in 2008).
2. Id.
3. ELIZABETH ANN DERMODY LEONARD, CONVICTED SURVIVORS: THE IMPRISONMENT
OF BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 1 (2002), available at http://www.freebatteredwomen.org/pdfs/
convsurv.pdf.
4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1564 (7th ed. 1999); see also TAMAR KRAFT-STOLAR ET AL.,
AVON GLOBAL CTR. FOR WOMEN & JUST. & DOROTHEA S. CLARKE PROGRAM IN FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE, FROM PROTECTION TO PUNISHMENT: POST-CONVICTION BARRIERS TO JUSTICE
FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVOR-DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK STATE 3, n.4 (2011), available
at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=avon_clarke
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often face a secondary restraint when they fight back to protect them-
selves: imprisonment.5  Believing there is only one remedy for ending
the abuse and ensuring survival, battered women kill their abuser.6
As a result, these survivors are charged with murder and are incarcer-
ated for lengthy periods of time.  Without a “get out of jail free card”7
or room for judicial discretion, these survivors are sent to jail as a
direct result of mandatory minimum sentencing policies.
Mandatory minimum sentencing provisions refer to “statutory
provisions requiring the imposition of a sentence of at least a specified
minimum term of imprisonment when criteria set forth in the relevant
statute have been met.”8  Today, mandatory minimum sentences are
used at both the federal and state levels in an effort “to provide tough,
uniform, fair, and economically efficient punishment for criminals in
America.”9  Nearly all states have passed “determinate sentencing
schemes” and mandatory minimum laws similar to the federal sen-
tencing guidelines for violent felonies.10  Mandatory minimum sen-
tencing results in zero possibility of early release, as it ensures that a
defendant will serve the designated mandatory minimum of his or her
sentence in prison.11
Inflexible mandatory minimum sentencing results in unfair pun-
ishment, perpetuates gender stereotypes, inadequately deters future
domestic violence, and creates an undue financial burden on the com-
munity.12  For some women, home is a place of greater danger than
public places—more dangerous than the workplace, more dangerous
than the highway, more dangerous than city streets.13  Yet, too often,
(“[D]omestic violence [is] ‘a pattern of coercive tactics that can include physical, psychological,
sexual, economic, and emotional abuse perpetrated by one person against an adult intimate part-
ner, with the goal of establishing and maintaining power and control.’”) [hereinafter REPORT].
5. See LEONARD, supra note 3, at 31.
6. See id. at 25 (“Some women perceive that every possible escape route away from the
terror is closed off from them and the only apparent avenue to end the ongoing violence is
through suicide or homicide.”).  More than 90% of women in prison for killing an intimate part-
ner were battered by an intimate partner in the past. See Coalition Memo, supra note 1, at 3.
7. This is a term of art coined by the popular game “Monopoly.”
8. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, OVERVIEW OF STATUTORY MANDATORY
MINIMUM SENTENCING 1 n.1 (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/LegislativeandPublicAf-
fairs/CongressionalTestimonyand_Reports/Submissions/20090710StCMandatoryMinimum.pdf
(last accessed Mar. 2 2013).
9. Christopher M. Alexander, Crushing Equality: Gender Equal Sentencing In America, 6
AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 199, 200 (1997).
10. Id. at 202.
11. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 1368; see also infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Part I.B-D.
13. LEONARD, supra note 3, at 1 (“Male intimates inflict more injuries on women than auto
accidents, muggings, and rape combined (McLeer and Anwar 1989).”).  While domestic violence
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these victims of abuse become defendants facing mandatory minimum
incarceration for killing their abuser.14  Mandatory sentencing pro-
duces gender disparities in the criminal justice system, as “[b]attered
women who kill often receive harsher sentences than men who mur-
der their wives or lovers.”15  The average sentence for a man who kills
his wife or girlfriend is two to six years.16  In comparison, women re-
ceive sentences of fifteen years.17  The difference in sentence lengths
occurs because battered women use a gun or weapon to protect them-
selves from abuse more frequently than men, who more often use
their bare hands.18  Thus, women face longer jail sentences than men
because the weapon involved in the crime raises the offense to a vio-
lent felony.19
Trials often end in convictions of first-degree murder for women
accused of killing their abusive partners.20  Abused women are often
affects all genders and types of relationships, this Comment discusses domestic violence issues in
view of a man abusing a woman, as this is the most common type of domestic abuse. See id. at 2
(“[A]buse of women by intimate male partners occurs more often than any other type of family
violence (Levinson 1989).”).
14. Correctional Association of New York, Women in Prison Project, Survivors of Abuse in
Prison Fact Sheet, 1 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.correctionalassociation.org/resource/wo-
men-in-prison-fact-sheet (noting that ninety-three percent of women convicted of killing inti-
mate partners (husbands, boyfriends or girlfriends) have been physically or sexually abused by
their partner) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
15. Christine Noelle Becker, Clemency for Killers? Pardoning Battered Women who Strike
Back, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 297, 330 (1995).
16. MICHIGAN WOMEN’S JUSTICE & CLEMENCY PROJECT, CLEMENCY FOR BATTERED WO-
MEN IN MICHIGAN:  A MANUAL FOR ATTORNEYS, LAW STUDENTS AND SOCIAL WORKERS 4
(Michigan ACLU, Oct. 1998), available at http://www.umich.edu/~clemency/clemencymnl/printa-
ble.html (“The average prison sentence for men who kill their intimate partners is [two] to [six]
years.  Women who kill their partners are sentenced, on average, to [fifteen] years.”).
17. Id.
18. See LEONARD, supra note 3, at 9 (“[M]ale offenders commit beating or strangulation
homicides; women, on the other hand, are more likely to stab or shoot their victims once.”).
19. See id. at 31 (“[A] woman is penalized more harshly because she used a weapon.  Re-
search shows that a batterer’s primary weapons are his hands, fists, and feet, and that typical
battering episodes involve slaps, punches, kicking, stomping, and choking (Gillespie 1989).  As
noted earlier, only male offenders commit beating or strangulation homicides (Casenave and
Zahn 1992).  Eisenberg and Dillon (1989) suggest that since a woman is merely equalizing the
relative strength of females versus males when she uses a weapon, it does not constitute ‘exces-
sive force,’ thus, the law should include an ‘equalizer principle.’”); see also id. at 28 (“[G]ender
inequities [persist] in the indictment, prosecution, and sentence determination of women who
kill their abusers. . . .  [W]omen have received longer determinate sentences . . . .”); id. at 29
(noting the system may be growing tougher toward these women); id. at 31 (“Frequently, a
woman is penalized more harshly because she used a weapon.”); id. (citing to Eisenberg and
Dillon, Leonard notes that the law should include an “equalizer principle” because “a woman is
merely equalizing the relative strength of females versus males when she uses a weapon”).
20. “The law divides criminal homicide into two classes of offense, murder and manslaugh-
ter, each of which is further differentiated based on the person’s state of mind at the time of
killing.” Id. at 109.  Leonard goes on to note that “[m]ost women accused of killing their abusive
male intimates are charged with first-degree murder.” Id. at 109-10 (citation omitted).
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convicted because the circumstances surrounding their homicidal acts
do not meet the requirements of current self-defense laws.21  The ele-
ments to prove self-defense are: the use of equal or lesser force
against someone when the person apprehends imminent and unlawful
deadly force.22  In addition, the non-aggressor, and a reasonable per-
son, must believe the deadly force was necessary, with no ability to
retreat.23  It is difficult for domestically abused defendants to prove
self-defense because the women often kill their abusers when it is
“safe.”24  For instance, many battered women kill their abuser while
he is sleeping; thus, they fail to meet the element of “imminent”
harm.25  Unfortunately, current self-defense laws do not reflect the
real circumstances that most battered women experience, and the de-
fendants are thus unable to meet the elements of self-defense.26
Understanding the unlikeliness of winning a claim of self-defense,
many abused women facing conviction will opt for a plea bargain, rea-
soning that it is a less risky option than going to trial.27  A plea ar-
21. Id. at 28 (“‘Despite generally abundant evidence that they were severely abused by the
men they killed, many if not most of these women are convicted because the circumstances
surrounding their homicidal acts do not meet the requirements of current self-defense law
. . . .’”).
22. MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES AND PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL LAW 375 (5th ed. 2003).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Lisa S. Scheff, People v. Humphrey: Justice for Battered Women or a License to
Kill? 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 225, 225-27 (1997) (Judy Norman was beaten, had glass broken against
her face, had cigarettes burned into her, was forced to prostitute herself, and compelled to eat
dog food off the floor on her hands and knees.  Denied by local law enforcement and battered
women’s shelters, Judy shot her sleeping husband in an act of desperation.  Unable to claim self-
defense because she killed her abuser while he was asleep, Judy was then convicted of
manslaughter).
25. See, e.g., id.; see also LEONARD, supra note 3, at 32 (“The requirements of immediate
danger, necessary force, reasonable belief and the duty to retreat present almost insurmountable
barriers to a self-defense claim in the wife-battery situation.”) (citation omitted).
26. See Scheff, supra note 24, at 226 (“[B]attered women have encountered unique difficul-
ties because the definition of self-defense does not encompass the concept of domestic
violence.”).
27. LEONARD, supra note 3, at 29 (“Osthoff (1991) reports that the vast majority of women
accused of killing their abusive partners (72 percent to 80 percent) are convicted or accept a
plea, and many receive long, harsh sentences.  In her analysis of domestic homicide offenders,
Mann suggests that the system may be growing tougher toward these women . . . .”).  Leonard
also discusses how “[t]he requirements of immediate danger, necessary force, reasonable belief
and the duty to retreat present almost insurmountable barriers to a self-defense claim in the
wife-battery situation.” Id. at 32 (citation omitted).  Thus, many battered women will opt for a
plea bargain, resulting in a long jail sentence.  Leonard notes that, “Some accused women accept
plea bargains to protect their children, to spare their families the humiliation of a trial, to avoid
the death penalty threatened by prosecutors, or to speed up what they see as the inevitable,
negative outcome.  Others refuse plea bargains because they are confident in the fairness of the
system . . . they are ready to fight for themselves . . . they feel they have nothing to lose, or . . .
they follow the instructions of their attorneys. Id. at 122; see also Linda L. Ammons, Why Do
You Do the Things You Do? Clemency for Battered Incarcerated Women, A Decade’s Review, 11
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rangement is likely to result in a voluntary manslaughter plea with a
reduced jail sentence.28
The prevalence, severity, and unique circumstances of domestic
violence warrant that cases involving such a delicate matter should be
treated in a special light in the criminal justice system.  New York’s
proposed Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA)29 would
help remedy the criminal justice system’s failure to protect abused wo-
men and the system’s unfair punishment of these survivors.  The DV-
SJA would permit judicial discretion and alternatives to incarceration;
thus, bypassing mandatory minimum regulations and creating more
protection for abused women.30
This Comment proposes that New York, and all states with
mandatory minimum sentencing and no exception for domestic vio-
lence cases, should adopt the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act
because it will protect abused women from harsh punishments and
release those who have been unfairly punished for protecting them-
selves and their families.  Part I of this Comment discusses the history
and background of mandatory minimum sentencing, and focuses on
policy arguments supporting and discrediting determinate punish-
ment.  In addition, background information and statistics relating to
domestic violence and the consequences of such violence are reviewed
in Part I.  Part II analyzes current mandatory minimum sentencing
policies in New York, and discusses and analyzes the DVSJA in detail.
Part II then compares relevant laws in New York to laws in three
other states, each with a different sentencing system.  The comparison
includes the states of Minnesota, Michigan, and Virginia in order to
assess fairness in sentencing.  Part III proposes that all states, includ-
ing New York, should adopt the DVSJA.  Part III advances that addi-
tional measures, such as judicial training, alternatives to incarceration,
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 533, 549 (2003) (“Women were also . . . coerced into plea
bargains because they knew and/or were advised that juries would not believe them, and it
would be hard, if not impossible to get jury instructions on self-defense.  The criminal justice
process for these women was fatally flawed.”).
28. See LEONARD, supra note 3, at 29.  Through narratives, Leonard cites to one case where
the “attorney for a Native American woman advised her to turn down a plea bargain, which
would have resulted in a much lower sentence than the final [seventeen] years to life she re-
ceived.” Id. at 111.
29. Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 5436 (proposed May 20,
2011) [hereinafter DVSJA].
30. Id. (“[The goal of the Act is to] expand upon the existing provisions of alternative sen-
tencing for domestic violence cases; [and] second, to allow judges the opportunity to resentence
currently incarcerated persons for offenses in which certain domestic violence criteria was a
significant element of the offense.”).
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and increased clemency be implemented along with the Act to protect
abused women and remedy unfair punishment.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE AND MANDATORY
MINIMUM SENTENCING
A. Domestic Violence Defined and Alarming Statistics
Domestic violence is “violence between members of a household,
[usually] spouses; an assault or other violent act committed by one
member of a household against another.”31  Some state statutes define
domestic violence, as “a pattern of coercive tactics that can include
physical, psychological, sexual, economic, and emotional abuse perpe-
trated by one person against an adult intimate partner, with the goal
of establishing and maintaining power and control.”32
The term battered woman is a generally accepted phrase; how-
ever, other commonly used terms include “abused woman,” “victim,”
and more recently, “survivor.”33  A battered woman is “a woman who
is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological be-
havior . . . in order to coerce her to do something . . . without any
concern for her rights.”34
Domestic abuse crosses all socioeconomic strata, racial, ethnic,
religious and age groups; however, abuse of women by intimate male
partners occurs more often than any other type of family violence.35
Since battering is the number one cause of injury to women in the
United States,36 it is not difficult to conceive that ninety-three percent
of women convicted of killing intimate partners (husbands, boy-
friends, or girlfriends) have been physically or sexually abused by
their partner.37  Crimes for which women are incarcerated are often
31. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1564 (7th ed. 1999).
32. REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 n.4 (citing The New York State Office for the Prevention of
Domestic Violence (OPDV)).
33. MICHIGAN WOMEN’S JUSTICE & CLEMENCY PROJECT, supra note 16, at 2 (“The victim
of this [domestic] abuse is referred to as the ‘survivor,’ because she in fact engages in many
strategies that help her survive the abuse.”).  Note that this Comment uses all four phrases
interchangeably.
34. LEONARD, supra note 3, at 4.
35. Id. at 2. In addition, “[e]ach year in America, up to 4,000 women are killed by their
husbands, boyfriends, or former partners, many of whom had looked to the courts for help.”
LEONARD, supra note 4, at 24 (citing National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Wo-
men 1994).
36. Fact Sheet, supra note 14, at 2.
37. Id. at 1.
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directly related to domestic abuse.38  In 1988, women committed only
6.8% of nonfamily homicides, but were responsible for 40.7% of
spousal homicides.39
The exorbitant number of women incarcerated for murdering an
abuser will continue to rise until effective measures are implemented
to protect abused women and a just punishment system is established.
Judges and juries often lack understanding of domestic violence is-
sues.40  Rather than empathize with the defendant, the trier-of-fact
has difficulty understanding why the abused victim did not leave the
relationship or report an abusive incident.41  The question: “Why does
a woman stay in an abusive relationship?” is often posed.42  In truth,
women never “stay” in battering marriages.43  The word “stay” inap-
propriately implies a static condition because the women in abusive
marriages are never static: “they are always in flux, always coping,
hoping, and looking for an end to the abuse.”44
Instead, the more appropriate question to ask is: “What prevents
her from leaving?”45  Domestic violence often goes unreported for
fear of arrest or further abuse by the intimate partner.46  Reports esti-
mate that only one in seven domestic assaults come to the attention of
38. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 (“The New York State Department of Correctional
Services, for example, found that [sixty-seven percent] of women sent to prison in 2005 for kill-
ing someone close to them were abused by the victim of their crime.  A 1996 study by the State
Division of Criminal Justice Services report that [ninety-three percent] of women convicted of
killing intimate partners had been physically and sexually abused by an intimate partner during
adulthood.”).
39. LEONARD, supra note 3, at 8.
40. See infra Part III.
41. Id.
42. Alix Kates Shulman, Foreword to WOMEN IN THE TREES, U.S. WOMEN’S SHORT
STORIES ABOUT BATTERING AND RESISTANCE, 1839-2000 xxi (Susan Koppelman ed.,
First Feminist Press 2004).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. LEONARD, supra note 3, at 18 (“[W]hile [sixty] percent of the [three-hundred] battered
women in their study asked to have their spouses arrested, police arrested the abusers only
[twenty-eight] percent of the time. . . .  Victims not only face the reluctance of some officers to
arrest abusers, they also contend with a growing possibility of their own arrests.”); see id. at 92-
93 (recounting one woman’s story who got her “ass kicked in” by her abuser after the police
left); see also id. at 17-18 (“A study of police response to spousal assault found that police of-
ficers, like the public at large, hold stereotypical views about battered women and family fights
that undermine their effectiveness in dealing with the batterer and the victim . . . .  [T]he ten-
dency persists for officers to view women claiming to have been abused as non-credible and
unworthy of police time.”).  In addition, people with children do not want to have a parent
locked away with no one to watch the children or fear the children will be taken away by child
protective services. Id. at 5.
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the police.47  Women offer numerous reasons for not calling police,
but as a general consensus, battered women purport that police re-
sponse does not resolve the issue.48  In fact, calling the police fre-
quently generates more violence from the abuser.49  In Leonard’s
article, one victim recounts calling the police and regrets placing her
abuser under citizen’s arrest.50  This victim notes that upon her hus-
band’s return home from police custody she was severely beaten.51
Notifying the police not only results in more abuse; but, police re-
sponse can actually lead to the arrest of the abused victim because the
police cannot tell who is the initial batterer.52
A study of police responses to spousal assault found that police
officers, like the public at large, hold stereotypical views about bat-
tered women and family fights.53  Common stereotypes include: bat-
tered women voluntarily stay in abusive relationships; women
provoke the beating and probably deserve to be hit; domestic violence
is a private rather than criminal issue and is not that serious; the man
is the sole head of the household and the wife should obey him.54
These stereotypes, and other adverse perceptions, plague the
criminal justice system and negatively impact abused women.  Down-
playing the seriousness of domestic violence or labeling the battered
woman as deserving of the abuse causes society to view the batterer’s
death as unjustifiable.55  This typecast of domestic violence results in a
47. Fact Sheet, supra note 14, at 2.
48. See LEONARD, supra note 3, at 27 (“Before the deadly event, many women make re-
peated but failed attempts to enlist the help of law enforcement for their abusive situations.  One
study of domestic homicides found that in 85 percent of the cases, the police had been sum-
moned at least one time before the final incident, and in half the cases, the police were called
five or more times before the killing occurred (Marcus 1981).  Research shows that police are
likely to respond more quickly if the attacker is a stranger than if he is known to the victim.”)
(citation omitted); id. at 17, 88.
49. See, e.g., infra note 50.
50. LEONARD, supra note 3, at 92-93
When he was violent with me, the police were called and they said they could not
arrest him because they didn’t see him hit me.  One time I had to place him under
citizen’s arrest because he had hit me in the head with a bottle.  He was drinking a beer.
He had hit me in the head with it.  The cops pulled up and he was laughing.  He was
laughing right when the cops pulled up and there was blood squirting out of my head.
The cops got out and stated, “We didn’t see him do it so we can’t arrest him.  The only
way we could take him is if you place him under citizen’s arrest.”  I go, “Do you know
what he’s going to do with me?”  They said that’s the only way.  So I did it.  Wrong
thing to do.  He didn’t even get down to the police station.  They took him down to his
mom’s house and dropped him off.  Then I really got the ass kicked in.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 90.
53. Id. at 17-18.
54. Id. at 17-18 n.1.
55. See id. at 27-28, 45.
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conviction for the battered woman.56  This conviction entails a long
determinate sentence as established by mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing statutes.  Proponents of mandatory minimum statutes are satisfied,
as they opine the mandatory minimum sentence will prevent criminals
from being placed back into society.57
In reality, abused women who are incarcerated for defending
themselves against abusers are more victims than criminals, and they
pose little threat to public safety.58  Killing an abuser in self-defense
occurs when the abuse becomes too violent and the abused woman
believes she has no alternative safe outlets.59  While the abused wo-
man may retaliate in a violent manner, statistics show that survivor-
defendants are not a danger to society.60  In 2008, eighty-four percent
of women sent to prison for violent felony offenses were first-time
felony offenders.61  Such survivors-turned-defendants have extremely
low rates of recidivism, no criminal records, and no history of violence
other than the offense for which they are in prison.62  Not a single
woman of the thirty-eight women convicted of murder and released
between 1985 and 2003, for example, returned to prison for a new
crime within a three-year follow-up period.63
B. Mandatory Minimum Sentencing History
A mandatory sentence is “a sentence set by law with no discre-
tion for the judge to individualize punishment.”64  A minimum sen-
tence is “the least amount of time that a [defendant] must serve in
56. Id. at 23-24.
57. See supra Part I.D.
58. Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
59. See, e.g., LEONARD, supra note 3, at 124 (“In the beginning, women believe in and call
upon diverse social systems—police, family, medical and mental health professionals, schools,
clergy, family courts— systems that would fail them and their children.  Their collective voice
describes a series of events and interactions that produces in each woman a firm belief that the
unavoidable conclusion to the violent relationship is death—hers, his, or the death of both
partners.”).
60. Catherine Epstein, Fairness for Defendants Who Survive Domestic Violence, WOMEN’S
MEDIA CTR. (June 21, 2011), http://www.womensmediacenter.com/feature/entry/fairness-for-de-
fendants-who-survive-domestic-violence.
61. Fact Sheet, supra note 14; see also LEONARD, supra note 3, at 27 (noting that the crimi-
nal justice system vigorously prosecutes battered woman who kill, even though most women
offenders of domestic homicide have no history of criminal or violent behavior).
62. Fact Sheet, supra note 14; see also Coalition Memo, supra note 1, at 3 (“Of the [thirty-
eight] women convicted of murder and released between 1985 and 2003, not a single one re-
turned to prison for a new crime within [three] years of release[.]”).
63. Epstein, supra note 60.
64. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (7th ed. 1999).
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prison before becoming eligible for parole.”65  The use of mandatory
minimum sentencing arose in 1951 with the enactment of the Boggs
Act, which imposed federal mandatory minimum sentencing for drug
offenses.66  A few years later, the Narcotics Control Act of 1956 in-
creased mandatory minimum sentencing for violations of drug laws.67
Until 1984, mandatory minimum sentencing largely corresponded to
drug offenses; however, in 1984, the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act established the United States Sentencing Commission and ex-
panded mandatory sentencing to include crimes with guns.68  Two
years later, in 1986, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act assigned mandatory
prison terms to persons in possession of various amounts of drugs.69
Not long after determinate sentencing for drug convictions, the
United States Sentencing Commission, in 1987, established the United
States Sentencing Guidelines to provide a framework for sentencing
all federal offenders.70
While federal mandatory minimums for designated offenses con-
tinued, society moved away from such strict punishment when prisons
quickly became overcrowded and the laws were proven much less ef-
fective than planned.71  In response to the poor reception of
65. Id.
66. Boggs Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-235, 65 Stat. 767 (repealed 1970) (“[The convicted]
shall be . . . imprisoned not less than two or more than five years. . . .”); see also History of
Mandatory Sentences, FAMM FOUND. (2005), http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/Updated
%20short%20HISTORY.pdf (stating that the Boggs Act imposed federal mandatory minimum
penalties for drug offenses in 1951) [hereinafter History Timeline].
67. Narcotics Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, § 7237(a), 70 Stat. 568 (repealed
1970); see also NAT’L ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES FOR BUPRENORPHINE TREATMENT, Laws: A
History of Opiate Laws in the United States, NABBT.ORG, http://www.naabt.org/laws.cfm (last
modified Dec. 12, 2012) (“Narcotics Control Act increased Boggs Act penalties and mandatory
prison sentence minimums for violations of existing drug laws.”).
68. History Timeline, supra note 66.
69. Id.; see also Darryl K. Brown, Anti-Drug Abuse Act (1986), ENOTES, http://www.
enotes.com/anti-drug-abuse-act-1986-reference/anti-drug-abuse-act-1986 (last visited Apr. 16,
2012).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994).  The purpose of the United States Sentencing Commission is
to establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that “pro-
vide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentenc-
ing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when
warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of
general sentencing practices . . . .” Id. § 991(b)(1)(B); see also Alexander, supra note 9, at 201
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)-(d)) (“The Guidelines provide a sentencing range calculated by consid-
ering the criminal conduct for which the offender has been convicted and the criminal history of
the offender.”); History Timeline, supra note 66 (“U.S. Sentencing Commission establishes U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines to provide framework for sentencing all federal offenders.”).
71. See, e.g., WOMEN IN PRISON PROJECT OF THE CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF N.Y.,
MANDATORY INJUSTICE: CASE HISTORIES OF WOMEN CONVICTED UNDER NEW YORK’S ROCKE-
FELLER DRUG LAWS iii (1999), available at http://www.correctionalassociation.org/publications/
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mandatory minimum sentencing, Congress enacted two provisions in
1994 that allowed federal judges more discretion by exempting certain
non-violent, first-time drug offenders from mandatory minimum pen-
alties.72  Furthermore, in 2005, the United States Supreme Court
found federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional, declaring them
advisory rather than mandatory.73  However, mandatory minimum
laws were not affected by the ruling.74  Today, mandatory minimum
sentences exist at the federal and state level in an effort to provide
tough, uniform, fair, and economically efficient punishment for
criminals.75  Nearly all states have passed “determinate sentencing
schemes” and mandatory minimum laws similar to the federal sen-
tencing guidelines for violent crimes.76
download/wipp/reports/Mandatory%20Injustice.pdf (“It costs $32,000 to keep one inmate in a
New York State prison for a year.  In the past fifteen years, the annual operating budget for state
prisons has climbed from $450 million to $1.8 billion.  Despite the cost, it is widely agreed among
criminal justice professionals and government officials that the Rockefeller Drug Laws have
failed to curb the drug trade.”); see also id. at 23 (“[T]he Rockefeller Drug Laws have ‘hand-
cuffed our judges, filled our prisons to dangerously overcrowded conditions and denied sufficient
drug treatment alternatives to nonviolent addicted offenders who need help.’”).
72. History Timeline, supra note 66.  The two mechanisms to bypass mandatory minimum
sentencing at the federal level include 18 USC § 3553(e) (“the substantial assistance provision”)
and 18 USC § 3553(f) (“the safety valve provision”).  Provision (e) authorizes the court to im-
pose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a
defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has
committed an offense.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006).  It may be applied to any qualifying offender,
regardless of the type of offense involved. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 5.
Provision (f) provides an additional mechanism by which certain drug offenders may be sen-
tenced without regard to the otherwise applicable drug mandatory minimum provisions.  It es-
sentially acts as a “safety valve” from operation of penalties because it permits offenders “‘who
are the least culpable participants in drug trafficking offenses, to receive strictly regulated reduc-
tions in prison sentences for mitigating factors’ recognized in the federal sentencing guidelines.”
Id. at 6.
73. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005) (holding federal sentencing guide-
lines to be advisory rather than mandatory).  Delivering the opinion of the Court in part, Justice
Breyer notes in Booker that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which makes the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines mandatory, is incompatible with the Sixth Amendment’s “jury trial” holding and must be
severed from the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 in order to make the Guidelines advisory. Id.;
see also History Timeline, supra note 66 (“In two cases, Booker and Fanfan, the U.S. Supreme
Court finds federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional, declaring them advisory, not
mandatory.  Mandatory minimum laws, however, are NOT affected by the ruling.”).
74. History Timeline, supra note 66 (emphasis added).
75. Alexander, supra note 9, at 200 (“Sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimum
sentences, and ‘three-strikes-and-you’re-out’ laws were enacted to provide tough, uniform, fair,
and economically efficient punishment for criminals in America regardless of race, ethnicity,
class, or gender.”).
76. Id. at 202; see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 25 (5th ed.
2009) (“Nearly all states have abandoned indeterminate sentencing systems for a determinate
one.”); Caroline Forell, Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the United
States, Canada and Australia, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 27, 43 (2006) (“Currently,
for violent crimes such as manslaughter and murder, all fifty American states have some form of
determinate sentencing, most frequently mandatory minimum sentences and sentencing guide-
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C. State Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: New York and Jenna’s
Law
Sentencing systems vary from state-to-state, resulting in inconsis-
tent sentencing and the raising of questions of fairness.  Many states
have strict mandatory minimum sentencing policies while other states
have a variation of structured sentencing guidelines.77  At least twenty
states and the District of Columbia have implemented sentencing
guidelines to “encourage judges to take specific legally relevant ele-
ments into account in a fair and consistent way when deciding whether
a convicted offender should be imprisoned, and if so, for what length
of time.”78  Of the twenty states with guideline systems, some are har-
sher than others because they involve longer determinate incarcera-
tion periods.79  A mandatory guideline system may entail “stricter
departure policies, tighter sentencing ranges, and more vigorous ap-
lines.  This often gives American trial judges substantially less room to factor in circumstances
using their own discretion . . . .”).
77. See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ASSESSING CONSIS-
TENCY AND FAIRNESS IN SENTENCING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THREE STATES 1 (2006),
available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/PEWExecutiveSummaryv10.pdf
(noting that guideline systems vary from state to state and comparisons are often based in the
language of one system being more or less “mandatory” or “voluntary” than another) [hereinaf-
ter COMPARATIVE STUDY]; Christopher Mascharka, Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Exemplify-
ing the Law of Unintended Consequences, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 935, 937 (2001) (“Not all
jurisdictions have embraced mandatory minimum sentences to the same degree.  The federal
government and certain states, including Michigan, New York, and California, have historically
been cited as examples of criminal justice systems with overly harsh mandatory sentencing struc-
tures.”); Mandatory Minimums In A Nutshell, FAMM FOUND., http://www.famm.org/Reposi-
tory/Files/041410%20MMs%20in%20a%20Nutshell.pdf (noting that sentencing guidelines are
the alternative to mandatory minimums).  FAMM’s factsheet goes on to explain that, “[M]any
states have sentencing guidelines, in addition to their mandatory minimums.  Guidelines can be
either mandatory . . . or advisory . . . . Advisory guidelines are fairer and more flexible than
mandatory minimums.” Id. Compare, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.02(3)(a) (McKinney 2009) (im-
posing a mandatory minimum of at least five years imprisonment if convicted of a class B felony,
such as an attempt to commit a class A-I felony of murder in the second degree; and, a
mandatory minimum of at least ten years for manslaughter in the first degree), with VA. CODE
ANN. § 17.1-801 (West 1998) (establishing the development, implementation and revision of
discretionary sentencing guidelines).
78. COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 77, at 1. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 22-2104(a) (2001)
(“The punishment for murder in the first degree shall not be less than thirty years . . . .”); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 70.02(2)(a) (McKinney 2013) (“[The] sentence imposed upon a person who stands
convicted of a class B or class C violent felony offense must be a determinate sentence of impris-
onment which shall be in whole or half years. The term of such sentence must be in accordance
with the provisions of subdivision three of this section.”).  The term of a determinate sentence
for a class B violent felony offense must be at least five years, unless the sentence is for a crime
of aggravated manslaughter in the first degree, which requires at least a ten year sentence. Id.
§ 70.02(3)(a).
79. See, e.g., COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 77, at 1 (noting that sentencing disparities
under indeterminate sentencing laws is a common concern for policymakers).
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pellate review[.]”80  In contrast, a voluntary or advisory guideline sys-
tem does not require a judge to follow a particular sentencing
recommendation.81  Instead, judges are allowed to depart from the
sentencing guidelines, provided they state a reason for not following
the recommendation.82
New York is one state that uses mandatory minimum sentencing
policies, rather than sentencing guidelines.83  In 1973, New York en-
acted the Rockefeller Drug Laws, which introduced mandatory mini-
mum sentences of fifteen years to life imprisonment for possession of
more than four ounces (112 grams) of a hard drug.84  The purpose of
this legislation was to deter crime; however, concerns with the increas-
ing amount of criminal justice resources and jail space created skepti-
cism of such sentencing policies.85  Strong criticism amounted to a
change in the laws in 1979, and the legislature amended the Rockefel-
ler Laws to increase the amount of drugs needed to trigger the fifteen-
year mandatory minimum sentence.86
New York’s mandatory minimum sentencing expanded beyond
drug cases into other areas of law.  In 1995, the Governor of New
York ended indeterminate sentencing for second-time violent felony
offenders, and only considered early release for prisoners who served
80. Id. See, for example, Minnesota, where the guidelines establish “presumptive, fixed
sentence for offenders . . . .  The guidelines shall provide for an increase of [twenty] percent and
a decrease of [fifteen] percent in the presumptive, fixed sentence.” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09,
subdiv. 5(2) (West 2012).  In addition, the court must “follow the procedures of the guidelines
when it pronounces sentence in a proceeding to which the guidelines apply by operation of
statute.” Id.  The Minnesota statute notes that the guidelines serve to “maintain uniformity,
proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing.” Id.
81. COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 77, at 1.  For example, the Virginia statute specifically
states that the guidelines are discretionary. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-801 (West 2012) (“The Com-
mission shall develop discretionary sentencing guidelines to achieve the goals of certainty, con-
sistency, and adequacy of punishment . . . .”).
82. See COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 77, at 1.
83. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 2009) (“[A] sentence of imprisonment for a felony
. . . shall impose a maximum term in accordance with the provisions of subdivision two of this
section and the minimum period of imprisonment shall be as provided in subdivision three of
this section.”); see also COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 77, at 6.
84. Rockefeller Drug Law, 1973 N.Y. Laws 1040-65; see also History Timeline, supra note
66.
85. See, e.g., WOMEN IN PRISON PROJECT OF THE CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF N.Y.,
supra note 71, at ii-iii (“These mandatory drug laws have contributed to New York’s skyrocket-
ing prison population over the past twenty-five years, which has climbed from 12,500 in 1973 to
over 70,000 in 1998. . . . It costs $32,000 to keep one inmate in a New York State prison for a
year.  In the past fifteen years, the annual operating budget for state prisons has climbed from
$450 million to $1.8 billion. . . . [I]t is widely agreed among criminal justice professionals and
government officials that the Rockefeller Drugs Laws have failed to curb the drug trade.”).
86. Aaron D. Wilson, Rockefeller Drug Laws Information Sheet, P’SHIP FOR RESPONSIBLE
DRUG INFO., http://www.prdi.org/rocklawfact.html (revised Aug.7, 2000).
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eighty-five percent of their original prison term and maintained a
good disciplinary record.87  Under this law, the judge established a
minimum and maximum term within allowable ranges.88  The offender
was eligible to first be considered for parole at the minimum term and
if granted, would continue on parole until the expiration of the maxi-
mum term.89
The requirement that individuals convicted of violent offenses
serve eighty-five percent of their sentence in prison was expanded to
first-time violent felony offenders with the enactment of the 1998 Sen-
tencing Reform Act, better known as “Jenna’s Law.”90  This amend-
ment also reads that if a sentence of imprisonment is to be imposed it
is to be a determinate sentence, and inmates must serve a period of
post release supervision following release from their sentence.91
While Jenna’s Law establishes determinate sentences for certain
violent felons,92 it also includes a domestic violence exception that
permits judges to grant an indeterminate sentence in cases where the
defendant is a first-time violent felony offender convicted of a crime
against his or her abuser.93  More specifically, after a hearing, the
court may impose an indeterminate sentence if it concludes that: (a)
the defendant was the victim of physical, sexual, or psychological
abuse by the victim or intended victim of the instant offense; (b) such
abuse was a factor in causing the defendant to commit the instant of-
87. Overview of Key Provisions of Chapter 1 of the Laws of 1998 – Jenna’s Law, N.Y.
STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/pio/jenna.htm (last
updated July 14, 2003).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1998, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 70.45 (McKinney 2009)
[hereinafter “Jenna’s Law”]; see also Overview of Key Provisions of Chapter 1 of the Laws of
1998 – Jenna’s Law, supra note 87 (noting that Jenna’s Law applies the requirement that individ-
uals convicted of violent offenses serve eighty-five percent of their sentence in prison to first-
time violent felony offenders); infra Part II (discussing the shortcomings of Jenna’s Law).
91. Jenna’s Law § 70.00.
92. Id. § 70.02, amended by establishing determinate sentencing for first-time violent felony
offenders. The prison term is to be set by the judge in whole or half years within the following
ranges:
• B felony - between 5 and 25 years
• C felony - between 31/2 and 15 years
• D felony - between 2 and 7 years
• E felony - between 11/2 and 4 years
However, Jenna’s Law does not remove any existing alternative sentencing option applicable to
first-time D and E violent felony offenders. Id.; see also Overview of Key Provisions of Chapter
1 of the Laws of 1998 – Jenna’s Law, supra note 87 (outlining the sentencing ranges for class B,
C, D, and E felonies).
93. Jenna’s Law, supra note 90, § 60.12; see also REPORT, supra note 4, at 11 (discussing the
domestic violence exception that Jenna’s Law provides in cases where the defendant is a first-
time violent felony offender convicted of a crime against his or her abuser).
2013] 997
Howard Law Journal
fense; and (c) the victim or intended victim was a member of the same
family or household as the defendant.94
Unfortunately, Jenna’s Law fails to reduce the “unduly harsh”
punishment that it sought to remedy for domestic violence cases.95
Harsh sentences for survivor-defendants continue because Jenna’s
Law does not provide a domestic violence exception for murder con-
victions.96  Similar to the opening quote of this paper, Victoria re-
counts how her once happy marriage turned frightening when her
husband began physically, sexually, emotionally, and financially abus-
ing her.97  One night, an argument ensued and he came after her with
a gun.98  Victoria was able to tear the gun away from her husband
during the struggle.99  The fight soon ended and her husband went to
sleep.100  Victoria was so fearful that her abusive husband would kill
her or her child, she proceeded into the bedroom that evening and
shot him.101  At trial, Victoria accepted a plea of first-degree man-
slaughter.102  With no previous criminal record, not even a speeding
ticket, Victoria was sentenced to the maximum term of eight and one-
third to twenty-five years.103
In addition to excluding murder convictions, Jenna’s Law’s do-
mestic violence exception does not protect against robbery, burglary,
or other property offenses where the abuse was a significant factor
94. Jenna’s Law § 60.12.  In such cases, the indeterminate sentencing ranges are as follows:
• B felony - maximum term between 6 and 25 years
• C felony - maximum term between 41/2 and 15 years
• D felony - maximum term between 3 and 7 years
• E felony - maximum term between 3 and 4 years
• The minimum term must be one-half the maximum
Id.
95. REPORT, supra note 4, at 11 (“At the time, the Legislature reasoned that retaining inde-
terminate sentencing and parole would lead to less punitive sentencing for survivors. . . . Though
intended to be more compassionate than the general sentencing statute, the Jenna’s Law excep-
tion retains a sentencing structure that is too harsh.”).
96. See id.  Murder convictions are designated as A-1 offenses under N.Y. Penal Law and
carry life as the maximum term. Id.
97. See Coalition Memo, supra note 1; see also REPORT, supra note 4, at 12 (chronicling the
experience of Victoria, a similarly situated victim of domestic violence).
98. REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id.  Like many abused women, Victoria notes the ineffectiveness of calling the po-
lice.  In prior instances, Victoria “[c]alled the police a few times but [it] only made matters
worse, especially because [her husband] was a police officer himself.” Id. at 12.  Victoria also
notes that when detectives asked if she had been battered, she did not reveal much about the
abuse because, “[b]elieve it or not, in my own sick way I was still trying to protect my husband.”
Id. at 13.
102. Id. Victoria served a total of seventeen years in prison. Id.
103. Id.
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causing the defendant’s actions.104  Most survivors engage in such ille-
gal activity because of abuse or fear of increased violence if they do
not comply.105  If, for example, a battered woman is coerced into aid-
ing her abuser commit a robbery, or any other act where domestic
violence is a significant factor, the abused and manipulated woman is
not eligible for less punitive sentencing.106  In the case of Debbie
Peagler, Debbie was wooed by the father of her child.107  Soon after
giving birth to their daughter, Debbie’s boyfriend asked Debbie to
help him earn some extra cash.108  Subsequently, Debbie was placed
in a room with a “john” and realized that her boyfriend was trying to
pimp her.109  When she refused, her boyfriend beat her until she com-
plied to prostitute for his financial gain.110  As the years passed, the
abuse escalated.111  Fearing for her life, Debbie cooperated with two
gang members, who then murdered her abuser.112  Debbie was
charged with first-degree murder and pleaded guilty to avoid the po-
tential death penalty sentence in the State of California.113  Similar to
Debbie, the criminal behavior of other survivor-defendants is a direct
result of abuse;114 however, they are not protected by domestic vio-
lence exceptions to punishment.  If Debbie’s scenario occurred in New
York, she would not be able to invoke the domestic violence excep-
tion under Jenna’s Law because the Act does not protect against of-
fenses where the abuse was a significant factor in the defendant’s
actions.115
Moreover, Jenna’s Law does not permit judges to dispense alter-
natives to incarceration for violent offenses.116  Instead, the current
Jenna’s Law exception permits only mandatory sentencing for lengths
slightly lower than the standard mandatory minimum sentencing for
104. Id. at 11 (noting that the overly narrow provision disregards the powerful role that do-
mestic violence plays in a survivor’s experiences and actions).
105. Coalition Memo, supra note 1, at 3.
106. REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
107. People v. Peagler, No. B208543, 2009 WL 1059003, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2009);
see also The Battle to Free Debbie Peagler, CRIMEAFTERCRIME.COM, http://crimeaftercrime.com/
the-case/interactive-timeline/ (last visited June 10, 2012) [hereinafter CRIME AFTER CRIME].
108. See CRIME AFTER CRIME, supra note 107.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Peagler, 2009 WL 1059003, at *3; CRIME AFTER CRIME, supra note 107.
113. Peagler, 2009 WL 1059003, at *3; CRIME AFTER CRIME, supra note 107.
114. Coalition Memo, supra note 1, at 3.
115. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
116. Id. (“Under current law, non-incarcerative sentences are permitted mainly for certain
non-violent offenses.”).
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the same crime.117  For instance, an abused woman charged with a
Class B felony in New York, such as murder in the second degree, will
face an indeterminate sentence with a maximum term between six and
twenty-five years118 under the Jenna’s Law exception, as opposed to
the determinate mandatory minimum sentencing range between five
and twenty-five years.119  This indeterminate structure may result in a
defendant serving more time in prison than they would under a non-
exception determinate sentence.120  Regrettably, the effect of the
Jenna’s Law exception undermines its intent to offer more compas-
sionate and lower sentences for survivors.121  Consequently, the ex-
ception is rarely used.122
D. Policy Arguments Supporting and Discrediting Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing
New York’s proposed DVSJA is currently under debate, as oppo-
nents of the bill assert that the Act will eliminate the current
mandatory minimum sentencing policies, which they opine are effec-
tive and just.123  The most common moral theories used to justify pun-
ishment on any defender include retributivism, utilitarianism, and
denunciation.124  In the first theory, retributivists believe punishment
is justified when the wrongdoer freely chooses to violate society’s
rules, regardless of whether the punishment will result in a reduction
117. Id. (“Notwithstanding the significant benefits associated with ATIs, the current Jenna’s
Law exception permits only mandatory prison penalties.”).
118. The minimum term must be one-half the maximum. See Overview of Key Provisions of
Chapter 1 of the Laws of 1998 – Jenna’s Law, supra note 87.
119. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.02 (McKinney 2009).
120. REPORT, supra note 4, at 11 (“[U]nder the exception, defendants can actually receive
longer sentences than those permitted under the general sentencing statute. . . .  [O]ne person
serving a sentence under the exception in 2007, for example, was given an indeterminate sen-
tence of [six] to [twelve] years – longer than the minimum five-year term allowed under the law’s
general provisions.”).
121. Id. at 12 (“Such sentence lengths and structure undermine the intent of the exception to
offer more compassionate and lower sentences for survivors.”).
122. Other possible reasons for exception’s lack of invocation include:
(1) lack of awareness among defense attorneys and judges about the exception’s
existence; (2) defendant’s reluctance to forgo a determinate sentence with a known
release date and accept an indeterminate sentence with a release date contingent upon
parole board approval; (3) the exclusion of murder charges; and (4) the law’s exclusion
until recently of intimate relationships where survivors and abusers do not live or share
children together and possible continuing lack of awareness among attorneys and
judges about the law’s expansion to include these intimate partners.
Id. at 12.
123. See New York Bill Could Reduce Sentences for Domestic Violence Victims, FINDLAW
(May 10, 2012), http://knowledgebase.findlaw.com/kb/2012/May/638747.html.
124. DRESSLER, supra note 76, at 17-19.
1000 [VOL. 56:983
Pulling the Trigger
in crime.125  Utilitarianists, on the other hand, purport that punish-
ment should be implemented to effectuate general or specific deter-
rence.126  Specific deterrence punishment is meant to deter future
misconduct by that same defendant; whereas, general deterrence aims
to “punish the defendant in order to convince the general community
to forgo criminal conduct in the future.”127  Under the denunciation or
expressive theory, punishment is justified as a means of expressing so-
ciety’s condemnation of the wrongdoer’s conduct.128  These theories
of punishment are used to strengthen arguments and discredit oppos-
ing arguments.
Accordingly, proponents of mandatory minimum sentencing as-
sert that such determinative laws reduce crime, establish uniformed
sentencing, and provide economic efficiency.129  Arguing that poten-
tial criminals and repeat offenders will avoid crime because they can
be certain of their sentence if caught, enthusiasts of mandatory mini-
mum sentencing contend that such laws serve as an effective deter-
rent.130  This line of reasoning is on par with the utilitarianism theory
of general deterrence, which reasons that the defendant’s punishment
serves as a lesson to the rest of the community.131  Furthermore, advo-
cates of mandatory minimums claim that society pays a lower cost
with that type of sentencing in effect, due to the laws high deterrence
rate.132
125. Id. at 16.
126. Id. at 14-15.
127. Id.at 15.
128. Id. at 18-19.
129. See Steven E. Landsburg, Does Crime Pay? Yes, for Those who Don’t Wince at the
Small Chance of a Big Punishment, SLATE (Dec. 9, 1999), http://www.slate.com/id/57573/; see
also Alexander, supra note 9, at 203-06 (discussing arguments in support of mandatory minimum
sentencing).  In addition, retributivists who view punishment as a means to secure moral balance
in society or punish to even the score may “focus on the view that humans generally possess free
will or free choice and, therefore, may justly be blamed when they choose to violate society’s
mores.” DRESSLER, supra note 76, at 16-17.  Retributivist may also support mandatory minimum
sentencing because wrongdoers’ punishment is justly deserved, regardless of whether or not it
will result in a reduction in crime. Id. at 16.
130. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 204 (“The general population is deterred by having
knowledge of the punishment that current laws could impose”); see also Mascharka, supra note
77, at 947-48 (“The theory behind these laws was that if potential felons knew in advance that
the penalty for certain crimes was a long prison sentence or death, they would think carefully
and refrain from violating the law.”).
131. DRESSLER, supra note 76, at 15.
132. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 206 (“[When an aggregate of factors such as] property
loss, pain and suffering, lost wages, police, security, medical, and insurance costs are weighed
against prison costs, the current determinate sentencing laws will save resources”).
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Supporters also maintain that mandatory minimum sentences cre-
ate a uniform system of punishment by removing varied judicial dis-
cretion and potential biases.133  Creating a sentencing system that
predetermines an appropriate sentence ensures the certainty and just
punishment that Congress intended, and eliminates unwanted
sentences that are perceived as too “soft.”134  It can be argued that
allowing judicial discretion, rather than mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing, violates the Eighth Amendment, which states “cruel and unusual
punishment” shall not be inflicted.135  The Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits punishment that is “barbarous in its infliction or grossly dispro-
portional to the offense committed.”136  Thus, proponents of
mandatory minimum sentencing argue that eliminating a predictable
and universal system of punishment would lead to judicial sentencing
that is too lenient or grossly disproportional to the homicide.137
As an alternative perspective, opponents of mandatory minimum
penalties declare this type of punishment system fails to deter poten-
tial criminals, leaves no room for judicial discretion, and comes with
high societal and economic costs.138  Studies show that increasing the
chances of conviction deters criminals more effectively than increasing
the length of the sentence.139  In addition, current mandatory mini-
mum laws reduce judicial discretion and consequently provide more
power to prosecutors.140  Prosecutors then serve as gatekeepers to the
court system and decide what charges to bring against a defendant.141
Challengers opine that the elimination of judicial discretion may
constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,142 which guarantees procedural fairness to criminal de-
133. Id. at 205.
134. Mascharka, supra note 77, at 942-43.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
136. DRESSLER , supra note 76, at 34.
137. See Mascharka, supra note 77, at 942-43.
138. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 206-22 (discussing arguments against mandatory mini-
mum sentencing).
139. Id. at 207-08.
140. OREGON CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION, LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE APPLICATION
OF MEASURE 11 AND MANDATORY MINIMUMS IN OREGON vi (2011), available at http://www.
oregon.gov/CJC/docs/Measure11AnalysisFinal.pdf?ga=t; see also Alexander, supra note 9, at
223-24; Mascharka, supra note 77, at 943.
141. See LEONARD, supra note 3, at 20.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
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fendants.143  Moreover, challengers assert that the constitutional guar-
antee of separation of powers is violated when mandatory minimum
sentencing removes judicial discretion and allots too much power to
the legislative branch.144  Mandatory minimum sentencing actually
raises the likelihood of conviction because defendants are more likely
to plead to a charge rather than face prosecution and risk the harsh
mandatory sentence.145  Challengers to mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing assert that the stereotypes about abused women in existence
before sentencing reforms continue in the criminal justice system and
perpetuate gender discrepancies in prison rates.146  Opponents also ar-
gue that alternatives to incarceration would be a more cost-effective
penalty than mandatory minimum sentencing, as overcrowding in pris-
ons will create costs “beyond what the public is willing to pay.”147
E. The Failure of the Self-Defense Argument in Domestic
Violence Cases
In addition to the failures of Jenna’s Law, the hardship abused
women face in proving the elements of self-defense also warrants a
need for new initiatives for abused women.
Abused women are often convicted because the circumstances
surrounding their homicidal acts do not meet the requirements of cur-
rent self-defense law.148  The elements to prove self-defense include
the use of equal or lesser force against someone when the person ap-
prehends imminent and unlawful deadly force.149  In addition, the
non-aggressor, and a reasonable person, must believe the deadly force
was necessary, with no ability to retreat.150  Domestically abused de-
143. DRESSLER, supra note 76, at 34.
144. Kieran Riley, Trial By Legislature: Why Statutory Mandatory Minimum Sentences Vio-
late the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 285, 286 (2010).
145. Mascharka, supra note 77, at 945-46; see also Ammons, supra note 27, at 549.
146. Alexander, supra note 9, at 207.
147. See also Alexander, supra note 9, at 221-22; WOMEN IN PRISON PROJECT OF THE COR-
RECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, MANDATORY INJUSTICE: CASE HISTORIES OF WOMEN
CONVICTED UNDER NEW YORK’S ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS 28 (1999), available at http://www.
correctionalassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Mandatory-Injustice.pdf (“[T]he cost of
lengthy sentences is far too great, not only because of the money squandered, but also because
long prison terms detract from a woman’s ability to make a successful transition back to her
family and community.”).  See generally FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS,
www.FAMM.org (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (advancing arguments by Families Against
Mandatory Minimums).
148. LEONARD, supra note 3, at 28.
149. See generally MOSKOVITZ, supra note 22, at 375-408 (describing self-defense in the con-
text of criminal law).
150. Id.
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fendants have difficulty proving self-defense because they often kill
their abuser when it is “safe” for the defendants.151  For instance,
many charged battered women kill their abuser while he is sleeping;
thus, the battered women fail to meet the element of apprehending
“imminent” harm.152  Unfortunately, current self-defense laws do not
reflect the reality that most battered women experience, and the de-
fendants are thus unable to meet the elements of self-defense.153
Understanding the unlikelihood of winning a claim of self-de-
fense, many abused women facing conviction will opt for a plea bar-
gain, reasoning that it is a less risky option than going to trial.154  A
plea arrangement is likely to result in voluntary manslaughter with a
reduced jail sentence, while taking the case to trial often ends in a
conviction of first-degree murder for women accused of killing their
abusive partners.155
151. “Safe” may be interpreted as either a confrontational or non-confrontational situation,
depending on the circumstances.  Scheff, supra note 24, at 226 n.14.  In her article, Scheff gives
case examples of non-confrontational situations when the woman felt it was most safe to kill her
husband, namely while he was sleeping.  For instance, Scheff notes, “Not only was [Norman]
unable to get help from the police, but once she acted to protect herself, the court rejected her
claim of self-defense.  Because Norman killed her abuser while he was asleep, the traditional
definition of self-defense did not apply.  Therefore, the judge refused to instruct the jury that it
might acquit if it believed Norman had acted in self-defense, and the North Carolina Supreme
Court upheld that result.” Id. at 226.
152. Id. at 226; see, e.g., id. at 237-38 (“Aris claimed she was acting in self-defense. She ex-
plained: ‘I felt when he woke up that he was then going to hurt me very badly or even kill me.’
Aris’s claim did not look like classic self-defense, primarily because the threat was not imminent
as the court defined that term.  The trial court clarified that the defendant’s belief need not be
reasonable for a claim of imperfect self-defense, but used their definition of ‘imminent’ to defeat
Aris’s claim of perfect self-defense[.]”).
153. See LEONARD, supra note 3, at 29 (“Osthoff (1991) reports that the vast majority of
women accused of killing their abusive partners (72 percent to 80 percent) are convicted or
accept a plea, and many receive long, harsh sentences.  In her analysis of domestic homicide
offenders, Mann suggests that the system may be growing tougher toward these women . . . .”).
Leonard also discusses how “[t]he requirements of immediate danger, necessary force, reasona-
ble belief and the duty to retreat present almost insurmountable barriers to a self-defense claim
in the wife-battery situation (1993, p. 50).” Id. at 32 (quoting Wilson).  Thus, many battered
women will opt for a plea bargain, resulting in a long jail sentence.  Leonard notes that, “Some
accused women accept plea bargains to protect their children, to spare their families the humilia-
tion of a trial, to avoid the death penalty threatened by prosecutors, or to speed up what they see
as the inevitable, negative outcome.  Others refuse plea bargains because they are confident in
the fairness of the system, because they are ready to fight for themselves, because they feel they
have nothing to lose, or because they follow the instructions of their attorneys.” Id. at 122; see
also Ammons, supra note 27, at 549 (“Women were also . . . coerced into plea bargains because
they knew and/or were advised that juries would not believe them, and it would be hard, if not
impossible to get jury instructions on self-defense.  The criminal justice process for these women
was fatally flawed.”).
154. LEONARD, supra note 3, at 122.
155. See LEONARD, supra note 3, at 29, 109-10.
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F. The Shortfalls to the Battered Woman’s Syndrome
Due to the difficulty of proving self-defense, some states allow a
battered defendant to show that she was suffering from battered per-
son syndrome.156  Although the syndrome is not a legal defense per se,
it may constitute self-defense, provocation, insanity, or diminished ca-
pacity.157  The term “Battered Woman Syndrome” was first intro-
duced by Dr. Lenore Walker in 1979.158  Battered Woman Syndrome
(BWS) is a sub-category of post-traumatic stress disorder and is used
to describe the combined symptoms that result from a pattern of phys-
ical and psychological abuse in an intimate relationship with an
abuser.159  BWS may be used in court at a battered woman’s trial in
order to “enhance the defendant’s credibility because the average lay
jury is not familiar with the effects of domestic violence on the abused
partner . . . .”160  Thus, under the theory, expert witness testimony is
allowed in the trial courts to attest to the dynamics of a battering rela-
tionship.161  Relevant to self-defense, a statute recognizing BWS and
admitting expert witness testimony162 would change the legal standard
from what a reasonable person would perceive as danger to how a
battered woman would perceive the situation.
The problem, however, is that such testimony may only be admit-
ted under certain circumstances.  Evidence of BWS will be denied ad-
mission by courts where “there is [1] insufficient evidence to raise the
issue of self-defense, [2] where the defendant has not established her-
self to be a battered woman, and [3] where the threat of harm is not
imminent or the degree of force used is excessive in light of the threat
156. Battered Person Syndrome, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Batteredpersonsyn-
drome (last visited Dec. 19, 2012) (“Battered person syndrome is a physical and psychological
condition that is classified as ICD-9 code 995.81 . . . The condition is the basis for the battered
woman defense that has been used in cases of physically and psychologically abused women who
have killed their abusers.”).
157. Battered Woman Defense, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Batteredwomande-
fense (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
158. See generally LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979) (identifying the es-
sential elements of what has become known as the “battered woman syndrome (BWS)”).
159. Erin M. Masson, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert or Opinion Evidence of Battered-
Woman Syndrome on Issue of Self-Defense, 58 A.L.R.5th 749 (1998).
160. Id.
161. Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321, 322 (1992).
162. “Expert on battered woman’s syndrome may testify only as to general behavior of vic-
tims of domestic abuse; expert may not give opinion as to whether the particular victim told the
truth or whether the particular victim in fact suffered from domestic abuse, as those questions
are solely within province of the jury.”  Masson, supra note 159.
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posed.”163  Accordingly, if Kate in the opening story went to trial, she
would not satisfy the elements of a traditional self-defense claim,
namely what a reasonable person would perceive as danger, threat of
imminent harm,164 and use of equal or lesser force.165  Therefore, ex-
pert witness testimony as to general behavior of victims of domestic
abuse would not be admissible.166  Ultimately, Kate’s attempt to use
the BWS defense would fail and she would risk conviction.
Due to the lack of understanding of domestic violence issues, in-
effective police response, inefficient policies, lack of prior felony con-
victions, and low recidivism rates for convicted battered women,
measures need to be implemented to remedy unfair mandatory mini-
mum punishment for victims of abuse.  New York’s proposed legisla-
tion, the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act, is one legislative
measure addressing these concerns.
II. STATE EXAMINATION: NEW YORK AND THE
PROPOSED DVSJA
A. Background and Purpose of the DVSJA
To eliminate unfair punishment faced by survivors-turned-de-
fendants in the State of New York, Senator Ruth Hassell-Thompson
and Assembly member Jeffrion Aubry introduced the Domestic Vio-
lence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) on May 20, 2011.167  The pur-
pose of the Act is “to amend the penal law and the criminal procedure
law in relation to sentencing and resentencing in domestic violence
cases.”168  The goal of the Act is to “expand upon the existing provi-
sions of alternative sentencing for domestic violence cases; [and] sec-
ond, to allow judges the opportunity to resentence currently
incarcerated persons for offenses in which certain domestic violence
criteria was a significant element of the offense.”169  If enacted, the
proposed legislation would amend New York’s penal and criminal
163. Id.
164. Emphasis added.  A threat of harm at some future date is insufficient to justify immedi-
ate deadly force, because it fails to meet the “imminence” requirement. Id.
165. See id.; see also infra note 1; see generally MOSKOVITZ, supra note 22, at 375-408
(describing the elements of self-defense).
166. Walker, supra note 161, at 323.
167. DVSJA, supra note 29.
168. Id.; see also NEW YORK CITY BAR, REPORT ON LEGISLATION BY THE DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE COMMITTEE (2011), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/DVSurvivors
JusticeDVReportFINAL6.16.11.pdf.
169. DVSJA, supra note 29.
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procedure law by giving discretion to judges when sentencing defend-
ants who are survivors of domestic violence, including the opportunity
for shorter, determinate terms, and community-based alternatives to
incarceration programs.170  Under the Act, a judge would be allowed
to impose an alternative sentence if he or she finds that: (1) the defen-
dant was, at the time of the offense, a victim of domestic violence; (2)
the abuse was a “significant contributing factor” to the crime; and (3)
a sentence under current law would be “unduly harsh.”171
The proposed legislation has stirred debate, as proponents of
mandatory minimum sentencing feel the current laws are fair and
just.172  Thus, supporters of the status quo assert that the defendant
murdered another human and should be adequately punished.173  Ste-
reotypes and false assumptions such as: the accused woman was not in
an abusive relationship because she had a job, she never reported the
incidence to law enforcement officials, or she failed to leave the rela-
tionship when she had alternative options, plague the courtroom and
warrant the need for new initiatives.174
The current legislative debate is especially important because
prior attempts to make exceptions to the mandatory minimum penal-
ties for crimes involving domestic violence in New York have failed.175
Most notably, Jenna’s Law fails to reduce “unduly harsh” punishment,
does not address murder convictions, and does not permit judges to
170. See id.; see also NEW YORK CITY BAR, REPORT ON LEGISLATION BY THE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE COMMITTEE (2011), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/DV-
SurvivorsJusticeDVReportFINAL6.16.11.pdf (noting that the Act would allow courts to take do-
mestic violence into consideration when determining sentencing).
171. DVSJA, supra note 29.
172. See New York Bill Could Reduce Sentences for Domestic Violence Victims, supra note
123.
173. See LEONARD, supra note 3, at 27-28 (“Though women kill far less frequently than do
men, their actions are less likely to be construed as justifiable by the American legal system, and
most probably by the general public.  We see this tendency most clearly in two situations: spousal
homicide in response to wife battery, and abortion.”).
174. See Coalition Memo, supra note 1 (For Kate, the prosecutor refused to lower his plea
offer of eight years because Kate didn’t “fit the profile of a battered woman because [she] had a
job.”  Kate refused to plead and instead went to trial, where documents attesting to the abuse
were never entered into the record.  Kate was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and
sentenced to eight and one-third to twenty-five years); see also LEONARD, supra note 3, at 23
(“The California Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts surveyed 425 judges and found that
nearly half believed that allegations of domestic violence are often exaggerated, and some ex-
pressed active hostility towards victims or domestic violence.”); id.  (“The committee’s conclu-
sions include: Some judges and court personnel approach domestic violence cases, whether
consciously or unconsciously, with assumptions based not upon personal experience or the facts
of a particular case but upon . . . stereotypes and biases[.]”).
175. See Jenna’s Law, supra note 90.
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dispense non-prison sentences.176  Unfortunately, the Jenna’s Law do-
mestic violence exception is rarely invoked by defendants, most likely
due to lack of awareness of the provision, defendant’s reluctance, and
the exclusion of murder charges.177
In addition, as noted above, it is difficult for abused women to
argue self-defense in domestic violence cases where they are charged
with killing their abusers.178  While recognition of BWS was an at-
tempt to the remedy this problem, the conditions on which expert tes-
timony may be admitted, and the breadth of such testimony, is far too
limited.  These prior attempts to eliminate unfair punishment reflect
the criminal justice system’s failure to protect abused women.  The
proposed DVSJA would help remedy the failed attempts in New
York, and if implemented in other states, it could protect battered wo-
men across the nation.
B. Mandatory Minimum Sentence State Comparison: Minnesota
and Virginia
Many states have mandatory minimum sentencing; however, al-
ternative sentencing guidelines that encourage judicial discretion have
become more widespread in recent years.179  To date, at least twenty
states and the District of Columbia have introduced sentencing guide-
lines to achieve non-discriminatory, predictable, and proportional sen-
tencing.180  Despite broad similarities in their intended purpose,
sentencing guidelines can take numerous forms.181  The State of Min-
nesota, for instance, has a relatively strict sentencing guideline sys-
tem.182  Minnesota imposes mandatory minimum sentencing for select
cases involving weapons or second offenses, and offers narrow ranges
of prison terms for other offenses.183  For instance, a person found
guilty of murder in the first degree must be sentenced to life in prison,
176. Id.; REPORT, supra note 4, at 11; see also infra Part I.
177. DVSJA, supra note 29; see also REPORT, supra note 4, at 12.
178. See infra Part I.E.
179. COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 77, at 1.
180. Id. at 1, 5 (citing, for example, Ohio and Wisconsin as states with more voluntary sen-
tencing guideline systems, while Oregon, Kansas, Washington, Minnesota, and North Carolina
have more mandatory guidelines).
181. Id. at 5.
182. Id. at 2.
183. See id. at 8.
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and a person found guilty of murder in the second degree may be
sentenced to imprisonment between fifteen and forty years.184
Under Minnesota law, the defendant will be sentenced to the
range specified in the sentencing guidelines because that state’s poli-
cies make it difficult for a judge to depart from the guidelines.185
Also, should defendants choose to appeal their sentence, they face a
vigorous appeal process.186  Relative to other states, Minnesota’s nar-
row sentence ranges, along with a low level of judicial discretion, cre-
ate sentences that are slightly more predictable.187
In comparison, Virginia’s voluntary system is based on detailed
calculation of sentences with wider ranges that allow more opportuni-
ties for the exercise of discretion.188  For example, a person convicted
of first degree murder can be imprisoned between twenty years and
life, with eligibility for parole; and, persons convicted of second de-
gree murder can be sentenced anywhere between five and forty
years.189  The more voluntary system means judges are free to depart
without justifying their reasons, and appellate review of guideline
sentences is prohibited by statute.190  Consequently, relatively lower
predictability transpires.191  Lack of predictability means that one
abused woman may be sentenced for life if she is found guilty of mur-
der, while another similarly situated abused woman may be sentenced
to three years.192  The inconsistent sentences are troublesome for the
battered women who receive longer sentences.  The discrepancy
amongst the courtrooms can lead to injustice.
184. MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a) (2012) (“Whoever does any of the following is guilty of mur-
der in the first degree and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life[.]”); Id. § 609.19 (2012);
see also List of Punishments for Murder in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/List_of_punishments_for_murder_in_the_United_States (last updated Dec. 18, 2012).
185. See COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 77 at 1, 6 (“Judges are required to give the sen-
tence within the presumptive range.  Judges can depart from the presumptive sentence if ‘there
exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances . . . .  The judge ‘must disclose in
writing or on the record the particular substantial and compelling circumstances . . . .’”).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2.
188. Id.
189. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (2006) (“All murder other than capital murder and murder in
the first degree is murder of the second degree and is punishable by confinement in a state
correctional facility for not less than five nor more than forty years.”); see also List of Punish-
ments for Murder in the United States, supra note 184.
190. See COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 77, at 5.
191. Id. at 2, 9 (“Sentences are predictable to the extent similar offenders receive similar
sentences.”).
192. See id. at 12.
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While there is tension between the desire for consistent sentenc-
ing and accurate discretion, the most important matter is whether the
defendant is receiving an appropriate sentence.  Battered women, who
are most often first time offenders and have a low recidivism rate, do
not receive fair sentencing under mandatory minimum statutes.  By
allowing room for judicial discretion, the narrowly-tailored category
of battered women who are unfairly sentenced would be protected.193
Moreover, studies show that “discretion afforded judges under more
voluntary guidelines does not result in discriminatory sentences.”194
III. PROPOSAL TO ADOPT THE DVJSA AND IMPLEMENT
ADDITIONAL STEPS
A. New York Should Adopt the Proposed DVSJA
The DVSJA has been endorsed by more than ninety-one support-
ers, including thirteen New York state senators and thirteen assembly
members.195  The proposed bill has the potential to be enacted when
legislative sessions resume in January 2012.196  The DVSJA has al-
ready been approved by the House and Senate, and at the start of the
calendar year 2012, the Correctional Association will hold a hearing
where domestic violence survivors who are formerly or presently in-
carcerated will submit testimony about their experiences.197
New York should adopt the proposed DVSJA because it will help
protect abused women, remedy unfair punishment, and be economi-
cally beneficial for the state.  First, “[b]y establishing a more compas-
sionate sentencing structure for survivors and enhancing recognition
of the impact of [domestic violence] on survivor-defendants, the [DV-
SJA] makes it less likely that survivors will be victimized by the very
system [meant to] protect them.”198  In New York alone, sixty-seven
percent of women in state prison for killing a close acquaintance were
reportedly abused by the victim of their crime.199  In 2007, women
193. See DVSJA, supra note 29.
194. COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 77, at 3 (concluding based on Pew Center data for the
state of Virginia and the National Center for State Courts comparative study results).
195. DVSJA, supra note 29; see also Legislative Sponsors, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS
JUSTICE ACT, http://www.dvsurvivorsjusticeact.org/dvsja/legislative-sponsors/.
196. Catherine Epstein, Exclusive: Fairness for Defendants Who Survive Domestic Violence,
WOMEN’S MEDIA CENTER BLOG (June 21, 2011, 9:26 AM), http://womensmediacenter.com/blog/
2011/06/exclusive-fairness-for-defendants-who-survive-domestic-violence/.
197. Legislative Sponsors, supra note 195.
198. Coalition Memo, supra note 1, at 2.
199. REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
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comprised eighty-one percent of intimate partner homicide victims in
New York State.200  Abused women report a sense of failure from the
criminal justice system to protect them, from law enforcement officers
to the judges in the courtroom.201  As discussed in Part I(A), abused
women choose not to call the police for numerous reasons, explaining
that the police fail to respond in an effective manner or that the bat-
terer will beat them more severely after the police leave.202  Killing an
abuser in self-defense occurs when the abuse becomes too violent and
the abused woman believes she has no alternative safe outlet.203
While the abused woman may retaliate in a violent manner, statistics
show that survivor-defendants are not a danger to society.204  Eighty
percent of women sent to New York’s prisons for a violent felony in
2008 had no prior felony convictions.205  In addition, recidivism rates
of battered women who kill are extremely low.206  Not a single woman
of the thirty-eight women convicted of murder and released between
1985 and 2003 returned to prison for a new crime within a three-year
follow-up period.207  The combination of a low recidivism rate, lack of
prior felony convictions, and failure by law officials to effectively re-
spond, indicate the need to amend mandatory minimum sentencing
policies and implement changes to protect abused women.
Enactment of the DVSJA would allow New York to take critical
steps toward addressing years of injustice faced by survivor-defend-
ants whose lives have been shattered by abuse.208  Yet, as with any bill
that deals with criminal justice reform and sentencing reform, particu-
larly for people convicted of violent offenses, opponents of the pro-
posed legislation fear it is too “soft on crime.”209  This resistance and
“‘tough on crime’ rhetoric” overshadows the critical issue and reality
of women’s lives and experiences.210  Resistance to the Act can be
200. Fact Sheet, supra note 14, at 2 (citing ADRIANA FERNANDEZ-LANIER & JAMES A. GIL-
MER, DOMESTIC HOMICIDE IN NEW YORK STATE, 2007, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SERVICES, OFFICE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH 4 (Dec. 2008)).
201. See LEONARD, supra note 3, at 17, 27, 88; see also supra Part I.A.
202. See LEONARD, supra note 3, at 17, 27, 88-89; see also supra Part I.A.
203. LEONARD, supra note 3, at 25.
204. Epstein, supra note 60.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Coalition Memo, supra note 1, at 2.
209. Epstein, supra note 60 (“[A]dvocates must overcome a potential perception of the bill
as soft on crime.”) (quoting Tamar Kraft-Stolar, director of the Women in Prison Project at the
Correctional Association of New York).
210. See id. (“‘People think that if a woman is a survivor of abuse, that’s a get-out-of-jail-free
card, and it’s not,’ said Jesenia Santana, legal services coordinator for STEPS to End Family
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subsided by educating opponents about the Act’s narrowly tailored
provisions that extend protection only to abused persons in need.211
Not all survivors of domestic abuse would be eligible for alternative
sentencing under the legislation, as provisions are included to help
Judges adhere to the purpose of the bill.212  For instance, a judge must
find the abuse was a “significant contributing factor.”213  In other
words, it must be shown that the defendant was, at the time of the
offense, subjected to substantial physical, sexual, or psychological
abuse inflicted by a spouse, intimate partner, or relative by blood or
marriage.214  In addition, the judge must find that a sentence under
the general law would be “unduly harsh.”215  By applying only to
abused persons who need protection, these provisions ensure the Act
is narrowly tailored to reduce any potential “soft on crime” effect.216
The Act would further remedy unfair punishment by including a
retroactivity provision that would provide currently incarcerated sur-
vivors the opportunity to apply for resentencing.217  Retroactivity of
the amendment is another positive step towards addressing years of
injustice faced by survivor-defendants whose lives have been shat-
tered by abuse.
In addition, the DVSJA should be enacted and used as a model
for other states because the proposed sentencing methods are more
cost-effective than mandatory minimums.218  Permitting judicial dis-
cretion shifts some sentences from mandatory minimum incarceration
to alternatives-to-incarceration (ATI) programs, which would “sub-
stantially reduce government spending.”219
Violence.  ‘Many women do a lot of time, and if we don’t acknowledge it and attempt to remedy
this injustice, we as a society are violating these women’s fundamental human rights.’”).
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. DVSJA, supra note 29; see also Epstein, supra note 60 (“In addition to a finding that the
abuse was a ‘significant contributing factor,’ the judge must find that a sentence under the law’s
general provisions would be ‘unduly harsh.’”).
214. See Epstein, supra note 60.
215. DVSJA, supra note 29; see also Epstein, supra note 60.
216. See Epstein, supra note 60.
217. DVSJA, supra note 29; see also Epstein, supra note 60.
218. See Coalition Memo, supra note 1, at 4 (allowing for reduced sentences and ATIs results
in less inmates in prison and in turn, it is more cost-effective.).
219. See Epstein, supra note 60 (“Shifting some sentences from incarcerations to ATI pro-
grams could also substantially reduce government spending, said Jaya Vasandani, associate direc-
tor of the Women in Prison Project of the Correctional Association of New York.”); see also
Mascharka, supra note 77, at 949-50 (There are obvious costs such as construction of the facility,
as well as the general annual incarceration costs.  On average, it costs about “$20,000 a year to
confine a state inmate and $24,000 to confine a federal inmate.”  In addition, “[h]idden costs,
such as health care and contracted services, may raise these figures as well[,]” especially with the
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In short, bypassing mandatory minimum sentencing and allowing
for judicial discretion will create more just, fair, and appropriate sen-
tencing measures.220  If passed, the legislation would be the first of its
kind in the country; yet, it should not be the last.221  All states should
adopt similar legislation to protect battered women accused of killing
their abuser.
B. Additional Steps
In addition to enacting legislation such as the proposed DVSJA in
New York, other measures need to be simultaneously implemented.
More specifically, if domestic violence cases are to obtain an excep-
tion to the mandatory minimum penalties, there needs to be sufficient
judicial training in light of the increased discretion that judges will
incur.  Far too often, court rulings are influenced by gender bias and
the trier of fact does not understand the dynamics of intimate partner
violence.222  A law school professor once told me about a domestic
violence case she worked on, where during the hearing, the judge re-
marked to the defendant, “Oh, you’re one of those.”223  What the
judge meant was, “One who never left.”224  A judge questioning the
ability of an individual to tolerate such severe acts of violence for so
long may result in a judge questioning the actual level of violence or
the victim’s motives for remaining in the abusive relationship.225  The
trier of fact’s bias, lack of actual knowledge, or understanding about
domestic violence issues could be damaging to the survivor-turned-
older prison populations created from mandatory minimum sentencing that result in an increase
in the cost of health care in the prison system.).
220. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 60 (“[Kim Dadou, an advocate for the bill and a survivor
herself, explained that, ‘[i]f the legislation had been enacted 20 years ago. . . [i]t would have
given me back probably 10 years of my life . . . and I would have been able to have a child and a
family of my own.  Coming home from prison [seventeen] years later, it’s too late to start a
family now, with nothing to offer them.’”).
221. See id.
222. See Dana Harrington Conner, Abuse and Discretion: Evaluating Judicial Discretion in
Custody Cases Involving Violence Against Women, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 163,
167, 176 (2009).
223. This was a case that stood trial in Massachusetts.  The name has not been disclosed for
privacy concerns.
224. See Shulman, supra note 42, at xxi (discussing women who do not “stay” in abusive
relationships, but are trapped).
225. See Conner, supra note 222, at 177; see also Coalition Memo, supra note 1, at 3 (“Abus-
ers control their victims through violence, coercion, intimidation, threats, isolation, and eco-
nomic deprivation.  Survivors are often unable to leave abusive relationships for a multitude of
reasons, including fear of retaliation against themselves or their children, and lack of social sup-
ports and financial resources.  In fact, the likelihood that a victim and her children will be
harmed or killed by an abuser increases if the victim leaves or attempts to leave.”).
2013] 1013
Howard Law Journal
defendant.226  To prevent this potential disaster in the courtroom,
judges exercising their discretion must be properly trained on domes-
tic violence issues to ensure the defendant has a fair proceeding and
the needs of battered women are met.227  For instance, in 2008, Bar-
bara Sheehan was charged with killing her husband after suffering
from years of abuse.228  Prosecutors in New York tried to blame
Sheehan, arguing that she was not a battered wife and had shot her
husband because she was angry over his infidelities and bizarre sexual
preferences.229  Prosecutors also argued that she stood to benefit from
his two life insurance policies.230  These misleading and false claims
regarding motive almost landed Sheehan in jail for murder, but she
was found not guilty in October 2011.231
If judges are to obtain more discretion in each case, they should
be able to award the most effective penalty.  Thus, alternatives-to-in-
carceration (ATI) should be considered when sentencing a defendant.
Alternatives-to-incarceration would provide significant benefits, such
as allowing individuals to serve their sentence while seeking any nec-
essary treatment, reconnecting with family, and contributing to soci-
ety.232  According to a recent report, at nearly one-fifth the cost,
alternatives-to-incarceration are significantly less expensive than im-
prisonment.233  Currently, one non-profit organization, STEPS to End
Family Violence (STEPS), manages the only alternatives-to-incarcera-
tion program in New York State designed for victims of abuse who kill
their abuser.234  The program works with courts to advocate for a re-
duction or complete dismissal of charges, or an agreement to later dis-
226. See MICHIGAN WOMEN’S JUSTICE & CLEMENCY PROJECT, supra note 16, at 4 (“Prosecu-
tors typically point out that instead of killing her partner, a battered woman could have stayed
with family, filed a complaint, gone to a shelter, or called the police.  These arguments demon-
strate a lack of understanding of the reality of a battered woman’s situation.”).
227. Cf. Conner, supra note 222, at 167 (“The trial judge. . .must have clear definition of what
constitutes domestic violence and understand how domestic violence affects all family members
and why this information is highly relevant . . . Moreover, the trial judge must be equipped with
unambiguous recommendations regarding the weight to be given to evidence of intimate partner
violence when making the ultimate . . . determination.”).
228. See Barbara Sheehan Acquitted of Murder; Guilty of Weapons Charge, CBS N.Y. (Oct.
6, 2011, 11:57 pm), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/10/06/barbara-sheehan-acquitted-of-mur-
der-guilty-of-weapons-charge/.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id. Although Ms. Sheehan was acquitted of murder, she was convicted of gun pos-
session and sentenced for five years; see also Dan Bilefsky, 5-year Term for Woman Who Killed
Her Husband, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at A26.
232. REPORT, supra note 4, at 11, 14.
233. See id. at 14.
234. See id. at 15.
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miss the charges after the defendant remains out of trouble for a fixed
time period.235  Alternatives-to-incarceration programs, such as
STEPS, lower recidivism rates, enhance community safety, and are
more effective than prison in helping individuals heal from an abusive
relationship.236  Programs like STEPS and other ATIs should be im-
plemented across the United States.
Not only would the survivor-defendant directly benefit from ATI,
but taxpayers would as well.  In general, “[i]ncreased use of alterna-
tive programs and shorter sentences mean less tax payer dollars spent
on incarceration.”237  Increased alternatives-to-incarceration resulting
from the DVSJA would result in a one-fifth reduction in cost per per-
son each year.238
In addition, the community benefits from ATI when persons are
effectively rehabilitated back into society.239  Although the programs
are designed to work independently, many of the programs require
participants to attend counseling, classes, and treatment for a period
of six to twelve months.240  By offering a chance to improve the skills
of the participants and an opportunity to change the circumstances
surrounding the survivor-defendant’s life, ATIs reduce the likelihood
that one will commit crimes again.241  In turn, this improves the
community.242
Lastly, there should be an increase in clemency in order to rem-
edy injustice for abused victims and gender-based sentencing dispari-
ties.243  Clemency is an official act by an executive that removes all or
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Coalition Memo, supra note 1, at 4.
238. See id. (“Cost per year to incarcerate a person in New York State prison: $55,000.  Cost
per year to send a person to an alternative to incarceration program in New York City:
$11,000.”).
239. See id. (“Allowing mothers to live in the community while serving sentences enables
them to maintain ties to children and lessen the trauma of separation – thereby increasing the
likelihood that children will receive the support they need to become healthy, productive
adults.”).  In essence, this is a “trickle-down” theory because it allows women out of prison to
aid their children; thus, resulting in a better community and future as the children will grow up to
be “good” adults.
240. See DOUGLAS YOUNG ET AL., ALTERNATIVE TO INCARCERATION PROGRAMS FOR FEL-
ONY OFFENDERS IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 1999), available at http://
www.vera.org/pubs/alternative-incarceration-programs-felony-offenders-new-york-city.
241. Coalition Memo, supra note 1, at 4.
242. See id.
243. See Becker, supra note 15, at 311 (“[T]he trend in today’s criminal justice system toward
inflexible sentencing guidelines and stricter enforcement of criminal sentences creates an in-
creasing necessity for clemency in order to ensure that battered women are treated fairly by the
criminal justice system.  It is against this backdrop of the current state of pardoning in the
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some of a sentence arising from a criminal act.244  While governors
have the power to grant clemency through state constitutions, the type
and processes they choose can vary greatly.245  Clemency may be
granted in the form of “commutation” or a “pardon,” although, com-
mutation is much more common.246  Commutation is better known as
a reduction in time to be served.247  Pardons restore all the rights and
privileges one had prior to being incarcerated; however, they are
rarely granted.248  When deciding whether to grant clemency, a gover-
nor may obtain information and counsel from a variety of sources,
including the parole and pardons boards, as well as in-house staff.249
Too often, political considerations outweigh concerns of justice
and exercising the power to pardon falls short at the “whim of the
executive.”250  However, in two recent events, the governors of Ohio
and Maryland granted clemency to a number of battered incarcerated
women.251  During his term of service in the 1990s, Governor Richard
F. Celeste granted clemency to twenty-eight incarcerated women who
were in prison because they killed their abuser.252  Around the same
time period, Governor Schaefer of Maryland granted clemency to
eight imprisoned women convicted of killing their abuser.253  The par-
dons stirred much debate, as they were the highest number of pardons
granted to abused women in such a short period of time.254  While the
United States that battered women who have killed their abusers are considered for clemency
today.”); see also id. at 330-31 (“Battered women who kill often receive harsher sentences than
men who murder their wives or lovers.  This demonstrates that the sentences that battered wo-
men who kill their abusers receive are not always based on just deserts, but may instead be based
on factors such as their gender.  Such unrelated sentences justify the exercise of executive
clemency.”).
244. Id. at 307.
245. See id. at 309; see also Ammons, supra note 27, at 550.
246. See Becker, supra note 15, at 307.
247. Ammons, supra note 27, at 550.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Becker, supra note 15, at 299 (“[T]he current structure of executive clemency is flawed,
largely because pardoning is exercised at the whim of the executive, with political considerations
often outweighing concerns of justice.”).
251. Ammons, supra note 27, at 563.
252. Ammons, supra note 27, at 544.
253. Thomas W. Waldron, Eight Women Who Killed to go Free, BALT. SUN (Feb. 19, 1991),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-02-19/news/19910501361battered-spouse-syndrome-schaefer-
clemency.
254. Critics also asserted that the decision to grant clemency would encourage other battered
woman to kill their abusers. See MICHIGAN WOMEN’S JUSTICE & CLEMENCY PROJECT, supra
note 16, at II(C)(1).  In addition, critics alleged the grant of clemency to battered woman would
lead to an implicit approval on a battered woman’s right to impose the death penalty on her
abuser, while others accused the governor as usurping the role of the jury, being insensitive to
the victims’ family members, and undermining the structure of the criminal justice system. Id.
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pardons from Governor Schaefer and Governor Celeste are helpful,
they address only a handful of wrongly convicted abused women and
do not resolve the issue at hand.  Clemency is a necessary remedy that
will continue to be used “as long as individuals are denied rights to
present an adequate defense at trial and until society responds ade-
quately to the problem of woman abuse.”255
CONCLUSION
Women who kill their abuser are being locked away at alarming
rates.256  Once victims of domestic violence, these women are now vic-
tims of an unfair criminal justice system.  Statistics show that women
are sentenced to prison for longer periods of time than male counter-
parts because a weapon is usually involved in their offense.257  States
that have mandatory minimum sentencing prohibit the opportunity
for judicial discretion and more appropriate sentencing.  In the state
of New York, the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act would help
remedy the criminal justice system that fails to protect abused women
and allows for unfair punishment.  The DVSJA would permit judicial
discretion and alternatives to incarceration; thus, bypassing
mandatory minimum regulations and protecting abused women.  New
York should adopt the DVSJA because it will protect abused women
and remedy unfair punishment.  New York’s proposed DVSJA serves
as a model provision that all states should adopt.  In addition to enact-
ing the legislation, sufficient judicial training, alternative to incarcera-
tion, and increased clemency should be implemented across all states.
“The battering and murdering of women by people with whom
they are in intimate relationships happens only because the society in
which we all live lets them get away with everything else that leads up
to it.”258  We can no longer let the survivors of domestic abuse be
punished for what society allows abusers get away with.  It is time to
take legal action and put an end to mandatory minimum sentencing
for victims who kill their abusers.
255. Ammons, supra note 27, at 535 (citing ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN
AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING (2000)).
256. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 (“The New York State Department of Correctional
Services . . . found that 67% of women sent to prison in 2005 for killing someone close to them
were abused by the victim of their crime.”).
257. See LEONARD, supra note 3, at 31.
258. Susan Koppelman, Introduction to WOMEN IN THE TREES: U.S. WOMEN’S
SHORT STORIES ABOUT BATTERING AND RESISTANCE, 1839-2000, at xxi, xxv (Susan
Koppelman ed., 2004).
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